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Summary of research 
 
Uniquely operated Home Detention Based Sanctions (HDBS) have existed 
since ancient times when several prominent people were placed on them. 
Contemporary HDBS, which utilise electronic monitoring (EM) technology, 
became first available in the 1980s in the United States of America (USA). 
Many nation states around the world have since embraced and trialled varied 
models of these sanctions. While the development and expansion of 
contemporary HDBS throughout the world has taken place over the last three 
decades (1982-2013) with varied success, relatively little is known about their 
comparative rationale, implementation and operation. The employment of 
comparative historical scholarship in this study of HDBS has allowed the 
researcher to identify and examine the similarities and differences in the 
development, operation and outcomes of HDBS over time (last three 
decades, that is, from 1982 to 2013) and place (the USA and Australia). This 
methodology was vital in order to predict the future trajectory of these 
sanctions and to specify the lessons learnt that could be implemented to 
improve their operation.   
 
More broadly, the evolution of the HDBS frameworks in this research has 
been divided into three ideologically distinguishable phases. The early phase 
of HDBS in the USA and Australia occurred from 1840s until the 1960s. It was 
characterised by the development and small scale operation of probation and 
parole. Offender supervision on these iconic community based dispositions 
was based on humanitarian principles. Following this, the middle phase of 
HDBS occurred in the USA and Australia from the 1960s to 1970s. It 
comprised five converging factors. The most problematic was that ‘tough on 
crime’ policies led to enormous prison crowding and budgetary restraint, while 
the currently available community based dispositions were regarded as 
ineffective. This culminated in a ‘correctional disillusion’ that led to 
governments’ decisions to introduce the late phase of HDBS, which has been 
operational over the last three decades (1982-2013).  
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The late phase of HDBS in the USA commenced with the implementation of 
intermediate sanctions, comprising of HDBS with Radio Frequency (RF) in the 
1980s. In the mid-2000s, however, the expansion of sex offender post-release 
supervision laws and the development of electronically monitored Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) technology led to utilisation HDBS for serious sex 
offenders. The number of offenders on all HDBS has been increasing in the 
USA. The ideology of offender supervision during this phase has been 
characterised by strict and close surveillance and monitoring, although 
treatment-based components have usually been available for serious 
offenders on HDBS with GPS. The last three decades of evaluative research 
about HDBS with RF have generally indicated problematic operational 
outcomes as well as significant ethical and political and stakeholder issues 
and dilemmas. On the other hand, HDBS with GPS have been operationally 
successful, although studies assessing some of their ethical and overall 
political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas have been lacking.  
 
The late phase of HDBS with RF in Australia also started in the 1980s. HDBS 
with GPS entered the correctional arena after 2000 in very similar 
circumstances to the USA. The overall number of offenders on HDBS in 
Australia has however remained relatively stable. The ideology of offender 
supervision on these sanctions has entailed a combination of strict and close 
surveillance and treatment-based components. The last three decades of 
evaluative research of HDBS with RF have generally found that these 
sanctions have achieved their anticipated operational results, but have 
encompassed significant ethical and particularly political and stakeholder 
issues and dilemmas. Research assessing the operational outcomes, ethical 
and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas of HDBS with GPS is still 
inadequate, and it is imperative that such research is conducted in the future. 
 
The predicted future trajectory of HDBS in both the USA and Australia is 
increased sanction application. This is based on six relevant facts - numerous 
nation states have adopted HDBS as permanent parts of their sentencing 
landscapes; throughout the Western world, HDBS mostly operate effectively; 
a few Australian jurisdictions have been examining ways of increasing the use 
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of these sanctions; EM technology is constantly advancing, becoming less 
intrusive and cheaper overall; nation states are developing additional satellite 
navigation systems and establishing Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS); and mass incarceration is not sustainable.  
 
The future viability and outcomes of HDBS in both nation states are however 
dependent on whether policy makers and/or correctional administrators, with 
the support of governments, improve the operation of HDBS by implementing 
the lessons learnt based on the evidence of best practice. These include: 
collaborative working and sharing of information with stakeholders; inclusion 
of rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives; ongoing independent evaluation 
process that informs continual improvement; application of equitable selection 
criteria and conditions; offender tailored order conditions and length of orders; 
provision of support for offenders’ co-residing family members; and clear 
policies and procedures to guide their operation. If the jurisdictions within the 
USA and Australia implement the specific lessons learnt relevant to their own 
problematic areas of HDBS’ operation, the application of these sanctions will 
become more effective.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to home detention based 
sanctions and research orientation 
 
All penal innovations are a product of their time, and this one is 
no exception. In order for a new sanction, or a new form of 
imprisonment to proliferate, it has to be consistent with some 
important penal philosophy.  
(Roberts, 2004:12) 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
As Roberts (2004) asserted in ‘The virtual prison: Community custody and the 
evaluation of imprisonment’ the birth and proliferation of all penalties, 
institutional and community based, is a distinct product of their time. Despite 
the fact that the early phase of diverting offenders from custody into 
community based penalties around the Western world began at the turn of the 
19th century, it was not until the 1960s that the concept of ‘decarceration’ or 
‘community treatment’ actually emerged and was theoretically and politically 
supported. It was presented “as a new panacea for the age-old problem of 
controlling the mad or the bad” (Chan, 1992:1). Policy makers generally 
hoped to minimise the increasing cost and ineffective outcomes of 
incarceration with a greater diversion of offenders into community based 
penalties centred on offender treatment (Clear & Dammer, 2003; King, 1991; 
Walker, 1991). A significant part of this diversion were contemporary Home 
Detention Based Sanctions (HDBS), which utilise electronic monitoring (EM) 
technology. The focus of this research is to analyse these sanctions in relation 
to their aims and rationale, implementation process, operation cycle and to 
ascertain what in fact can be learnt from the last three decades of their 
operation (1982-2013).   
 
This chapter commences with background contextual information for this 
research. It discusses the application of the earliest forms of HDBS from the 
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ancient times, when they were imposed on revolutionaries, to the 
‘transportation policy’ when they were imposed on convicts in the beginning of 
the settlers’ period in Australia (O’Toole, 2006; Whitfield, 1997). The chapter 
then outlines the contemporary world-wide application of HDBS. Throughout 
the Western world these sanctions were initiated as original sentences of the 
court in the 1980s, but some authoritarian governments still apply them 
sporadically and distinctly to isolate ‘dissidents’ (Roberts, 2004). The 
contemporary terminology of these sanctions, as applied throughout the 
Western world, is then clarified as various different titles are classified under 
the umbrella of HDBS for the purpose of this research.  
 
The historical development of the tool of contemporary HDBS – electronic 
monitoring – is then critically discussed. Whilst HDBS were initially developed 
on the basis of human surveillance they flourished with the introduction of 
electronic surveillance. The maturing of the Electronic Monitoring (EM) 
technology from Radio Frequency (RF) to Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
has allowed sentencing more serious offenders onto these sanctions (Lilly & 
Nellis, 2013).  
 
Subsequently, the methodology and the data collection used in this research 
are outlined. While the development and expansion of contemporary HDBS 
throughout the Western world over the last three decades (1982-2013) with 
varied success, relatively little is known about its overall development, 
implementation and operation, as well as the current issues it encompasses. 
Consequently, through a comparative historical analysis, the researcher 
identified and examined similarities and differences in the operation and 
outcomes of HDBS over time [last three decades, that is, from 1982 to 2013] 
and place [the United States (USA) and Australia]. It was hence possible to 
predict HDBS’ future trajectory in both nation states1 and specify the lessons 
learnt that would allow these sanctions to become more effective and better-
utilised in the future. 
  
                                                 
1
 The USA and Australia are referred to as ‘nation states’ in the remainder of this research.  
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This chapter then outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this research. The 
development of contemporary HDBS throughout the Western world was part 
of the theoretical underpinning termed ‘decarceration.’ More broadly, 
however, the evolution of HDBS frameworks comprised of three distinct 
phases which are discussed throughout the research. The chapter concludes 
with the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the early and the middle 
phases of HDBS in the USA and Australia. Chapter 3 analyses the late phase 
of HDBS in the USA. Chapter 4 analyses the late phase of HDBS in Australia. 
Chapter 5 provides the overall conclusion to the research and future 
implications for HDBS in both the USA and Australia.   
 
1.2 Background contextual information   
 
The following section ‘sets the scene’ by providing the historical groundwork 
for HDBS and the contemporary world-wide application of HDBS.  
 
1.2.1 Historical groundwork for HDBS   
 
Ever since the establishment of communities, some form of social control 
aimed at curbing undesirable conduct has existed, so, as Welch (2004:21) 
suggests, “punishment is as old as civilization itself”. The importance of how 
society punishes wrongdoers must also not be underestimated:  
 
The punishment of criminal offenders is a barometer of culture. As it 
represses undesirable conduct, punishment simultaneously expresses 
civility. Punishment signifies a society’s values, morality, sensibilities 
and reasoning.  
(Ericson, 1992:xv cited in McMahon, 1992:xv)  
 
Legal codes of punishment which have served as official guidelines of society 
are thought to have been first established by the imposition of the Code of 
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Hammurabi2 in 1750 B.C. in Babylon. These legal codes set the trend for 
penalties to be very severe including whipping, mutilation and forced labour 
for many centuries (Welch, 2004). The only ‘wrongdoers’ who at times 
avoided the imposition of these harsh corporal penalties were political 
dissidents and radical thinkers who were usually silenced through strict 
detention within the community (Whitfield, 1997; Morris & Tonry, 1990; Ball, 
Huff & Lilly, 1988). This type of punishment, today classified as a HDBS, 
seems to have constituted the earliest form of community based sentences. It 
must be noted that although an offender’s home was used as a ‘place of 
punishment’, HDBS in ancient times did not operate like today’s HDBS. The 
primary difference was that numerous stringent conditions were not imposed 
on offenders as they are today. (For more information see section 1.3.2). The 
sanction concentrated on ‘isolating’ the offender from the general community, 
that is, their supporters. Furthermore, these sanctions were usually imposed 
by reigning rulers or governments without any “proper judicial due process” 
(Ball et al., 1988:21). The confinement to one’s home was indeterminate; it 
lasted until the individual dissident recanted their beliefs, passed away, was 
executed, or the regime was overthrown (Roberts, 2004).  
 
Since ancient times several prominent people have been sentenced to these 
uniquely operated HDBS because they were regarded as posing a threat to 
the ruler or the government (Roberts, 2004). Prominent examples include: 
 
 St Paul the Apostle, who became one of the first major Christian 
missionaries and theologians. He spread Christianity, which was 
banned throughout the Roman Empire in the early AD period.3 As a 
result, Roman soldiers detained him in his home. Once they realised 
that he would not renounce his faith he was ‘martyred’ in 64AD (Gibbs 
& King, 2003a; Pearsall & Trumble, 2002).  
 
                                                 
2
 This is well known as the ‘eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth’ principle. The basis for 
punishment under this code was ‘lex talionis’ meaning the ‘law of retaliation’ which refers to 
vengeance (Welch, 2004). 
3
 Christianity was established as the official religion of the Roman Empire in 313AD 
(Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2000). 
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 Galileo Galilee, the Florentine philosopher, astronomer and physicist, 
was found guilty of heresy in 1634 when he offered an unorthodox view 
of the universe - that the earth revolved around the sun. The church 
authorities forced him to spend the last 8 years of his life detained in 
his home (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994; Lay, 1988a; Lay, 1988b; 
Whitfield, 1997; Lilly & Ball, 1987).   
 
 Queen Lili’uokalani, who was the last reigning monarch of the Hawaiian 
Islands, was confined to her home in 1895 due to the overthrow of the 
Hawaiian monarchy by a group of USA businessmen and missionary 
descendants. She was released 8 months later with the establishment 
of the Republic of Hawaii and soon after abdicated her throne (Barnes, 
1999).  
 
 Nicholas II, who was the last emperor of Russia, and his family were 
detained in their home and forced to abdicate in 1917 by the 
Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution.  A year later they were 
executed (Whitfield, 1997). 
 
Therefore, political dissent was suppressed by forcing ‘dissidents’ outside of 
the public arena (Ball et al., 1988). 
 
The first time a unique form of a community based sanction with some 
elements of HDBS was applied on a large offender population was between 
1790 and 1838 in the beginning of the settlers’ period in Australia (O’Toole, 
2006; Lay, 1988b). Under the wider policy of ‘transportation’, 175,000 convicts 
were permanently removed from England to Australia between 1787 and 
1868 (Miethe & Lu, 2005; Brown, 1989). Almost 90% of these convicts were 
assigned to work for free-settlers and about 10% were employed by the 
government to work on projects or placed into institutions of secondary 
punishment (O’Toole, 2006; Finnane, 1997; Blackmore, Cotter & Elliott, 
1969).  
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The ‘assignment system’, onto which the vast majority of the convicts were 
placed, formed a pioneering way of managing offenders from the late 18th until 
the mid 19th century. Yet it must be noted that the:  
 
assignment system was not the result of a breakthrough in 
correctional philosophy; it was more properly the result of a 
practical decision in offender management in the absence of 
walls.  
(Lay, 1988b:3)  
 
Under this system, offenders were effectively banished [that is, physically 
removed] from their communities in England and placed on [what can today 
be referred to as] a community based sanction in Australia. They were 
assigned to undertake hard labour for free-settlers within a set of laws and 
rights. The strictest condition was that offenders were not allowed to be 
absent from work without pre-approved leave by the free-settler, or able to go 
from one settlement to another without a pass from a magistrate (Clarke, 
1997). The free-settlers were in turn expected to generally supervise as well 
as support offenders by providing lodgings and clothing (O’Toole, 2006; 
Blackmore et al., 1969). According to O’Toole, the objective of the assignment 
system was unprecedented: 
  
The assignment system was a form of intensive community-
based supervision. Having a convict placed completely under 
the control of a free settler put the onus on the settler to ensure 
they got the best out of the individual, training and instructing 
them to be a productive community member. 
 
    (O’Toole, 2006:33) 
 
The free-settler essentially consented to be the community-based ‘jailer’ of the 
offender in the assignment system. Apart from controlling the offender, they 
also resided with them and provided them with their basic human needs, as 
well as attempted to reform them - all in return for the provision of labour. It is 
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clear that this system utilised some elements of the currently applied HDBS – 
although the role of the free-settler is now principally played by the 
supervising officer and at times by the offender’s co-resident/s. (See section 
1.3.2 for the currently applied HDBS order conditions).  
 
It is not surprising that the assignment system was very advantageous for the 
British government. It was seen to be both cost-effective and strategic in the 
long-term despite the high cost of offender transportation from Britain to 
Australia. This policy pragmatically meant that additional prisons did not have 
to be built in Britain and government costs post-transportation were 
transferred initially to the free-settlers and then onto the convicts who 
compensated the settlers through their hard labour. Undertaking hard work 
provided offenders with the potential to become productive settlers by learning 
practical skills as well as developing independence and self-esteem (O’Toole, 
2006; Lay, 1988a; Lay, 1988b). It was also thought that because offenders 
were supervised in the community by law abiding settlers the stigmatisation 
process associated with convicts-only socialisation would be reduced. The 
prospect of cheap labour also more generally encouraged large-scale 
capitalist settlers to migrate to the new colony (Clarke, 2003).  
 
In due course the most fundamental expectation of the British government’s 
transportation policy was fulfilled as ex-convicts eventually prospered and 
themselves employed newly arrived convicts. This has been encapsulated by 
O’Toole (2006) as: 
 
The best evidence of the success of the assignment system can 
be seen by the situation in the colony by the 1820s. By then the 
majority of the convicts had been assigned to masters who were 
ex-convicts. According to Hirsh (1983) these ex-convicts owned 
half the wealth in the colony and three-quarters of the land.  
     
(O’Toole, 2006:33) 
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For these reasons, Hughes (1987:586) referred to the assignment as “… by 
far the most successful form of penal rehabilitation that had ever been tried in 
English, American or European history.”  
 
During the early 1830s however the balance of the previously predominant 
convict population overwhelmingly changed and increasingly lost its political 
influence. In order for the new colony to further prosper the British 
government sponsored a large number of free-settlers to migrate to Australia 
(O’Toole, 2006; Grigsby, 1976). This newly composed mostly free-settler 
population became quickly dissatisfied for two reasons. First, they had to 
compete for work with the convict population who worked for free or very 
cheaply. Second, they had to live among ex-convicts who prospered in the 
new colony. As they regarded themselves as socially and morally superior, 
the free-settlers refused to socially mix with the ex-convicts, let alone accept 
them as their equals (O’Toole, 2006; Clarke, 2003; Grigsby, 1976). Their 
persistent complaints to the British government ultimately resulted in an 
inquiry into the convict transportation policy by the House of Commons 
despite the earlier reports of the policy’s efficacy (O’Toole, 2006).  
    
The Committee of the English House of Commons during 1837-1838, which 
was headed by William Molesworth who was an outspoken opponent of 
transportation, recommended the ending of the assignment system. In 
particular, the Committee “found that transportation did not reduce the crime 
rate in Britain, did not reform the criminals who were transported and 
produced a colony (Australia) founded on ‘depravity’”4 (O’Toole, 2006:34). 
This outcome was widely publicised as Molesworth was the owner of popular 
English journals (O’Toole, 2006). As this finding appealed to people’s 
retributive views, the British administrators and the general public were 
quickly persuaded that the assignment system was a ‘light form of 
punishment’ where convicts were able to acquire new skills instead of being 
                                                 
4
 It must be noted that eventually it became apparent that the Committee’s negative finding 
about the assignment system was clearly influenced by Molesworth’s own biases against the 
transportation policy (O’Toole, 2006).  
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actually punished. As a result, the assignment system was abandoned in 
1838 (O’Toole, 2006; Blainey, 1994; Grigsby, 1976).  
 
The assignment system seemed to have laid the groundwork for the 
subsequent introduction of iconic community based dispositions during the 
1840s. These were probation, which started in Boston (USA), and parole at 
the Norfolk Island (Australia). These two dispositions formed part of the early 
phase of HDBS (discussed in Chapter 2.2), and were the predecessors to the 
late phase of HDBS when contemporary application of these sanctions started 
(discussed briefly below section 1.2.2 and in Chapter 3.2 and Chapter 4.2).  
 
1.2.2 Contemporary world-wide application of HDBS 
 
It was not until the 1980s in the United States of America (USA) when 
contemporary HDBS, which utilise electronic monitoring technology, became 
actual sentences of the court (Enos, Holman & Carroll, 1999; Whitfield, 1997). 
Viewed as a modern solution to the increasingly unsustainable cost of 
incarceration and prison overcrowding crisis, the implementation of these 
sanctions expanded rapidly across the USA (Doherty, 1995; Renzema, 1992). 
(See Chapter 3.2 for additional information about the inception and 
proliferation of HDBS in the USA). 
    
Similar to the USA, other nation states (particularly throughout the Western 
world), have also experienced burgeoning prison populations and prohibitive 
costs of building and sustaining prisons (O’Toole, 2002; Bonta, Rooney & 
Wallace-Capretta, 1999; Whitfield, 1997; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Baumer & 
Mendelsohn, 1990). The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed many nation 
states swiftly embracing and trialling varied models of HDBS. The first of 
these included Australia, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Scotland (New Zealand Department of Corrections, 
2000; Whitfield, 1997; Mainprize, 1995). Subsequently, on the cusp of 21st 
century, Switzerland, France, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
Portugal, Italy, Argentina, Taiwan, Singapore and Israel joined the growing 
10 
 
international trend of confining offenders in their homes as an alternative to 
incarceration (Paterson, 2007; Lilly & Nellis, 2001). While most of these HDBS 
operate similarly, each nation state designed its own HDBS as a response to 
the unique issues identified within its criminal justice system.   
  
It is interesting to note however that while legislators had originally believed 
that HDBS would be widely applied, sentencers have generally been cautious 
in imposing these sanctions. In the USA, which is still the largest user of these 
sanctions, there are more than 200,000 offenders on HDBS at any one time5 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009:17; Alarid, Cromwell & del Carmen, 2008:197). 
The average daily number of offenders on HDBS in Australia is about 770 
offenders (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Henderson, 2006). While it may appear that 
that these numbers are significantly different, for example, that the number of 
offenders in Australia is much smaller than in the USA, the numbers similarly 
represent a few percent of the ‘potential offender market’ in both jurisdictions6. 
It is however worth noting that, since the inception of these sanctions, their 
growth has been either stable or increasing (DeMichele & Payne, 2009:17,13; 
Henderson, 2006:71).  
 
In contrast to Western nations that impose HDBS for various types of 
offenders, some authoritarian governments apply these sanctions sporadically 
and distinctly. They only place individuals whom they consider to be ‘political 
insurgents’ on HDBS. These sanctions operate similarly to house arrest7 as in 
ancient times, without imposing any additional punitive or reformative 
conditions (see above discussion). The aim of the authoritarian governments 
is simply “to isolate (and hence neutralise) [the offender] from other like-
minded individuals” (Roberts, 2004:7). The reason why these dissidents are 
                                                 
5
 This number includes all defendants and offenders subjected to electronic monitoring, that 
is, on various community based dispositions such as bail, parole and probation and bail 
(Alarid et al., 2008).   
6
 This statistic was calculated by subtracting the number of offenders on HDBS from 
Whitfield’s calculation of the ‘potential market’ in both the USA and Australia. Whitfield 
(2001:61) “defined the [potential] market as the sum of the prison and supervised populations 
– a very crude approach indeed, but with the sole virtue that it makes international 
comparison more realistic and achievable.” 
7
 The term ‘house arrest’ developed a negative connotation due to its association with political 
detention and its use has been abandoned (Fox, 1987a).  
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not incarcerated is because the same degree of isolation experienced on this 
unique type of HDBS could not be achieved. Recent examples of ‘dissidents’ 
who were/are indefinitely confined to their homes include:  
 
 Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been the figurehead for Myanmar’s8 
struggle for democracy. She was Myanmar’s democratically elected 
leader in 1990 and the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. 
Despite this, the military regime refused to hand over power to her 
and confined her to house arrest for 15 of the 21 years of her 
imprisonment (Win & Genser, 24.10.089). In 2010 she was released 
after a widely criticised general election in Myanmar in which the 
military retained power. Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in the future of 
democracy in Myanmar remains a subject of debate (Mydans, 
17.05.09; Amnesty International, 2008).  
 
 Mordechai Vanunu, who is Israel’s former nuclear technician. After 
spending 18 years in prison for being found guilty of treason for 
revealing details of Israel’s nuclear weapons program to the media, 
he was released onto house arrest in 2004. He remains indefinitely 
subjected to numerous restrictions on speech and movement 
(Tisdall, 29.12.09).  
 
 Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is a nuclear scientist in Pakistan. He 
was also indefinitely placed under house arrest by the former 
President Musharraf in 2006 for undisclosed political affiliations. 
Despite never being officially tried for the offence of spreading the 
unauthorised uranium enrichment technology to the Middle Eastern 
countries, he made a televised confession to that effect (Button, 
19.08.06).   
 
                                                 
8
 In 1988-89 the State Law and Order Restoration Council changed the official name of 
Burma to Myanmar (Daniel, 2008). 
9
 When a date is referenced it denotes referencing of a newspaper article. 
12 
 
Therefore, various aspects of HDBS have been applied throughout the world 
in recent times. Each nation state operates a distinct form of HDBS that 
targets unique issue/s within its criminal justice system. This issue can be as 
diverse as reducing prison overcrowding (USA) and silencing political 
dissidents (Myanmar).  
 
1.3 Terminology and definition of contemporary HDBS  
 
This section clarifies the various contemporary terminology that is associated 
with HDBS, and provides a definition of HDBS. It is confined to those 
sanctions that are widely applied to various offender populations as actual 
sentences of the court that impose numerous conditions on offenders, rather 
than isolated cases of ‘political dissidents’ who are confined to their homes. 
 
1.3.1 Clarifying the terminology associated with HDBS 
 
It is difficult to find a common definition for contemporary HDBS throughout 
the Western world because a number of countries that utilise them define and 
apply them in myriad ways. Nevertheless, the purpose of this section of the 
research is to, in the clearest way possible, provide generalised explanations 
of HDBS in order to provide a better understanding of their similarities and 
differences.  
  
Current community based dispositions under which offenders are detained in 
their homes appear under a wide variety of potentially confusing titles. 
Researchers refer to these almost identical sanctions by the following 
terminology: home detention (Corrections Victoria, 2003), home detention 
curfew (Paterson, 2007; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 
2006), home confinement (Welch, 2004), house arrest (Spelman, 2004), or 
electronic monitoring (Cotter, 2004; Welch, 2004). Some authors alternatively 
use these terms in a variety of combinations, such as ‘electronically monitored 
home confinement’ (Champion, 2008; Enos et al., 1999); ‘electronic detention 
house arrest’ (Spelman, 2004) or ‘home confinement and electronic 
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monitoring’ (McCarthy, McCarthy & Leone, 2001). Others refer to them 
interchangeably (Champion, 2008; Cromwell, Alarid & del Carmen, 2005; 
Welch, 2004; Ball & Lilly, 1986), and some even try to distinguish between 
them (such as Schmidt, 1989).  
 
Although it is more than 20 years ago now, Schmidt’s (1989) attempt to 
distinguish between the various labels given to HDBS remains one of the 
most discussed in the literature. He differentiated between the three main 
subtypes of HDBS in terms of their varied levels of punitiveness. These were 
as follows: 
 
 Curfew – as the least severe. Offenders who are on a curfew must 
remain at home for a specified period of time, usually between 8 and 
12 hours during the night.  
 
 Home detention – as being within the middle range of severity. On 
home detention, offenders must remain in their home at all times, 
except when they are attending pre-approved activities such as 
employment, education, correctional treatment, or other types of 
necessary and authorised leave such as a medical emergency or legal 
appointment.  
 
 House arrest – as the most severe. Offenders on house arrest are 
most strictly confined to their homes at all times – they are only able to 
leave for urgent serious medical treatment and, in some programs, 
religious practices (Schmidt, 1989). 
 
Schmidt’s typology has, however, become outdated. Offenders today are no 
longer placed onto HDBS that have conditions such as those described under 
‘house arrest.’ Strict confinement was seen to be psychologically damaging to 
offenders and their household members (Nellis, 2013; Spelman, 2004). 
Further, as mentioned earlier, the term ‘house arrest’ became unpopular due 
to its association with political detention (Fox, 1987a).  
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Another level of complexity with the terminology relates to the ambiguous 
relationship between HDBS and the USA sanction known as Intensive 
Supervision Probation/Parole (ISP), and more generally the concept of 
‘intensive supervision’. In some USA literature, ISP is a separate stand-alone 
sanction to which home detention and home confinement are frequently 
applied as conditions (Cromwell, et al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2001; Enos et 
al., 1999; Lay, 1988a). On the other hand, some USA literature states that 
home detention and home confinement incorporate more generally the 
concept of ‘intensive supervision’, which comprises various restrictions and 
obligations that are placed on offenders (Cromwell, et al., 2005; Lay, 1988a). 
In more recent times in the USA ‘home detention programs’ have become 
almost non-existent while ‘home detention,’ that is electronic monitoring, is 
applied  as a condition of various community based sanctions, particularly ISP 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; McCarthy et al., 2001). 
 
Therefore, a wide range of terms are associated with what are in reality very 
similar sanctions that principally (at least partially) restrict the offender to their 
home as a means of detention and more generally punishment (Nellis, 2013; 
Schmidt, 1994b; Ball & Lilly, 1986). For the purpose of this research all of 
these sanctions are collectively classified under the umbrella of the term 
‘HDBS’.  
 
1.3.2 Defining HDBS 
 
The application of contemporary HDBS throughout the Western world is 
flexible as these sanctions can be applied at various stages of the criminal 
justice process including both juvenile and adult offender populations. 
Traditionally, the technology has been attached to HDBS that operate as 
either pre-trial or post-trial alternatives to incarceration, and more recently it 
has formed a part of extended supervision orders and restraining orders 
(Nellis, 2010a; Renzema 1992).   
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Pre-trial HDBS usually operate as a component of bail, so they are utilised for 
unconvicted defendants as a method of enhancing their appearance at trial 
and non interference with victims/witnesses; hence they are not used as a 
punishment as such (Altman & Murray, 1997; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990). 
These dispositions were established in order to reduce the size of the remand 
population, as defendants who do not meet eligibility criteria for release on 
bail/recognisance (due to their seriousness and risk) are placed on them 
(Minister of Justice, 2011; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990).   
 
On the other hand, post-trial HDBS are imposed as a criminal sanction after 
an offender’s conviction (Heggie, 1999). Mostly, these sanctions operate as 
equivalent to incarceration on the basis that they, similar to incarceration, 
serve multiple sentencing philosophies, including incapacitation, retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation (Meyer, 2004). The most controversial 
sentencing justification of HDBS is incapacitation. This is because offenders 
can cut off the electronic device, abscond and commit a crime (Alarid et al., 
2008; Meyer, 2004; Clear & Dammer, 2003). [Electronic monitoring devices 
need to be able to be cut off easily in cases of medical or safety 
emergencies]. It is however arguable that incapacitation can be achieved 
when offenders’ movement is adequately monitored by authorities, and 
electronic monitoring system alerts are immediately responded to, and the 
offender is captured and sanctioned if they breach the pre-determined HDBS 
conditions (Meyer, 2004).  
 
Post-trial HDBS typically operate as either ‘front-end’ or ‘back-end’ 
alternatives to imprisonment (Heggie, 1999; Tonry, 1998). Offenders are 
placed onto ‘front-end’ HDBS by having their sentences of imprisonment fully 
suspended and being sentenced instead to serve their time at home (Smith, 
2001; Heggie, 1999; Tonry, 1998). Alternatively, only offenders who had first 
been imprisoned are able to be released early and placed onto ‘back-end’ 
HDBS (Dodgson, Goodwin, Howard, Llewellyn-Thomas, Mortimer, Russell & 
Weiner, 2001; Heggie, 1999; Tonry, 1998; Church & Dunstan, 1997). The aim 
of all post-trial HDBS is to reduce or stabilise rising prison populations. The 
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specified offender target group for post-trial sanctions is most frequently low 
to medium-risk, non-violent offenders (Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, 2000; 
Schulz, 1995; Rackmill, 1994; Lilly, Ball, Curry & Smith, 1992; Baumer & 
Mendelsohn, 1990; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990).    
 
HDBS that operate as extended supervision orders entail monitoring of the 
most serious offenders (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007). 
This was only made possible with the introduction of Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS) technology in the late 1990s. (See section 1.4.3 for the 
explanation of GPS technology). In fact, after serving the entirety of their 
prison sentences serious offenders (mostly convicted of sex related offences) 
who are determined to be at high risk of reoffending are placed onto these 
sanctions (Nellis, 2010a). HDBS that operate as extended supervision orders 
were established under extended sex offender laws that were the result of a 
community demand for continued strict supervision of these offenders. This 
was the result of ‘moral panics’ created by the media in the USA about a few 
high-profile cases of known sexual predators who committed heinous crimes 
against children (Bales, Mann, Blomberg, Gaes, Barrick, Dhungana & 
McManus, 2010a). Similarly, in Australia the media fuelled a community 
uproar due to the release of well-known sex-offenders who were perceived to 
be too dangerous for unsupervised release back into society (Milovanovic, 
13.07.05). The aim of these sanctions is to increase community protection by 
reducing the ‘opportunity and availability’ of victims (Nellis, 2010a).      
 
Apart from most obviously depriving the offender of their liberty through home 
confinement and/or GPS enabled tracked movement, HDBS throughout the 
Western world generally share three ideological features. First, these 
sanctions are designed to be ‘punitive’ (as they impose a number of onerous 
obligations onto the offender) but they are also inherently ‘humane’ (as they 
allow the offender to remain in the community continuing to work and be with 
their family) (Carlson, Hess & Orthmann, 1999; Byrne, Lurigio & Baird, 1989; 
Clear, Flynn & Shapiro, 1987). Second, these sanctions generally employ 
rehabilitative programs to address the offending-related needs of offenders; 
these include substance abuse treatment programs, sex offender programs, 
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violence intervention programs, adult literacy programs, and/or employment 
training (Langan, 1998; Johnson, 1995; Richards, 1991). Third, a range of 
strict surveillance and monitoring mechanisms, which encompass various 
electronic monitoring devices, are imposed on offenders to strictly control their 
movement and more generally to protect the community (Alarid et al., 2008; 
Langan, 1998; Richards, 1991).  
   
More specifically, HDBS usually impose a number of core and some specific 
conditions10 on offenders. These conditions essentially result in offenders 
having certain obligations. Offenders on these sanctions are generally 
obligated to:  
 
 Have a ‘suitable residence’ that is maintained with electricity, landline 
and/or mobile phone (Gainey et al., 2000; Carlson et al., 1999; Micucci, 
Maidment & Gomme, 1997; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990). Additionally, 
strict residency requirements are imposed on offenders on HDBS with 
GPS so that they are not near children in schools and parks. It should 
however be noted that offenders on HDBS with GPS in the USA only 
are able to be homeless (Bales, Mann, Blomberg, McManus & 
Dhungana, 2010b).   
 
 Obtain ‘co-residents’ agreement’ to serve the HDBS with passive and 
RF technology. It should be noted that this is not a requirement for 
offenders on HDBS with GPS. This is probably because the imposition 
of GPS monitoring means that co-residents are not disturbed by 
random home visits or phone calls at all times which are an inevitable 
part of passive and RF monitoring (Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 2004; 
McCarthy et al., 2001; Church & Dunstan, 1997). 
 
                                                 
 
10
 Core or standard conditions are mandatory and are applied to all offenders. Specific or 
special order conditions on the other hand are discretionally applied to offenders depending 
on their special circumstances, that is, their risk and need (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). 
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 Provide for their own basic needs financially and physically; these 
needs include food, hygiene and medical requirements (Ansay, 1999; 
Van Ness, 1992; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990; Ball et al., 1988).  
 
 Submit to surveillance and control at any time. This may include 
wearing and maintaining the electronic monitoring device, regularly 
reporting to a correctional office, receiving phone calls, home and work 
place visits and allowing a search of their premises, and generally 
planning all of their activities in advance (Bales et al., 2010b; Jannetta, 
2006; Ansay, 1999; Heggie, 1999; Church & Dunstan, 1997; Heath, 
1996; Rackmill, 1994; Blomberg, Bales & Reed, 1993; Van Ness, 1992; 
Ball et al., 1988). 
 
 Agree that immediate family, co-residents, employers in most 
programs, and even neighbours in some programs (Blomberg et al., 
1993), are told about them being on the HDBS (Ansay, 1999; Heggie, 
1999; Church & Dunstan, 1997; United States General Accounting 
Office, 1990; Ball et al., 1988).  
 
  Remain at home for specific periods of time ranging from a night 
curfew to 24-hour detention (Nellis, 2013; Gainey et al., 2000; Bonta et 
al., 1999; Carlson, et al., 1999; Heggie, 1999; Church & Dunstan, 
1997; Heath, 1996; Rackmill, 1994; Blomberg et al., 1993; Maxfield & 
Baumer, 1990). Additionally, offenders on HDBS with GPS are 
mandated to stay away from predetermined exclusion zones (Nellis, 
2013; Bales et al., 2010a; Bales et al., 2010b). (For more information 
see section 1.4.3). As mentioned earlier, offenders on HDBS with GPS 
in the USA only are able to be homeless (Bales et al., 2010b).   
 
 Abstain from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol (Gainey et al., 2000; 
Heggie, 1999; Church & Dunstan, 1997; Heath, 1996; Blomberg et al., 
1993). 
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 Limit association to people who have not been and are not involved in 
criminal activities (Ansay & Benveneste, 1999; Carlson et al., 1999; 
Heggie, 1999). 
 
 Engage in necessary developmental, counselling and/or treatment 
programs (Bales et al., 2010b; Gainey et al., 2000; Ansay, 1999; 
Church & Dunstan, 1997; Micucci et al., 1997; Heath, 1996; Blomberg 
et al., 1993; Van Ness, 1992; United States General Accounting Office, 
1990). 
 
 Perform community work and/or engage in employment (Bales et al., 
2010b; Brown, McCabe & Wellford, 2007; Tennessee Board of 
Probation and Parole 2007; Blomberg et al., 1993; Van Ness, 1992; 
United States General Accounting Office, 1990). 
 
 Only in the USA, pay part of their own supervision cost, drug/alcohol 
testing and make specific victim restitution payments/fines/court costs 
(Bales et al., 2010a; Gainey et al., 2000; Whitfield, 1997; Heath, 1996; 
Blomberg et al., 1993; Fulton & Stone, 1992).  
 
Offenders’ compliance with these obligations, which are the outcome of 
imposed HDBS’ conditions, is monitored by their supervising officers. Non-
compliance with any conditions of HDBS constitutes a breach. HDBS can be 
breached by offenders committing further offence/s and/or technical 
violation/s (Champion, 2008; Cromwell et al., 2005; Clear & Byrne, 1992). All 
instances of further offending during a HDBS constitute an immediate return 
to court for re-sentencing. However, not all breaches of HDBS due to 
technical violations, which constitute the majority of all breaches of HDBS, 
warrant a return to court for re-sentencing (Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 2004; 
Nellis, 2004). Consequently, a distinction must be made between minor and 
serious breaches due to technical violations: 
 
20 
 
 Minor breaches include being late once off, failing to attend a 
supervision/ treatment appointment or producing a positive urine 
sample. These are dealt with by an internal administrative process in 
which the offender is usually formally warned or more stringent 
conditions are imposed on them by the Manager/Director of the HDBS.   
 
 Serious breaches on the other hand constitute offenders absconding 
(by cutting off the electronically monitored device and becoming 
unreachable by the correctional authorities) and/or repeating minor 
breaches. These are dealt with by a formalised process, that is, a 
return to court where the judge/magistrate most often revokes the 
HDBS and imprisons the offender.     
 
Research has indicated that the strict severity of HDBS results in offenders 
committing technical violations, which constitute minor or serious breaches of 
HDBS (Clear 2007; Clear, Cole & Reisig, 2006; Meyer, 2004).   
 
1.4 Historical development of the tool of contemporary HDBS - 
electronic monitoring technology 
 
The following section describes the early attempts at the use of electronic 
monitoring technology and explains the development and the intricacies of 
electronic monitoring with RF, as well as electronic monitoring with GPS. It 
concludes with a discussion on the subsequent developments in electronic 
monitoring technology. 
 
1.4.1 Definition and early uses of electronic monitoring technology  
 
While contemporary HDBS were initially developed on the basis of human 
surveillance they flourished with the introduction of electronic surveillance. 
This is because the technology resolved the problems associated with manual 
monitoring of offender compliance, which was regarded as labour-intensive, 
personnel dependent, and unreliable due to potential threats to public safety 
(Baumer et al., 1993). It also allowed the sentencing of more serious offenders 
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to community based sanctions, and more generally enhanced the professional 
status of correctional agencies (Baumer, Maxfield & Mendelsohn, 1993). 
Community based dispositions consequently became ‘tougher’ by being ‘more 
surveillance-oriented’ (Petersilia, 2000:178).  
 
The core condition of contemporary HDBS, which is surveillance and control 
of offenders’ movement, is monitored and enhanced by the electronic 
monitoring technology (Bonta et al., 1999; Byrne et al., 1989). The emergence 
and the rapid development of electronic supervision technologies has brought 
enormous irreversible change to community corrections as well as the 
broader criminal justice system. Its scope has even been compared with the 
advent of the light bulb that was said to be responsible for major social 
change in advancing Western civilisation (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). 
 
Cromwell et al., (2005:181) define electronic monitoring as:   
 
a correctional technology used as a tool in intensive supervision 
probation, parole, or home confinement using a radio frequency 
or satellite technology to track offender whereabouts using a 
transmitter and receiver.   
 
Electronic monitoring is therefore utilised as a telemetry tool in conjunction 
with HDBS (Nellis 2010/2011; Mair, 2006; Carlson et al., 1999; Schmidt, 
1994b; Renzema, 1992). Technology encompassing various types of 
electronic monitoring equipment is designed to increase the accountability of 
offenders in the community by enhancing the officer’s ability to supervise 
offenders (McCarthy et al., 2001; Champion, 1996). It is very important to note 
that the technology does not therefore replace personal contact with 
offenders, which is essential “to meet surveillance and case management 
goals” (Heath, 1996:28).  
  
The nature and extent of the electronic monitoring technology that is applied 
on offenders on specific community based sanctions varies widely. It is 
primarily dependent on the jurisdiction’s funding levels and officials’ 
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preferences and desired security. Furthermore, it varies in accordance to a 
jurisdiction’s social, cultural and political factors (Nellis, 2010/11). As a result, 
vendors throughout the Western world have produced several types of 
electronic monitoring equipment to satisfy officials’ diverse needs. These 
include passive electronic monitoring technology, active radio frequency 
electronic monitoring technology, hybrid passive and active electronic 
monitoring technology, and GPS that also operate as passive, active and 
hybrid systems (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007; McCarthy 
et al., 2001; Heath, 1996). (For more information see below). 
 
The very first attempt of using electronically monitored devices to track the 
movement of human beings in the community was undertaken in 1964 by Dr 
Schwitzgebel and his colleges at Harvard University in the USA11 (Whitfield, 
1997; Renzema, 1992; Fox, 1987b; Schmidt & Curtis, 1987). This experiment, 
whose findings were published in 1966 in the Harvard Law Review, was titled 
‘electronic rehabilitation system.’ It was tested around the Harvard University 
campus with volunteers including students, parolees and “mental patients” 
who wore an electronic monitor (Fox, 1987a:133). 
 
There were multiple receiver transmitters around the Harvard campus 
to pick up and retransmit the signal via a missile-tracking device. The 
tracking device showed on a screen where on the Harvard campus or 
its vicinity the person wearing the monitor was.  
(Fox, 1987b:76) 
  
It was hoped that the tracking device that is worn in the future would be able 
to monitor “physiological functions, blood alcohol levels, brainwaves, and 
other bodily activities that might be predictive of criminality” (Fox, 1987b:76). 
This would then mean that it could be a more humanitarian means of 
monitoring offenders and mental patients, and it could even replace prisons 
and mental institutions (Renzema, 1992; Fox, 1987b). However, the 
experiments did not show significant achievements, and as a result did not 
                                                 
11
 The idea of tracking human movement was based on the tracking of animal movement in 
the wild (Fox, 1987b).  
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generate interest among corrections or mental health professionals 
(Renzema, 1992).  
 
Nevertheless, soon after this experiment, Ingraham and Smith (1972 cited in 
Cohen, 1977:224) made a prediction that the future ability of electronic 
monitoring will be limitless:  
 
In the ‘very near future’, a computer technology will make possible 
[new types of] alternatives to imprisonment. The development of 
systems for telemetering information from sensors implanted in or on 
the body will soon make possible the observation and control of human 
behaviour without actual physical contact. Through such telemetric 
devices, it will be possible to maintain twenty-four-hour-a-day 
surveillance over the subject and to intervene electronically or 
physically to influence and control selected behaviour. In the name of 
social order, these new forms of control, which have important 
implications for basic civil rights, may percolate into the community with 
little scrutiny or public accountability.  
 
Four decades later the envisaged application of electronic monitoring 
technology has not been realised. This is probably because policy makers 
have been largely mindful of the potential legal and ethical implications that 
such an application would have.    
  
Following the Harvard University experiment, the next formalised attempt at 
using electronic monitoring was based on New Mexico, USA District Court 
Judge Jack Love’s inspiration when he read a Spiderman comic strip in 1977. 
The comic strip illustrated Spiderman being tracked by a transmitter fixed to 
his wrist (Ball et al., 1988). The judge used this idea to develop electronically 
monitored tracking of offenders in the community because he was frustrated 
at imprisoning offenders who he believed did not need to be imprisoned, but 
did need a more stringent sanction than regular probation (Goss, 1990). He 
was specifically saddened by a prison riot that killed relatively minor offenders 
who he had sentenced to prison (Fox, 1987b). Consequently, he approached 
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major computer companies, none of whom were willing to commit resources 
to such a project. Subsequently, Michael Goss, an engineer, left his current 
employment and established his own company to pursue this idea. After a 
number of years he designed a device consisting of an electronic bracelet, 
which emitted a signal picked up by a receiver placed in a home telephone 
(Nellis & Lilly, 2013; Renzema, 1992). This device was lawfully used by Judge 
Love for the first time on a probation violator in March 1983 in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico (Fox, 1987a). However, due to faulty equipment and a lack of 
funding this attempt at electronic monitoring failed with only 5 offenders being 
monitored (Renzema, 1992).12    
  
The winding down of the Cold War and the advancement of computer and 
telecommunication technology resulted in unprecedented application of 
technology in the criminal justice system. The sophisticated technological 
systems predominantly designed for military purposes were quickly adapted 
to ‘techno-corrections’ - keeping offenders under surveillance (Paterson, 
2013; Padgett, Bales & Blomberg, 2006; Petersilia, 2000; Whitfield, 1997). 
These technological advancements included electronic monitoring, voice 
verification systems, on-site drug testing, and breathalysers through the 
phone (Petersilia, 2000). In particular, it was electronic monitoring which was 
said to have been perhaps the most important penal innovation of the 1980s. 
 
During the mid-1980s, the most basic ‘passive electronic monitoring’ 
equipment became commercially available in the USA (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009; Anderson, 1998). This technology simply confirmed the offender’s 
presence in their home when the central computer randomly contacted them. 
The central computer was programmed to generate random telephone calls to 
the offender, who was required to provide voice identification or insert the 
encoder device (worn on their wrist or the ankle) into the verifier box. More 
recently, offenders have had to provide their fingerprint or a retinal scan in 
order for their identity to be confirmed (Black & Smith, 2003; Community 
                                                 
12
 Following Goss’s initial trial, Thomas Moody in late 1983 in Key Largo, Florida developed 
the first electronic monitoring continuous signaling system which subsequently became a part 
of an ongoing statewide HDBS managed by a private contractor (Pride Inc) (McCarthy et al., 
2001; Renzema, 1992). 
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Based Services Directorate, 1999; Anderson, 1998; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt, 
1994b; Harkins, 1990). When the phone is not answered, is busy for a period 
of time, or if the offender fails to be correctly identified, a breach report is sent 
to the correctional agency which then follows up the offender’s whereabouts 
(Anderson, 1998).   
 
In the late-1980s and early-1990s, literally hundreds of articles appeared in 
the correctional literature advocating the application of passive electronic 
monitoring technology in community corrections (Ball et al., 1988). The 
technology was described as safe, secure, reliable and, most importantly, 
cost-effective in comparison to incarceration (Baumer et al., 1993; Maxfield & 
Baumer, 1990). Proponents also argued that wide-spread application would 
result in the technology becoming increasingly less expensive, and that 
further technological developments would make the technology progressively 
more precise (Corbett & Marx, 1992). Although at this time a few sceptics 
warned that the use of the technology in corrections would subsequently raise 
unanticipated issues, critical discourse was generally lacking (Schmidt, 
1994b; Ball et al., 1988). Hence, the idea of ‘cheap’ close surveillance and 
monitoring of offenders very much appealed to policy makers as well as 
criminal justice professionals (McCarthy et al., 2001).    
 
1.4.2 Electronic monitoring with RF  
 
A more advanced version of ‘active electronic monitoring’ equipment, which 
operates on the basis of active RF, became extensively available in the early 
1990s.13 It continuously informs authorities about whether the offender is 
present or absent at a specified place (Mair, 2006). This technology utilises a 
combination of radio frequency signals and standard telecommunications 
technology (Ferguson, 13.11.00). A signal is continuously emitted from an 
offender’s bracelet or an anklet transmitter to the monitoring unit, which is 
                                                 
13
 Electronically monitored technology combined with other devices to monitor offenders’ 
sexual urges, inclination to violence, and drug use also became available at this time 
(McCarthy et al., 2001). 
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usually located in the offender’s home14 (Schmidt, 1998; Harkins, 1990; 
Vernon, 1987). This monitoring unit is connected by a landline phone to the 
central computer, indicating every time that an offender leaves or returns 
home (Anderson, 1998). In accordance with an offender’s pre-approved 
activity plan, all of the pre-arranged absences (such as work schedules and 
counselling/treatment appointments) are entered into the central computer, 
and if an offender leaves or returns at an unscheduled time, a breach is 
reported.  
 
Alternatively, in order to verify an offender’s location away from home (for 
example their presence at a work, school or counselling session), supervising 
officers use a portable monitoring unit or a ‘drive-by’ unit which picks up the 
radio signals from the offender’s transmitter (Courtright, 2002; Schmidt, 1998; 
Altman & Murray, 1997; Vaughn, 1987). A number of advantages are 
associated with the portable monitoring unit - it protects the officer from 
entering potentially dangerous areas, allowing them to quickly verify the 
presence of a number of offenders, as well as being less intrusive for the 
offender (Courtright, 2002; Altman & Murray, 1997). When it is handheld or 
used in a vehicle with a roof-mounted antenna it can detect the radio signals 
from the offender’s transmitter within a range of 67-267 metres (Courtright, 
2002; Schmidt, 1998; Altman & Murray, 1997). It can also ascertain the 
battery status of the transmitter and whether the offender has tampered with 
it. Similarly, these devices can also alert authorities that an offender is at an 
unauthorised location; for example, on a random drive-by an officer can find 
out if an offender is at a public place instead at work (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). 
 
A ‘hybrid electronic monitoring’ system combines both active and passive 
electronic monitoring technologies (Renzema, 1992). Under this model, 
offenders wear a transmitter that continuously indicates whether they are at 
home during certain times, and they are also passively supervised by 
                                                 
14
 This technology specifically indicates whether the offender is within the 50-60 metres of the 
home-based receiver (Schmidt, 1998; Harkins, 1990). 
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secondary means (Schmidt, 1994b). These secondary means of supervision 
include a requirement to respond to random phone calls from supervising 
officers, and to confirm their identity through voice verification systems or the 
insertion of a wrist worn device into the verifying box (Schmidt, 1994b; 
Renzema, 1992).  
 
During the 1990s, however, a number of specific problems with the 
functioning of the passive as well as active RF electronic monitoring 
equipment emerged (Schmidt & Curtis, 1987). These mainly comprised of: 
 
technical and electric problems such as bad wiring, living close to radio 
stations, power outages, and call-waiting and call-forwarding features 
[which] caused problems with the transmitter being able to send and 
receive the required information to central control. 
 
(Alarid et al., 2008:195)  
 
In addition, large metal objects (usually made from iron and steel inside or 
surrounding the offender’s home), ‘sleeping patterns’ and ‘dead spots’ were 
found to interrupt transmissions or create an electromagnetic field and 
indicate false alarms (Ball et al., 1988; Fox, 1987a; Schmidt & Curtis, 1987; 
Friel & Vaughn, 1986). Furthermore, some older phone line equipment was 
not able to transmit the electronic monitoring signals. Similarly, if an offender 
had technologies such as call forwarding, call waiting or a portable phone, the 
electronic monitoring technology was not able to determine whether they were 
at home or not (Schmidt, 1994b; Fox, 1987a). Since all violations had to be 
followed-up to reduce the likelihood of the offender violating their order 
conditions by roaming free after removing the electronic equipment, research 
indicated that ‘false alerts’ required significant follow-up by officers. This 
impacted on the morale and fortitude of correctional officers (Meyer, 2004; 
McCarthy et al., 2001).  
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The rapid development of the electronic monitoring technology has meant that 
the above stated operational problems have been progressively resolved and 
that the technology has generally improved. For example: 
 
 Radio interference and weather-related issues that resulted in losses in 
transmission were fixed. This was achieved by installing surge 
protectors on incoming electrical and telephone lines, placing repeater-
signal stations, and providing uninterruptable power supplies 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Schmidt, 1994b; Fox, 1987b; Schmidt & Curtis, 
1987).  
 
 Inadequate telephone line compatibility and related technological 
issues have been resolved (Schmidt, 1994b; Fox, 1987a).  
 
 Specific improvements were made to the equipment that offenders 
wear. More specifically, it was miniaturised, its battery life was 
enhanced, and its bands were made stretchable and tamper resistant 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Schmidt, 1994b).  
 
 The equipment signal was made for each offender. This meant that 
when an officer drove-by to conduct a portable check on whether the 
offender was at a specified location, the officer was able to distinguish 
whether that specific offender was actually present. Even if signals 
from other offenders in the area were simultaneously evident (Schmidt, 
1994b).  
 
Although passive and active RF electronic monitoring had been available in 
community corrections for some 15 years, their major limitation was their 
inability to pinpoint the offender’s location if they absconded and were not 
within the specified area (Cotter, 2004). 
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1.4.3 Electronic monitoring with GPS   
 
In the late 1990s the most sophisticated ‘electronic monitoring with GPS’ was 
adopted in the USA’s criminal justice system (Johnson, 2002). Unlike its 
predecessors, GPS has a unique ability to pinpoint the specific current 
location as well as past locations of the offender (Bishop, 2010; Sex Offender 
Supervision and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010; DeMichele & Payne, 
2009; Wagner, 2008; Jannetta, 2006; Shute, 2007). It also provides 
communication with the offender (and past victim if applicable), location 
mapping for archive retrieval, immediate tamper notification and remote laptop 
tracking with a wireless modem (Florida Department of Corrections, 2006). 
The development of GPS has been considered to be so significant that it 
prompted some researchers to ask ‘whether there is a future for RF in a GPS 
world’? Lilly and Nellis (2013) have explained that RF is likely to remain in 
operation as correctional authorities have usually purchased the technology 
as opposed to leased it, and staff are generally familiar with its operation.   
 
Electronic monitoring with GPS uses telephonic communications and 
elements of RF together with the USA Department of Defence’s GPS system 
to identify an offender’s location on a map (Brown et al., 2007). It specifically 
tracks offenders’ movements via satellite triangulation,15 a network of 5 
ground stations,16 and the portable tracking device which is attached to the 
offender (Mair, 2006; Black & Smith, 2003). GPS agencies are further able to 
program specific location parameters - inclusion and exclusion zones: 
 
                                                 
15
 There are 34 USA military defence NAVSTAR GPS satellites, of which 24 constantly orbit 
the earth 11,000 nautical miles above it and send signals to the ground stations at the speed 
of light (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Brown et al., 2007). These satellites were originally 
designed for military navigation, mapping and weapons delivery purposes, but are now used 
for a variety of non-military purposes including personal car and boat navigation as well as 
supervision of offenders. Information from 3 to 6 satellites is needed to indicate the offender’s 
exact location (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Cotter, 2004; Johnson, 2002). The use of the 
satellites for military purposes has decreased to less than 10% (Nellis, 2005). There have 
however been concerns that some of the satellites are outdated and need fixing (Michael, 
McNamee & Michael, 2006); steps have been undertaken to address this. (For more 
information see section 1.4.4).      
16
 There are 5 ground stations around the world that manage the operational health of the 
satellites by transmitting orbital corrections and clock updates (Brown et al., 2007). 
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 Inclusion zones are areas where the offender is expected to be at 
various times, such as the static workplace during the day and their 
home during the night. The number of inclusion zones can range from 
100 to an unlimited number and size (Cotter, 2004; DeMichele & 
Payne, 2009).  
 
 Exclusion zones are areas where the offender is not permitted to go; 
these include parks and schools for paedophiles, a former partner’s 
home or place of employment for a perpetrator of domestic violence, or 
bars and pubs for an alcoholic. The number of exclusion zones can 
range from 20 to an unlimited number and their size is between 91 
metres to 610 metres radius (Cotter, 2004; DeMichele & Payne, 2009; 
John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000).    
 
All of the zones are entered on GPS mapping software in the form of 
addresses. The GPS software enables zones to be established as non-
circular shapes (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). A computer program instantly 
sends alerts if an offender enters the exclusion zone or leaves the inclusion 
zone at an unscheduled time. The offender’s movement is then monitored to 
determine if their entry or exit was accidental or deliberate. If it seems that the 
offender was in an exclusion zone intentionally, the police are given the 
offender’s exact location to arrest them (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).     
 
A specific type of GPS technology, called ‘bilateral technology,’ is used for 
perpetrators of domestic violence/stalking where, apart from the perpetrator, 
the victim carries their own GPS device and their movement becomes a 
mobile exclusion zone to the perpetrator’s movements (Nellis, 2010c; 
McFerran, 2008). Victims are alerted when the offender is in close geographic 
proximity to them. Offenders are similarly alerted if they are approaching the 
mobile exclusion zone (that they may have been unaware of) and instructed 
to change their direction immediately (Ballard & Mullendore, 2002; Johnson, 
2002). If the offender violates the rules, the authorities are notified (Johnson, 
2002). The evidence has shown that the use of GPS technology in domestic 
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violence and stalking cases however is not a panacea, as offenders are still 
able to re-offend; however, “it does provide an improved warning system and 
evidence of where the offender has been” (McFerran, 2008:3).  
 
GPS can operate under three modes:  
 
 Active: The information pinpointing the offender’s whereabouts is 
transmitted from the GPS receiver to the monitoring centre almost 
continuously, that is, every 1 to 5 minutes, referred to as near-real-time 
(Brown et al., 2007; John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000). This type 
of monitoring is very resource intensive due to the continuous flow of 
information that needs to be assessed by staff (Fransson, 2005). 
However it allows for very quick response times and is usually most 
appropriate for the highest-risk offenders.  
 
 Passive: The GPS receiver stores all of the information about the 
offender’s whereabouts and transmits it to the monitoring centre at 
regular intervals (usually once a day). The downloaded information is 
then assessed by the staff. Therefore, any zone violations or crime 
incident notifications are retrospectively identified and acted upon 
usually the next day (Fransson, 2005; Frost, 2002; John Howard 
Society of Alberta, 2000). This mode is usually most appropriate for 
relatively stable high-risk offenders.   
 
 Hybrid: This is the latest mode of GPS monitoring combines active and 
passive monitoring. It is essentially passive monitoring where offender 
location data is reported more regularly, that is every few hours, unless 
an offender enters an ‘exclusion zone’ and/or tampers with the 
equipment. The monitoring then switches onto active monitoring 
reporting offender movement in near-real-time (Brown et al., 2007; 
DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Fransson, 2005). For the vast majority of 
high-risk offenders this is the most useful and cost-effective type of 
GPS monitoring. This is because exclusion areas can be made 
sufficiently large so that active monitoring can commence as soon as 
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possible when the offender nears the exclusion zone. Correctional 
authorities then assess the alert and if necessary send the police to 
intervene (Fransson, 2005).  
 
Active GPS systems are consequently the most expensive type of GPS 
monitoring (Cotter, 2004). Throughout the USA the median cost of active GPS 
tracking per offender per year was estimated to be $5,475 and passive GPS 
$4,745 per offender per year. This figure includes the cost of the lease of 
equipment as well as staff and overhead resources, but excludes costs 
associated with staff overtime, specialised staff training and lost/stolen 
equipment (Brown et al., 2007). 
 
In order for the GPS system to obtain a wearer’s location it needs to be in a 
position where it can receive the GPS signal from the GPS satellites. This 
signal is best received outdoors, but modern GPS receivers are sensitive 
enough to also receive signals in domestic environments through tiled rooves 
or large windows. Difficulties in obtaining a location are typically encountered 
in heavily urbanised areas, in or around high-rise buildings, in tunnels and 
underground and in metal enclosures such as trains and to a lesser extent in 
motor vehicles (Buck, 2009; DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Shute, 2007).  
 
The GPS device must be able to access the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) network to transfer information regarding its location 
and any breaches such as curfew violations or equipment tampering to the 
vendor’s Central Monitoring System (CMS) for processing (DeMichele & 
Payne, 2009; Brown et al., 2007). Access to the GSM network can be a 
problem in far rural and mountainous areas, in underground parking garages 
or rail tunnels (Nellis, 2008).  
 
The main limitation that has been associated with the operation of HDBS with 
GPS is ‘false alerts,’ which occur frequently while the personnel who are 
doing the monitoring usually find it difficult to ascertain which alerts are false 
and which ones are real and must be attended to (Armstrong & Freeman 
2011; Bales et al., 2010; Sex Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring Task 
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Force, 2010). The reason behind these alerts is that GPS equipment involves 
complex technology and devices which are subjected to a variety of harsh 
environmental conditions on a daily basis.  
 
Evidence-based research from the USA has indicated that in order for HDBS 
with GPS to operate satisfactorily staff must have clearly defined 
responsibilities, as well as familiarity with associated tasks (Turner, Jannetta, 
Hess, Myers, Shah, Werth & Whitby, 2007). The complexity of the tasks 
involved is explained by McCarthy et al., (2001:192):  
 
A computer-skilled employee is required to enter and remove clients 
from the system, input schedule modifications [if applicable, 
inclusion and exclusion zones], and produce summaries of EM 
contact records. Additional work is involved in the training and 
orienting of clients, connecting of equipment, updating of offender 
schedules, keeping track of excused absences, reviewing and 
interpreting system messages, following up on suspected violations, 
and conducting independent field checks of the offender and 
equipment. When the system is out of order, the tasks must be 
performed manually.  
 
Consequently, all levels of staff require ongoing training so that they can 
undertake tasks in multiple areas of the system (Turner et al., 2007).  
 
In addition, evidence-based research has indicated the importance of an 
effective centralised monitoring centre that manages the enormous data flow 
and adequate responses to alerts (Sex Offender Supervision & GPS 
Monitoring Task Force, 2010). The staff at the monitoring centre need to be 
thoroughly trained to interpret and prioritise the large volume of alerts and 
pass them on to correctional officers and/or the police who then respond to 
the alerts (Sex Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010). 
Sound collaboration between all of the parties involved must be in place (Sex 
Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010).    
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A key advantage of tracking offenders with GPS is that their tracking 
movements can be compared with geographic information systems (GIS), 
which display crime incident data, thus uncovering whether they have 
engaged in further offending (O’Hara, 2004; Frost, 2002). In fact, it can be 
used in court to convict or exonerate offenders17 (Sex Offender Supervision 
and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010; Wagner, 2008). Two vendors in the 
USA, Pro-Tech Monitoring and Satellite Tracking of People, have developed 
software systems, CrimeTrax and VeriTracks respectively, that cross-
reference the two separate data sets and detect ‘hits’; these are automatically 
provided to law enforcement agencies (Drake, 2009).  
 
The tolerances of the systems are adjustable. One agency may want 
to know if any offender has been within 1,000 feet of any reported 
crime scenes within 1 hour of the offence occurring. Other agencies 
may want to narrow the search by asking for a list of offenders who 
were within 250 feet of any crime scene within 15 minutes of the 
crime occurring.  
(Drake, 2009:5) 
 
The validity of the data is investigated and it is determined whether the 
offender is a potential witness or a suspect in a crime. If the investigation 
results in an arrest, the Department of Corrections is notified and the offender 
is charged with breaching the conditions of their order (O’Hara, 2004). 
 
It should however be noted that the consolidation of GPS and GIS data is not 
a typical part of GPS offender monitoring programs. This could be due to a 
lack of knowledge of the availability of the technology, or some law 
enforcement agencies being unwilling to share their data, and/or overall inter-
agency co-operation being complex and time consuming (Drake, 2009). A 
number of USA states have nevertheless been advocating for a wider 
                                                 
17
 Although initially some judges were reluctant to accept GPS tracking data as evidence of 
further offending, as the technology has continued to mature it has become accepted as 
evidence (Brown et al., 2007; Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007; Turner et al., 
2007).   
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application of the integrated investigative technology (Sex Offender 
Supervision and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010). 
 
Another way of enhancing supervision and monitoring of high-risk offenders 
who are GPS tracked is polygraph testing. This practice is typical in the USA 
where in some states, like New Jersey, supervising officers are trained in 
polygraph testing and test offenders on a regular basis (New Jersey State 
Parole Board, 2007). In California however, expert polygraph examiners test 
offenders on a frequent basis and discuss the results with the supervising 
officers (Sex Offender Supervision and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010). 
This practice helps the supervising officers to uncover information about 
offender’s inappropriate thoughts, and may provide indications of increased 
risk of re-offending; hence, allowing early intervention by supervising officers. 
It should however be noted that polygraph testing cannot be used as 
evidence in criminal cases (New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007).  
 
1.4.4 Subsequent developments in electronic monitoring 
technology 
 
The search for increasingly reliable technological supplements to face-to-face 
supervision has continued. This is because the application of electronic 
monitoring equipment has been strongly supported by a large private sector of 
the equipment’s manufacturers and vendors (Lilly & Nellis, 2013; Mair, 2006; 
McCarthy et al., 2001). These private providers have invested a lot of money 
in continuously improving the technology, and they have successfully 
marketed at correctional tradeshows (Mair, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Further progress and more widespread use of electronic monitoring 
technologies are likely to persist in the future as the need to contain 
correctional costs continues. 
 
The precision of GPS tracking is constantly being enhanced in numerous 
specific ways. For example:  
 
36 
 
 Improved GPS reception – The recently available GPS chips utilise 
assisted GPS (A-GPS) along with sophisticated algorithms, which allow 
for the location of the offender to be tracked even if only partial signals 
are received from the satellites. In addition, the improvements in GPS 
devices’ antenna technology have made offender tracking more 
precise in structures that are made out of wooden frames (which was 
an issue in the past) (Drake, 2009; Nellis, 2010c).    
 
 Mobile phone tower trilateration – In the USA some mobile phone 
companies (such as Sprint Inc) use the SDMA communication network, 
which provides mobile phone location by measuring the distance from 
the mobile phone to three or more mobile phone towers.18 Some GPS 
vendors (such as Omnilink of Alpharetta) supplement this information 
with the GPS tracking data for more precise tracking of offenders 
indoors in metropolitan areas (Nellis, 2010c; Drake, 2009). 
 
 Upgrade of the GPS system – The accuracy of monitoring offenders 
subjected to GPS tracking will continually improve due to an ongoing 
upgrade of the GPS system (Bergin, 2013; Drake, 2009; Nellis, 2008).  
 
 WiFi and WiMax – The integration of WiFi and WiMax location data into 
GPS tracking data has become possible, thus allowing offender 
movement to be tracked underground (Drake, 2009). 
 
 Deduced (Dead) Reckoning – The use of ‘dead reckoning’ when a 
GPS signal is lost enables continuous estimation of the offender’s 
pathway by sensing their direction, altitude and acceleration. In fact, 
various devices including accelerometers, digital compasses, 
gyroscopes and altimeters take over until the GPS signal is regained. 
These are achieving a 90% accuracy level. Dead reckoning is 
particularly useful in determining whether the offender has remained 
inside a building (Drake, 2009).  
                                                 
18
 This signal strength is more robust than the GPS signal, which is typically used by the 
mobile phone companies (Drake, 2009). 
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The most significant development in relation to GPS tracking however is the 
establishment of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which within 
the next decade will combine the tracking information from more than 100 
satellites from various countries. In particular, it will integrate the tracking data 
gathered by the USA’s GPS, Russian’s GLOSNASS, Europe’s GALILEO and 
China’s COSMOS.19 This will “deliver improved availability, accuracy and 
integrity” (Victorian Spatial Council, 2011:12).   
 
In addition, miniature tracking devices that are surgically implanted beneath 
the skin with an ability to monitor physiological signs have also been 
developed (Bright, 17.11.02; Fabelo, 2001). The most sophisticated devices 
also include a miniature video camera that enables officials to observe the 
wearer’s location and activities (Fabelo, 2001). These have not been used on 
offenders so far; this is probably because of potential human rights issues.  
 
A much less controversial technological innovation called ‘kiosk reporting’ has 
been developed for monitoring low-risk offenders on HDBS. It has been 
utilised, for example, by the New York Probation Department since 2008.  
  
The system allows offenders to report as frequently as needed (at 
scheduled times) to a machine – resembling an ATM [Automatic 
Teller Machine] – that uses a thumb print scan to identify the user, 
and takes a photograph and video of the reporting session.  
 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009:20) 
 
Offenders are required to complete a series of questions on their progress 
and kiosks are interfaced with the state’s police databases so that they can 
prompt the offender to report to an officer, take a drug test or follow some 
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that GLOSNASS, GALILEO and COSMOS are the actual titles of 
satellite navigation systems that are written in all capital letters. GLOSNASS became fully 
operational in late 2011.GALILEO became partially operational in 2012, and will be in full 
operation by 2015. COSMOS will be operational in 2020 (Bergin, 10.07.13; Drake, 2009; 
Nellis, 2008).  
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other action. While there have been no reported differences in the rates of 
technical violations or re-offending, this has resulted in officers’ workloads 
becoming more manageable and public safety being improved. This is 
because officers have been freed up to more comprehensively supervise 
high-risk offenders who are not suitable for kiosk reporting (DeMichele & 
Payne, 2009).  
 
Therefore, a quantum leap has been made over time in the application of 
electronic monitoring as it has offered abundant possibilities for controlling 
offenders in the community (Clear & Cole, 2003; Schmidt & Curtis, 1987). Its 
inception has been referred to by renowned criminologist George Mair 
(2006:57) as “the most significant development in intermediate sanctions20 in 
the last 30 years”. The latest technological developments have generally 
meant that, apart from detaining offenders in their own homes, it is now 
possible to restrict their access to carefully identified places and/or people, 
and impose strict surveillance on them that tracks their movements in almost-
real-time (Cromwell et al., 2005). In addition to increasing HDBS’ capacity to 
inhibit crime, the technology can also ensure that offenders attend 
rehabilitative initiatives which encourage them to adopt a pro-social lifestyle 
(Nellis, 2010b; New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007; Payne & Gainey, 2004; 
Morris, 1988). This has enabled correctional authorities to impose HDBS on 
more serious offender cohorts, which is likely to result in the wider application 
of these sanctions and overall cheaper per offender cost (Tennessee Board of 
Probation and Parole, 2007). It is possible that in time these technological 
developments, which make HDBS increasingly reliable, will result in greater 
community support for such sanctions.   
 
1.5 Methodology and data collection  
 
This section outlines the methodology and the data collection used in this 
research. It discusses the focus of the study and research questions, the 
                                                 
20
 Intermediate sanctions are defined as “spectrum of community supervision strategies that 
vary greatly in terms of their supervision level and treatment capacity, ranging from probation 
to partial custody” (Alarid et al., 2008:369). HDBS are an element of intermediate sanctions 
(Champion, 2008; Petersilia, 2000). 
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rationale for the study, the comparative historical methodology, the data 
collection process and analysis. It concludes with a discussion of the 
limitations of the research.   
 
1.5.1 Focus of the study and research questions   
  
While the development and expansion of contemporary HDBS throughout the 
world has taken place over a three decade period (1982-2013) with varied 
success, relatively little is known about the rationale behind its implementation 
and operation, as well as the current issues (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear et al., 
2006; O’Toole, 2006; Nellis, 2005). At a ‘macro-level,’ there has been an 
abundance of quantitative research focusing on effectiveness-related issues 
of specific HDBS21 such as cost, potential net widening effect22, and 
recidivism rates (Roy & Barton, 2006; Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005; Finn & 
Muirhead-Steves, 2002; Stanz & Tewksbury, 2000). At a ‘micro level,’ there 
has been limited qualitative research investigating how offenders relate to 
punishment on HDBS (Gainey & Payne, 2000; Ansay, 1999; Ansay & 
Benveneste, 1999; Payne & Gainey, 1998; Mainprize, 1995; Doherty, 1994). 
Importantly, there does not seem to have been any ‘middle-ground research’ 
exploring HDBS’ aims and rationale, implementation process, operation cycle 
and what in fact can be learnt from the last three decades of HDBS’ operation.  
 
Consequently, the main question of this research is: ‘What has been the 
evolution of HDBS frameworks and their associated outcomes in the USA and 
Australia particularly over the last three decades (up to 2013)?'  
  
Sub-questions of this research are: 
1. Which correctional predecessors, factors and theoretical underpinnings led 
to the establishment of HDBS during the 1980s in the USA and Australia?  
                                                 
21
 Most of this research was government-sponsored evaluations of pilot or just initiated 
HDBS. 
22
 The term net widening “is based on an analogy to a fisherman’s net. If the net is opened 
more widely, more fish will be caught in it. In this context it refers to sanctioning those 
[people] who would not have otherwise have been sanctioned or sanctioning someone more 
severely than would otherwise have been done” (Schmidt, 1994b:371).  
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2. How have HDBS operated and what have been their associated trends 
from 1982 until 2013 in the USA and Australia?  
3.  What have been the outcomes of the operation of HDBS from 1982 until 
2013 in the USA and Australia?  
  
Hence, the questions posed by this research are unique in criminological 
literature. This study seeks to improve the overall operation of HDBS by 
providing policy makers and other stakeholders with previously un-researched 
‘middle-ground’ insights about the efficacy of various policy developments and 
implementation and operation processes in this rapidly growing area of 
correctional policy. 
 
In order to best answer the research question and sub-questions, the 
evolution of the HDBS frameworks in this research has been divided into 
three ideologically distinguishable phases. These include:   
 
 The early phase of HDBS in the USA and Australia operated from 
1840s until 1960s. This phase was characterised by the introduction of 
probation and parole, which were the predecessors to the late phase of 
HDBS when contemporary application of these sanctions started (Clear 
et al., 2006; O’Toole, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2001; Cromwell & 
Killinger, 1994).  
 
 The middle phase of HDBS was the interregnum between the two 
phases, which operated during the 1960s and 1970s in both the USA 
and Australia. It comprised five converging factors that led to the late 
phase of HDBS (McCarthy et al., 2001; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; 
Patmore, 1991; Petersilia, 1987).  
 
 The late phase of HDBS in the USA and Australia has been operating 
from 1982 to today (2013). The contemporary application of these 
sanctions started in the 1980s when HDBS with RF were introduced. 
Further, in the mid-2000s HDBS with GPS were initiated. 
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In this research, the three phases were analysed in accordance with themes 
and presented chronologically.  
 
1.5.2 Rationale for the study  
 
This exploratory investigation will be of critical importance to policy makers 
worldwide, as the future of punishment for most offenders must lie in 
community based corrections. This is primarily due to the dual forces of 
increasing rates of incarcerating offenders and escalating costs of 
imprisonment in both the USA and Australia (Fowley, 12.02.13; Clear, 2007; 
Welch, 2004). More specifically, since the 1980s the incarceration rate in the 
USA has more than tripled (Schmitt, Warner & Gupta, 2010; Welch, 2004). 
This is a particularly significant statistic as the 1980s was marked by the 
introduction of a wide array of surveillance oriented community based 
penalties that have operated as alternatives to incarceration in an attempt to 
reduce the number of offenders sentenced to prison. Even more concerning is 
that 60% of offenders in prisons in the USA are non-violent offenders (Schmitt 
et al., 2010). Conversely, growing evidence suggests that some alternatives 
are just as effective as prison for many offenders, and rehabilitation is more 
likely outside the artificially created prison setting (Clear et al., 2006; Graycar, 
2000; Keay, 2000). Therefore, the potential of HDBS which are socially useful 
and financially prudent must be recognised, as opposed to prisons which are 
very expensive to build and maintain and fuel social dislocation and shatter 
families.  
 
In addition, the fact that contemporary HDBS have been in existence since 
the 1982, reaching an important 30-year landmark of natural progression23, 
means that policy makers, practitioners and scholars need to reflect upon and 
learn from their operation. In particular this research will be of special benefit 
to policy makers who are constantly looking to improve HDBS and to broaden 
                                                 
23
 HDBS’ natural progression has included the following stages – beginning in the 1980s, 
proliferation, implementation and evaluation in the 1990s (Petersilia, 2000), redesign, growth 
and evaluation in the 2000s.  
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their use (Clear et al., 2006; New South Wales (NSW) Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006; Payne & Gainey, 1998; Chan & Ericson, 1981). While 
some jurisdictions have evaluated the pragmatic issues associated with these 
sanctions, they have not recognised the lessons learnt that would allow these 
sanctions to become more effective and better-utilised. This comparative 
historical investigation of HDBS enables policy makers to learn from afar, in 
terms of both time and distance, by providing a more complete understanding 
of the specific components/initiatives that constitute best practice among 
HDBS. Policies based on empirical research can then be introduced to 
improve the operation of HDBS in the highly dynamic and continually evolving 
criminal justice environment.  
 
This study will be of value not only to stakeholders concerned with corrections 
policy, but it will also be useful for a broader audience interested in justice 
processes and their intended and non-intended effects. It is specifically 
anticipated that a wider dissemination of this study’s results will inform the 
community about the previously unknown trends, benefits and issues of 
HDBS. In addition, the comparative findings may in fact educate the 
community about the importance of HDBS’ punitive and reintegrative 
potentials, thus changing the traditionally negative perceptions of these 
sanctions (Payne & Gainey, 1998; Larivee, 1993). Therefore, this study 
should be beneficial for a wide range of interest-groups as decarceration of 
offenders proceeds worldwide.   
 
1.5.3 Comparative historical methodology  
 
In order to investigate the historical terrain and the current operation of HDBS 
in the USA and Australia a comparative historical methodology approach was 
determined to be the most suitable. This is due to two fundamental reasons. 
First, significant processes, such as the evolution of HDBS frameworks, are 
best understood historically, that is through the recognition of the significance 
of chronological sequences and the unfolding of events over time. Second, a 
comparative analysis of these processes is most appropriate so that lessons 
43 
 
transcending national boundaries can be learnt (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 
2003). Therefore, a combination of comparative and historical methodology, 
which is aligned with the qualitative research tradition, is the best way of 
uncovering the efficacy of various HDBS, related developments and 
implementation processes in the two nation states.  
 
Since the 1990s, comparative historical methodology has gained prominence 
and has even been referred to as the ‘leading form of analysis’ in the social 
and political sciences, including criminal justice studies (Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003; Neuman, 2000). It has enjoyed unprecedented 
influence as a social research method with an increase in the volume of 
comparative historical books and eminent journals publishing articles based 
on comparative historical research. Institutions and organisations have been 
progressively more receptive to comparative historical investigations 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003).  
 
Even though comparative historical researchers typically do not claim to 
discover universal knowledge about historical incidents or movements, their 
research aims to uncover critical lessons from the past: 
 
Comparative historical analysts are frequently able to derive 
lessons from past experiences that speak to the concerns of the 
present. Even though their insights remain grounded in the histories 
examined and cannot be transposed literally to other contexts, 
comparative historical studies can yield more meaningful advice 
concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that 
aim for universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details.   
 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003:9) 
 
The overarching purpose of these inquiries is to “understand the past and the 
present in the light of the past,” thus improving current policies and processes 
(Burns, 1996:387).  
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Comparative historical methodology is generally difficult to succinctly define 
as it is not unified by one theory or one method. Furthermore, its adherents 
continue to be innovative and look into other fields for methods or theories 
(Kaestle, 1992, 1997 cited in Johnson & Christensen, 2004). This does not 
however mean that there is no overall consistency in the way in which this 
research is conducted (Johnson & Christensen, 2004). For example, 
Mahoney & Rueschemeyer’s (2003) three guiding features of comparative 
historical research are generally accepted among comparative researchers 
(see Babbie, 2005). These three leading features are said to include: 
 
 exploring causal arrangements that produce major outcomes 
 analysing chronological processes 
 utilising logical comparison, generally limited to a small number of 
cases.  
 
All of these focal points are clearly pertinent to the current study. First, the 
central aim of this study is to investigate the causal configurations, that is, 
nation state specific correctional predecessors, factors and theoretical 
underpinnings that were responsible for the establishment of HDBS 
frameworks, so that it is possible to assess the associated outcomes of 
HDBS. Second, this study will chronologically explore each nation state’s 
specific development, the operation, and associated trends of HDBS 
frameworks. This is important because practical and procedural changes 
could be related to wider national or international events and/or research 
findings. Third, the researcher will engage in a systematic and contextual 
comparison of HDBS in two nation states in order to “formulate new concepts, 
discover novel explanations, and refine pre-existing theoretical expectations in 
light of detailed case evidence” (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003:13). 
Therefore, as historical differences and/or trajectories become apparent, 
theoretical explanations24 will be conceptualised (Amenta, 2003).  
 
                                                 
24
 These explanations may be portable, that is, only applicable in certain cases or time 
periods (Amenta, 2003). 
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A key argument supporting the decision that comparative historical 
methodology is most suitable for this study is that it is defined as a “powerful 
method for addressing big questions” that are relevant to the real world25 
(Skocpol, 2003:420; Neuman, 2000:383). By asking large comparative 
questions about the development of social policy,26 such as why revolutions 
occurred in some countries and not in others, or why one country was an 
early or a late adopter of establishing a policy, researchers are able to 
reconceptualise events or movements (Amenta, 2003). Questions posed are 
generally regarded to be substantively and normatively significant by 
specialists, as well as non-specialists as researchers aim to provide 
historically grounded explanations of important large-scale outcomes 
(Amenta, 2003; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). Hence, the application of 
comparative historical methodology in this study enables the review of HDBS 
in the USA and Australia to answer a fundamental question – what has been 
the evolution of HDBS frameworks and their associated outcomes?  
 
In comparative historical inquiries, larger questions are normally confined to 
analysing carefully selected cases that possess sufficient similarities to be 
meaningfully compared with one another. While these cases for comparison 
can vary significantly, most common units selected in studies utilising 
comparative historical research are nation states (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 
2003). As mentioned earlier, nation states are also used in this study as the 
basis for comparison of HDBS. Literature on comparative studies indicates 
that within the context of global economies, world systems, and multinational 
penetration, comparative research among similar societies is most suitable 
(Miethe & Lu, 2005; May, 1997). This is principally because processes in 
these countries are regarded to be comparable and “countries that are similar 
are more likely to borrow from one another” (Teune, 1990:58 cited in May, 
1997:185). Therefore, if nation states are homogenous on a number of 
theoretically relevant dimensions, they are said to be appropriate for 
                                                 
25
 It should be emphasised that there is a significant gap in criminological research asking 
larger comparative questions (Neuman, 2000).  
26
 Questions in comparative historical research do not have to be confined to “asking 
questions only for which there are sufficient data on a population of cases to answer the 
questions” (Amenta, 2003:105). 
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comparison and generalisation (Amenta, 2003; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 
2003; Skocpol, 2003).  
 
For the reasons mentioned this study focuses on comparative analysis of the 
implementation and the operation of HDBS in two similar nation states - the 
USA and Australia. In the USA every county and state has its own criminal 
justice system and there is also a federal criminal justice system. Similarly, 
each of Australia’s states and territories has its own independent criminal 
justice system. All of these however operate somewhat alike and face 
common issues (Challinger, 1994a; Schmidt, 1994a). This is because most 
vital commonality between these nation states is that they belong to the same 
legal and cultural tradition (Miethe & Lu, 2005). Both the USA and Australia 
were British colonies and, as a result, their culture and religious backgrounds 
are reflective of the ‘Common Law legal tradition’ (Miethe & Lu, 2005; Reichel, 
2002). In addition, their structural profiles have many similarities; for example, 
the two nation states: 
 
 are geographically diverse 
 have mixed racial/ethnic groups 
 Christianity is their dominant religion 
 have high economic development  
 are highly industrialised 
 are based on capitalism and the market economy 
 face growing class disparity  
 operate on the basis of political democracy 
 have two major political parties 
 have separate executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government  
 have a hierarchy of federal/state court systems 
 their criminal acts are classified as felonies or misdemeanours OR 
summary and indictable offences  
 have relatively high crime rates (Hayman, 17.11.06; Ryan, 17.11.06; 
Miethe & Lu, 2005; Crystal, 1997; Kaim-Caudle, 1973).  
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Apart from having significant structural commonalities, the two nation states 
have faced the same correctional challenges and pressures. In particular, 
during the 1970s and 1980s the escalating cost of building and sustaining 
prisons forced the nation states to search for cheap but effective community 
based sentences. As a result, the nation states, albeit at different times, 
initiated HDBS in order to divert the increasing number of offenders being 
sentenced to prison (O’Toole, 2002; Whitfield, 2001; Bonta et al., 1999; 
Whitfield, 1997; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990). Since 
introducing these sanctions the nation states have experimented with various 
components/initiatives of HDBS, searching for the particular aspects of these 
sanctions that might constitute best practice. These nation states have also 
invested considerable amounts of money in the ongoing development of 
cheaper and more sophisticated electronically monitored devices that have 
enabled increasingly secure home-based offender confinement (Brown et al., 
2007; Nellis, 2005). However, the success of the various initiatives has never 
been comparatively assessed.   
  
The practice of comparatively studying topics across the nation states, 
referred to as ‘comparative research’ or ‘cross-national research’, has gained 
eminence among social scientists over the last 50 years (May, 1997). 
Increasing globalisation27 has meant that the world is ‘getting smaller’ and 
progressively more interconnected due to increases in mass communications 
and technological advances. This advancement has led to the widespread 
development and rapid progression of nation states (Miethe & Lu, 2005; May, 
1997). The fact that various practices/processes which aim to achieve similar 
aims operate among the nation states means that the need for cross-national 
research challenging ethnocentric beliefs and encouraging shared learning is 
considerable.  
 
A comparative approach challenges our ethnocentric beliefs of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ practices based on our particular culture and 
                                                 
27
 Globalisation has been defined as “ a multidimensional set of social processes that create, 
multiply, stretch and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the 
same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the 
local and the distant” (Steger, 2003:13).  
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national experiences. The potential discovery of punishment 
responses and principles that transcend boundaries of time and 
space provides an empirical basis for improving our 
understanding of criminal sanctions and punishment in Western 
and non Western societies. 
 (Miethe & Lu, 2005:2).  
  
The comparative component of this study is essential because of four specific 
benefits that are unique to comparative research. The first is the ‘import-
mirror’ advantage, which suggests that comparative research gives the 
researcher a critical insight into the operation and the potential improvement 
of HDBS practices in the two nation states (May, 1997). This is because the 
comparative inquiry allows the researcher to conduct the broader ‘inter-
societal comparison,’ which is the analysis of the distinct ways in which the 
two nation states have reacted to the economic challenge of financially 
unsustainable increasing rates of incarceration. Furthermore, the more 
specific ‘intra-societal comparison’ is also conducted assessing the various 
ways in which different jurisdictions within the two nation states have 
implemented and operated HDBS (May, 1997). 
 
In particular, when conducting comparative analysis each nation state is 
treated as if it has ‘multiple layers’. This effectively means that the researcher 
“grasps surface appearances as well as reveals the general, hidden 
structures, unseen mechanisms, or causal processes” (Neuman, 2000:391). 
HDBS are therefore analysed within clearly recognisable as well as hidden 
socio-political variations, so that the complex relationship between politics and 
correctional practice becomes apparent (Skocpol, 2003). This importantly 
reveals the rationale and aims that have led to the establishment of these 
sanctions, their implementation process and the operation cycle. It then 
becomes possible to assess whether the goals that these sanctions were set 
to achieve have been accomplished in each nation state (Burns, 1996).  
 
The second advantage of comparative research is the ability to understand 
the reasons behind the varied processes in separate societies. By comparing 
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HDBS in two nation states it is possible to ascertain whether they have 
developed in similar or diverse ways (May, 1997:186). Rose (1991:447 cited 
in May 1997:187) concisely explained this process: 
 
Anyone who engages in comparative research immediately notices 
differences between countries. Yet anyone who persists in wide 
ranging comparative analysis also recognises boundaries to these 
differences: for example, among two dozen countries the variations 
in methods of electing parliament are different. Since the time of 
Aristotle, the first task of comparison is to observe the extent to 
which countries differ or are similar. The second task is to ask why. 
Under what circumstances do differences occur? 
 
It was anticipated that this research would therefore uncover why the 
operation of HDBS, in terms of the overall conditions and the offender 
selection criteria, is somewhat different in the USA from its operation in 
Australia (Paterson, 2007). To determine the reasons behind the varied HDBS 
operation, HDBS must be analysed in the context of each nation state’s 
social, economic and political system (May, 1997).  
 
‘Theory development’ is the third advantage that has been associated with 
comparative research, as comparative studies are said to be ideal in 
discovering overall theories that describe the way in which societies are 
organised (Amenta, 2003; Neuman, 2000; May, 1997). Once the researcher 
gains a deep understanding of the operation of HDBS in the two nation states 
they “think seriously about the issues of process, timing, and historical 
trajectories” (Amenta, 2003:94). In the process of evidence synthetisation the 
concepts are refined, patterns across nation states and time are established, 
and critical similarities and differences begin to be drawn out (Neuman, 2000). 
The data is then organised into sequences and paired together to create ‘a 
larger picture’ (Neuman, 2000). All of the evidence is also examined from as 
many angles as possible and additional links and connections are explored 
(Neuman, 2000). At the final stage of the analysis the researcher reads and 
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re-reads all of the notes from the documents and studies, ensuring that the 
information is sorted appropriately into themes.  
 
Comparative analysis of HDBS more generally opens the possibility of 
identifying robust patterns across both the comparative and historical context 
as well as exceptions to these patterns (Miethe & Lu, 2005). On the basis of 
established patterns gathered from this methodological framework the 
researcher develops theories on HDBS frameworks within two correctional 
continuums. Conversely, when exceptions to these patterns are uncovered 
the researcher restricts claims of universalism and notes that further research 
assessing the reasons behind the exceptions is required (Miethe & Lu, 2005). 
This method of theory development is summarised by Amenta (2003:95) as:   
 
In [this] process, we appraise and develop new theoretical 
arguments, ascertain the conditions under which they apply or do 
not, refining theoretical argumentation along the way, and uncover 
new empirical facts and patterns as a result of new questions and 
theoretical development. 
 
Because there are significant structural similarities between the two nation 
states which are compared in this study, it was anticipated that the researcher 
would develop universalistic theories, meaning that they would be applicable 
across the two nation states. Nevertheless, it was possible that some of the 
aspects of these theories would be particularistic, meaning that they would 
only be applicable to one nation state (May, 1997). Hence, important 
contributions to knowledge will be made as the operation of HDBS is 
explained through the analysis of the broader causal propositions in society. 
In fact, the key strength of this comparative historical research is the 
development of the overarching theoretical framework that applies to the 
development of HDBS in two nation states, as well as an overall improvement 
in the meaning and conceptualisation related to HDBS (Amenta, 2003; 
Skocpol, 2003; Neuman, 2000).  
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The fourth benefit of comparative research is the ability to predict the future 
(May, 1997). Comparative critical assessment of HDBS across the two nation 
states28 enabled the researcher to assess the outcomes of HDBS on a nation 
state specific level, and more importantly, make likely predictions about the 
future trajectory of HDBS frameworks in each nation state. When explaining 
this method’s unique ability to capitalise on the past, Berg (1998 cited in 
Johnson & Christensen, 2004:393) highlighted the following:  
 
The past can give us a perspective for current decision making and 
help to avoid the phenomenon of trying to reinvent the wheel. The 
past can also provide information about what strategies have and 
have not worked. In other words, it allows us to discover those 
things that have been tried and found wanting and those things that 
have been inadequately tried and still might work.  
 
On the basis of understanding each nation state’s social and cultural context, 
the researcher was able to further specify the potential of specific HDBS as 
well as the particular components/initiatives likely to enhance their operation. 
As a result, Departments of Corrections in the USA and Australia “will be able 
to embark upon particular courses of action knowing their likely 
consequences” (May, 1997:188). It should however be noted that criminal 
justice is a highly evolving field in which new social, political or economic 
conditions may arise that create fundamental changes.  Predictions based on 
past performance must therefore be considered in conjunction with new 
developments (Borg & Gall, 1989). Nevertheless, future decision making is 
informed as policy makers are provided with a comprehensive understanding 
of what constitutes best practice among HDBS. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Comparative critical assessment was conducted on the basis of a longitudinal outline that 
chronologically specifies all of the HDBS in each nation state. This method is frequently 
employed in historical comparative research (Dawson, Klass, Guy & Edgley, 1991). 
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1.5.4 Data collection and analysis  
 
In qualitative research, which underpins this study, the quality of data 
collected is imperative in order for the researcher to gain insights about the 
development, implementation and operation of HDBS in two nation states 
(Punch, 1998). This is because the researcher’s task is to be able to convey 
the ‘entire picture’ through ‘thick description’ which comprises two aspects: 
 
First, the description (of the group or case, event or phenomenon) 
must specify everything a reader needs to know in order to 
understand the findings. Second, the research report needs to 
provide sufficient information about the context of the research so 
that the reader can judge the transferability or generalizability of its 
findings. 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985 cited in Punch, 1998:192) 
 
The advantage today, unlike prior to governmental bureaucratisation in the 
20th century, is that substantial information is generally available on 
correctional policies (Amenta, 2003). Abundant government and independent 
studies enabled the researcher to understand the wider social and political 
factors, as well as the more specific aims and the rationale that shaped the 
implementation of these sanctions, and the specific lessons learnt from the 
operation of HDBS in the two nation states.  
 
While comparative historical researchers predominantly rely on analysing 
qualitative data, they are also allowed to use quantitative data to supplement 
their analysis (Neuman, 2000). In particular, the researcher combined both 
micro (small scale independently conducted studies based on offender views 
of HDBS) and macro levels (large scale government funded full scale 
evaluations of HDBS) of reality and linked them to each other (Neuman, 
2000). So, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative micro and macro 
data was used to “reconstruct and present the facts and figures in a way that 
communicates an understanding of the events from the multiple points of view 
of those who participated in them” (Johnson & Christensen, 2004:392). 
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Rigorous analysis of extensive literature on the operation of HDBS throughout 
the two nation states enabled the researcher to understand their social 
meaning and context (Neuman, 2000).  
 
Historical comparative research therefore requires that extensive bibliographic 
documentation related to the topic is obtained, including various published 
and unpublished sources such as public documents, archival records, 
personal documents, administrative documents and formal studies and 
reports29 (Neuman, 2000; Sarantakos, 1993). So, the researcher’s first task 
was to search for as many primary30 and secondary31 sources relating to the 
topic as possible (Borg & Gall, 1989). There is a lack of primary sources on 
HDBS, as all of the literature is written by government organisations or 
independent researchers rather than offenders who have experienced the 
sanction. This meant that the researcher searched for the most useful and 
accurate secondary sources to obtain offenders’ views of HDBS (Johnson & 
Christensen, 2004; Neuman, 2000). Thus, like most comparative historical 
researchers, the researcher primarily relied on secondary sources of data, 
that is, published and unpublished books, articles and manuscripts written by 
specialist criminologists (Neuman, 2000). The researcher’s overall aim was to 
gather data from a variety of sources and vantage points, forming data 
triangulation (Burns, 1996). 
 
In order to collect comprehensive qualitative and quantitative data for this 
study the researcher initially examined many general indexes and catalogues 
at university libraries throughout the USA and Australia. Several hundred 
                                                 
29
This specifically means that relevant legislation, policy and procedural manuals, 
manuscripts, annual reports, evaluations, newspaper and journal articles need to be 
collected.  
30
 A primary source is defined as “the testimony of an eyewitness, or of a witness by any 
other of the senses, or of a mechanical device like the dictaphone – that is, of one who... was 
present at the events which he tells” (Dawson et al., 1991:256). Studies based on these 
sources are considered to be most accurate (Dawson et al., 1991:256). 
31
 A secondary source is defined as “one which offers indirect or hearsay evidence by other 
than eyewitnesses and is often an analysis and synthesis of primary sources” (Dawson et al., 
1991:256).   
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studies, books and manuscripts were obtained.32 The researcher also 
searched several State libraries as well as specialised research libraries 
within Correctional Services Departments and historical archives throughout 
the USA and Australia, accessing several hundred more sources of 
information related to the topic. At the end of the data collection stage the 
most complex task was identifying a range of data sources that strictly related 
to the scope of the study as well as similar types of evidence from each nation 
state33 (Neuman, 2000; Borg & Gall, 1989).  
 
In accordance with the scope of this study, the focus was on selecting 
sources that discussed the historical as well as current aspects, including the 
operation, trends and outcomes of carefully defined HDBS, especially over 
the last three decades (1982-2013). In practice this meant that a clear set of 
guidelines had to be drawn up to determine whether a piece of literature 
related to HDBS was within the scope of the study. Only documents and 
studies referring to specifically defined HDBS were included. The following 
criteria formed the basis of this selection:  
 
 HDBS that target adult offenders rather than juveniles 
 HDBS that are designed to supervise post-trial orders rather than pre-
trial releases 
 HDBS that are actual ‘front-end’ or ‘back-end’ alternatives to 
imprisonment or are applied as post-prison extensions of offender 
supervision  
 HDBS that apply electronic monitoring as well as human supervision 
on offenders. 
 
The fact that the data had been collected and determined to be relevant to the 
research questions “may be biased, distorted and somewhat invalid when 
                                                 
32
 Most of the literature was ordered through a Document Delivery Service at RMIT 
University. This is a free service that enables Higher Degree students to obtain up to 100 
documents/sources per year that are not stored at RMIT libraries.   
33
 While searching for similar types of evidence from each nation state, the researcher 
discarded some data that was deemed to be ‘inessential’, that is, it may only be necessary if 
the researcher was studying and/or claiming expertise specific to one nation state (Amenta, 
2003). 
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used for other purposes” meant that it had to be tested for truthfulness (Burns, 
1996:393). This is because historical documents and studies gathered for this 
study had already been collected for another purpose or administrative 
function. Consequently, it is important to recognise that:  
 
any source can be affected by factors such as prejudice, social or 
economic conditions, political climate, and religious background... 
Even if a document has not been deliberately altered or falsified, it 
could be affected by the particular bias a person may have or the 
political or economic climate existing at the time.  
 
(Johnson & Christensen, 2004:399-400) 
 
The overall process of critically evaluating every data source in terms of 
external34 and internal35 criticism is referred to as ‘historical criticism’ 
(Johnson & Christensen, 2004; Borg & Gall, 1989). When external criticism of 
the data was conducted it was determined that all of the documents and 
studies were authentic. This is because these discuss a relatively non-
controversial correctional process that took place in recent history (Johnson & 
Christensen, 2004). When internal criticism of the data was undertaken the 
findings were somewhat more complex. Because many of the documents and 
studies collected were conducted and/or funded by government organisations 
it is possible that there was research bias and distortion – wherever possible 
these were balanced with independently conducted research (Borg & Gall, 
1989).      
 
The assessment of data accuracy and its strength of evidence essentially 
meant that “each fact and proposition were carefully weighted and added to 
the case leading to the research conclusion” (Burns, 1996:393). Where the 
                                                 
34
 External criticism establishes the validity or authenticity of the data (Burns, 1996).  
35
 Internal criticism is only conducted once external criticism has been completed, and it 
establishes the accuracy and worth of the data (Johnson & Christensen, 2004; Burns, 1996). 
Here the researcher needs to assesses whether the document reveals the ‘true picture’, that 
is, “were the writers honest, biased, too antagonistic or too sympathetic, sufficiently 
acquainted with the topic?” (Burns, 1996:393). It is very important to establish this because 
“what most affects the reliability of a source, is the intention and prejudices of the writer” 
(Kuppuram & Kumudamani, 2002:158).  
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evidence was strong, the researcher was able to generalise their 
interpretations and where it was not, the generalisability of the findings was 
limited (Borg & Gall, 1989). In assessing the collected data the researcher 
also noted alternative interpretations of evidence and instances where issues 
were not mentioned (as per Neuman’s 2000 suggestions). Data collection and 
evaluation in comparative historical methodology is generally said to be less 
biased than other methods, as the researcher cannot control the variables 
and texts are accessible and readily available for testing and re-testing 
(Burns, 1996; Sarankatos, 1993).  
 
1.5.5 Limitations of this study 
 
No research methodology is without its limitations, and this study is no 
exception. A limitation often associated with comparative historical research is 
that the data collected can have problems with equivalence36 (Neuman, 
2000). In this study this problem was substantially minimised as there were no 
vast differences in eras or cultures being analysed and there was very little 
possibility of misunderstanding or misinterpreting events. This is because this 
research is centred on a correctional process that took place in recent history 
and not in a different era. In addition, the two nation states where HDBS were 
analysed belong to the same legal and cultural tradition, and as a result have 
significant cultural similarities (Miethe & Lu, 2005; May, 1997). Therefore, it 
was possible, where appropriate, for the researcher to generalise and explain 
social relations across the nation states and their social contexts.  
 
Another weakness of comparative historical methodology is that the scope of 
the study is bounded by the literature examined, meaning that the limitations 
of individual documents and studies become the limitations of this study 
(Sarantakos, 1993). Specifically, some of the documents and studies 
contained information and/or were based on a relatively small number of 
offenders, and so were not representative or fully generalisable (Sarantakos, 
                                                 
36
 Problems with equivalence mean that the researcher is unable to adequately comprehend 
cultures and societies that are different from their own (May, 1997). 
57 
 
1993; Dawson et al., 1991). The researcher attempted to overcome this 
problem by gathering information from as many sources as possible,37 at the 
same time critically analysing their methodologies and the specific HDBS that 
they had examined (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Sarantakos, 1993).  
 
A related problem with comparative historical methodology is that it is possible 
that there is a lack of documents within one or more of the nation states being 
comparatively analysed (Miethe & Lu, 2005; Neuman, 2000). This was 
somewhat a difficulty in the present study as the quantity and quality of data in 
the two nation states where HDBS were comparatively examined varied. In 
fact, there was an overwhelming amount of literature in the USA and generally 
less information in Australia.38 Further, in both nation states, particularly 
Australia, the amount of studies on HDBS with RF greatly outweighed studies 
on HDBS with GPS. Where relevant this is indicated throughout the following 
chapters. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence gathered the researcher 
was able to draw conclusions on the implementation and the operation of 
HDBS frameworks in the two nation states, the USA and Australia. 
 
In addition, the researcher had to be aware of other researchers’ inferences 
and logical analyses when critically evaluating collected documents and 
studies (Neuman, 2000; Burns, 1996). It is understood that all researchers 
bring their own perspectives to an analysis, and it is necessary to keep in 
mind the possibility of biases and beliefs of those who conduct the empirical 
research as well as the social and political context in which they function 
(Burns, 1996). Therefore, processes have already been interpreted by the 
primary authors who have potentially made decisions on attending to some 
details and omitting others from their reports (Borg & Gall, 1989). 
 
Government conducted or sponsored analyses of HDBS (which are 
extensive) may, for example, mean that political accommodation and 
                                                 
37
 Unlike in most comparative historical studies where research is limited, indirect and 
generally incomplete where conclusions at times have to be based on fragmentary evidence, 
gathering ample government records and independent studies on home detention practices in 
the two nation states was not an issue (Neuman, 2000). 
38
 This is because HDBS originated in the USA and over the years the USA has invested 
more resources into studies and evaluations in comparison with Australia. 
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attendant biases – whether favourable or unfavourable – could be possible 
(Hughes, 2000; May, 1997; Burns, 1996; Sarantakos, 1993). Conversely, 
studies conducted or financed by government departments are often done by 
a group of individuals who are less likely to be able to select some information 
and disregard other information, and their personal biases are not likely to 
become apparent as the data is analysed and re-analysed a number of times 
by different individuals. Furthermore, government reports are seldom 
organised in terms of a narrative history so these are relatively easy to 
compartmentalise (Neuman, 2000). Nevertheless, the researcher has tried to 
balance these potentially biased studies with independently conducted 
research.  
 
In evaluating the potential biases of collected documents and studies, the 
researcher adds yet “another layer of interpretation in the way they choose to 
emphasise or ignore facts about the past and in the way they fit facts into 
categories and patterns” (Borg & Gall, 1989:806). While the researcher 
creates the story line on the basis of the interpreted evidence, it is possible 
that different researchers looking at the same literature may ascribe different 
meanings to it (Neuman, 2000; Burns, 1996). Thus, the researcher also 
potentially brings their own perspectives and personal biases to the research 
(Burns, 1996). 
 
Despite these limitations, a comparative historical approach still has the best 
potential for understanding the similarities and differences in the 
implementation and the operation of HDBS across the two nation states 
including the identification of the components/initiatives that constitute best 
practice among these sanctions. It is also important to emphasise that the 
limitations that are associated with this methodology are also present in most 
other research designs (Miethe & Lu, 2005). In addition, these limitations “can 
be minimised somewhat by common sense, logical reasoning, and the 
exercise of appropriate caution when making inference about general 
practice” (Miethe & Lu, 2005:53). 
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1.6 Theoretical underpinnings  
 
The rapid development of community based corrections over the last century 
(including HDBS more recently) throughout the Western world was part of the 
theoretical underpinning termed ‘decarceration’ which resulted in dramatic 
changes in the use of punishment (Cohen, 1979; Matthews, 1979). The most 
significant change was that, by the end of the 1960s, prisons once again, as 
at the end of 18th century, became places of ‘last resort.’ That is, the courts 
applied a sentence of incarceration only once they had explored and 
eliminated all non-custodial options (Cohen, 1979). Commitment to this policy, 
labelled ‘decarceration’, marked by the introduction of various non-custodial 
sanctions, was unprecedented in the Western world. This will become evident 
in the following chapters. 
 
The study of decarceration – of efforts to minimize the use of prison – 
has been among the most intellectually fruitful topics in contemporary 
criminology and has attracted some of the best thinkers in the field... 
More than any other topic, decarceration research has taken 
criminology outside of narrow parameters of the criminal justice 
institution, and into myriad social, cultural, economic and political 
institutions that also constitute crime and punishment.    
 
(Ericson in Chan, 1992:v) 
As Ericson in Chan (1992) explained, since the 1970s many theorists have 
written about decarceration from many different viewpoints. However, the first 
person to conduct a theoretical and political analysis of deinstitutionalising 
‘deviant populations’ was Andrew Scull in 1977. He conducted an historical 
analysis of the social control apparatus in prisons and mental hospitals in the 
USA and England and compared it with the wider changes in these countries’ 
social systems (Scull, 1977). The aim of this study was to reveal the complex 
interplay of politics, economy and ideology behind increasing diversion of 
offenders and mental hospital patients into community settings. In order to 
explain this major change in penal policy which effectively resulted in 
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institutions becoming the last rather than first resort, he coined the word 
‘decarceration’ which he explained as: 
 
shorthand for a state-sponsored policy of closing down asylums, 
prisons and reformatories. Mad people, criminals and delinquents are 
being discharged or refused admission to the dumps in which they 
have been traditionally housed. Instead, they are to be left at large, to 
be coped with “in the community.” 
 (Scull, 1977:1) 
 
Despite the fact that this is a specific and narrow definition of decarceration – 
in the correctional context the basic opposite of incarceration– throughout 
Scull’s book it becomes apparent that the meaning of the label is actually 
wide-ranging; that is, it describes the entire process of diversion from the 
segregative forms of social control (Chan, 1992; Matthews, 1979; Scull, 
1977). According to Matthews (1979) Scull’s description of decarceration in 
fact encompasses four distinctive processes. These include: 
 
 The ‘physical expulsion’ of inmates due to the closure of institutions 
 Reduced level of incarceration due to a cut in correctional funding 
 Decriminalisation of offences 
 Increased use of discretion by the police and the courts in order to 
divert offenders into non-custodial penalties39  
 
The contemporary meaning of decarceration similarly encapsulates numerous 
processes associated with the general trend towards non-custodial or 
community based responses to crime and deviance. Chan clearly illustrates 
this point: 
 
the term ‘decarceration’ has been used to describe a variety of 
diversionary measures, including the decriminalization of offences, 
police cautioning of juveniles, pre-trial diversion of accused persons, 
                                                 
39
 It is interesting to note that Matthews (1979) concluded that none of the four processes that 
Scull had predicted had in reality eventuated.  
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sentencing of offenders to non-custodial penalties, conditional release 
of prisoners, the use of half-way houses and privatization of 
corrections. ‘Community corrections’ is the ideological umbrella under 
which these policies or programs have been justified.   
 
(Chan, 1992:1) 
 
A significant part of this major change in corrections was HDBS frameworks. 
More broadly, the evolution of the HDBS frameworks in this research has 
been divided into three ideologically distinguishable phases - the early, the 
middle and the late phase of HDBS - these are analysed in forthcoming 
chapters.  
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
 
The next chapter (chapter 2) describes the early and middle phases of HDBS 
simultaneously in the USA and Australia. The early phase essentially 
comprised the development and operation of probation and parole from the 
1840s until the 1960s. During this time the ideology of offender supervision 
was based on humanitarian principles. The middle phase of HDBS is 
subsequently discussed. It is an interregnum during the 1960s and 1970s 
between the early and the late phase of HDBS, which comprised five 
converging factors. Most significantly, the quandary was the outcome of the 
‘tough on crime’ policies that led to unsustainable prison crowding and 
budgetary restraint, while the currently available community based 
dispositions were ineffective. This propelled governments’ decisions to 
introduce the late phase of HDBS.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the late phase of HDBS in the USA which is still 
operational. It commences with the implementation of intermediate sanctions 
in the 1980s. These essentially comprised HDBS with RF. In the mid-2000s, 
however, the expansion of sex offender post-release supervision laws 
resulted in HDBS with GPS being introduced for serious sex offenders. The 
number of offenders on all HDBS has been increasing in the USA. During the 
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late phase of HDBS, the ideology of offender supervision has been 
characterised by strict and close surveillance and monitoring, although 
treatment-based components are usually available for serious offenders on 
HDBS with GPS. The last three decades of evaluative research of HDBS with 
RF indicated problematic operational outcomes as well as significant ethical 
and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. On the other hand, HDBS 
with GPS have been operationally more successful. But there has been 
insufficient research assessing some of their ethical and overall political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas.  
 
Chapter 4 explains the late phase of HDBS in Australia which is still 
operational. The chapter starts with a historical account of the introduction of 
HDBS with RF in the late 1980s. The chapter then discusses HDBS with GPS 
which entered the correctional arena after 2000 in very similar circumstances 
as in the USA. The number of offenders on HDBS in Australia remained 
relatively stable. The overwhelming ideology of offender supervision on HDBS 
has generally been based on a combination of strict and close surveillance 
and treatment-based components. Research has indicated that HDBS with 
RF have generally achieved their stated operational objectives, but have 
encompassed significant ethical and particularly political and stakeholder 
issues and dilemmas. Research assessing the operational outcomes, ethical 
and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas of HDBS with GPS is still 
lacking and it is imperative that it is conducted in the future.  
  
Chapter 5 starts by summarising the key outcomes and conclusions of the 
research. It then predicts increased application of HDBS as a future trajectory 
in both the USA and Australia. Future viability and outcomes of HDBS in both 
countries are however dependent on whether policy makers improve the 
operation of HDBS by implementing the lessons learnt from the evidence of 
best practice. These include collaborative working and sharing of information 
with stakeholders, inclusion of rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives, 
ongoing independent evaluation process that informs continual improvement, 
application of equitable selection criteria and conditions, offender tailored 
order conditions and length of orders, provision of support for offenders’ co-
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residing family members, and clear policies and procedures to guide their 
operation. If jurisdictions in the USA and Australia implement the specific 
lessons learnt relevant to their own problematic areas of HDBS operation, the 
application of these sanctions will become more effective in the future.  
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Chapter 2 – Early and middle phases of HDBS in the 
USA and Australia 
 
So it was not merely a question of reform ‘going wrong’. The 
benevolent sounding destructuring package had turned out to 
be a monster in disguise, a Trojan horse. The alternatives had 
merely left us with ‘wider, stronger and different nets’.  
 
(Cohen, 1985:38) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
It was hoped that the widespread introduction of community based sanctions 
in the 1980s would provide sentencers with a ‘carceral archipelago’ that would 
be applied in the USA and elsewhere as alternatives to prison. Instead as 
Cohen (1985) described, these sanctions became ‘add ons’ to the current 
system capturing increasing numbers of offenders in the “wider, stronger and 
different” net of social control. As a result, opposite to the intended effect, the 
widespread utilisation of community based sanctions had no effect on the 
rising prison population and growing correctional outlays (McCarthy et al., 
2001; Tonry, 1999; Biles, 1996). It must however be noted that absolute 
support is given to the wide application of community based sanctions, 
particularly as most incorporate rehabilitative measures, that are much more 
likely to rehabilitate offenders in comparison with prisons (Clear, 2007).   
 
This chapter critically discusses the early and the middle phases of HDBS 
simultaneously in the USA and Australia. This is because in both nation states 
there were similar factors and their outcomes. The chapter consists of two 
themes in which information is presented chronologically. The first theme 
analyses the early phase of HDBS, which began with the introduction of 
probation and parole in the 1840s. The philosophic core of the early phase of 
HDBS was based on humanitarian principles. The application of probation 
and parole was initially sporadic and it was not until the 1960s that the 
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utilisation of these sanctions proliferated and offender rehabilitation practices 
were officially embraced. This led to additional government funding and 
increased application of early phase HDBS. Progressively these sanctions 
gained credibility and public support (Petersilia, 1998; Tulett, 1991; Richards, 
1988).   
 
The second theme then assesses the middle phase of HDBS in the 1960s and 
1970s which comprised numerous factors (Tonry, 1990; Blomberg, Waldo & 
Burcroff, 1987). These include: 
 
 The recognition that imprisonment has multifarious drawbacks, such as 
being ineffective, inhumane and costly.  
 An ideological shift where the prison became an option of last resort in 
the sentencing hierarchy and community based dispositions were 
preferred.  
 The decarceration debate which entailed a number of prominent 
theorists debating the main reason behind the substantial change in 
sentencing practices and whether its outcome was a success.  
 An unprecedented problem for the state’s philosophy – ‘get tough on 
crime’ – resulted in overwhelming prison crowding and consequently 
unsustainable cost (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994).  
 Procedural as well as operational problems that collectively indicated 
ineffectiveness with existing community based sentences, that is, 
probation and parole.  
Although these combined factors resulted in the development of the late 
phase of HDBS, it was the final two – ‘get tough on crime’ that led to 
enormous prison crowding and budgetary blowout, and the ineffectiveness of 
currently available community based dispositions – that made it necessary for 
governments to introduce the late phase of HDBS when contemporary 
application of these sanctions started (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; King, 1991; 
McCarthy, 1987). (This is discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
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2.2 Early phase of HDBS (1840s-1960s) 
 
This section describes the early phase of HDBS across the USA and Australia 
which lasted from the 1840s until 1960s. This phase was marked with an 
introduction and proliferation of probation and parole. The mode of community 
based supervision for both of these sanctions was primarily based on 
rehabilitative principles. Probation and parole were the predecessors of the 
late more prominent and contemporary phase of HDBS, which is still 
operational.  
 
2.2.1 Historical development and proliferation of probation  
  
While the idea of probation40 can be traced back to judicial experimentation in 
England in the 1820s41 and USA in 1830s,42 until it was trialled and there was 
proof that it could be a valuable treatment process respected by the courts 
and the public, it was not enacted (Cromwell et al., 2005). The first person in 
the USA to formalise ‘court leniency’ and in fact the ‘father of probation’ was 
John Augustus (Clear et al., 2006). While he was a bootmaker by profession 
and never worked in the criminal justice system, his interest in helping 
offenders especially alcoholics was stimulated by his membership of the 
Washington Total Abstinence Society43. He has been recognised as being the 
first probation officer, coining the term ‘probation’44 and laying its groundwork 
(O’Toole, 2006; Clear & Cole, 2003; Enos et al., 1999).  
  
                                                 
40
 Probation is basically defined as “the idea that, in lieu of imprisonment, the offender is 
allowed to live in the community under supervision and demonstrate a willingness to abide by 
its laws” (Clear et al., 2006:189). 
41
 In the 1820s in Warwickshire, England, magistrates mitigated punishment of imprisonment 
by conditionally releasing suitable young offenders back into the care of their parents or their 
masters. This practice was based on an emerging ideology that offender guidance and 
assistance instead of stringent punishment are more likely to reduce recidivism (Tulett, 1991).   
42
 In the 1830s there were some isolated examples of judges in Boston, Massachusets, USA, 
placing offenders onto community based probation-like sanctions but these have not been 
well documented (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994).  
43
 This organisation was devoted to the promotion of temperance (Cromwell & Killinger, 
1994). 
44
 The term ‘probation’ was derived from the Latin verb probare, meaning to prove, to test 
(O’Toole, 2006).  
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His activities were begun in 1841 when in court one morning he saw ‘a 
rugged looking man’ who told him that if he could be saved from prison 
‘he never again would taste intoxicating liquors’ (Augustus 1939:4-5). 
He persuaded the judge to bail the man to his care, and thus begun his 
practice of putting up a bail surety, helping the person in a number of 
practical ways and then reporting back to the court at the end of the 
bail period.  
 
(Raynor & Vanstone, 2002:14) 
 
For the remainder of his life Augustus was both a bondman and probation 
officer at the Boston Courts in the USA (Cromwell et al., 2005; McCarthy et 
al., 2001). He used his own finances and the financial aid that was 
subsequently given to him from the influential members of the community to 
pay bail and fines for offenders. His work then focused on rehabilitating 
offenders based on his assertion that offender reformation and crime 
prevention instead of revenge should be the primary purposes of punishment. 
Even though Augustus’ activities are today considered to be philanthropic, 
they were novel and progressive at the time. As a result, he faced vigorous 
opposition inside and outside the court, and was also mocked by newspaper 
reports that referred to him as lacking decency and wanting to make a profit 
(Cromwell & Killinger, 1994).  
 
During a period of 18 years Augustus successfully supervised almost 2,000 
people, very few of whom returned to court for reoffending (McCarthy et al., 
2001). This excellent record of offender reform can be attributed to Augustus’ 
establishment of rehabilitative casework strategies such as assisting 
offenders in finding accommodation45 and employment, as well as, helping 
them regain their self-respect through counselling and treatment. In some 
situations he also provided various forms of assistance for offenders’ families 
(Clear et al., 2006; Lipchitz, 1986). Hence, through helping offenders 
Augustus gained their confidence and friendship and also intensively 
                                                 
45
 Most offenders were initially taken into Augustus’ home until he was able to help them 
organise more permanent housing (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). 
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supervised their activities. He additionally developed administrative processes 
that are still a vital operational part of community based sanctions. These 
include presentence investigations, reports to the court, and revocation of 
processes (Clear et al., 2006). Augustus and his volunteers’ tireless efforts 
resulted in the first probation statute being enacted in Massachusetts in 1878; 
this statute created an official state-wide probation system with salaried 
probation officers (O’Toole, 2006; Cromwell et al., 2005; Tulett, 1991). States 
that soon followed Massachusetts’ lead in introducing probation were 
Vermont, California, Rhode Island and New York (Cromwell et al., 2005; 
McCarthy et al., 2001).  
 
By 1920 every USA state had a juvenile probation scheme, and 33 states 
operated adult probation as a correctional disposition (Cromwell et al., 2005; 
McCarthy et al., 2001). There were three key reasons for this timeframe. First, 
the 1916 United States versus Killits case46 eventually resulted in the passage 
of the National Probation Act (1925) that authorised the suspension of prison 
sentences and adopted probation as a formal sentencing option. Second, the 
use of community based dispositions for young offenders was advocated by 
the increasingly prominent juvenile court movement. Third, there was more 
general support for flexible case-by-case rehabilitative approaches for 
offenders (Champion, 2008; Clear et al., 2006; McCarthy et al., 2001).  
  
By 1954 every USA state operated adult probation as a correctional 
disposition (Cromwell et al., 2005). While the introduction of probation during 
the 1920s was a part of the larger progressive reform movement toward more 
humane treatment of offenders, its potential to act as an inducement for 
offenders to plead guilty and relieve overcrowded courts resulted in its 
increasing use during the 1940s and 1950s (Clear et al., 2006).  
 
                                                 
46
 It is interesting to note that in the United States versus Killits case the Supreme Court ruled 
that the trial court did not have the constitutional authority to indefinitely suspend a sentence 
of incarceration. However, instead of viewing this case outcome as a backward step in the 
progression of probation, its proponents subsequently extensively lobbied Congress, which 
passed the national probation legislation in 1925 that formally promoted the use of probation 
(Mays & Winfree, 2002).    
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Similar probation statutes allowing adults to be released from court on the 
condition of good behaviour were only enacted in Australia around the 1950s 
(Tulett, 1991). This time delay is very interesting given that as early as 1887 
probation became available for young offenders in two Australian states - 
Queensland and South Australia. The scope of probation for youth however 
was very limited in that it was restricted to those offenders who committed first 
offences of a minor nature (Daley, 2005; Tulett, 1991). The primary intent was 
to more effectively reform the character of these young offenders by offering 
them a ‘second chance’, so that they could avoid ‘contamination’ with other 
more serious prisoners. An associated benefit, although usually not 
mentioned, was saving money due to diversion from costly overcrowded 
prisons (O’Toole, 2006; Tulett, 1991). Queensland and South Australia’s 
legislation was based on the British Probation of First Offenders Act 1887 
(Tulett, 1991). 
 
Tasmania paved the way in introducing the first adult probation service in 
Australia in 1946, New South Wales followed suit in 1951, South Australia in 
1954, Victoria in 1957, Queensland in 1959 and Western Australia in 1963 
(O’Toole, 2006; Daley, 2005). All of the Australian states based their 
probation statutes on the English Probation Service, which was established in 
1907. The main aim of probation supervision was to treat an offender as an 
individual, advising and supporting them, while relatively low priority was 
placed on punishment (O’Toole, 2006; Tulett, 1991). In addition, probation 
officers were appointed to assist the judiciary in the sentencing process by 
conducting comprehensive investigations into defendants’ social backgrounds 
and providing pre-sentence reports (Tulett, 1991).   
 
It is worthy of note that the recommendation of Magistrate Halcombe’s Royal 
Commission in 1930 to introduce probation for adult offenders in South 
Australia on the basis of English and Canadian models was ignored by the 
state government of the day. Although the rationale was not officially 
provided, it was thought that probation for adult offenders would be too 
expensive and difficult to administer in a vast country such as Australia 
(Tulett, 1991). Furthermore, there was some political disagreement about who 
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should administer probation – prison officers or social workers – if it was 
enacted (Tulett, 1991). Lastly, Chief Probation Officer and Controller of 
Prisons, Whittle, did not support Halcombe’s recommendation, possibly as he 
did not want to lose control of the proposed probation service, as it was 
recommended that it be developed separately from prisons (Tulett, 1991). 
 
The impetus for implementation in the 1950s was bringing Australia into line 
with the international practice of offender management after the end of the 
Second World War (O’Toole, 2006; O’Toole, 2002). In particular, the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations urged all governments to 
adopt or expand the availability of probation in order to prevent future crime 
through the treatment of offenders (Tulett, 1991). An associated benefit to 
governments was the diversion of offenders from overcrowded prisons 
(O’Toole, 2006; O’Toole, 2002). 
 
2.2.2 Historical development and proliferation of parole  
 
While there were some attempts to release prisoners early from prisons in 
Spain and in Germany during the 19th century, Englishman Alexander 
Maconochie was credited with developing the first operational parole47 system 
(Cromwell et al., 2005; Clear & Cole, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Maconochie was a retired naval captain and geographer who administered 
British penal colonies in Australia and in the South Pacific (Clear et al., 2006). 
As a young man, he spent 4 years as a prisoner of war which gave him a 
unique insight into the plight of the incarcerated (O’Toole, 2006). In 1837 he 
proposed a ‘marks system’ to the English House of Commons, arguing for a 
gradual offender release mechanism dependent on offenders’ good conduct 
and hard work, not simply the length of time they spent in custody. This 
‘marks system’ set the historical foundation of the modern parole system 
(Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). 
                                                 
47
 Parole is most simply defined as an early prison release mechanism that mandates 
community-based supervision of offenders (Clear et al., 2006). The word parole originated 
from the French word parole d’honneur, which stands for ‘word of honour’ (McCarthy et al., 
2001). 
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 In 1840 the English authorities offered Maconochie the opportunity to test his 
‘marks system’ on Norfolk Island. Norfolk Island is located 1,600 kilometres off 
the eastern coast of Australia and is classified under the jurisdiction of New 
South Wales (Cromwell et al., 2005). Although he was sceptical about 
whether it was suitable for his purpose, he accepted the appointment and was 
appointed as the governor. Prior to his arrival, Norfolk Island (opened in 1825) 
was renowned for being one of the world’s most severe penal environments. 
Here, there were about 2,000 incorrigible convicts who had committed violent 
offences whilst incarcerated in England and Ireland and were permanently 
transported to Australia (Morris, 2002 cited in Cromwell et al., 2005). They 
were kept in severely overcrowded conditions. Further, “verbal interactions 
were at an absolute minimum, and prisoners experienced no meaningful 
work, education or recreational activities and little or no time out of their cells” 
(O’Toole, 2006:36). Prisoners were also brutally treated by the constant use 
of punishments such as cat-o-nine-tails, the gag,48 solitary confinement and 
exposure to the gallows (O’Toole, 2006).  
 
During his four year tenure on the island, Maconochie changed all this. He 
argued that offenders should be treated in accordance with regulations which 
were based on humane principles. As a result, he “discontinued flogging and 
chain gangs and introduced adequate food, health care, disciplinary hearings 
and reading material” (Morris, 2002 cited in Cromwell et al., 2005:224). Based 
on good offender behaviour, a graduated incentives-based release system 
was also initiated on Norfolk Island. It operated in the following way: 
 
As prisoners demonstrated evidence of good behaviour and good work 
ethic, their freedom and privileges gradually increased. Marks were 
deducted for negative behaviour. Maconochie’s system allowed 
prisoners to move from strict imprisonment, to labour in work gangs, 
through conditional release around the island and finally to complete 
the restoration of liberty. 
(Morris 2002 cited in Cromwell et al., 2005:224) 
                                                 
48
 The gag is “a large wooden mouth piece that prevents communication and is held in place 
at the back of the head with a leather strap” (O’Toole, 2006:37). 
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Maconochie’s perceptions and operations were unprecedented for his time 
and he faced strident opposition. The resistance was both from English and 
Australian officials and the public, who, on the basis of their retributive stance 
regarded the ‘marks system’ as “radical and too liberal” (Cromwell & Killinger, 
1994:197). Some even considered him to be “irrational and the humanity 
extended to prisoners under his control scandalous” (O’Toole, 2006:36). 
Despite the success of the ‘marks system,’ as evidenced though offenders’ 
reformation with reconviction rates of less than 3% of 1,450 released 
offenders during Maconochie’s term, the influential opposition ultimately 
prevailed. The event which was crucial to his demise was his permission for 
prisoners to celebrate Queen Victoria’s birthday on which they spent the day 
attending various amusements and had dinner with rum and lemonade. Even 
though there were no disciplinary issues, in 1844, Maconochie was dismissed 
soon after in 1844 and his release system was abolished (O’Toole, 2006; 
Cromwell et al., 2005). Maconochie’s successors at Norfolk Island 
immediately reintroduced the brutalities of the past, resulting in numerous 
prison riots, murders and suicides. The establishment was closed in 1856. 
According to the New South Wales government, however, the reason for the 
closure of the prison was expensive maintenance (O’Toole, 2006).  
 
The first person to be influenced by Maconochie’s innovative penal practices 
was Sir Walter Crofton, the director of the Irish prison system. He drastically 
revised the Irish prison system in 1854 by implementing the main principles of 
the ‘marks system’ (Welch, 2004). The basis of the reform was the assertion 
that offender reformation should be the goal of incarceration, and offenders 
who show “achievement and positive attitude changes” should be rewarded 
by early release (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994:198). Amended administration of 
the Irish prison system meant that offenders were provided with a graduated 
release experience comprising three distinct phases - strict imprisonment, 
followed by an indeterminate sentence and a potential ‘ticket of leave’ 
(Cromwell et al., 2005).  
 
As prisoners moved into the third phase of penal servitude by earning marks 
for good conduct and achievement in education and industry, they were 
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conditionally released into the community. Once paroled, under the granting 
of the ‘ticket of leave,’ they were required to maintain employment, reside at a 
specified location, and submit monthly reports about their progress to the 
police (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994).49 Unlike the English model of ‘ticket of 
leave,’ which had no supervisory ability to track offenders, the Irish model 
contained the infrastructure of offender control and support which was 
provided by civilian employees or the police (Clear et al., 2006; Cromwell & 
Killinger, 1994). In cases where offenders failed to comply with any of the 
specified conditions, they were returned to prison to serve the remainder of 
their sentences (McCarthy et al., 2001). The Irish system of ‘ticket of leave’ 
was regarded as successful because it “had the confidence and the support of 
the public and of the convicted criminal” (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994:198).  
  
As the English and Irish parole experiments became known across the 
Atlantic, a few attempts were made in the USA during the mid 19th century to 
release offenders early from prisons. It was not, however, until 1876 that the 
first parole system became operational in the USA. The superintendent of the 
Elmira Reformatory in New York, Zebulon Brockway, became renowned for its 
establishment (Clear et al., 2006; Clear & Cole, 2003). He firstly convinced 
the New York legislators to pass an indeterminate sentence law authorising 
correctional personnel instead of the judiciary to determine the amount of time 
that offenders should serve in prisons. Secondly, he introduced a system at 
Elmira Reformatory where offenders could be paroled for a period of up to 6 
months (McCarthy et al., 2001).  
 
Similar to the English and Irish parole models, a decision to parole the 
offender at Elmira Reformatory depended on them earning ‘good time credits’ 
based on their compliance with prison rules and prison officers believing that 
they were ready to be released (McCarthy et al., 2001). Unlike the Irish 
system, where there was continuous offender supervision and monitoring, in 
this model the offender was only required to report monthly to their guardian. 
The guardian was an ordinary citizen who volunteered their time in 
                                                 
49
 These conditions resemble today’s parole conditions throughout the Western world 
(Cromwell et al., 2005). 
74 
 
supervising the offender and whose role was to regularly compile a written 
report about the offender’s progress and submit it to the prison where the 
offender was incarcerated (Cromwell et al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2001). As 
the number of parolees increased, the state replaced voluntary parolee 
supervisors with trained and paid supervising officers, and volunteer-based 
prison societies were formed to further assist parolees’ reintegration 
processes (Clear et al., 2006). 
 
Although the other USA states were initially slow in introducing statutes 
allowing early offender release mechanisms, 44 USA states provided for 
offender release on parole and had indeterminate sentencing laws in place by 
the mid-1920s. At this time, the vast majority, in fact more than 80% of 
felons50 in major industrialised USA states, were paroled prior to being 
released from prison (Clear et al., 2006). Major industrialised USA states were 
more likely to embrace parole possibly because of their more progressive 
thinking about the cost-effectiveness of parole when compared with 
incarceration (Clear et al., 2006). By 1944, the other 6 USA states also had 
implemented parole and indeterminate sentencing laws (Cromwell et al., 
2005; Clear & Cole, 2003).  
 
Evaluative studies of parole from the 1920s and 1930s were however 
predominantly negative – generally indicating high rates of parolee re-
offending and prejudice among parole board members who were deciding 
whether an offender should be paroled (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear et al., 2006). 
This led to significant improvements in the operation of parole; comprising of 
increased conditions on offenders and enhanced supervision, including the 
establishment of parole board guidelines about offender release (Alarid et al., 
2008). Additional reforms were introduced between 1945 and 1970, including 
the provision of vocational training, educational programs and individual 
therapy (Alarid et al., 2008). Interestingly, the media has traditionally 
negatively portrayed parole by publishing only horrific stories of parolees 
committing heinous crimes predominantly in newspapers. Due to its ongoing 
                                                 
50
 Felony offender is a term exclusively applied in the USA referring to offenders convicted of 
indictable offences (Siegel, 2005). 
75 
 
negative media portrayal, parole, as well as subsequent community based 
sanctions, have generally been regarded as unreliable (Clear et al., 2006). 
(For more information see Chapter 3.3.4 and Chapter 4.3.4). 
 
The imposition of parole flourished until the 1970s51 with liberally imposed 
indeterminate sentencing and widely encouraged discretionary releases by 
parole boards (Clear et al., 2006). The legislative proliferation of parole, 
similar to probation, during the 1920s was based on humanitarian reasons. 
However, it should be noted that the first Intensive Probation/Parole 
Supervision (IPS)52 programs, called HDBS in this research, emerged in early 
1950s. These were trialed on a larger scale in the 1960s and 1970s (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). Offenders on these sanctions were subjected to very strict 
individualistic supervision on regular probation or parole (Deschenes, Turner 
& Petersilia, 1995; Lurigio & Petersilia, 1992; Polk & del Carmen, 1992; Clear 
& Hardyman, 1990). (This is further discussed in Chapter 3.2.2). 
  
The associated economic benefit of parole, like probation, during the 1940s 
became vital (Cromwell et al., 2005). This was because scarce state and 
federal financial resources were for the first time being drained by prisons. 
Between the 1840s and 1940s USA prisons were generally self-sufficient (and 
in some cases profitable) due to leasing out of prisoner labour to private 
companies (Cromwell et al., 2005). In the 1940s however legislation was 
passed limiting offender labour to certain industries, and as a result, prison 
profits decreased and taxpayers for the first time started bearing some of the 
costs of offender incarceration. As soon as it was realised that paroling 
offenders would somewhat offset this spending, it became increasingly 
popular (Cromwell et al., 2005).  
 
                                                 
51
 More specifically, in 1973 the critiques of rehabilitation programs became particularly 
influential and the government under community pressure imposed ‘tough on crime’ policies. 
As a result, there were significant moves to strict determinate sentencing of prisoners (Daley, 
2005; Clear et al., 2006). (For more information see section 2.3.4). 
52
 As mentioned earlier, Intensive Probation Supervision and Intensive Parole Supervision 
both have the same abbreviation ‘IPS’ due to almost identical requirements (Petersilia & 
Turner, 1993). 
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In spite of Maconochie’s development of the first operational parole system in 
Australia during the 19th century, a more formal and structured process of 
parole did not become operational in Australia until the mid-20th century. The 
genesis of modern parole can be traced to the influential Alexander 
Whatmore’s report which was presented to the Victorian Government in 1951 
(Nicholson, 1988). The then Inspector General for Penal Establishments, 
Whatmore travelled through the United Kingdom (UK), USA and Europe 
visiting various correctional establishments and authorities. Based on this 
experience and in accordance with the humanitarian principles that were 
prevailing at the time, he recommended that Australia generally improve and 
modernise its prison operation as well as establish a parole service (Provan, 
2007; Nicholson, 1988).  
   
However, at the time of Whatmore’s report a limited form of parole existed in 
Victoria. In fact, it operated under Indeterminate Sentences Act 1907 and was 
only related to prisoners who were serving indeterminate sentences (Provan, 
2007). These sentences were exclusively given to habitual criminals who 
were detained at the Governor’s Pleasure. A body called the Indeterminate 
Sentences Board administered indeterminate sentences by visiting prisons on 
a monthly basis, and granting prisoners temporary release (usually of a 6 
month duration) which was followed by a 2 year probation period (Provan, 
2007). 
 
Parole was firstly officially introduced in New South Wales in 1951 and then 
subsequently throughout all of the states (O’Toole, 2006; Daley, 2005; 
O’Toole, 2002). More specifically, the Penal Reform Act (Vic) 1956 
encompassed many of Whatmore’s recommendations and also formed the 
basis of most other Australian jurisdictions’ parole legislation (Nicholson, 
1988). Most significantly, a system of determinate sentencing, parole and the 
Adult Parole Board was introduced in Victoria.53   
 
                                                 
53
 It replaced indeterminate sentences and the Indeterminate Sentences Board (Nicholson, 
1988). Australian jurisdictions established Indeterminate Sentences Boards in early 1900s to 
regulate the detention and release of habitual criminals confined in reformatory prisons 
(Nicholson, 1988). 
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The authority of the Parole Board in Australia was different to the USA. In 
Australia the sentencing court was to set the limits within which parole was to 
be applied to a prisoner so that the Parole Board’s discretion was much more 
limited than in the USA where the Parole Board determined the actual 
sentence served by the prisoner (Adult Parole Board, 2010; Nicholson, 1988). 
This may have been one of the reasons that parole in Australia attracted less 
condemnation than parole in the USA (Nicholson, 1988). The severe criticism 
of the operation of Parole Boards in the USA in the late 1970s resulted in 
dramatically changed policies of discretionary release which was either limited 
or abolished (Alarid et al., 2008).  
 
Similarly to the USA, the aim of parole was to assist the transition of the 
offender back into the community through the provision of links with welfare 
organisations which helped the offender to obtain employment and housing 
(O’Toole, 2006). It must be noted however that in Australia the concept of 
after-care for prisoners had unofficially existed in practice through the work of 
the church and welfare agencies since the first organised prison systems 
were developed during the late 19th century (O’Toole, 2006).  
 
2.2.3 Ideologies of supervision   
 
Supervision ideologies of probation and parole are concurrently discussed, 
because in most USA and Australian states officers supervise both 
probationers and parolees on the same caseload. The supervision process 
and order conditions of both are very similar, even though parolees are 
usually more serious offenders than probationers (Alarid et al., 2008; O’Toole, 
2002; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). The underlying ideological basis for the 
development of probation and parole was humanitarianism. As such, the 
mode of community based supervision of offenders on probation and parole, 
from the late 1840s until the late 1960s, in the USA and Australia was 
primarily based on humanitarian principles (Clear et al., 2006; O’Toole, 2006; 
Daley, 2005; Tulett, 1991). The overarching aim was offender reformation, 
and within it two distinct modes of supervision were in place. 
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The first supervisory mode was titled the ‘Casework Era’ and operated 
between the early 1900s and late 1960s (Cromwell et al., 2005). From the 
1900s until the 1940s, offender supervision was mostly based on 
humanitarian principles. However, an ideological problem was starting to 
emerge. Most probation officers saw themselves as following the ‘social work 
model.’ This was based on the humanitarian and rehabilitative orientation that 
emphasised the provision of supportive services to meet offenders’ needs 
(this was originally developed by Augustus and his volunteers in the USA). In 
contrast an increasing number of probation officers then saw themselves as 
following the ‘law enforcement model.’ This was based on offender 
surveillance and close control coupled with enforceable conditions. This was 
generally developed by subsequent probation officers who had a previous law 
enforcement background (Clear et al., 2006). This dichotomy however was 
not particularly significant during the early phase of HDBS, as the treatment-
oriented social worker role of probation prevailed.   
  
A parallel problem faced by probation officers was that, throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s there wasn't a body of knowledge about offender treatment, and 
even more importantly, evaluative treatment-related literature was almost non-
existent. This meant that literature on which supervisory strategies were more 
effective was rare, and as a result there was generally a lack of consistency in 
methods of offender supervision. 
 
Probation officers were given an almost impossible task: with very little 
scientifically based theory to guide [probationers’] actions, they were 
expected to keep their charges crime-free. What passed as ways to 
reform probationers often turned out to be little more than attempts to 
indoctrinate them with middle-class moral injunctions – work, go to 
church, keep clean, get ahead, be good – attitudes not consistent with 
real life in city slums.  
  (Clear et al., 2006:53) 
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This operational uncertainty led some politicians to argue against probation, 
claiming that sentencing offenders to probation instead of prison was in fact 
being ‘soft on crime’ (Clear et al., 2006). Despite these criticisms, the use of 
probation continued. This was probably because it was considered to be 
valuable in inducing offenders to plead guilty, thus relieving the pressure on 
overcrowded courts (Clear et al., 2006). 
 
A more uniform approach toward offender supervision began in the 1940s 
when offender reformation was officially adopted as the principal goal of 
punishment and the rise of the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ was significant. 
Correctional administrators embraced psychological and medical literature 
and employed terminology such as ‘treatment’, ‘intervention’ and ‘diagnosis’ 
(Clear et al., 2006; Gibbons, 1992). Supervising officers increasingly viewed 
themselves as ‘caseworkers,’ whose primary aim was to create a therapeutic 
relationship with the offender and help them to live a productive life in the 
community (Cromwell et al., 2005; King, 1991; Vodanovic, 1988). The main 
thrust of this supervisory strategy was to assess the offender and then to 
address the problems that had contributed to their offending behaviour 
(O’Toole, 2006; Broadhurst, 1991; Tulett, 1991).  
 
More specifically, supervising officers established rapport with offenders, and 
then used it to modify their inappropriate behaviour (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Supervising officers were hence ‘agents of change’ who aimed to personally 
reform offenders through their counselling techniques (Clear et al., 2006; 
Cromwell et al., 2005). This mode of supervision was significant for the further 
development of probation and parole as it moved them into the realm of a 
profession. The skills that were developed subsequently became renowned in 
offender interviewing and counselling in social work (Clear et al., 2006; 
Cromwell & Killinger, 1994; Tulett, 1991).  
 
Several factors were responsible for the demise of the ‘Casework Era’ and the 
establishment of a subsequent ideology of probation and parole supervision. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, criminological literature increasingly 
described crime as a complex phenomenon; that is, “the product of poverty, 
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racism, unemployment, unequal opportunities, and other social factors” (Clear 
et al., 2006:190). While in principle supporting community based sanctions 
and offender reintegration, the literature generally encouraged more 
professional and specialised offender treatment (Clear et al., 2006). This 
recommendation was empirically supported by the USA National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973. In its main 
report the Commission concluded that probation and parole failed to realise 
many of their goals because officers dealt inadequately with offenders’ 
complex needs (cited in Cromwell & Killinger, 1994).  
 
A further problem was that there did not seem to be an actual process to 
ascertain when an offender had been rehabilitated. Moreover, when an 
offender was not rehabilitated they were usually blamed despite the fact that 
there could have been actual problems with the rehabilitative programs and 
the nature of their supervision (Daley, 2005; O’Toole, 2006; Broadhurst, 
1991). All of these findings were not surprising, as a compounding problem 
had been that supervising officers had become overburdened with high 
caseloads and administrative duties. They were increasingly unable to 
develop meaningful relationships with offenders, which was the central tenet 
of this supervisory approach (McCarthy et al., 2001). On the basis of these 
operational issues, the Commission advocated for offender treatment to be 
provided by specialised service providers (cited in Cromwell & Killinger, 
1994).   
  
A subsequent mode of offender supervision, which also operated during the 
early phase of HDBS, was called “Brokerage of Services Era” (McCarthy et 
al., 2001). It was particularly prominent during the 1970s when the aim of 
rehabilitating offenders prospered, but, as evaluative studies and prominent 
literature showed, the mode of probation and parole supervision changed 
from officer provided treatment to service brokerage. Under this philosophy, 
the officer’s main role was to determine offenders’ reasons for offending, their 
specific needs (related to employment, training, housing, and health) and then 
refer them for treatment to the appropriate community agency (Clear et al., 
2006). It was anticipated that specialised service providers, skilled in working 
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with specific problems, would then more effectively administer the ‘specialised 
treatment’ than the officer could have (Cromwell et al., 2005). The officer’s 
subsequent task was to monitor the linkages between the offender and the 
appropriate agencies and their overall reintegrative progress in the community 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). Evaluative studies 
praised this specialised rehabilitative approach and, as a result, community 
based correctional budgets grew strongly throughout the 1970s (Clear et al., 
2006).    
 
A less prominent supervision approach which was closely aligned to the 
“Brokerage of Services Era” model and operated during the same timeframe 
was the “Community Resource Management Team Model” (Cromwell et al., 
2005). Probation and parole officers who utilised this model developed 
specialised skills and linkages with community agencies in one or two distinct 
areas such as drug abuse, employment, or family counselling.  Probationers 
and parolees were then assisted by several officers depending on their needs. 
As this supervisory approach was seldom applied, it was not rigorously 
evaluated (Cromwell et al., 2005).  
 
By the late 1970s, the overall condemnation of the rehabilitation ideal and 
rehabilitative programs diminished the general belief in the ability to treat 
offenders (Cromwell et al., 2005; Daley, 2005; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994; 
Broadhurst, 1991; Weatherburn, 1991). According to some authors, such as 
Vodanovich (1988), the demise of rehabilitation, which was the linchpin of 
community based corrections, had a lasting effect on these sanctions as it 
eroded their theoretical basis. The disillusionment resulted in significant 
moves by the criminal justice system to appear tough and punitive on 
criminals. Consequently, a drastic change in community based offender 
supervision occurred - offender reformation was substituted with offender 
deterrence - to be achieved through surveillance and punishment (Clear et al., 
2006; O’Toole, 2006; Daley, 2005; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994; Broadhurst, 
1991; King, 1991). (For more information see Chapter 3.2.4).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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2.3 Middle phase of HDBS – Interregnum (1960s-1980s) 
 
This section describes the middle phase of HDBS across the USA and 
Australia which lasted from the 1960s until the 1980s. This phase consisted of 
five distinct converging factors that resulted in the much more substantial late 
phase of HDBS after the 1980s.  
 
2.3.1 Multifarious drawbacks of imprisonment  
 
Even though criminologists had historically criticised the appropriateness of 
the use of incarceration as the suitable response to most forms of crime,54 the 
period during the 1960s was significant in correctional history as it was 
marked by unprecedented criticism of incarceration (Chan, 1992; Cohen, 
1979). The plentiful arguments against the use of incarceration can be 
classified into three clusters ineffectiveness of prison, inhumaneness of prison 
and cost of prison.   
 
Ineffectiveness of prisons - The foremost argument for increased application 
of community based dispositions was that prisons were not effective in 
deterring and/or rehabilitating offenders (Cohen, 1979; Tomasic & Dobinson, 
1979). Offenders were said to “frequently leave prison with greater reasons 
for offending than when they went in” (Walker, 1991:49). Incarceration was 
found to be supporting criminal socialisation, providing opportunities for 
learning more sophisticated criminal tactics, encouraging gang violence, 
sexual assault and generating racial discord55 (Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et al., 
2001; Enos et al., 1999; Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998; Doherty, 1995; 
Gerkens, 1987; Burns, 1975). This collectively meant that prisons produced 
generally more violent offenders who were more likely to re-offend once they 
                                                 
54
 In fact, there are reports going back to the 1820s which concluded that prison failed to 
reduce crime (Hoggarth, 1991). 
55
 Community based sanctions, and in particular HDBS, could be seen as a relatively non-
violent alternative to incarceration (Wahlrab, 2012; Hallett, 2008; Steger & Lind, 1999; 
Galtung, 1990). There is considerable literature about non-violence, but there does not seem 
to be any discussion of HDBS as a viable non-violent alternative. This research is however 
relevant to a more general discussion on non-violence that goes beyond the current literature 
on HDBS.  
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were released (Chan, 1992; Greenberg, 1975). This was eloquently summed 
up as: prison “is serving little purpose other than to reinforce criminal 
inclinations and to improve the criminal expertise of the sentenced” (Vernon, 
1987:2). 
 
If prisons were overcrowded then the environment within them was even more 
problematic as tensions and frustrations inevitably found in confinement 
situations were generally exacerbated. More specifically, the shortage of 
space and personnel usually meant that it was “difficult for prison 
administrators to protect the weak from the strong56 and to isolate from the 
gang” (Morris, 1988:5). Further, access to and engagement in education, work 
and other programs was restricted (Walker, 1991; Carlson, 1988).    
 
Leading sociological theories in particular became increasingly influential in 
the negative portrayal of incarceration. For example, labelling theory (which 
was dominant during the 1960s), established that the further the offender was 
processed into the criminal justice system and forced into close association 
with other delinquents the more difficult it was to abandon a criminal career, 
reintegrate back into society, and become a ‘conformist’ living a ‘pro-social 
lifestyle’ (McCarthy et al., 2001). Arguments ensued that formalised 
processing and incarceration should be discouraged (Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 
1998; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Hylton, 1982; Cohen, 1979). The government 
therefore had the responsibility to be progressive and support community 
based alternatives to incarceration (Chan, 1992; Cohen, 1979).  
 
Inhumanness of prisons - The burgeoning of community based alternatives to 
imprisonment was further encouraged by the argument that prison was an 
inhumane and even a disgraceful setting. In prison studies of the Victorian 
and South Australian states, Neilson Associates (1983) and Hunt and 
Woodberry (1987) respectively specifically found that conditions in many 
                                                 
56
 It is very common for prisoners to classify themselves into ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak.’ The 
weak, who are usually younger and more impressionable prisoners, constantly live under the 
threat of violence and intimidation (Gerkens, 1987).  
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prisons were inconsistent with the United Nations Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners.57  
     
The facilities can be variously described as outmoded, sub-standard, 
unhygienic, and in some cases unsafe, and generally neglected. 
Even the newer facilities, such as Ararat prison, show signs of 
considerable neglect…   
 
(Neilson Associates, 1983:284) 
  
Chan and Zdenkowski (1986) and Chan (1992) similarly reported that prisons 
were horrific and brutalising places that were characterised by deprivation, 
degradation, boredom, loneliness, loss of privacy and fear of violence. More 
specifically, the older institutions were depicted as “often harsh and 
sometimes barbaric,” and the newer institutions were referred to as “pastel 
prisons” that can be psychologically oppressive (Greenberg, 1975:7).  
 
It was also argued that, in the artificially created setting, offenders “become 
accustomed to an alien lifestyle, which is unlike anything that occurs in the 
community” (Champion, 1996:282). This process of institutionalisation 
occurred due to three reasons. First, offenders were physically separated 
from their family unit and these conventional ties became weakened and 
disrupted. Second, while incarcerated they were constantly surrounded by 
violence and gang activities that became the norm. Third, when prisons were 
overcrowded, which was often the case, all of the negative consequences of 
imprisonment were even more emphasised (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994). It was 
consequently asserted that the experience of imprisonment generally did not 
equip offenders with the necessary skills to cope with conventional life on the 
outside once they were released; alternatively, it made it very difficult for them 
to readjust to society and live productive lives (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Van 
Ness, 1992).  
 
                                                 
57
 These are specific guidelines outlining the minimum acceptable standards of prison life 
concerning for example, accommodation, hygiene and food; thus, these are essentially “basic 
rights” of prisoners (Hunt & Woodberry, 1987:48).  
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Cost of prison - An added bonus further supporting the proliferation of 
community based sanctions, in fact the “hard evidence” (Walker, 1991:49), 
was that institutional punishments were simply too expensive when compared 
with community based sanctions (Dean-Myrda, & Cullen, 1998; Walker, 1991; 
McCarthy, 1987; Cohen, 1979). It is worth noting that these early cost 
analyses simply compared the direct cost of being on the HDBS and per diem 
cost of incarceration (Schmidt, 1994b). Therefore, they omitted the indirect 
non-correctional costs of incarceration such as the loss of productivity of 
persons previously employed and the costs of welfare support for their 
families once they were sent to prison. These are typically avoided when a 
sentence is served in the community. If these costs of incarceration were also 
included, then the cost saving associated with community based dispositions 
would have been even higher (Walker, 1991).  
 
Prisons were actually becoming increasingly costly during the 1960s due to 
the rapidly rising cost of prison construction and government employees’ 
salaries (Abadinsky, 1987; Greenberg, 1975). In the USA, states found the 
spiraling costs of incarceration in the 1960s particularly intolerable because 
they were not used to bearing any of the costs of offender incarceration 
(Cromwell et al., 2005). As mentioned earlier, taxpayers only started 
contributing to the costs of incarceration in the 1940s and soon after they 
ended up paying the entirety of the prison costs (Cromwell et al., 2005).   
 
Numerous researchers and correctional departments therefore presented 
calculations that states could save substantial amounts of money if lower-risk 
offenders were supervised in the community instead of being sent to prison 
(Petersilia, 1987). Further, as opposed to imprisonment where the indirect 
non-correctional costs are considerable, when community based sanctions 
are imposed these are turned into substantial savings (Joutsen & Zvekic, 
1994). This is because community based dispositions, unlike prisons, are 
‘socially cost-effective’ due to “indirect welfare savings occasioned by 
offenders continuing in employment, contributing to the support of their 
families and saving their family circle from psychological and financial 
disruption” (Fox, 1987a:139). The multifarious drawbacks of imprisonment led 
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to an ideological shift where the prison became the last resort and community 
based sanctions became preferred.  
 
2.3.2 Ideological shift - prison becomes last resort and community 
based sanctions expand  
 
The catalyst for the stakeholders’ shift towards a much more substantial 
utilisation of community based punishment was extensive literature from the 
1950s and 1960s which argued there was a multitude of irrecoverable 
problems with imprisonment (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Chan, 1992; Cohen, 
1979; McCarthy, 1987; Greenberg, 1975). Instead of incarceration McCarthy 
(1987:3) advocated for a more rapid expansion of diversionary programs, 
hailing non-institutional sanctions as “best strategies to meet individual 
offender needs, promote reintegration, and reduce crime.” An added bonus 
was the fact that these programs were cheaper than incarceration (McCarthy, 
1987).  
 
As both the USA and Australia were in a financial position to experiment in the 
1960s (that is, there was full employment, rising wages, and an expansion of 
the welfare state) and the overall sentiment during this era was based on 
‘general progression’, alternatives to incarceration flourished (Ball et al., 1988; 
McCarthy, 1987). This period of economic prosperity, which started following 
the end of the Second World War, peaked in the 1960s, and collapsed in the 
early 1970s, was referred to by some observers as the “golden age of 
controlled capitalism” (Steger, 2003:38). Bipartisan political support prospered 
in both the USA and Australia and various legislative changes were 
implemented enabling state sponsored policies towards community based 
sentences to become fully effective and the prison became a sentencing 
option defined as “last resort” (Chan & Ericson, 1981:5). It was presumed that 
non-custodial sentences would be more effective in rehabilitating offenders as 
they would reduce their reoffending and subsequent incarceration rates 
(Meyer, 2004; McCarthy, 1987).  
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In the USA, major efforts were undertaken by the state to accelerate the 
diversion of criminals away from prisons (Greenberg, 1975). The most 
significant legislation, supported across the political spectrum, was the Model 
Sentencing Act which was revised in 1963 to instruct judges to sentence all 
offenders (providing that they posed no danger of serious harm to public 
safety) to community based sentences (Greenberg, 1975). In addition, 
reputable government-sponsored studies (two federally appointed 
commissions the President’s Commission, 1967, and National Advisory 
Commission, 1973, as well as a state-appointed body Citizen’s Study 
Committee 1972, cited in Greenberg, 1975) advocated for a further expansion 
of the criminal justice sentencing continuum and greater use of community 
dispositions.  
 
Similarly, the utilisation of community based sentences was gathering 
momentum in Australia during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Almost every 
government commission, task force and department associated with 
sentencing and penal policy encouraged this (Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986). 
The laws were also changed in all states and territories to widen the 
application of community sentences and apply the principle of using 
imprisonment as a sentencing option of last resort.  
 
Even though there was certain vagueness about what community corrections 
actually meant, community based programs quickly expanded in relative 
obscurity and largely free from critical scrutiny (McCarthy et al., 2001; 
Petersilia, 1997; Greenberg, 1975). While there was a slight increase in the 
parole rate, the most rapid growth was in the size of the probation service in 
both the USA and Australia (Polk, 1987). In fact, in Australia during the 1970s 
the Adult Probation Service expanded three-fold in terms of its officer 
personnel (Tulett, 1991; Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986). The problem however 
was that the rate of imprisonment remained relatively stable (Polk, 1987). 
Further,  
 
there was no independent evaluation studies to establish whether the 
[community based sentences] were being implemented effectively, 
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and whether the goal of rehabilitating probationers was being 
achieved in the manner that the legislators envisaged.  
 
(Tulett, 1991:130)  
  
The expansion of community based sanctions was subsequently vigorously 
challenged as part of the decarceration debate. 
 
2.3.3 Decarceration debates  
 
Well-publicised criticisms of incarceration led to increasing dissatisfaction of 
its use for controlling offenders. This was supposed to be overcome by the 
widespread introduction of non-custodial sanctions which were ‘miraculously’ 
seen to be: 
 
 more effective than imprisonment as they increase the chance of the 
successful reintegration of the offender into the community 
 a more humane way of punishing an offender as they remained within 
their conventional network of support 
 less costly than imprisonment (Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998; McMahon, 
1992; Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986; Scull, 1984; Hylton, 1982; Chan & 
Ericson, 1981; Cohen, 1979).  
 
According to Cohen (1979:342) this set of justifications was “repeated with the 
regularity of religious catechism” and was seen to be a “matter of common 
sense”, “what everybody knows”, or the “irrefutable result of empirical 
research”. The proponents of this approach as well as anybody who called 
themselves progressive, insisted that community based sanctions “must 
obviously be better” and must at “least be given a chance” (Cohen, 1979:342).  
 
Despite the fact that extensive arguments against incarceration propelled the 
widespread introduction of community based sanctions, Scull (1977) argued 
that decarceration was only able to occur in the second half of the 20th century 
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because of the costly development of the post-Second World War welfare 
state and unsustainable segregative modes of social control. Scull (1977) 
therefore theorised that although three main justifications had been given for 
the shift towards community corrections (in that prisons were considered to be 
ineffective, inhumane and expensive), the primary element in the reform 
movement was the growing fiscal crisis of the state. This crisis occurred due 
to the unprecedented ‘social organisation’ of capitalist societies which 
effectively meant that there was a significant rise in expenditure on health, 
education and social security programs during the 1960s. Government 
spending also rose due to the unionisation of state employees which almost 
doubled the cost of institutional care in prisons and mental institutions (Scull, 
1977). In the late 1960s, however, the maintenance of this welfare state 
became unsustainable and intense pressure was mounted to reduce public 
expenditure (Ball et al., 1988).  
  
Scull (1977) asserted that the beginning of this economic crisis created by 
significant new expenditures was the catalyst that forced the state to 
increasingly employ cheaper alternatives to the traditional institutionalisation 
of deviants (mentally ill and prisoners) in mental institutions and prisons. 
Decarceration was supported by the fact that the mentally ill and criminals 
were for the first time provided with public housing as well as welfare 
payments while undergoing their ‘treatment in the community’ (Scull, 
1977:152). 
 
Theory of decarceration was based on an analysis of the USA prison 
population which between 1962 and 1970 was characterised by a steady 
reduction and a simultaneous increase in community based controls such as 
probation and parole (Scull, 1977). The same time period saw a reduction in 
the size of most mental hospitals and even the closure of several of them 
(including some juvenile reformatories) as well as a continuing increase in 
community based responses such as half-way houses58 (Scull, 1977). 
                                                 
58
 Unlike today when half-way houses are used only for criminals as a part of their re-
integrative post-prison process, they were used for both criminals and the mentally ill in the 
1970s (Scull, 1977).  
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However, it should be noted that Scull’s (1977) analysis missed the rapid 
growth of the prison population during the 1970s across the USA (USA 
Department of Justice, 1978 cited in Chan & Ericson, 1981). 
 
Nevertheless, the historically unprecedented major shift in social control and 
practice resulted in deviants being “dumped back on the rest of us” in the 
community while they “received little or no supervision” (Scull, 1977:1). Scull 
(1977) illustrated this in the following statement: 
 
For the criminal and delinquent, ‘community corrections’ has meant a 
further erosion of the sanctions imposed on their conduct. Not only are 
they steadily less likely to be caught in the first place, but if they do 
have the misfortune to be apprehended and convicted, their chance of 
receiving a prison term grows ever more remote. Instead they find 
themselves released on probation, ‘supervised’ by men coping with 
caseloads of one and two hundred persons. This allows the probation 
officer to give each case an average of ten or fifteen minutes’ attention 
per week.  
(Scull, 1977:2)  
 
These ‘inadequately supervised’ offenders were placed in deteriorating inner-
city neighbourhoods where caring and coping with them was problematic due 
to limited resources. In these ‘delinquent ghettos’ the extent of state 
intervention and expenditure substantially reduced (Scull, 1977).  
Consequently, the end of the golden age of controlled capitalism meant that 
cheaper ways of confinement became a necessity (Scull, 1977). The cycle of 
penal reform and reaction was governed by economic constraint which led to 
a less punitive outlook (Weatherburn, 1991).  
 
While subsequent researchers generally regarded Scull’s (1977) analysis of 
decarceration of mental patients as influential, his explanations of 
decarceration of criminal offenders were found to be problematic (Chan, 
1992). More specifically, the criticisms were mainly centred on Scull’s 
description and explanations of decarceration as a phenomenon (Chan, 
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1992). In particular, consequent researchers vigorously challenged “the ‘holy 
trinity’ of reform rhetoric” that community based sanctions are going to be less 
costly, more effective and humane in comparison to incarceration (McMahon, 
1992:33). Matthews (1979) and Chan (1992) however rigorously criticised 
Scull’s (1977) entire study by for its sketchy data, methodological 
shortcomings, theoretical confusions and political impotence. 
 
Extensive literature appeared disputing the notion that community-based 
corrections were successful in reducing the state’s costs. One of the first 
researchers to warn about the cost-effectiveness argument was Greenberg 
(1975). Based on an examination of the USA Departments of Corrections data 
where extensive implementation of community based sanctions had taken 
place, he concluded that “substantial budget cuts through decarceration seem 
slight” (Greenberg, 1975:6). This was due to the running costs in prisons 
being fixed and not able to fluctuate when there are less prisoners.  
 
Other researchers generally supported Greenberg’s finding, explaining that 
savings are only marginal until the number of prisoners is substantial enough 
to affect the staffing of the facility or reduce the requirement for construction of 
additional facilities (Schmidt, 1994b; Polk, 1987). Weatherburn’s (1991) 
analysis of the variable cost of imprisonment, such as prisoners’ meals and 
the cost of managing them, however illustrated that such costs are 
considerable and a diversionary program could have a significant impact on 
reducing them. 
 
Hylton’s research (1982) had similarly challenged the assumption/finding that 
community based alternatives are cheap. Based on a meta-analysis of 
evaluations of non-custodial sanctions in the USA he reported that, while a 
simple comparison between the ‘per offender’ costs of incarceration versus a 
community based disposition is generally going to conclude that community 
based supervision is cheaper. This is often misleading since the low costs of 
community based sanctions often reflect the lack of quality of the services 
provided (Hylton, 1982:364-365). To illustrate this point Hylton (1982: 364-
365) asserted that: 
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the assessment of the costs associated with community corrections is 
much more complex than usually suggested by proponents ... When 
complex factors are considered, it becomes clear that in many 
instances financial savings do not accrue from community programs; 
where savings are achieved, it is often because program objectives 
have been sacrificed... It [also] seems reasonable to suggest that some 
of the portion of police costs, other security costs, court costs, and 
expenses associated with insurance claims, property loss, medical 
care, disability payments, and the like, ought to be attributed to the 
policy of operating programs of correction in the community.  
 
Matthews (1979) supported this conclusion stating that community based 
programs would be considerably more expensive if they provided appropriate 
rehabilitation programs that target various offender needs such as drug use, 
psychiatric issues and lack of educational/vocational skills. If indirect costs, 
even though these are not borne by the correctional system, were also 
somehow included in the overall cost of community corrections, the costs 
would be more expensive than imprisonment (Hylton, 1982; Greenberg, 
1975).   
 
Cohen’s (1979) findings were particularly damming, as he reported that 
government savings were impossible because decarceration had actually 
resulted in an expansion of ‘new populations of offenders’ in the criminal 
justice system. This argument was based on his statistical analysis of British 
and USA incarceration rates during the 1970s which were either steady or 
increasing. Furthermore, he found that increasing numbers of minor offenders 
who would have otherwise avoided incarceration were formally processed and 
placed on community based sanctions. Cohen explained that the problem was 
that community based sanctions had “become not alternatives at all but new 
programs which supplement the existing system or else expand it by 
attracting new populations” (Cohen, 1979:347). This pioneering finding was 
termed “widening of the net of social control,” or ‘net widening’ for short 
(Cohen, 1979:347).  
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Chan and Ericson (1981) and Hylton (1982) agreed with Cohen’s notion that 
there had been no cost savings, but in fact an increase in the use of 
community based penalties beyond the regular use of prisons. Chan and 
Ericson (1981) empirically proved this on the basis of their analysis of the 
official trend data of public expenditure statistics in Canada during the 1970s 
when community correctional programs were heavily implemented. Similarly, 
Hylton (1982), who had examined the effects of the introduction of community 
correctional programs in Saskatchewan (Canada) from 1962-1979, found that 
not only was there no reduction in the number of offenders incarcerated, but 
also that there was a three-fold increase in the number of people under state 
supervision. It was concluded that decarceration had turned out to be more 
expensive than institutionalisation as it was accompanied by a substantial 
growth of the criminal control apparatus (Hylton, 1982; Chan & Ericson, 
1981). According to Chan and Ericson (1981:45) community based sanctions 
became “add ons” to the criminal justice system rather than genuine 
alternatives to incarceration.  
 
It was no surprise that comparative research assessing correctional spending 
in Australia, Canada and the USA concluded that there had been an 
enormous increase in expenditure. For example, in Australia in 1968-69 
combined correctional outlays were $22 million and in 1981-82 they had 
increased significantly to $276 million (Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986).   
 
A number of studies have also pointed out that there is a lack of empirical 
support for the premise that community-based sentences are more effective 
than institutional punishments in reducing the crime rate. Cohen (1979:343) 
specifically reported that in Britain and in the USA during the 1970s “no 
community alternative to imprisonment had proven to be more effective in 
reducing crime (through preventing recidivism) than imprisonment”. Hylton 
(1982) supported this finding after conducting a meta-analysis of existing 
evaluations of non-custodial sanctions throughout the Western world. He 
emphasised that by 1982 no Western country which had widely adopted 
community based programs was reporting substantial reductions in crime or 
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recidivism rates. Morris (1974) and Chan and Zdenkowski, (1986) similarly 
reaffirmed this finding by concluding that there was no substantial reduction in 
prisoner numbers and clearly no indication of prisons ‘disappearing’ anywhere 
in the world.  
 
The lack of effectiveness of community based sanctions was attributed to the 
inadequacy of appropriate community based services and treatment for the 
vast majority of offenders on these sanctions. Blomberg (1980), who re-
examined a number of studies that assessed the quantity and quality of 
services provided to those sentenced to community based dispositions in the 
USA, found that offender treatment was uneven and that offenders frequently 
did not receive the services that were ordered by the court. Hylton (1982) 
agreed with Blomberg (1980) concluding that it is not clear that clients 
generally receive adequate services in the community. Earlier Greenberg 
(1975) reported that even in cases where community based treatment was 
available it did not prove to be particularly effective, and at times it had a 
detrimental effect. Consequently, studies overwhelmingly suggested that 
community based sanctions do not rehabilitate offenders more effectively than 
prisons.  
  
More generally, Greenberg (1975) explained that the community may not be 
the ‘ideal’ therapeutic place for offender treatment and rehabilitation as the 
offender ‘got into trouble there’ in the first instance. Consequently, when the 
offender is sentenced onto a community based sanction the criminogenic 
environment in which they may have lived still surrounds them. For example, 
past criminally-inclined associates and drug use could be the obstacles to 
compliance on these sanctions. Offender reintegration may be additionally 
difficult as “the community itself may have little desire to be reintegrated with 
its criminals” (Greenberg, 1975:5).  He concluded that high rates of recidivism 
maybe the result of many complex factors in society, not simply inadequate 
treatment provision on the community based sanction.   
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The final argument that community based programs are more humane in 
comparison with correctional institutions had also been questioned by a 
growing body of evidence. Reviewing the operation of community based 
sanctions in the USA and Britain, Hylton (1982), Cohen (1979), and 
Greenberg (1975) collectively argued that for many offenders being on a non-
custodial sentence is more similar than dissimilar to being in prison. For 
example, Cohen (1979), in discussing the blurring of boundaries between 
institutional and non-institutional punishments, emphasised that halfway 
houses have rules which are very similar to the rules imposed in institutions. 
He concluded that sometimes it was very difficult to distinguish between the 
experiences of the two sanctions. This argument was also illustrated by 
Greenberg (1975:8-9): 
 
the substitution of a halfway house or group home for a prison or 
reformatory is not “deinstitutionalisation” but the replacement of one 
institution by another… When freedom from supervision can be 
reached simply by walking away, and is therefore a constant 
temptation, some halfway house residents may find contained 
residence in the house even more irritating than the prison. Indeed, 
male ex-prisoners released to halfway houses in several large cities 
have indicated to the author that they had initially accepted halfway 
house placement with the expectation that it would be an improvement 
on prison, but later found they had been mistaken.  
 
It is no surprise that many offenders reported being ‘resentful’ soon after 
being placed in a half-way house, as strict regulations were imposed on them, 
including abstaining from drugs, alcohol and sexual activities, as well as 
adhering to a strictly enforced curfew (Greenberg, 1975). Compliance with 
being ‘half-free’ and resisting the constant temptation of freedom, which can 
be reached by simply walking away, was reported to be particularly difficult for 
offenders (Greenberg, 1975). Conditions imposed on offenders on community 
based sanctions, which seem to favour punitive goals as opposed to 
rehabilitative goals, often resemble the features of custodial sentences which 
they were originally designed to replace (Cohen, 1979).  
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By the early 1980s therefore the available evidence indicated that all three 
principal arguments presented to maintain the widespread adoption of 
community based programs were dubious (Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986). In 
particular, there was clearly no indication of community based programs being 
more humane and effective than prison and leading to reduced correctional 
outlays (Hylton, 1982; Chan & Ericson, 1981; Scull, 1977). As Hylton 
(1982:372) concluded: 
 
Community programs have not reduced reliance on correctional 
institutions; instead, they have served to expand greatly the proportion 
of the population under state supervision. While many clients are 
channelled into services that are inexpensive to operate, the social 
control apparatus as a whole has expanded and the costs associated 
with the maintenance of social order have continued to increase.  
 
Hence, the widespread introduction of community based sanctions throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s widened the net of social control and increased 
correctional outlays (Hylton, 1982; Cohen, 1979). This led to the ‘get tough on 
crime’ philosophy. 
  
2.3.4 ‘Get tough on crime’, phenomenal prison overcrowding and 
escalating cost  
  
A multitude of factors throughout the 1970s contributed to the subsequent ‘get 
tough on crime’ policy and unprecedented prison overcrowding crises in the 
USA and Australia.59 In the USA it began in the early 1970s with the rampant 
increase in crime and acts of civil disobedience against the USA’s 
involvement in the Vietnam war in major cities throughout the country 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998; Gibbons, 1992; Hartjen, 
1992; Morris, 1988; Petersilia, Turner, Kahan & Peterson, 1985). Interestingly 
enough, the increase in crime was not ‘actual’ as, according to victim surveys, 
                                                 
59
 Prison overcrowding however was not a new phenomenon in corrections. As Morris 
(1988:5) eloquently summed up “after all, it was the overcrowded prison and hulks of 18
th
 
century England, combined with the revolutionary fervour of the dissident colonial Americans, 
that brought the First Fleet here (to Australia) two hundred years ago.” 
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it was the reporting of crime that was rising dramatically, not the actual 
commission of criminal of acts (Kennan, 1987). Further, it is worth noting that 
new categories of crime were established and crime was generally being 
better detected and prosecuted than in the past (Kennan, 1987). Property 
crime in fact made up 80% of all reported crime during this time. This 
substantial increase coincided with the global economic instability that was 
characterised by high inflation, low economic growth, high unemployment, 
and public sector deficits as well as the increased use of illicit drugs (Steger, 
2003; McCarthy et al., 2001; Holten & Handberg, 1990).  
  
Despite the fact that the type of crime that was escalating was overwhelmingly 
property crime, combined with acts of civil disobedience, the media cultivated 
the community’s fear of crime by highlighting isolated cases of sensational 
and terrifying violent acts. This led to an unfounded national concern about 
soaring violent crime and the community changing their lifestyles in order to 
avoid serious victimisation (Lurigio & Petersilia, 1992; Burns, 1975). 
Traditionally held punitive sentiments towards offenders were easy for the 
media to ignite. As Ranaulf (1964, cited in Greenberg 1975:24) described:  
 
Those who have hoped that the public would forgive and forget have 
not considered that there may be social-psychological sources to the 
desire to punish which cannot be simply wished away. 
 
As a result, the public demanded the harsher treatment of criminals 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998; Gibbons, 1992; Hartjen, 
1992; Morris, 1988; Petersilia et al., 1985). The judiciary was fiercely criticised 
as it was believed that it was too lenient in sentencing offenders. Instead it 
was argued that more stringent sentences, predominantly incarceration, 
needed to be imposed (Burns, 1975). In particular, incarceration of offenders, 
based on just deserts [spelt also as just desserts] principles, was favoured. 
This is however contrary to the purpose for which the prison was initially 
established (Dawes, 1988). The modern prison, which was invented in the 
late 18th century by the Quakers of Pennsylvania, was in fact based on 
humanitarian and rehabilitative principles, thus replacing corporal punishment 
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(Dawes, 1988). Morris (cited in Dawes, 1988:63) described it most eloquently 
as “a gift born of benevolence not malevolence, of philanthropy not 
punitiveness.” 
 
In addition, negative community based and rehabilitative program evaluations 
appeared in the mid-1970s, exacerbating the growing cynicism regarding the 
effectiveness of correctional treatment. This resulted in a decline in 
enthusiasm for offender rehabilitation (McCarthy et al., 2001). The most 
renowned such study in the rehabilitation literature is summarised as ‘nothing 
works’ (Sarre, 2005:164). It was actually an article written by the infamous 
Robert Martinson, who was part of a research team60 that explored the 
effectiveness of USA correctional rehabilitative programs. This study 
employed the technique of ‘meta analysis’ to systematically re-analyse 231 
studies of rehabilitative programs. These studies were carefully selected on 
the basis that they were conducted in a time period between 1945 and 1967 
in the USA and were all determined to be methodologically rigorous 
(McMahon, 1992:16). Martinson’s study update, which became one of the 
most frequently quoted articles in rehabilitation literature, titled ‘What works? 
Questions and answers about prison reform’ (1974:25 cited in Sarre, 
2005:162), concluded that “with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative 
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on 
recidivism”.   
 
Even though the subsequent final report (by Lipton, Martinson & Wilks, 1975) 
negated ‘closing the rehabilitation door’ (Holt, 1998), and Martinson himself 
later re-affirmed the value of offender rehabilitation (cited in Sarre, 2005), 
rehabilitation’s demise was secured. This was because Martinson’s (1974 
cited in Sarre, 2005) preliminary finding that the rehabilitation ideal had failed 
was quickly embraced by both sides of USA politics and widely publicised. In 
particular, liberals (democrats) initially felt confused about the failure of 
community based and rehabilitative programs. The conservatives 
(republicans) however quickly embraced these negative findings, proposing to 
                                                 
60
 In fact, Martinson subsequently joined Lipton and Wilks when they were well into the 
research (Sarre, 2005:164). 
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end lawlessness and increasing crime rates by ‘getting tough’ on offenders. 
As the community embraced conservatives’ suggestions, the liberals also 
started to vigorously support them (Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998).   
 
It was consequently believed that, if offender rehabilitation could no longer be 
legitimated by science, then there was no actual role for indeterminate 
sentencing, early release mechanisms or ‘lenient probation’. As a result, an 
innately retributive public turned its complete attention to the strict penalising 
of ‘irreparable’ offenders (Holt, 1998; Petersilia et al., 1985).  
 
The escalating rates of crime and fear of crime, together with the presumed 
failure of the correctional rehabilitative ideal, resulted in the ‘get tough’ 
approach to sentencing of offenders in the late 1970s and 1980s (Ball et al., 
1988:32). The most profound legislative amendment was at a Federal level by 
the conservative Regan administration61 - the Sentencing Reform Act (1984) - 
requiring ‘truth in sentencing’, with the main intention to teach offenders that 
‘crime does not pay’ (McCarthy et al., 2001).   
 
The shift in federal sentencing policy pragmatically influenced state policies in 
every USA state. They amended their policing, prosecutorial and judicial 
practices to be based on severity as opposed to leniency (Holt, 1998; Corbett 
& Marx, 1992; Morris, 1988). This was achieved through a number of specific 
reforms including the abolition of early release, mandatory minimum 
sentences62 and determinate sentencing63 (Holt, 1998; Lurigio & Petersilia, 
1992).  
 
Long-lasting, strictly-deprivative incarceration was supposed to not only deter 
offenders from re-offending, but also to prevent those contemplating criminal 
                                                 
61
 Ronald Regan was the President of the USA from 1981 until 1989. During this time his 
administration implemented numerous punitive correctional policies (McCarthy et al., 2001).  
62
 Under mandatory sentencing, regardless of the circumstances of the case and offender’s 
background, a minimum sentence to be served in prison is dependent on the crime 
committed (Schmidt, 1994a). For example, the minimum prison time to be served by violent 
offenders usually increased to 85% (Holt, 1998). 
63
 Sentencing indeterminancy, prior to being terminated, was used as a traditional way to 
reduce and control prison crowding (Alarid et al., 2008; Tonry & Lynch, 1996; McCarthy et al., 
2001). 
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conduct from engaging in it (Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998). Therefore, the 
overarching belief was that the ‘war against crime’ would be won if the 
criminal justice system collectively treated offenders punitively by imprisoning 
them (Braithwaite, 1988). Criminologists at the time however argued that the 
war on crime can only be won by engaging offenders in various pro-social 
community based initiatives, that is, schools, churches, playgrounds, work 
places and homes (Braithwaite, 1988; Carlson, 1988; Morris, 1988). In 
particular, Braithwaite (1988:56) 25 years ago stated that “the major elements 
of victory will be employment, education, health welfare and more equal social 
and economic opportunities for all citizens.” As predicted, ‘war on crime’ has 
not been won by simply incarcerating offenders. Community based 
reintegrative initiatives have delivered much better outcomes. (For more 
information see Clear, 2007; Clear & Cole, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, the difficulty was that politicians were elected on the basis of 
two opposing ideologies - getting tough on crime as well as reducing the 
burden on taxpayers (Clear, 1997; Cochran, 1992). So, the community 
wanted offenders to be punished by being incarcerated but without an 
increase in their taxes64 (Carlson, 1988). This meant that, in practice, 
“everyone wanted an ever-increasing piece of a constantly shrinking fiscal 
pie” (Cochran, 1992:309). Escalating prison funding throughout the 1970s had 
come “at the expense of having to reduce funding for schools, roads, 
economic development, health care, and other priorities” (Clear & Dammer, 
2003:101). A significant problem with this change in the allocation of 
expenditure was that an actual investment (as opposed to reduced spending) 
in health care, education, housing and employment would have probably 
reduced the number of criminogenic situations and had a considerable and 
lasting effect on crime and delinquency (Morris, 1988).  
 
The get tough on crime policy resulted in longer-term incapacitation and soon 
lead to a tremendous strain on the existing prison system (Lilly, Ball, Curry & 
                                                 
64
 In addition, the community also did not want prisons being built in their neighbourhoods. In 
fact, popular opinion was held that they should be constructed as far as possible in sparsely, 
populated/unpopulated country areas (Carlson, 1988). 
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McMullen, 1993; Corbett & Marx, 1992; Gibbons, 1992; McCarthy, 1987). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the prison populations in the USA kept 
spiralling out of control (Whitfield, 1997; Tonry & Lynch, 1996). Hylton 
(1982:343) encapsulated this view as follows:  
 
The American Correctional Association reported in 1980 that numbers 
in state and federal institutions had reached an all-time high for the fifth 
consecutive year. State and federal prison populations reached 
310,000 that year, a 58 percent increase over the figures for 1970, 
while the United States population increased by less than 10 percent in 
the same period. 
 
Between 1975 and 1985 the prison population grew 10 times faster than the 
general population, that is, it doubled, so prison overcrowding not surprisingly 
became rife (Gibbons, 1992; Braithwaite, 1988). This occurred despite the 
fact that “old and discarded buildings were once more being reopened and 
crammed with prisoners” (Hylton, 1982:343). A crisis point was reached in the 
1980s, as prison operating capacity met less than one third of required bed 
space (Wilson, 1998; Austin & Krisberg, 1982).  
 
During this time, rates of imprisonment had been escalating in almost every 
English speaking democracy (Morris, 1988; Richards, 1988; Vodanovich, 
1988; Kennan, 1987). However, it is interesting to note that the proliferation of 
stricter laws in the USA during the 1970s and 1980s comparatively resulted in 
the exclusion of more people per capita from their communities in prisons 
than in any other Western country (Lurigio & Petersilia, 1992; Morris & Tonry, 
1990; Lilly, 1989). This comparative disparity in rates of imprisonment 
between the USA and other Western countries has continued to this day 
(Cole, 2011; Reichel, 2008; Roth, 2005). 
 
The escalation in punitiveness that was created by the ‘get tough’ rhetoric in 
the 1970s is still generally operational despite the fact that it has not been 
justified on any theoretical grounds, nor have any social benefits been served 
by it (Clear & Dammer, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2001; Clear, 1997; Clear, 
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1994). However, during the last few years there have for the first time been 
indications of more reasonable crime and justice policies in the USA, such as 
the justice reinvestment movement, resulting in actual flattening out of the 
incarceration rate and even its reduction in state prisons (Cole, 2011; 
Guerino, Harrison & Sabol, 2011). The shift in policies has been the result of 
states’ inability to finance growing prison populations due to the country’s 
economic downturn as well as global instability (Brown & Schwartz, 2011; 
Clear et al., 2006; Tonry, 2004).   
 
A substantial number of prisoners took legal action in the 1980s, arguing that 
overcrowding in prisons violated the eight-amendment of the USA 
Constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The Federal 
courts agreed that the overcrowding crisis contravened the USA Constitution 
and subjected 40 states (particularly those in the south of the country) to 
judicial orders limiting their prison population and making it mandatory for 
them to address overcrowding (Whitfield, 1997; Schmidt, 1994a; Walker, 
1991; United States General Accounting Office, 1990; Petersilia, 1987; Austin 
& Krisberg, 1982). 
 
The most problematic consequence of the get tough approach was that the 
‘incarceration binge’ quickly meant ‘going broke’ (Braithwaite, 1988; Petersilia, 
1987). Between 1960 and 1980 spending on corrections more than doubled, 
and in the following 10 years it doubled again (Whitfield, 1997; Braithwaite, 
1988). More demanding prison standards and increasingly expensive prison 
construction and operation meant that the USA could not build new prisons 
fast enough to keep pace with the increasing number of offenders being 
sentenced to incarceration (Whitfield, 1997; Walker, 1991; United States 
General Accounting Office, 1990). It must be remembered that while the initial 
costs of construction and the conversion of prison space were expensive, 
long-term operational expenses were even more astronomical (Carlson, 
1988). 
 
[Even] politicians were starting to admit (though often not in public) that 
they could not build their way out of the problem when the capital cost 
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of each new cell was $75,000 and revenue costs of $14,000 per 
prisoner per year had been reached.  
 
(Whitfield, 1997:35) 
 
The fact that prison overcrowding reached epidemic proportions, coupled with 
policy makers’ inability to finance the rapid building of new prisons, invariably 
resulted in increased sentencing of serious offenders onto community based 
sentences (McCarthy, 1987). (For more information see section 2.3.5). 
 
Unsurprisingly, a very similar situation was taking place in Australia. Despite 
the fact that the specific type of crime that was officially increasing 
significantly was property crime (Gerkens, 1987), the public’s general 
perception of crime became dominated by violent crimes as reported by the 
tabloid media. It should however be noted that in Australia, similarly to the 
USA, it is most likely that the ‘actual’ crime rate was not drastically increasing, 
but people were more likely to report crime so the official crime rate was 
increasing dramatically (Kennan, 1987). In addition, as mentioned earlier, 
crime was generally better detected and prosecuted than in the past (Kennan, 
1987). Dramatic reporting of victimisations resulted in increasingly vocal 
lobbying for perpetrators of crime to be safely locked away (Richards, 1991; 
Nicholson, 1988). This resonated with the public and in turn meant that they 
became so concerned about the incidence of violent crime and the fear of 
becoming a victim, that they wanted to punish all offenders harshly (Patmore, 
1991; Vodanovich, 1988). Research has however shown that it is generally a 
false notion that victims of crime are comforted and mollified by increased 
punishment of the offender (Stoneman, 1991). 
  
Increased public antipathy towards crime and criminals created a climate 
where the prevailing mood was in favour of ‘getting tough’ toward offenders, 
and the imposition of harsher law enforcement and penal policies (Biles, 
1996; Weatherburn, 1991; Gerkens, 1987). Community’s “right to feel secure 
and protected from crime” was solely equated with sentencing of offenders to 
lengthy terms of incarceration (Hunt & Woodberry, 1987:52). This was despite 
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equivocal evidence that did not support imprisonment as a method of crime 
prevention (Lobban, 1987; Zdenkowski, 1987). Gerkens (1987), Kennan 
(1987) and Zdenkowski (1987) however criticised the significant influence of 
the ‘media reported public opinion,’ arguing that it usually comprised the vocal 
minority, those usually uninformed, due to a lack of access to detailed and 
accurate information about sentencing matters. A recommendation was made 
to set up an independent body that could gauge informed public opinion and 
that would more appropriately guide policy making in the criminal justice 
sphere but this did not eventuate for some years65 (Kennan, 1987). 
 
The community’s perceived leniency of the criminal justice system resulted in 
bipartisan political support in most jurisdictions across Australia to increase 
prison sentences by abolishing remissions for good behaviour and early 
licence releases. More specifically, legislation encompassing USA slogans 
such as ‘truth-in-sentencing’66 or ‘real time sentencing’ and ‘three strikes and 
you’re out’ was implemented (Biles, 1996; Richards, 1991; Stoneman, 1991). 
Further, 
 
expert reviews of the role of sentencing suggested that ‘just deserts’ 
should be the primary aim of sentencing policy and that the aims of 
deterrence and rehabilitation are relevant but secondary (Australian 
Law Reform Commission, 1988). Thus, ‘just punishment’ which 
stresses proportionality, certainty and limited executive discretion 
restricts the extent that sentencers can pursue deterrent or 
rehabilitative purposes.  
(Broadhurst, 1991:25)   
 
The reform process throughout Australia was therefore aimed at 
reconstructing penalties and curtailing release discretion to enhance certainty 
                                                 
65
 It was not until 2004 that the independent statutory body titled the ‘Sentencing Advisory 
Council’ was established in Victoria. Its main role is to inform the community about sentencing 
issues and to advise the government and courts about community perceptions (Sentencing 
Advisory Council, 2012).   
66
 For example, in New South Wales the extra punitive power granted by the ‘truth in 
sentencing’ laws is seen in the minimum percentage of the total sentence to be served in 
prison for life sentences trebling from approximately 25% to 75% under the new minimum 
term (Stoneman, 1991).  
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and significantly reduce early release options, such as parole eligibility for 
offenders (Broadhurst, 1991; Kennan, 1987). The abolition of a pre-existing 
safety valve to reduce overcrowding in prisons resulted in a prison 
overcrowding problem for Australian jurisdictions which was very similar to the 
aforementioned situation in the USA (Stoneman, 1991; Gerkens, 1987).  
  
A potent combination of punitive attitudes and sentencing practices led to 
escalating rates of imprisonment67 and acute prison overcrowding in all 
mainland states in Australia (Biles, 1996; Owston, 1991; Stoneman, 1991; 
Lay, 1988a; Vernon, 1987; Zdenkowski, 1987). For example, in Victoria, 
which has had a traditionally relatively low incarceration rate, prison numbers 
grew by almost 100% in a three-year period from 1984 to 1987 (Kidston, 
1987). As the sheer number of offenders overwhelmed the resources of space 
and personnel, consuming more and more scarce state funding, the search 
for solutions to the problem became a necessity (Patmore, 1991). A quick 
resolution was also crucial because overcrowding neglected prisoners’ human 
rights and impacted on the safety and well being of correctional personnel 
(Hunt & Woodberry, 1987).  
 
There were two possible solutions to the overcrowding crisis. The first was 
building more prison space. In capital costs during the 1980s each new cell 
cost between $130,000-$200,000 (depending on the security level of the 
prison) and the annual cost of keeping each offender had reached about 
$33,000 (Lay, 1988a; Kennan, 1987; Kidston, 1987; Vernon, 1987). It should 
be noted that the cost of prison construction and operation in Australia has 
traditionally been much more expensive than in the USA. This is due to 
Australia having a much lower incarceration rate per 100,000 adult population, 
much smaller prison capacities, more expensive construction costs and 
                                                 
67
 Studies have repeatedly shown that there are vast differences in imprisonment rates 
(prisoners per 100,000 of the adult population) among the Australian states and territories 
(Biles, 1996; Walker, 1991). For example, the most substantial variations are found among 
the territories - the Northern Territory rate is nearly always 9 or 10 times higher than the rate 
for the Australian Capital Territory and, among the states, the Western Australian rate is 
between 2 and 3 times higher than the Tasmanian rate (Biles, 1996). An explanation for this 
disparity is that Aboriginal people, who make up the majority of the prison population in both 
the Northern Territory and Western Australia, are 15 times more likely to be imprisoned than 
non-Aboriginal people (Dawes, 2003). 
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generally better conditions in prisons (Reichel, 2008; Stephan, 2004; Haney, 
2001). 
 
The second solution was imposing a moratorium on the building of more 
prison space and adopting policies to reduce prison crowding, that is, 
somehow control increasing numbers of offenders outside the parameters of 
prisons (Patmore, 1991; Lay, 1988a). At the time the cost of community based 
programs was comparatively far less - $1,800 per offender per year. When 
the impact of unpaid community work was taken into account the cost was 
even lower ($1,230) (Kidston, 1987).  
 
The economic imperative meant that correctional administrators formulated a 
strategy to expand the use of community based dispositions in order to divert 
offenders away from imprisonment and thereby alleviate prison overcrowding 
(Richards, 1988; Hunt & Woodberry, 1987; Chan & Zdenkowski, 1986). 
Research had indicated however that a solution to the overcrowding crisis 
should involve a holistic approach by the entire criminal justice system - that 
is, apart from most obviously encompassing an overhaul of correctional 
practices, it should also include policing and courts practices because of their 
flow-on effects (Grant, 1987; Kidston, 1987; Vernon, 1987).   
   
2.3.5 Ineffectiveness of existing community sentences  
       
During the 1980s it became apparent that existing community based 
sentences in the USA were ineffective. At this time the criminal justice system 
was faced with an unprecedented situation – the critical nationwide level of 
prison overcrowding resulted in the courts being obliged to sentence 
significant numbers of felons to probation (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Petersilia 
et al., 1985). Probation was however initially designed to supervise non-
serious small caseloads of offenders who could be rehabilitated through a 
partially controlled life in the community. So, the National Institute of Justice 
sponsored the RAND Corporation to conduct the first-ever comprehensive 
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study of probation, in particular trying to determine what implications were 
associated with the placement of felons on probation. 
 
The RAND Corporation subsequently reported that traditional probation was 
an inefficient and inappropriate sentencing disposition for serious offenders68 
(Burns, 1975). More specifically its findings indicated that about two-thirds of 
nearly 2,000 felony probationers who were tracked during its study69 were re-
arrested before their probation period had expired; over half of these were re-
convicted, and over a third were re-incarcerated (Petersilia et al., 1985). 
These results clearly indicated that probation was not an effective sentencing 
disposition for felons, as they were highly likely to re-offend and compromise 
public safety. Despite this specific finding, RAND’s widely accepted and 
disseminated study wrongly resulted in probation’s overall loss of credibility 
(Tonry, 1990; Petersilia, 1987).  
 
High breach rates of probation were to be expected as, instead of 
strengthening financial support for probation agencies to manage the 
increasing as well as complex clientele being sentenced to it, the allocated 
funds actually decreased. In fact, from 1975 to 1985, the probation population 
had increased by 70% while its allocated funding had decreased by 25% 
(Petersilia, 1985). Probation agencies consequently experienced serious 
financial difficulties, and were forced to reduce staff and specialised program 
initiatives (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). The lack of funding also meant that 
probation officers were overburdened as they were increasingly allocated 
higher caseloads. This resulted in them being less able to supervise offenders 
or hold them accountable for their crimes (Petersilia, 2000; Petersilia et al., 
1985). The budget reductions were the result of the community’s punitive 
                                                 
68
 There were however earlier reports outlining the overall inefficacy of probation. For 
example, as early as 1967 the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice reported that most probationers (in fact 76% of misdemeanants and 
67% of felons) received only ten-to-fifteen minute interviews with their officer once or twice a 
month. The Commission therefore concluded that probationers were denied appropriate 
counselling and supervision which are the main goals of probation (Ball et al., 1988). 
69
 These felons were from Los Angeles and Alameda counties in California and they were 
tracked for a period of up to 40 months (Petersilia et al., 1985).  
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mood and politicians’ reluctance to support anything apart from the ‘tough on 
crime’ position (Petersilia et al., 1985).  
 
The RAND study concluded with specific recommendations on what the 
criminal justice system should do to rectify the ineffectiveness of probation. 
More specifically, the increasing number of serious offenders whose complex 
needs could not be managed under the current probation framework. The 
researchers believed that increased funding for probation alone could not 
alleviate the issues that were associated with its operation. Probation was 
said to “need a new, formal mandate that establishes its mission and 
recognises the kinds of offenders it now faces” (Petersilia et al., 1985:xi). 
Further, it was recommended that a spectrum of community based 
alternatives to prison be developed; most importantly, it needed to encompass 
a new ‘reliable’ intermediate punishment for felons (Petersilia, 2000; Petersilia 
et al., 1985)     
 
An ‘offshoot study’ found that parolees had similarly high recidivism rates as 
probationers (Petersilia, Turner & Paterson, 1986). Researchers identified 511 
probationers from the original sample of nearly 2,000 felony probationers in 
California and matched them with 511 parolees on the basis of similar 
background and criminal characteristics (Petersilia et al., 1986). When the 
recidivism rates of these two groups of offenders were compared two years 
post sentence the outcome was that parolees had higher rates of recidivism 
and offended more quickly than probationers, although their crimes were not 
comparatively more serious. In particular, 72% of the parolees versus 63% of 
probationers were re-arrested, and 47% of parolees were incarcerated 
compared with 31% of the probationers (Petersilia et al., 1986). Having a 
period of incarceration immediately prior to the community based disposition 
was associated with a higher probability of recidivism (Petersilia et al., 1986). 
The reason behind the high recidivism rate was that similarly to probationers, 
parolees were also inadequately supervised because of limited resources. 
The recommendation was to expand the range of community based sanctions 
available for felony offenders (Petersilia et al., 1986).  
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Very similar findings indicating unacceptably high parolee reoffending rates 
were reported by Beck and Shipley (1987). They based their conclusion on a 
study of almost 4,000 young prisoners (aged between 17 and 22) released 
from prison on parole in 22 states across the USA in 1978. The specific 
finding was that 70% of these offenders were re-arrested for a serious crime 
within 6 years after their release and about 50% were re-incarcerated (Beck & 
Shipley, 1987). A subsequent much larger scale study conducted by the same 
researchers indicated comparable findings. Of the 108,580 offenders released 
from prison on parole in 11 states in 1983, 62.5% were rearrested for a 
serious crime within 3 years of their release from prison (Beck & Shipley, 
1989). Hence, extensive research throughout the USA indicated the 
inadequacy and/or failure of existing community based sanctions, that is, 
probation and parole, recommending that more effective community based 
sanctions be established.   
 
In Australia, mainly state-level procedural as well as effectiveness related 
criticisms were levelled at parole and probation. The strongest condemnation 
came from the Nagle Royal Commission into New South Wales prisons in 
1978. Nagle produced a scathing analysis of the operation of the Parole 
Board for its inadequate reasoning, non-availability of written decisions, lack 
of operational principles, and absence of an offender’s right to appear and be 
heard (Nicholson, 1988). Subsequently, in 1980, Interim Report Number 15 of 
the Australian Law Reform Commission on the sentencing of federal 
offenders recommended ‘the abolition of parole’ (Nicholson, 1988). The main 
reason for this recommendation was that offenders were paroled on the basis 
of unfairness and inconsistency having served much shorter periods in prison 
when compared with the original sentences imposed by the judiciary. The 
Final Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission, Number 44, 
published in 1988, however took into account the need to retain parole as a 
community based sanction, and parole was said to have some merit 
(Broadhurst, 1991). Nevertheless, the first two critical reports were the start of 
the community’s perception of parole as a ‘charade’ (Nicholson, 1988).  
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In 1987, the Victorian Sentencing Committee disagreed with earlier criticisms 
that were aimed at the operation of parole. It specifically asserted that the 
Parole Board cannot interfere with judicial sentencing authority, as its 
discretion is limited by the judiciary’s control over the maximum and minimum 
sentence imposed on an offender (Nicholson, 1988).  More specific issues 
with the operation of parole, similar to the ones reported in New South Wales, 
were however uncovered. These included:  
  
That its proceedings are conducted in secrecy and parole decisions 
which affect the liberty of the individual are not revealable. The 
general criteria applied by the Parole Board are not readily available 
either to prisoners or the public. The parole procedure does not fully 
utilise the facilities available to the community to assist the re-
integration of the offender into the community through the community 
based programs of the Office of Corrections.  
 
(Nicholson, 1988:49) 
 
Further research in Victoria revealed that, similarly to parole, the operation of 
probation was also problematic. There were substantial variations in the 
amount of supervision that individual offenders received on both parole and 
probation. Very few probationers and parolees, only those that presented as 
very difficult, were appropriately supervised. Most were not supervised at all 
and were not even allocated supervising officers (Kidston, 1987). These 
inequities led to legal complaints, particularly when offenders were charged 
with breaches of their orders (Richards, 1988). 
 
A study which specifically measured the effectiveness of parole in Western 
Australia over a 20 year period found that the vast majority of offenders 
complied with its restrictions. In particular, about 70% of offenders 
successfully completed their parole period, whereas about 30% committed 
technical violations and/or reoffended (Vodanovich, 1988). Similar results 
were reported in New South Wales where, in a randomly selected sample of 
400, offenders 60% successfully completed their parole period (Porritt, 1988). 
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The rates of failure were nevertheless considered to be unacceptably high 
and a steady stream of criticism was levelled at parole from both the media 
and some politicians. As a result, public confidence in the operation of parole 
continued to be low (Vodanovich, 1988).  
 
In South Australia and New South Wales, researchers explored whether being 
supervised on parole versus receiving no community based supervision 
positively affected subsequent recidivism rates. In South Australia, recidivism 
rates were compared between two offender groups in a sample of 866 
offenders (Morgan, 1988). The first group was selected parolees and 
prisoners who were released without any community based supervision, and 
the second group was offenders released on parole with mandatory 
supervision. Three years post sentence completion the reoffending rate for 
offenders who were not receiving any community based supervision was 62% 
versus 59% for those who were paroled (Morgan, 1988). Similar findings were 
reported in New South Wales where a two year follow up of a sample of 762 
offenders indicated that paroled prisoners had only marginally lower 
recidivism rates than those who were released unconditionally (Broadhurst, 
1991). Hence, the differences between paroled and non-paroled groups were 
found to be insignificant. 
  
Throughout Australia, community based correctional programs, probation and 
parole, lost considerable credibility due to questionable administration as well 
as effectiveness (Broadhurst, 1991; Grant, 1987). As a result, all jurisdictions 
needed to implement radical changes if community based dispositions were to 
regain credibility and support (Nicholson, 1988; Vodanovich, 1988; Kidston, 
1987). It was also suggested that, as in the USA, more reliable community 
based alternatives needed to be introduced into the sentencing hierarchy 
(Kidston, 1987). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter critically described the development of the early and the middle 
phases of HDBS across the USA and Australia. The early phase of HSBS 
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essentially comprised of relatively tentative and small-scale application of 
probation and parole from the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century. 
During this time the ideological and legislative groundwork for community 
based sentences was laid. The supervision of offenders was based on 
humanistic and rehabilitative principles. It was not however until the next 
phase of HDBS, the middle phase, that stakeholders both in the USA and 
Australia shifted their paradigm of punishment away from incarceration toward 
community based dispositions (Chan & Ericson, 1981; Scull, 1977). 
 
The middle phase of HDBS specifically comprised five converging factors that 
occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The first showed imprisonment as an 
inhumane environmental setting which was ineffective and costly (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003; Enos et al., 1999). The second was the ideological shift away 
from the use of incarceration as the primary method of punishment and 
simultaneous development of community based sanctions. The third included 
critical debates about the rationale and the effect of the widespread 
introduction of community based sanctions, which was a significant part of the 
‘decarceration’. The fourth was the introduction of the ‘get tough’ on crime 
policies that resulted in overwhelming prison overcrowding and escalating cost 
that soon became unbearable. The fifth factor showed the ineffectiveness of 
existing community based dispositions, that is, probation and parole. These 
factors collectively propelled the introduction of the late much more substantial 
phase of HDBS, which is discussed in two forthcoming chapters (Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4) (Tonry, 1990; Blomberg et al., 1987).  
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Chapter 3 – Late phase of HDBS in the USA 
 
We have punitive options outside of incarceration. The 
community corrections field can and does provide adequate 
oversight to supervise in such a way that public safety is not 
hampered. Despite periodic reports of “parole does not work” 
(Solomon, Kachnowski, and Bhati, 2005), and media reports of 
probation failures, let’s remember that a prison stay rarely has 
pro-social transformative effects. That is, if by ‘work’ we are 
referring to recidivism, then we already know that individuals 
released from prison are typically rearrested. 
 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009:11) 
 
3.1 Introduction    
  
As illustrated above by DeMichele & Payne (2009), community based 
sanctions are continually compared to imprisonment, the cornerstone of the 
present penal system and the most feared sanction due to its stringent 
deprivations, and they face an ongoing challenge. This challenge is to provide 
sufficient penalties and restrictions so they are appropriate alternatives to 
imprisonment for some offenders. Some community based dispositions, such 
as HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS, have the propensity to be onerous. In 
addition, if these sanctions are appropriately implemented and resourced they 
typically elicit more positive outcomes in comparison with prisons such as 
lower cost and lower recidivism (Bales et al., 2010a; DeMichele & Payne, 
2009; Clear, 2007).  
 
This chapter critically discusses the currently operational late phase of HDBS 
in the USA only. The late phase of HDBS in Australia is discussed in a 
separate chapter because its development and proliferation took two 
somewhat diverging pathways and as a result had varied outcomes (see 
Chapter 4). The late phase of HDBS in both nation states was the result of the 
middle phase that most significantly entailed the ‘get tough on crime’ policy 
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that led to enormous prison crowding and budgetary restraint, and 
ineffectiveness of current community based dispositions, probation and parole 
(see Chapter 2).  
 
This chapter consists of two themes in which information is generally 
presented chronologically. The first theme in this chapter critically describes 
the operation of the late phase of HDBS in the USA. The first sub-theme is the 
development of HDBS with RF, which were implemented throughout the USA 
as a part of intermediate sanctions in the 1980s (Petersilia, 1998; Clear & 
Hardyman, 1990). Rehabilitative ideals were turned into punitive courses 
characterising offender supervision by strict and close surveillance and 
monitoring (Petersilia, 1998). The second sub-theme is the development of 
HDBS with GPS, which was initiated by the expansion of sex offender post-
release supervision laws in the mid-2000s. These surveillance-oriented 
sanctions are applied on serious sex offenders in order to increase public 
safety and/or divert them from imprisonment due to prohibitive costs of 
building and sustaining prisons (Bales et al., 2010a; DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). Currently, the number of offenders on HDBS with GPS is close to the 
number of offenders on HDBS with RF and it seems that it will overtake it in 
the near future (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).  
 
The second theme discussed in this chapter is the assessment of outcomes 
of the late phase of HDBS in the USA. More specifically, HDBS with RF as 
well as HDBS with GPS are separately analysed in relation with 4 sub-themes 
– operational results, ethical issues and dilemmas, legal issues and dilemmas 
and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. The last three decades of 
evaluative research of HDBS with RF have indicated problematic operational 
outcomes as well as significant ethical and political and stakeholder issues 
and dilemmas. On the other hand, HDBS with GPS have been operationally 
more successful, but research assessing some of their ethical and overall 
political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas has been lacking. Despite their 
individual problems, HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS have both become 
integral components of the correctional continuums across the USA (Clear et 
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al., 2006; Clear & Dammer, 2003; Fulton, Latessa, Stichman & Travis, 1997; 
Tonry, 1990).   
 
3.2 Late phase of HDBS – Operation (1982-2013)   
 
The following section of the research provides a comprehensive exploration of 
the historical development of contemporary HDBS in the USA. The mode of 
community based supervision on HDBS has primarily been based on strict 
offender punishment and the enhancement of public safety. 
 
3.2.1 Historical development and proliferation of intermediate 
sanctions 
 
The late phase of HDBS commenced in the 1980s when it became apparent 
that the major diversion of offenders to non-custodial settings was essential 
(Clear & Hardyman, 1990; Petersilia, 1987). As mentioned in Chapter 2, this 
was mainly propelled by the prohibitively high capital and maintenance costs 
of prisons and the overwhelming institutional crowding (McCarthy et al., 2001; 
Carlson, 1988; McCarthy, 1987). Financial pressures meant that more 
responsible governmental decision-making practices were established. In 
particular, public accountability and corporate management principles were 
setup in government agencies. These primarily aimed to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government expenditure as it became subject 
to severe constraints (Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Tulett, 1991). As King (1991) 
asserted, governments had, for the first time:  
 
been forced to examine what services we provide, why we provide 
them, whether they could be provided more effectively or efficiently 
by someone else, whether the costs outweigh the advantages, and 
whether the community really wants or needs the service in the first 
place. 
 
(King 1991:101) 
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The establishment of ‘intermediate sanctions’70 – largest ever community 
based sanctions development – consequently aimed to offer jurisdictions a 
viable means of diverting prison-bound offenders and thus ensuring that 
prison space is utilised more effectively and efficiently (Carlson, 1988). The 
new spectrum of sanctions represented mid-range punishments for offenders 
for whom imprisonment was unnecessarily severe and traditional probation 
was inappropriately light (Petersilia, 2000). The overarching term 
‘intermediate sanctions’ encompasses all community based sanctions that lie 
somewhere between imprisonment and probation on the criminal justice 
continuum; these include HDBS, half-way houses and boot camps 
(Champion, 2008; Petersilia, 2000; Petersilia, Turner & Deschenes, 1992; 
Byrne, 1990; McCarthy, 1987).  
 
Although ‘intermediate sanctions’ usually operate as ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’ the title ‘intermediate sanctions’ was chosen to represent them 
due to two reasons. First, unlike ‘alternatives to imprisonment,’ ‘intermediate 
sanctions’ is a broader term that encompasses a variety of sanctions that 
involve a short period of incarceration. Second, the term ‘intermediate 
sanctions’ is considered to be ‘politically neutral’ as opposed to ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’ which is said to contain politically liberal bias (Schmidt, 1994a). 
 
However, the portrayal of intermediate sanctions as ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’ was difficult for the community to accept (Dean-Myrda & 
Cullen, 1998). This ideological problem occurred because all community 
sentences were originally therapeutic in nature and designed only for minor 
offenders to keep them out of prison (Carlson, 1988; Lobban, 1987). Further, 
it was too difficult for the community to accept these new, albeit ‘tougher,’ 
community based sanctions as being adequately retributive for offenders who 
may have committed serious offences (Carlson, 1988; Hunt & Woodberry, 
1987; Lobban, 1987; Harry & Clifford, 1986). This is not surprising because, 
since its inception, incarceration has been overwhelmingly synonymous with 
                                                 
70
 The introduction of intermediate sanctions had been for a number of years advocated by 
prominent criminologists such as Morris and Tonry (1990), Petersilia et al., (1985) and Burns 
(1975).  
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punishment, so “the notion that law breakers deserve to suffer (i.e. be 
imprisoned) for their offences [was] a belief not easily abandoned” by the 
state or the community (Scull, 1977:135).  
 
The new continuum of sanctions allows the judiciary to carefully match 
offenders to this “ladder of scaled punishments,” commensurate with the 
seriousness of their crimes (Morris & Tonry, 1990:227). This more 
appropriately satisfies “the just deserts concern for proportionality in 
punishment” (Tonry, 1998:80), and results in a “comprehensive, principled 
and even-handed system of punishment that does less harm and achieves 
greater decency and justice than present practice, with no loss in the 
prevention and control of crime” (Morris, 1988:10). Morris & Tonry (1990) 
however warned that intermediate punishments would not automatically be 
‘alternatives to imprisonment’ as they could just as easily be alternatives to 
probation depending on how the judiciary applied them.   
 
The [then] existing continuum of sanctions was considered to be inadequate 
as the judiciary faced a polarised choice between two extremes. 
Pragmatically, offenders had to be classified into two very different categories 
– serious offenders, who were to be imprisoned, and less serious offenders, 
who were to be placed on probation (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Burns, 1975). 
The problem was that there was no ‘middle range’ of sentencing dispositions 
for those offenders who occupied the middle ground on the scale of severity 
of ‘just deserts’. Petersilia (1998) encapsulated this view:  
 
This two fold division disregards the range of severity in crime, and as 
a result, sentencing can err in one direction or another: either it is too 
harsh, incarcerating people whose crimes are not serious enough to 
warrant a sanction this severe, or too lenient, putting on probation 
people whose crimes call for more severe punishment. 
 
(Petersilia, 1998:68) 
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An updated sentencing continuum with a variety of sanctions between the 
imprisonment and probation seemed necessary. As the development of these 
sanctions was enmeshed in the politics of ‘get tough’ they were surveillance 
and control oriented. They were promoted to the public on the basis of 
enhanced public safety through strict offender control rather than as a form of 
treatment or a lenient sanction (Clear et al., 2006; Tonry, 1998; Joutsen & 
Zvekic, 1994; Carlson, 1988).  
 
In addition, it was claimed that intermediate sanctions would ‘solve’ the most 
complex problems that the criminal justice system was facing (Dean-Myrda & 
Cullen, 1998). The expectations of intermediate sanctions were best 
summarised by Petersilia (1998:68):  
 
 to save taxpayers’ money by providing cost-effective alternatives to 
incarceration for prison-and-jail-bound offenders 
 to deter offenders (specifically) and the public (generally) from 
crime 
 to protect the community by exerting more control (than traditional 
probation) over offender behaviour 
 to rehabilitate offenders by using mandatory treatment 
requirements, which are then reinforced by mandatory substance 
abuse testing and the swift revocation of violators. 
 
More generally, intermediate sanctions were promoted on the basis that they 
would allow less serious offenders to remain in the community, where they 
would be able to maintain family ties and continue to work (Joutsen & Zvekic, 
1994). Consequently, offenders’ readjustment to society is facilitated by using 
these sanctions, while offenders avoid the ‘prisonisation’ and/or contamination 
with more serious criminals (Gibbs & King, 2003a; Mays & Winfree, 2002; 
Petersilia & Turner, 1998). 
 
Apart from these well-publicised ‘stated purposes’, it had been argued that 
intermediate sanctions also have a variety of other significant but underlying 
‘latent aims.’ For example: 
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 to create correctional reform by providing judges with diverse 
sentencing options beyond the narrow choice of probation and prison 
 to satisfy the public by introducing strict and punitive punishments 
 to provide an opportunity for probation administrators to supervise 
offenders in a firm and comprehensive manner (Lurigio & Petersilia, 
1992; Tonry, 1990).  
 
Subsequently, however, the literature has indicated that both the stated and 
latent expectations of intermediate sanctions were far-reaching and their 
goals were lofty, unrealistic and even in some respects contradictory71 (Clear, 
1997; Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Petersilia et al., 1992; Clear & Hardyman, 
1990). This was best summed up by Tonry & Lynch (1996:101) in the 
following terms: “like most propositions that seem too good to be true, this one 
was not true.”72  
 
3.2.2 Historical development and proliferation of HDBS  
 
The first IPS programs, called HDBS in this research, emerged in the early 
1950s. These were subsequently trialed on a larger scale in the 1960s and 
1970s (Clear & Dammer, 2003). Offenders on these sanctions were subjected 
to very strict individualistic supervision on regular probation or parole 
(Deschenes et al., 1995; Lurigio & Petersilia, 1992; Polk & del Carmen, 1992; 
Clear & Hardyman, 1990). The ideology behind these early HDBS was that 
smaller offender caseloads would enhance the prospect of offender 
rehabilitation as supervising officers had more time for one-on-one 
counselling and other rehabilitative measures (Clear & Dammer, 2003; Lurigio 
& Petersilia, 1992). Nevertheless, various evaluative studies concluded that 
the recidivism rates of probationers/parolees in these HDBS caseloads were 
often higher and that these programs generated more technical violations 
                                                 
71
 Similarly, since its establishment the prison has had a series of ambitious expectations 
from “Quaker ‘gateway to heaven’ concept, to the more recent magic box phenomena in 
which we claimed that we could manage rehabilitation – insert a criminal or convict, press a 
programme button, and extract a compliant citizen” (Braithwaite, 1988:55).   
72
 It is not within the scope of this research to explore the overall goals of intermediate 
sanctions in more detail, but the specific aims and the outcomes of HDBS will be specifically 
analysed in section 3.3 for the USA and in Chapter 4.3 for Australia. 
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than regularly supervised probationers/parolees (Clear & Dammer, 2003; 
Lurigio & Petersilia, 1992; Clear & Hardyman, 1990).   
 
It should be noted, however, that offenders were assigned to these 
early caseloads based on the seriousness of their offence, prior record, 
or behavioural patterns. Their recidivism rate was then compared to 
the recidivism rate of less serious, regular probationers. Because none 
of the numerous extraneous variables was controlled, it is neither 
possible nor sound to attribute the rate of recidivism to any single 
variable.  
(Polk & del Carmen, 1992:44) 
 
In fact, these early evaluations of HDBS provided little accurate information 
about their actual efficiency. Nevertheless, the finding that close contact 
between the supervising officer and the offender does not guarantee greater 
success resulted in community correctional caseload sizes dramatically 
increasing during the 1970s (Polk & del Carmen, 1992; Clear & Hardyman, 
1990). As a result, government funding soon dissipated and the first HDBS 
were quickly dismantled (Polk & del Carmen, 1992).  
3.2.2.1 Inaugural HDBS   
 
Despite a weak evidence base about HDBS, a subsequent set of HDBS trials 
commenced in the 1980s with enormous enthusiasm from correctional 
authorities, legislatures and even the public. It started with Georgia’s 
implementation of the first well-publicised IPS program, called HDBS in this 
research (Petersilia, 2000). This sanction was piloted in 1982 in 13 of 
Georgia’s 45 judicial sentencing circuits (Erwin & Bennett, 1987). It was 
designed as a ‘front-end’ alternative to imprisonment, the main objective being 
to divert high-risk but non-violent felons from over-crowded prisons, and to 
include regular probationers who needed greater supervision (Petersilia, 
2000; Fulton, Stone & Gendreau, 1994; Petersilia, 1987).  
 
The highest per capita incarceration rate in the USA and subsequent prison 
overcrowding in the late 1970s were the catalyst for Georgia’s desperation to 
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devise a workable community based sanction (Champion, 2008). The prison 
overcrowding crisis in Georgia was eloquently explained by Erwin (1986:17):  
 
Despite massive funding for new facilities [in the 1970s], prison 
population continued to outstrip capacity, resulting in gross 
overcrowding, huge backlogs of state inmates in local jails, Federal 
lawsuits, and serious budgetary pressures. 
 
Offenders typically spent between 6 to 12 months in the intensively 
supervised HDBS and then a year on regular probation that imposed less 
stringent conditions (Byrne et al., 1989; Petersilia, 1987). Severe conditions 
and intensive contact between the supervising officers and the offender were 
imposed as it was believed that this would increase deterrence and 
simultaneously enhance the prospect of rehabilitation (Petersilia, 1987). The 
standard sanction conditions included:  
 
 Four to 7 weekly supervision contacts 
 adherence to an 8 hour a night curfew 
 performance of community service (a minimum of 132 hours during the 
Order) 
 payment of a supervision fee ($10 to $50 a month)  
 full-time employment or enrolment in an educational/vocational 
program (Petersilia, 2000; Fulton et al., 1994; Erwin, 1987; Erwin & 
Bennett, 1987; Petersilia, 1987). 
 
Additional restrictions such as further curfew times and unannounced drug or 
alcohol testing also could be imposed by the judge or the probation officer 
(Erwin, 1987; Petersilia, 1987). In late 1987 some jurisdictions in Georgia 
added electronic monitoring as an enhancement to the HDBS (Erwin, 1990).  
 
Specific order conditions and the intensity of supervision steadily declined on 
the basis of three graduated phases. Once an offender had met all of the 
conditions of an earlier phase, they were moved to a later phase (Fulton et al., 
1994; Byrne et al., 1989; Erwin, 1987). The first two phases were mandatory 
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and offenders spent a minimum of three months in each one. The length of 
the third phase was unspecified and had to be determined by the supervising 
officer (Fulton et al., 1994; Erwin, 1987).  
 
A unique team based approach of offender supervision operated in Georgia. 
In practice, this meant that the team consisted of a probation officer and a 
surveillance officer who supervised a caseload limited to 25 offenders on 
HDBS (Petersilia, 2000). The probation officer’s role included screening 
offenders to determine their sanction eligibility, identifying offender treatment 
needs and providing direct services or access to the required social services, 
ensuring proper case administration and serving as court liaison. The 
surveillance officer’s duties included enforcing the sanction conditions, 
providing surveillance capabilities, and generally assisting the probation 
officer (Petersilia, 2000; Fulton et al., 1994; Erwin, 1987; Petersilia, 1987). 
The double-teaming, where one officer specialised in risk reduction and the 
other in risk control, was seen to be essential in order to closely monitor 
offenders in a supportive way (King, 1991; Clear et al., 1987).  
 
With the intention of avoiding inappropriate net widening, offender selection 
criteria in Georgia’s HDBS specified prison-bound offenders as its target 
group. It was specifically defined as “serious but nonviolent offenders who, 
without the intensive supervision option, would have gone to prison in the 
jurisdiction under which they were sentenced” (Erwin, 1986:2). Offenders 
could be placed on the HDBS directly at the time of sentencing as well as 
after sentencing as long as HDBS staff recommended them for the sanction 
(Fulton et al., 1994). An additional requirement was that the sentencing judge 
also had to sign a statement declaring that the offender would have been 
incarcerated if they were not placed on the HDBS (Clear et al., 1987).  
 
In 1987 the Georgia’s Department of Corrections published an internal 
evaluation of its HDBS. This evaluation was based on the first four years of 
sanction operation (from 1982 to 1985), when it expanded from 13 to 33 
judicial sentencing circuits, and had supervised 2,322 offenders (Petersilia, 
1987). The costs, revocation and reoffending rates were compared between 
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the entire HDBS group and a carefully ‘matched’ group of regular probationers 
and prisoners (Erwin, 1987). The findings were uniformly positive – a saving 
of about $6,000 per offender diverted from prison onto HDBS, as well as 
lower recidivism rates for serious crime when offenders on HDBS were 
compared to both regular probationers and prisoners (Petersilia, 2000; Erwin, 
1987; Erwin & Bennett, 1987; Petersilia, 1987). The success of Georgia’s 
HDBS resulted in huge media and professional interest. It became a hallmark 
HDBS, prompting many USA jurisdictions to develop similar sanctions 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia, 1987). 
 
A number of methodological problems with Georgia’s self-reported 
‘effectiveness’ emerged in the late 1980s (Fulton & Stone, 1992). Apart from 
the fact that the internal evaluation suggested possible biased results, the 
main criticism of Georgia’s HDBS evaluation was that a truly matched 
comparison group was not identified. This was because the prison group (173 
offenders) was much smaller than the HDBS group (542 offenders) and had 
somewhat different demographic characteristics (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; 
Byrne et al., 1989). In addition, the fact that Georgia attributed the reduction in 
the number of those incarcerated solely to the introduction of its HDBS was 
challenged as a multitude of other factors such as prison capacity, legislation, 
as well as the development of alternative sanctions such as ‘shock 
incarceration’73 could have also reduced incarceration (Byrne et al., 1989). 
Finally, despite Georgia’s vigorous efforts to avoid inappropriate net widening 
by carefully defining its clientele as ‘prison diversions’, a number of studies 
have suggested that over half of the offenders on the HDBS seemed to have 
been diverted from probation instead of prison (McCarthy & McCarthy, 1991; 
Clear et al., 1987). This finding was based on the statistical analysis of the 
profile of the HDBS’ clientele, which more closely resembled regular 
probationers than prisoners. The potential net widening effect clearly offsets 
the lucrative cost saving figures (Petersilia & Turner, 1992; Byrne et al., 
1989).  
                                                 
73
 ‘Shock incarceration’ is a relatively short period of incarceration lasting between 30 to 90 
days. The aim is for offenders to find the prison experience to be onerous, and hence not re-
offend (for more information see Clear et al., 2006).  
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It is important to note that these criticisms of Georgia’s HDBS did not damage 
the strong support it had won from both the legislative and judicial branches of 
government (Clear et al., 1987). This was because, ever since the sanction 
was initiated, extensive education and lobbying of key government officials as 
well as the media was conducted by administrators (Clear et al., 1987; Erwin 
& Bennett, 1987). Having been successfully promoted on the basis of 
‘toughness and strictness,’ the sanction enjoyed sustained backing from 
stakeholders (Clear et al., 1987; Erwin & Bennett, 1987; Petersilia, 1987).   
 
Georgia’s HDBS had become the most popular and widely replicated HDBS. 
This was even though its replication had subsequently proven to be 
problematic as Georgia’s HDBS could not simply be copied. Georgia, unlike 
many other states in the USA, had particularly harsh sentencing practices 
and, as a result, an extraordinarily wide pool of potential clients for the HDBS. 
Hence, in order to have an adequate number of offenders, the replicated 
HDBS’ structure had to be carefully adapted to the specific jurisdiction’s 
intrinsic operation of its criminal justice system. Further complexity arose 
because most jurisdictions that replicated Georgia’s HDBS failed to 
adequately lobby and educate stakeholders about the sanction and as a 
result faced a lack of stakeholder support (Clear et al., 1987; Petersilia, 1987). 
 
New Jersey’s HDBS was second to Georgia’s in terms of pre-eminence and 
duplication (Byrne et al., 1989). It gained its prestige on the basis of its 
operation as a back-end alternative to imprisonment, that is, after a period of 
shock incarceration (Pearson & Harper, 1990). New Jersey established HDBS 
in 1983 in order to alleviate the state’s serious prison overcrowding problem 
(Byrne et al., 1989; Pearson, 1987a). To avoid the potential for net widening 
and actually reduce the number of those incarcerated, only prisoners who had 
served between 30 and 60 days in custody were able to apply for early 
release onto HDBS. An initial offender assessment was conducted within the 
prison, and the final decision on whether to release the offender onto HDBS 
was made by a 3 judge re-sentencing panel. Each offender was first released 
onto the HDBS for a trial period of 90 days, and once that period had been 
successfully completed, they were officially placed onto the sanction for a 
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duration of 1 to 5 years (Pearson & Harper, 1990; Byrne et al., 1989; Pearson, 
1985).   
 
Similarly to Georgia’s HDBS, compliance with the conditions of the HDBS in 
New Jersey was strict and punitive, requiring offenders to make a “7-day-a-
week effort” (Byrne et al., 1989:29). Standard conditions included: 
 
 at least 20 monthly contacts 
 at least 4 drug tests per month  
 completing at least 16 hours of community service per month 
 abiding by an electronically monitored curfew 
 being employed or satisfactory progressing in an 
educational/vocational training program  
 attending specialised counselling programs such as programs dealing 
with drug abuse, family problems and financial problems  
 if applicable, paying fines, restitution and child support (Pearson & 
Harper, 1990; Byrne et al., 1989; Pearson, 1987a).  
 
The intensity of all of these requirements was slowly reduced as the offender 
progressed though the sanction. Offenders who did not comply with these 
stringent conditions may have had additional restrictions/requirements 
imposed on them or else were returned to prison (Fulton et al., 1994; Pearson 
& Harper, 1990). Electronic monitoring increased offender surveillance, 
reduced menial checking that officers were conducting, and increased overall 
cost-effectiveness (Lay, 1988a). 
 
Unlike the team based supervisory approach in Georgia’s HDBS, New 
Jersey’s HDBS distinctively placed an emphasis on collaborative association 
between officers supervising offenders on HDBS and various community 
members and organisations (Fulton et al., 1994). Offenders were obliged to 
have a community sponsor who saw them on a regular basis, discussed their 
problems and provided encouragement. In addition, they were required to 
have a network team sponsor/s who practically helped them. For example, 
they assisted them with transport to and from work, treatment programs 
126 
 
and/or community work (Pearson, 1987a). Supervising officers were 
mandated to work closely with the community and network team sponsors to 
enhance compliance with sanction regulations and assist offenders’ 
reintegration into society (Byrne et al., 1989). 
 
With the intention of avoiding the criticisms of potential bias that Georgia’s 
internal HDBS evaluation attracted, an external evaluation of the New Jersey 
HDBS was conducted. During 1987 and 1988 the USA National Institute of 
Justice sponsored Pearson to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the New Jersey HDBS compared with a closely matched 
sample of parolees (Byrne et al., 1989; Pearson, 1988; Harper, 1987). The 
study concluded that the introduction of the HDBS yielded the following 
significant benefits for New Jersey: 
 
 A cost saving of approximately $7,000-$8,000 per offender who was 
released early from prison and placed onto the HDBS in comparison to 
a matched sample of parolees who served the original time in prison 
and were then paroled (Byrne et al., 1989; Pearson, 1988; Pearson, 
1987b).  
 ‘True’ diversion without the opportunity for net widening (Byrne et al., 
1989; Pearson, 1988).  
 Ten percent lower recidivism rate for offenders on HDBS compared 
with the matched sample of parolees (Pearson, 1988).  
  
These exceptional evaluation results led to complimentary media coverage. 
Subsequently, there was an extensive introduction of HDBS modeled on New 
Jersey’s HDBS across the USA in the late 1980s (Clear et al., 1987). 
 
Similarly to the critique of Georgia’s HDBS overwhelmingly positive findings, 
the accuracy of New Jersey’s HDBS complimentary conclusions were also 
questioned. The main criticism was that a truly matched comparison group 
was not in place, as only about 25% of the control group was roughly 
comparable by offence type and risk-level to the treatment group (Byrne et al., 
1989). This lack of comparability between the treatment and comparison 
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group of offenders subsequently meant that the conclusions about cost-
effectiveness, as well as lower recidivism rates, were likely to be deceptive 
(Byrne et al., 1989). In addition, despite the claim that New Jersey’s HDBS 
was a ‘true diversion program’, a number of researchers such as Byrne et al 
(1989), Lay, (1988a) and Clear (1987) argued that there was the potential for 
offender net widening. They explained that, while sentencing judges did not 
directly place offenders on the HDBS, the fact that they knew about it meant 
that they could have adjusted their sentencing practices. Hence, judges could 
have anticipated that incarcerated offenders would be subsequently released 
onto the HDBS. According to Clear (1987) and Tonry (1990) even partially 
true, this would override the benefits of the HDBS as only one sixth of 
prisoners who applied were selected because of the sanction’s rigorous 
eligibility screening.  
 
Despite these persuasive criticisms, New Jersey’s HDBS continued to receive 
strong judicial support and acclaim from politicians and criminal justice 
officials (Byrne et al., 1989; Clear et al., 1987). In particular, dissemination of 
research reports and regular meetings with criminal justice professionals was 
used to dismantle any skepticism and misunderstandings about the sanction. 
Because public support was also seen to be important, care was similarly 
taken to explain the sanction to community groups and the media (Pearson & 
Harper, 1990). It was additionally thought that achieving positive outcomes 
during the first few years of operation was vital, so the sanction was 
implemented as planned, without ‘cutting corners’. The ongoing support for 
the HDBS prevailed over the rigorous questioning of its successful operation 
(Pearson & Harper, 1990).  
 
In 1983 Florida implemented its own well-regarded statewide adult HDBS 
titled ‘Community Control Program’.74 It was implemented as a ‘front-end’ 
                                                 
74
 It is interesting to note that neither IPS or home detention are included in its official title, 
even though some authors refer to it as IPS and others as home detention; nevertheless as 
all of these sanctions have essentially identical features it is a HDBS (Byrne & Pattavina, 
1992). Today however an electronic monitoring component is attached to various community 
based dispositions in Florida including felony offender probation, drug offender probation, sex 
offender probation, community control, conditional release, parole and addiction recovery 
supervision (Bales et al., 2010b). This is in accordance with the trend across the USA to 
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sanction aiming to divert prison-bound offenders from entering prison thereby 
alleviating prison overcrowding (Whitfield, 1997; Ball et al., 1988). Offenders 
could spend up to 2 years on the sanction as an alternative to 12-30 months 
in prison (McCarthy et al., 2001). Upon completion of the HDBS, offenders 
were either placed on regular probation or granted unconditional release 
(United States General Accounting Office, 1990). 
 
Florida’s HDBS was based on a significant degree of offender control; its 
standard conditions included: 
 
 being confined to one’s home at all times except when performing pre-
approved activities such as working, shopping for food, and attending 
to medical needs   
 reporting to a supervising officer 4-7 times a week 
 performing community work  
 paying restitution and supervisory fees  
 submitting urinalysis, breathalyser or blood specimen tests 
 participating in ordered self-improvement programs  
 maintaining a daily activity log (Ansay & Benveneste, 1999; Blomberg 
et al., 1993; Baird & Wagner, 1990; United States General Accounting 
Office, 1990).  
 
Apart from these core conditions offenders were occasionally mandated to 
maintain or restrict contact with their victims, neighbours, friends and creditors 
(Ball et al., 1988). Supervising officers monitored compliance with these 
conditions through intensive individualised face-to-face supervision of 
offenders (Blomberg et al, 1993; Blomberg et al., 1987). In certain cases, 
personalised supervision was supplemented with electronic monitoring75 
(McCarthy et al., 2001; Lilly et al., 1992).  
                                                                                                                                           
apply electronic monitoring as a condition of various community based sanctions, particularly 
ISP (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
75
 The first jurisdiction in Florida to implement HDBS with electronic monitoring was Palm 
Beach County in 1984 (Lilly et al., 1992). Traditionally throughout Florida, electronic 
monitoring technology has been seldom applied, that is, on a few percent of offenders on 
community based programs. Electronic monitoring was initially imposed at the discretion of 
129 
 
In order to reduce the potential for net widening, the HDBS’ target population 
was carefully defined in the sentencing guidelines. The specified candidates 
were non-violent felons who would not normally qualify for probation due to 
their criminal history and current offence, and probationers and parolees 
charged with technical or misdemeanor violations (United States General 
Accounting Office, 1990; Blomberg et al., 1987). Once an offender was placed 
on the HDBS, a needs-assessment was conducted and an individualised 
management plan was developed (Blomberg et al., 1987).  
 
In the first few years after Florida’s HDBS was introduced it was periodically 
evaluated. The findings were substantially more modest than Georgia and 
New Jersey’s HDBS’ evaluations, indicating that Florida’s HDBS generally 
diverted more prison-bound offenders than in widened the net. The program 
achieved a cost saving of approximately $2,746 per offender, and resulted in 
comparatively lower re-offending rates than for prisoners (McCarthy et al., 
2001; Baird & Wagner, 1990). As these positive outcomes were not 
subsequently criticised, Florida’s HDBS became the largest and best-
established HDBS in the USA (Clear & Dammer, 2003; Blomberg et al., 1993; 
Baird & Wagner, 1990; United States General Accounting Office, 1990; Ball et 
al., 1988). 
 
Official evaluations of Georgia’s, New Jersey’s and Florida’s HDBS indicated 
very favourable findings and were not overwhelmed by criticism, even though 
some of it was persuasive. As a result, these three programs became 
pioneers in corrections (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Tonry, 1990; Byrne et al., 
1989). Well publicised success stories in the media referred to these 
sanctions as ‘the future of corrections’ and were the catalyst for the 
development of similar sanctions throughout the USA in the late 1980s (Fulton 
& Stone, 1992; Petersilia, 1990b; Byrne et al., 1989; Petersilia, 1987). Positive 
accolades of HDBS were based on the stakeholders’ confidence that 
significant benefits were associated with these sanctions. The overarching 
belief was that HDBS could simultaneously relieve the intractable problem of 
                                                                                                                                           
correctional officers as a disciplinary measure, and since 2004 it is imposed solely at the 
discretion of the sentencing authority  (Bales et al., 2010b; McCarthy et al., 2001). 
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prison crowding as well as promote public safety by strictly controlling 
offenders (Polk & del Carmen, 1992; Clear & Hardyman, 1990; Silverman, 
2001). The remarkable expectations of HDBS were summarised as:  
 
the most significant experiment made by the criminal justice system in 
the next decade [1985-1995]. We expect to see such programs 
adopted in jurisdictions across the country. If [these programs] prove 
successful over time and across jurisdictions, they would not only 
restore probation’s credibility, but they could also reduce incarceration 
rates without increasing crime. And perhaps most important such 
programs may well rehabilitate at least some of the offenders who 
participate.  
 
(Petersilia, et al., 1985:77)  
 
Unfortunately HDBS did not achieve the anticipated outcomes in the USA. 
(For more information see section 3.3). 
3.2.2.2 Expansion and subsequent development of HDBS  
  
By 1990 all states of the USA had established HDBS with RF for adult 
offenders and more than 55,000 offenders were participating in them at any 
one time (McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia, 2000; United States General 
Accounting Office, 1990; Pearson, 1988). As the main component of HDBS 
from the 1990s became the EM technology that they utilise, in the remainder 
of this chapter they are referred to as either ‘HDBS with RF’ or ‘HDBS with 
GPS.’ HDBS, which use the different EM technology, must be distinguishable 
as they usually have vastly different rationales, operations and outcomes. (For 
more information see below). In instances when the generic term ‘HDBS’ is 
used in the remainder of this chapter it refers to both ‘HDBS with RF’ as well 
as ‘HDBS with GPS.’   
 
The aim of HDBS with RF was mainly to divert offenders from prison at 
sentencing or by early release from prison (Alarid et al., 2008; Petersilia & 
Turner, 1993). In cases of diversion there was however some disparity in 
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equivalence between the time the offender was to spend on the HDBS with 
RF in lieu of prison. More specifically, legislation varied between the ratios of 
1:1, 3:1 and even 5:1 (Fox, 19878b; Ford & Schmidt, 1985). In the more 
conservative jurisdictions, once offenders realised that they had to spend a 
longer period of time on the HDBS with RF than in prison, they often opted for 
imprisonment (especially as there were usually further reductions in 
incarceration time due to prison overcrowding) (Clear, 1997; Petersilia, 1997). 
As a result, it soon became apparent that in order to alleviate prison 
overcrowding, the time spent on the HDBS with RF needed to be equated 
with the time spent in prison.    
   
The maximum duration of these sanctions was usually 6 months, with 
lessening phases that reinforce good conduct (Fox, 1987a; Fox, 1987b). Six 
months was thought to be the maximum duration that offenders were able to 
remain confined to their homes (subject to manual physical monitoring by 
supervision officers and/or RF electronic monitoring technology). This was 
based on research which indicated that most offenders are impulsive by 
nature and unable to comply with longer sanction duration period (For more 
information see Schmidt, 1994b; Fox, 1987b). Over time this concern 
dissipated due to less regard for offenders’ impulsivity and the introduction of 
GPS electronic monitoring technology that continuously tracks offender 
movement and does not confine them to their homes for prolonged periods of 
time (Bales et al., 2010b). 
 
Although HDBS with RF varied by jurisdiction, most imposed a number of 
requirements including 3 times a week contact with supervising officers, 
adherence to a curfew, maintenance of full-time employment, submission of 
random urine and alcohol testing, and payment of victim restitution as well as 
part of the cost of supervision (Deschenes et al., 1995; Fulton & Stone, 1992). 
Consequently, HDBS with RF overwhelmingly emphasised offender control 
(Clear & Dammer, 2003).   
 
In 1997, the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) developed a 
specific model of HDBS with RF titled ‘prototypical intensive supervision’ 
132 
 
(Fulton et al., 1997). This sanction was based on research in the 1990s which 
criticised the strong emphasis on offender control, arguing that greater 
participation in treatment and employment programs would in fact lower 
recidivism rates (Petersilia & Turner, 1992; Pearson, 1987a). The model 
shifted the exclusive emphasis of HDBS with RF on incapacitating and 
punishing the offender to a more integrated focus on risk-control, treatment 
and services. This approach to supervision aimed to achieve long-term 
behavioural change in offenders. Sanctions with this ideology were piloted in 
10 jurisdictions across the USA (Fulton et al., 1997). Unfortunately no 
significant differences in recidivism rates were reported between these 
offenders and offenders assigned to regular punitive supervision (Fulton et al., 
1997). This surprising finding may be explained by the fact that even though 
these offenders were provided with intensive treatment during their sanction, 
post sanction there were no treatment provisions. Offenders’ personal issues, 
which are usually long-term addictions to illegal substances were thus easily 
resumed. Subsequent engagement in crime to support the addiction was 
therefore often the outcome.  
 
Also in 1997, Florida conducted another correctional experiment, related to 
the use HDBS with GPS to monitor serious violent offenders on community 
supervision. This trial was implemented as an alternative to the imprisonment 
of sex offenders with the aim to assess the possibility of reducing prison 
overcrowding (Johnson, 2002). Up until this point, the placement of serious 
offenders on HDBS with RF was inconceivable; however, the fact that GPS 
technology allows unprecedented careful monitoring and tracking of offenders 
has allowed this initiative to occur (Brown et al., 2007; New Jersey State 
Parole Board, 2007; Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007; 
Vaughn, 1987; Friel & Vaughn, 1986). The trial results indicated promising 
findings related to the use of HDBS with GPS for serious offenders. 
 
It was not, however, until the mid-2000s with the expansion of serious sex 
offender post-release supervision laws at the state and federal level that the 
utilisation of HDBS with GPS spread (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 2006). 
The updated sex offender laws were the result of known offenders committing 
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brutal crimes on children. They are essentially ‘memorial laws’ as they are 
named after the high-profile victims - Megan’s Law (1994)76, Jessica’s Law 
(2005)77 and Adam Walsh Law (2006)78 (Terry, 2011; Bales et al., 2010a; 
Harris & Lurigio, 2010). Collectively these laws impose longer incarceration 
terms and ongoing post-sentence community based surveillance of sex 
offenders. The surveillance specifically encompasses: 
  
 sex offender registration and community notification 
 residency restrictions 
 HDBS with GPS for serious sex offenders (mostly paedophiles) who 
have completed their maximum prison sentences.79  
  
More recently, however existing sex offender laws in the USA have been 
further extended so that HDBS with GPS can be applied to serious sex 
offenders as a condition of standard probation and parole, allowing complete 
or partial diversion from imprisonment (Armstrong & Freeman, 2011; Myers, 
2011; Jannetta, 2006). Some states also broadened the types of serious 
offender categories on whom HDBS with GPS can be applied. As well as 
serious sex offenders they have included violent offenders, habitual property 
                                                 
76
 Megan Kanka was a 7-year-old girl from New Jersey who was brutally raped and murdered 
in 1994 by a twice-convicted sex offender who had moved across the street from her family 
home. It is believed that her death could have been prevented if the family had known about 
their neighbour’s previous offences. Following a public outcry the federal and all state 
governments introduced a law titled ‘Megan’s law’. This law mandates each sex offender to 
be registered on a freely accessible public website as well as allows sex offenders to be 
monitored using GPS technology (Wagner, 2008).   
77
 Jessica Lunsford from Florida was abducted, raped and also brutally killed at the age of 9 
by a known sex offender in 2005. Because the offender was not registered with the police 
when he committed the crime, the inadequacy of ‘Megan’s law’ became apparent. The case 
became the catalyst for the creation of federal and state ‘Jessica’s law’ which requires lifetime 
GPS monitoring after a long prison term for adults convicted of a serious sexual crime against 
a child (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). 
78
 Adam Walsh was 6 years old when he was abducted from a shopping centre and his 
decapitated body was partially recovered in Florida in 1981. On the 25
th
 anniversary of his 
death, in 2006, the USA Congress passed ‘Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act’. 
This Act established a national Sex Offender Registry and mandates sex offenders to 
regularly update their whereabouts every three months for the rest of their lives, every 6 
months for 25 years of registration, and every year for 15 years of registration depending on 
the seriousness of their offences and when they committed them (Brown et al., 2007; 
McPherson, 2007).  
79
 This research is confined to analysing the third aspect of the ongoing post-sentence 
community based surveillance of sex offenders – being on HDBS with GPS. This is because 
research on it is generally lacking, while there is extensive research on the first and the 
second aspects (Harris & Lurigio, 2010).  
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offenders, gang related offenders, perpetrators of domestic violence/stalking 
and, in some cases, bailed high-risk defendants (Pinto & Nellis, 2011; Drake, 
2009; Brown et al., 2007; Shute, 2007; Jannetta, 2006).80 
 
The placement of serious offenders (mostly sex offenders), onto extended 
supervision HDBS with GPS is directly imposed by the judiciary without 
obtaining an offender’s consent (Bales et al., 2010b). These sanctions can be 
imposed in duration from a few months to a few years and even a lifetime in 
some states (Bishop, 2010; DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Brown et al., 2007). 
On average, the length of HDBS (probation/parole) with GPS is between 30 
and 90 days when used as a sanction (Brown et al., 2007). Non-compliance 
with these sanctions typically results in imprisonment. Currently, 35 states in 
the USA are using HDBS with GPS for serious sex offenders, 5 are using 
HDBS with GPS for broader serious offender categories, and many others are 
in the process of trialling it (Armstrong & Freeman, 2011; Tennessee Board of 
Probation and Parole 2008).  
 
HDBS with GPS typically use other tools and methods as part of an overall 
supervision strategy. Supervision strategies include:  
 
 RF monitoring 
 Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring (SCRAM) 
 urine analysis for drug and alcohol use  
 polygraph testing 
 field visits  
 regular office visits. 
      
A significant component of HDBS with GPS is mandatory treatment for 
offenders. Treatment strategies include substance abuse treatment, sex 
offender treatment, anger management treatment and mental health 
                                                 
80
 The application of HDBS with GPS on these ‘other’ offenders and even defendant cohorts 
is still in its infancy, so evaluative and critical discourses, as far as can be determined, are not 
yet available. So, the explanatory and evaluative discussion throughout this research is based 
on the application of HDBS with GPS for serious sex offenders.   
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counselling. Offenders are also typically assisted with employment related 
issues (Brown et al., 2007).  
 
Supervising serious sex offenders in the community is a very challenging task, 
which requires highly experienced and thoroughly trained supervising officers 
(Sex Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010; Winistorfer & 
Milano, 2010). Constant vigilance is required as this offender group is likely to 
be ‘deceptive and manipulative.’ Furthermore, a new crime committed may 
have irreparable consequences for the victim, the family and the community. 
Supervising officers therefore usually closely collaborate with treatment 
providers and aim to proactively avoid offenders reoffending (Turner et al., 
2007).  
 
The utilisation of HDBS with GPS for sex offenders has not been contentious 
in the USA. Advocates have maintained that it enhances community 
protection as the likelihood of offender detection is increased, with the most 
vulnerable members of the community, that is children, being better protected 
from strangers who want to commit the most repugnant crimes (Myers, 2011; 
Sex Offender Supervision and GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010; Jannetta, 
2006; Nellis, 2004). These beliefs are held despite research that has indicated 
that the vast majority of paedophiles are known to their victims, and that 
paedophiles are an offender category least likely to reoffend (Myers, 2011; 
Richards, 2011; Harris & Lurigio, 2010). Further, it has been argued that in 
comparison with prolonged incarceration or a term in a mental health 
institution, HDBS with GPS in the community are less onerous for the offender 
and provide them with better rehabilitative prospects. They are also much 
cheaper for the state (Myers, 2011). 
     
Nevertheless some opponents, mainly civil rights advocates, have argued that 
HDBS with GPS conflict with offenders’ human rights, are excessively 
onerous, and enhance their stigmatisation (Myers, 2011). Further, it has been 
stated that it could even be unconstitutional to extend correctional supervision 
post maximum sentences being served. To date, however, the judiciary has 
not ruled any aspects of HDBS with GPS to be unconstitutional (Iqbal, 2008). 
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(For more information see section 3.3.3). Despite some opposition, the use of 
HDBS with GPS has proliferated throughout the USA.   
 
State and federal legislation across the USA under which HDBS with GPS 
operate resulted from the culture of fear and moral panic that generally 
surrounds sex offenders and in particular violent paedophiles. Sex offenders 
are considered to be particularly deceptive and manipulative. Further, if they 
commit a new sex crime, this will create unbearable suffering for victims, their 
families and the entire society more so than any other new crime committed 
(New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007). Enhanced supervisory strategies 
were accordingly thought be essential for high-risk sex offenders in an effort 
to reduce their level of recidivism. Unlike the past when HDBS with RF were 
developed to curtail prison overcrowding and escalating costs, less concern 
occurred about the costs and the net widening potential of HDBS with GPS 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 2006). The primary rationale for these 
sanctions is therefore based on reducing offender risk and enhancing 
community protection and safeguarding victims.  
  
In summary, there has been an ongoing expansion of HDBS that utilise both 
RF and GPS electronic monitoring technology. Since 1990, HDBS coupled 
with active RF electronic monitoring have existed in all 50 states of the USA, 
and offender numbers have continued to grow gradually (Renzema, 1992). 
They have however varied markedly from state to state (Lilly & Nellis, 2013). 
Further, since the late 1990s the application of HDBS that use GPS 
technology has also been increasing. In particular, in 2011, 35 states in the 
USA were using HDBS with GPS for serious sex offenders, 5 were using 
HDBS with GPS for broader serious offender categories, and many others 
were in the process of trialling it (Armstrong & Freeman 2011; Tennessee 
Board of Probation and Parole 2008). The growth has therefore been 
substantial as Table 3.1 shows (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 1993; 
Baumer and Mendelsohn, 1992; Friel, Vaughn & del Carmen, 1987).  
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  Table 3.1 - Offenders on HDBS in the USA (total number) 
Year Offenders on RF Offenders on GPS 
1986 95 - 
1990 12,000 - 
1992 30,000 - 
1993 50,000 - 
1999 75,000 230 
2002 75,000 1,200 
2004 82,000 5,000 
2006 90,000 20,000 
2008 102,000 62,000 
2009 110,000 90,000 
 
It is interesting to note that the number of offenders on GPS is increasingly 
catching up to the number of offenders on RF, and it is likely to overtake it in 
the near future (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). The overall numbers are however 
still relatively small, as they comprise only a few percent of all offenders in the 
USA (Lilly & Nellis, 2013; DeMichele & Payne, 2009).    
 
3.2.3 Ideologies of supervision on HDBS  
  
During the late phase of HDBS, which essentially consisted of the instigation 
and proliferation of HDBS with RF and GPS, the mode of offender supervision 
has primarily been based on strict offender punishment and the enhancement 
of public safety.81 This punitiveness oriented offender supervision and 
surveillance based approach was the result of a marked philosophical and 
political shift away from offender treatment and rehabilitation in the 1970s.82 
                                                 
81
 This model of offender supervision replaced the models operating during the Casework Era 
and the Brokerage of Services Era which both emphasised the importance of therapeutic 
correctional treatment, that is, diagnosing the reason for offending and subsequently 
rehabilitating the offender (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). (For more information see Chapter 
2.2.3).  
82
 The move to a more punitive role for probation and parole was triggered by Martinson’s 
initial finding that ‘nothing works’ in rehabilitating offenders. Despite being refuted and having 
a number of methodological flaws this finding dealt an irreparable blow to the rehabilitation 
ideal, because it appealed to both liberals and conservatives (Sarre, 2005; Cromwell & 
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From the 1980s until the present day two distinct modes of offender 
supervision based on similar philosophies have been in place (Cromwell et 
al., 2005).  
      
The ‘Justice Model of Supervision’ operated between the mid-1980s and 1995 
(Cromwell et al., 2005). The focal point of this model was to re-define and re-
establish the value of HDBS with RF. It was thought that this would be 
achieved by portraying these sanctions as distinct community based 
dispositions that control, punish and manage offender risk, appropriately 
corresponding to the seriousness of the crime committed. As Gemignani 
(1983 cited in Cromwell et al., 2005:109) explained: 
  
The justice model advocates an escalated system of sanctions 
corresponding to the social harm resulting from the offense and the 
offender’s culpability. The justice model repudiates the idea that 
probation is a sanction designed to rehabilitate offenders in the 
community and, instead, regards a sentence of probation as a 
proportionate punishment that is to be lawfully administered for certain 
prescribed crimes.     
 
More specifically, due to the perceived “failure of corrections to live up to its 
‘promises’ to rehabilitate, reintegrate, and restore offenders to productive, law 
abiding lives”, the main aim of this model of supervision was to drastically 
change the way that offenders had been traditionally supervised in the 
community (Cromwell & Killinger, 1994:123). Instead of applying rehabilitative 
strategies such as offender counselling and reporting, the emphasis was on 
‘getting tough’ through home-based deprivation of liberty and community and 
victim reparation (Champion, 2008). The officer’s primary role under this 
model was to monitor the offender’s confinement in their home (through 
electronic monitoring technology), attendance at supervision appointments, 
performance of community work and payment of victim restitution83 (Alarid et 
                                                                                                                                           
Killinger, 1994). (See Chapter 2.3.3 for a more detailed description of the events that led to 
the demise of the philosophy of rehabilitation). 
83
 The fact that the entire case coordination and offender monitoring occurred from the 
confines of the office meant that this style of supervision was referred to as a ‘fortress style’. 
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al., 2008; Champion, 2008; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). Only in cases where 
the offender expressed a need or desire to engage in counselling or 
treatment, and was prepared to pay for it, were they referred to the community 
agency/ices that would provide the rehabilitative assistance84 (Alarid et al., 
2008; Cromwell et al., 2005).  
 
The justice model’s increased tendency to advocate for risk control in 
community corrections was criticised on several grounds (King, 1991). 
Principally, it was thought that the emphasis away from rehabilitation toward a 
sole emphasis on risk control would have permanent negative impacts on the 
roles and functions of community corrections officers (King, 1991). Further, 
reactive case management practice based on enforcement of surveillance 
was said to limit proactive creative individualistic case management plans and 
‘deskill’ correctional officers (King, 1991). This resulted in the recruitment of 
‘new types’ of correctional officers who were surveillance-oriented security 
guards performing technical and clerical tasks over skilled specialised 
counsellors/case managers. The latter were becoming fewer and fewer and 
only dealt with the highest risk offenders (King, 1991). Finally, as corrections 
officers were mandated as a part of their role to visit offenders at their 
home/workplace and even supervise various tests, this had made the nature 
of their job more prone to physical violence (King, 1991).   
 
Evaluations indicated that the justice model approach of offender supervision 
had relatively high recidivism rates. It did not prove to be more successful in 
reducing recidivism in comparison with previous rehabilitative supervision 
approaches (Cromwell et al., 2005). This is not surprising, as criminogenic 
factors that lead offenders into criminal activity were generally not dealt with 
by the supervising officer or specialised community agency/ies who previously 
provided rehabilitative treatments.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
This separation of the officer from the offender and the community was subsequently 
regarded as the main disadvantage of this model of supervision (Alarid et al., 2008).   
84
 It should be noted that there were legislative provisions in some jurisdictions allowing for 
treatment-related order conditions on HDBS with RF. However, due to a diminished belief in 
the ability to treat offenders, these were probably seldom imposed, and even when they were, 
the rehabilitative services lacked quality due to reduced funding (Alarid et al., 2008).  
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The latest supervision initiative, which was developed in the late 1990s, is 
known by a variety of terms including ‘neighbourhood based supervision’, 
‘community justice’ and ‘broken windows probation’ (Alarid et al., 2008). 
Similar to the ‘justice model of supervision,’ this model is primarily aimed at 
enhancing public confidence in HDBS with RF and GPS. It is believed that the 
community can regard these sanctions as palatable if offender supervision is 
tough and visible (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear & Dammer, 2003). As a result, this 
approach employs a mixture of supervisory strategies, community oriented 
policing methods and treatment provisions. Some of these include: 
 
 strong and consistent enforcement of order conditions, which increases 
offender accountability 
 visible offender supervision 
 enhanced partnerships between supervising officers, treatment 
providers, and the police 
 combined use of offender’s GPS tracking movements and Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) technology, which displays crime incident 
data to more effectively apprehend offenders if they re-offend 
 application of performance-based initiatives to regularly measure the 
effectiveness of HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS (Beto, 2000:12 
cited in Cromwell et al., 2005). 
 
Further, neighbourhood based supervision usually uses a unique model of 
case allocation where offenders are assigned to officers according to 
relatively small geographic areas. GIS mapping technology is heavily relied on 
in this approach as it provides officers with an unprecedented amount of 
offender-related information which can be used to apply offender-specific risk 
management as well as engagement in suitable treatment. More specifically, 
GIS: 
 
uses special computer software to visually diagram locations in a 
neighbourhood, or the entire city, of individuals and/or events. GIS 
enables a probation or parole agency to obtain a full picture of who 
is on probation and where probationers live... Available data 
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includes number of police calls for service, the number and location 
of orders for protection, and access to treatment venues from 
probationers’ residence… [this] information can be shared with 
police departments which already use GIS to locate suspects and 
investigate new crimes. 
    
    (Alarid et al., 2008:115) 
 
The utilisation of GIS in geographically confined offender caseloads also aims 
to enhance public safety, as officers are able to thoroughly get to know 
offenders, their circumstances and surroundings, and usually quickly capture 
them if they re-offend (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear & Dammer, 2003).  
 
Preliminary evaluations of neighbourhood based supervision models have 
produced mixed results. In comparison with the more traditional justice model 
of supervision, the positive outcomes of this approach include that offenders 
seem to obtain more support from their supervising officers such as finding 
employment, and accessing treatment providers. Further, officers report 
closer connections with the police and the community agencies. However, 
technical violation rates are higher and re-offending rates are similar when 
compared to the justice model of supervision (Alarid et al., 2008). Higher 
technical violation rates for offenders supervised on this model are not 
surprising as close contact between officers and offenders, which is integral to 
this supervision model, is bound to uncover more technical violations (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). 
 
3.3 Late phase of HDBS – Assessment of outcomes (1982-2013)   
 
This section discusses the outcomes of the currently operational late phase of 
HDBS in the USA. These outcomes are chronologically described over the 
last three decades, first in relation to HDBS with RF and then HDBS with 
GPS. It should however be noted that the number of studies assessing the 
outcomes of HDBS with RF generally outweighs the number of studies 
assessing the outcomes of HDBS with GPS. This is probably because there 
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has been three decades of application of HDBS with RF and less than a 
decade of application of HDBS with GPS. 
 
The outcomes are presented under 4 sub-themes - operational results, ethical 
issues and dilemmas, legal issues and dilemmas, and political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas. While the arguments presented under 
operational results are predominantly based on actual figures, the analysis 
presented under ethical, legal and political and stakeholder issues and 
dilemmas is somewhat broader and less tangible.  
 
3.3.1 Operational results  
 
The Operational results are presented under 4 points. The first broadly 
examines whether HDBS have widened the net or reduced prison crowding. 
The second analyses the effect of HDBS’ technical violation rates on prison 
crowding. The third investigates the effect of HDBS’ recidivism rates on prison 
crowding. The fourth discusses whether HDBS have generally reduced the 
cost of corrections. These areas are determined to be pivotal in analysing the 
operational results of HDBS because they either formed the rationale for their 
establishment or were generally considered to be important by corrections 
departments. The number of studies which specifically assessed the 
operational results of HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS is extensive. 
Studies examining specifically the operation of HDBS with GPS are abundant 
probably because during the first decade of the initiation of these sanctions 
correctional departments allocated the necessary funding to explore their 
operation in relation to various supervision models and costs so that most 
serious offenders (who are typically subjected to these sanctions) can be 
supervised most effectively. 
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3.3.1.1 Have HDBS widened the net or reduced prison 
overcrowding?   
 
The impetus for the creation and legislative proliferation of HDBS with RF 
across the USA was a belief that these sanctions would alleviate 
overcrowding in prisons (Fulton et al., 1997). A nation-wide survey conducted 
in 1990 revealed that ‘virtually all’ of the 335 agencies that operated HDBS 
with RF stated that one of their main goals in developing and operating these 
sanctions was to reduce the size of the prison population (Renzema, 1992). In 
order to achieve this goal, HDBS with RF aimed to divert lower-risk prison-
bound offenders from prison85 (Clear et al., 2006; Tonry, 1990).  
 
Problems occur when HDBS with RF do not attract prison bound offenders as 
then they merely widen the net of social control. The result is that offenders 
who would otherwise be sentenced to less intrusive means of control such as 
ordinary probation and parole are placed on the more severe sanctions. 
Consequently, if there is a net widening effect of HDBS with RF there is no 
reduction in the prison population or the correctional budget but rather an 
increase in both (Meyer, 2004; Wagner & Baird, 1993). In spite of this, Tonry 
(1990) has argued that the net widening effect can also be viewed positively. 
This is because it enhances the overall functioning of the criminal justice 
system by improving the struggling and overburdened operation of probation. 
He further believed the sentencing of some probation-bound offenders to 
HDBS with RF where they are more appropriately stringently supervised can 
have favourable effects. During this era of economic rationalism, net widening 
is nevertheless considered to be problematic as it has opposite consequences 
to the standard goal of public policy - maximising cost-effectiveness (Walker, 
1991). 
 
In the 1980s, studies analysing the effects of HDBS with RF generally found 
that prison diversion was occurring. This indicated that the characteristics of 
                                                 
85
 Instead of targeting the prison bound population, very few HDBS with RF were specifically 
developed to target high-risk probationers; the most prominent such sanction is the 
Massachusetts HDBS (Byrne et al., 1989).  
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offenders on HDBS with RF predominantly resembled the prison population 
(Erwin, 1987; Pearson, 1987b). Subsequent research vigorously disputed the 
validity of these findings, arguing instead that true-diversion did not occur. It 
was reported that over half of offenders on HDBS with RF during this time 
were not prison-bound but were instead diverted from ordinary probation and 
parole onto HDBS with RF (McCarthy & McCarthy, 1991; Byrne et al., 1989; 
Clear, 1987; Clear et al., 1987).  
 
Various studies in the 1990s reported that significant net widening occurred 
as offenders on HDBS with RF were not truly prison bound as legislatively 
intended (Meyer, 2004; Fulton et al., 1997; Champion, 1996; Clear & 
Hardyman, 1990; Tonry, 1990). Even though most HDBS with RF referred to 
their client group as ‘serious’, ‘dangerous’ or ‘recidivist’ prison-bound 
offenders, in reality the stringent eligibility criteria often excluded various 
offence categories and inadvertently relegated the offender pool to low-risk 
probation-resembling offenders (Meyer, 2004; Clear, 1997; Clear & 
Hardyman, 1990). More specifically, this included minor offenders, non-violent 
offenders and non-parole violators, who were usually employed and had 
strong family support that made them more likely to successfully complete the 
HDBS with RF (Alarid et al., 2008; Champion, 2008; Meyer, 2004; Welch, 
2004).  
 
In addition, when higher risk offenders were considered eligible for HDBS with 
RF, they usually declined placement and opted instead for prison, which they 
regarded as comparatively ‘easier’ (Clear, 1997; Fulton et al., 1997; Petersilia, 
1997; Clear & Hardyman, 1990). This is due to serious offenders’ usual 
familiarity with prison terms, environments and culture. These offenders also 
typically lack community-based support systems and generally feel unable to 
comply with stringent order requirements of HDBS with RF. In particular, they 
feel that it would be impossible for them to resist the various pro-social and 
anti-social temptations in the community that are forbidden on HDBS with RF 
(Spelman, 1995; Crouch, 1993). Furthermore, these offenders are generally 
aware that, due to prison overcrowding, only a fraction of the imposed 
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sentence of incarceration is usually served – at times this can be as low as 
10% (Clear, 1997; Petersilia, 1997). 
 
More specifically, research indicated that net widening occurred during 
sentencing of offenders to front-end and back-end HDBS with RF (Tonry, 
1990; Pearson, 1987a). Front-end HDBS with RF were promptly recognised 
as more susceptible to net widening as offenders are sentenced to them at 
the sentencing stage and not from prison. Research indicated that many 
offenders were placed onto front-end HDBS with RF rather than regular 
probation. This occurred even though judges at sentencing were usually 
required to sign affidavits declaring that the offender was prison-bound (Clear, 
1997; Clear & Hardyman, 1990; Tonry, 1990; Erwin, 1987). Somewhat 
surprising was that even back-end HDBS with RF, which directly release 
offenders early from prisons, have difficulty achieving prison diversion. This is 
because judges were found to typically sentence borderline cases (but in fact 
probation bound offenders) to prison and invite them to subsequently apply for 
HDBS with RF (Clear, 1997; Tonry, 1990; Clear et al., 1987).  
 
After 2000, it became apparent that HDBS with RF have not reduced prison 
crowding (Meyer, 2004; Clear & Dammer, 2003; Johnson, 2002). This is even 
though there is some evidence which indicates that offenders are being more 
carefully selected for HDBS with RF. This is due to considerable uncertainty 
about how to target higher risk prison bound offenders to HDBS with RF in a 
manner that reduces prison crowding and simultaneously achieves 
community protection (McCarthy et al., 2001).  
 
Some HDBS with GPS technology have recently reduced prison 
overcrowding, but others have widened the net (Meyer, 2004; Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). This reduction relates to its use for serious sex and violent 
offenders who are placed onto HDBS with GPS as an alternative to 
imprisonment. Conversely, offenders who are placed onto extended 
supervision HDBS with GPS post their prison sentence to increase public 
safety have widened the net. Previously, these offenders would have been 
released into the community after their prison sentence expired, or they would 
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have been paroled (for more information see DeMichele & Payne, 2009; New 
Jersey State Parole Board, 2007; Shute, 2007; Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 
2005). Of interest is, as previously stated, that little concern comparatively 
exists when net widening is the result of placing serious offenders on HDB 
with GPS (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 2006).  
 
In order to reduce the possibility of casting the correctional net too widely, 
HDBS with GPS should be reserved only for the highest risk offenders 
(Bottos, 2007). It is highly likely that HDBS with GPS will be increasingly 
applied across the several stages of the criminal justice process, from those 
awaiting trial, to those on front-end and back-end sanctions, as well as those 
on extended supervision orders. As such it could be very easy to subject 
substantial numbers of offenders under these sanctions to heightened 
surveillance. Accordingly, these sanctions should be applied to carefully 
selected offenders matching the intensity of service and supervision and risk 
(Bottos, 2007).  
 
3.3.1.2 What has been the effect of HDBS technical violation rates on 
prison crowding?  
Apart from the fact that net widening associated with HDBS with RF has 
generally not reduced prison crowding, the placement of low-risk offenders on 
HDBS with RF has resulted in high rates of technical violations and 
subsequent sentencing of offenders to prison. This inadvertently exacerbates 
prison crowding (Bottos, 2007; Tonry, 1990). Over the last three decades the 
rates of technical violations of HDBS with RF have varied greatly, fluctuating 
between 10 and 70 (Clear & Dammer, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia 
& Turner, 1992). The highest rates have generally been reported among 
HDBS with RF that have longer average lengths of orders, apply stricter 
conditions, intensively monitor offenders and do not provide offenders with 
adequate rehabilitative services (for more information see Bourke, 1997 and 
Gray, Fields & Maxwell, 2001 cited in Alarid et al., 2008; Clear & Dammer, 
2003; Ansay, 1999; Petersilia & Turner, 1992). 
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In the 1980s, the rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF varied 
between 10 and 25% (Schmidt, 1994b; Wagner & Baird, 1993; Pearson & 
Harper, 1990; Fox, 1987a). These rates were low for two reasons. First, 
offenders were carefully hand-picked for participation on these sanctions. The 
states that implemented initial HDBS with RF such as Georgia, New Jersey 
and Florida were in a unique position as their prisons were the most severely 
overcrowded in the USA (Champion, 2008; Byrne et al., 1989; Ball et al., 
1988; Erwin, 1986). This was due to traditionally stringent sentencing 
practices that in reality meant when these states introduced HDBS with RF it 
was easy for them to ‘hand pick’ offenders who were more likely to be 
compliant and not commit technical violations (Wagner & Baird, 1993; 
McCarthy & McCarthy, 1991; Byrne et al., 1989; Clear, 1987; Clear et al., 
1987; Erwin, 1987).  
 
Second, there was enormous enthusiasm among stakeholders to achieve 
positive outcomes during the first few years of operation of HDBS with RF 
(Byrne et al., 1989). This meant that early sanctions generally encompassed 
rehabilitative services; these services at least to some extent addressed 
offenders’ needs, thus reducing rates of technical violations (Pearson & 
Harper, 1990; Pearson, 1985). Nevertheless, after this ‘Hawthorne effect’,86 
that is, during the 1990s, rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF 
soared (for more information see Lilly et al., 1993). 
 
Technical violation rate increased on HDBS with RF during the 1990s. It 
ranged between 40 and 60% (Gray, Fields & Maxwell, 2001 cited in Alarid et 
al., 2008; Morrison, 1994; Petersilia & Turner, 1992). There were two key 
reasons for this. First, all states across the USA had established HDBS with 
RF by 1990 and the novelty and enthusiasm surrounding these sanctions had 
abated (McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia, 2000; United States General 
Accounting Office, 1990; Pearson, 1988). As a result, the sanctions were no 
                                                 
86
 The ‘Hawthorne effect’, is the initial period when a HDBS is implemented. At this time, 
offenders who are highly likely to be compliant are carefully ‘hand-picked’ for participation on 
these sanctions. These offenders are not likely to commit technical violations or reoffend. 
However, after this initial period of sanction operation, the operation and outcomes are highly 
likely to deteriorate. (For more information see Lilly et al., 1993). 
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longer carefully operated, with the emphasis overwhelmingly on the punitive 
aspects of HDBS with RF. Offender rehabilitation was ignored which lead to 
higher rates of technical violations (Clear & Dammer, 2003; Clear, 1997; 
Tonry & Lynch, 1996; Deschenes et al., 1995; Fulton & Stone, 1992; 
Petersilia & Turner, 1990). Second, net widening meant that many non-prison 
bound habitual property offenders were sentenced to HDBS with RF. These 
offenders were not deterred by a short incarceration period if they breached 
the HDBS with RF. These offenders were generally aware that they were low-
risk and that endemic prison crowding meant that they would not experience 
long prison sentences (for more information see Petersilia, 2000; Petersilia, 
1998; Tonry, 1990).  
 
Since 2000, technical violations of HDBS with RF as well as HDBS with GPS 
technology have been relatively low, at between 10 and 40% (Padget et al., 
2006; Frost, 2002; McCarthy et al., 2001). More specifically, technical 
violation rates of HDBS with GPS are comparatively lower than for HDBS with 
RF. For example, across the USA it has been found that technical violation 
rates for HDBS with RF are on average around 30 to 40% (slightly down on 
1990s figures), and on HDBS with GPS on average between 10 and 30% 
(Padgett et al., 2006; Frost, 2002; McCarthy et al., 2001).  
 
The most compliant group on HDBS with GPS is sex offenders (Bales et al., 
2010a). There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, the 
fact that high risk offenders are monitored by the most sophisticated GPS 
technology seems to serve as a deterrent and creates an awareness that if an 
offender breaches the conditions they will be caught (Wagner, 2008; Padgett 
et al., 2006; Frost, 2002). Second, due to their high-risk classification, these 
offenders are typically aware that if they breach the conditions they will face a 
lengthy period of incarceration. 
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3.3.1.3 What has been the effect of HDBS recidivism rates on prison 
crowding? 
 
High recidivism rates following HDBS with RF have worsened the prison 
crowding crisis across the USA. Since being implemented re-offending rates 
post HDBS with RF have varied between 10 and 40% (Wagner & Baird, 1993; 
McCarthy & McCarthy, 1991; Pearson & Harper, 1990; Petersilia & Turner, 
1990; Pearson, 1988; Erwin & Bennett, 1987). Empirical evidence has shown 
that if offenders undergo treatment during HDBS with RF their level of 
recidivism is reduced (Petersilia, 1997). The ongoing problem however has 
been a lack of financial support for HDBS with RF. This meant that insufficient 
resources have been allocated for the provision of treatment for offenders on 
these sanctions (Clear & Dammer, 2003; Petersilia, 1997). Nevertheless, the 
importance of other supportive mechanisms such as family and/or co-
residents’ support, the assistance of community-based networks and the 
availability of adequate employment, cannot be underestimated in living a pro-
social crime-free lifestyle after the HDBS with RF.   
 
During the 1980s, follow up recidivism rates (some 1 year post being on the 
sanction, some 2 years post being on the sanction and some 5 years post 
being on the sanction) were reported to range between 10 and 36%. This was 
initially perceived to be very positive because it was substantially lower than 
recidivism rates after incarceration which are normally over 60% (for more 
information see Wagner & Baird, 1993; McCarthy & McCarthy, 1991; Pearson 
& Harper, 1990; Pearson, 1988; Erwin & Bennett, 1987; Erwin, 1987). 
Subsequently however these low re-offending rates were vigorously critiqued 
as offenders on HDBS with RF at that time were carefully hand-picked for 
participation, and as mentioned earlier, were not truly prison bound (Clear & 
Hardyman, 1990). As a result, these relatively low-risk and low-need 
offenders were less likely to re-offend than a prison bound cohort (McCarthy & 
McCarthy, 1991; Byrne et al., 1989; Clear, 1987; Clear et al., 1987). Further, 
the relatively low recidivism rates were also not surprising because early 
HDBS with RF provided offenders with some treatment and support 
mechanisms (Pearson & Harper, 1990; Pearson, 1985). 
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Re-offending rates were reported to be considerably higher during the 1990s, 
on average approximately 40% a year post HDBS with RF (Lilly et al., 1993; 
Petersilia & Turner, 1990). The increase in re-offending was the result of 
stringent offender control becoming pre-eminent and treatment and support of 
offenders’ needs becoming negligible  (Clear & Dammer, 2003; McCarthy et 
al., 2001; Petersilia, 2000; Clear, 1997; Deschenes et al., 1995; Fulton & 
Stone, 1992). Inadequate provision of rehabilitative strategies consequently 
contributed to offenders being more likely to engage in re-offending after their 
HDBS with RF (Clear & Hardyman, 1990; Erwin & Bennett, 1987). Further, 
lower-risk offenders, who were predominantly sentenced onto HDBS with RF 
during the 1990s, were more likely to re-offend post the HDBS with RF for the 
same reason that they were more likely to commit technical violations. They 
were aware that their penalty, usually a period of incarceration, would be 
relatively short due to their low-risk status as well as prison overcrowding (for 
more information see Petersilia, 2000; Petersilia 1998; Tonry, 1990).  
 
From 2000 onwards there has been a lack of specific follow up of offenders’ 
recidivism rates post their HDBS with RF in the USA (Alarid et al., 2008; 
Brown et al., 2007). One influential study analysing whether being on HDBS 
with RF had any specific deterrent effect on offenders was conducted by 
Padgett et al., (2006), from Florida State University. Empirical evidence 
indicated a crime suppression effect even during a relatively short period of 
being on HDBS with RF (Padgett et al., 2006). In particular, lower technical 
violations, revocation rates and recidivism rates for the duration of being on 
the sanction were found in comparison with offenders on all other community 
based dispositions without electronic monitoring (Florida Department of 
Corrections, 2003; Padgett et al., 2006). Overall, the results showed that 
electronic monitoring significantly reduced the likelihood of offenders failing to 
comply with the HDBS with RF, effectively serving to incapacitate and/or 
deter offending, and hence protecting public safety (Padgett et al., 2006). 
However, it remains unclear whether this could be sustained after years of 
being on the HDBS with RF (Nellis, 2010c). Even so, the enhanced level of 
supervisory control that is afforded through electronic monitoring beyond 
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human contact alone may augment offender accountability, thus ultimately 
reducing the likelihood of re-offending (Florida Department of Corrections, 
2003; Padgett et al., 2006).     
 
Contrary to the mixed recidivism-related findings that are associated with 
HDBS with RF, all studies since 2000 that have analysed HDBS with GPS’ 
effect on recidivism have found considerable impacts. For example, the State 
Parole Board, New Jersey, GPS monitoring report suggested that the 
placement of sex offenders onto the HDBS with GPS contributed to a lower 
recidivism rate than nationwide data for high-risk sex offenders showed (New 
Jersey State Parole Board, 2007). The pilot program spanned over 3 years 
and consisted of 225 sex offenders. Evaluative results showed that only 5.3% 
of these sex offenders on the HDBS with GPS were arrested for a new 
sexual offence following their release from prison (New Jersey State Parole 
Board, 2007). GPS monitoring was said to encourage high-risk sex offenders 
to control their behaviour by producing controls which prevent offenders from 
criminogenic situations, hence circumventing the inspiration for new crimes. 
The State Parole Board adopted a “containment” approach, meaning 
intensive parole supervision, offender-specific treatment, and polygraph 
examinations alongside GPS monitoring (New Jersey State Parole Board, 
2007). Sex offenders reported that they felt as though their movements were 
being watched, placing a greater control on their behaviour. Additionally, a 
constant reminder was realised through wearing the device (New Jersey 
State Parole Board, 2007). Most importantly, offender-specific treatment 
directly addressed sexual offending behaviours based on cognitive-
behavioural principles, intervening proactively in order to prevent re-
offending. The New Jersey State Parole Board (2007) observed that 
offenders who completed offender-specific treatment recidivated at a 
significantly lower rate.   
 
The empirical findings from the largest ever comparative assessment of the 
operation of electronic monitoring technology versus ordinary community 
supervision of over 270,000 offenders were also very encouraging and 
supportive of earlier reported Padgett et al. (2006) findings. The study 
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conducted by Bales et al. (2010a) found that being on a HDBS with RF 
reduces the likelihood of failure under community supervision, in relation to 
technical violation rates and recidivism, by about 30%. Being on a HDBS with 
GPS provides a further 6% compliance improvement rate when compared to 
HDBS with RF. This study also found that HDBS with GPS monitoring are 
most effective for sex offenders, as they are the most compliant offender 
category (Bales et al., 2010a).  
 
Brown et al. (2007) in their empirical studies sponsored by the USA National 
Institute of Justice best summarised the ‘lessons learned’ concerning 
recidivism and deterrence associated with HDBS with GPS. These included: 
 
 GPS does prevent an individual from committing a crime, and it 
provides offenders with a set of rules which they fully understand the 
consequences of, and have a choice about whether to abide by 
 Because offenders believe that they are being observed, they may be 
less likely to engage in non-compliant activities 
 Particular locations and victims are avoided due to geographical 
perimeters set by exclusion zones 
 Maintaining contact with former associates is discouraged due to the 
presence of GPS 
 It is however unknown whether being subjected to GPS has a 
sustainable impact on behaviour modification (Brown et al., 2007).  
 
The steady accumulation of evidence has therefore revealed that stand-alone 
electronic supervision does not have a positive impact on recidivism, and that 
produces positive results when combined with treatment (Nellis, 2010c; 
Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005). Despite this, research indicates that USA 
jurisdictions rarely build rehabilitative elements into HDBS with RF (Olotu, 
Beaupre & Verbrugge, 2009). This is because these sanctions were 
developed on the basis of punitiveness which has meant that the rhetoric of 
rehabilitation has often been overlooked. Yet the placement of serious 
offenders onto HDBS with GPS has meant that treatment and rehabilitative 
provisions are increasingly incorporated into these sanctions and that the 
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technology is not simply viewed as a deterrent tool in itself (Nellis, 2010c; 
Brown et al., 2007; New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007). As a result, further 
and more intensive interaction of treatment and control in HDBS, particularly 
with RF, may in the future provide more longer-term effects in recidivism 
reduction (McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia, 1997).    
  
3.3.1.4 Have HDBS reduced the cost of corrections?   
 
Directly related to the aim of relieving overcrowded prisons and diverting 
offenders into community based settings is the goal of saving money 
(Petersilia, 2000; McCarthy, 1987). In comparison with incarcerating an 
offender, placing them on a HDBS with RF seems to be much cheaper for the 
state. For example, it “costs the state nothing to house them; lodging, 
subsistence, and often even the cost of an electronic monitor are covered by 
the offender’s own resources” (Clear & Dammer, 2003:221). Over the last 
three decades however there have been mixed findings about whether HDBS 
with RF actually achieve financial savings for the state. This seems to be 
dependent on 4 factors including: 
 
 Whether prison-bound offenders are actually sentenced to HDBS with 
RF. In cases where net widening occurs no savings are possible as 
offenders who are sentenced to HDBS with RF would have otherwise 
received a less serious punishment such as traditional probation. In 
fact, additional expenses are incurred because the cost of HDBS with 
RF is up to 10 times more expensive than regular probation (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003; Clear, 1997; Schmidt, 1994b). 
 
 The rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF. Tough enforcement 
of stringent conditions of HDBS with RF usually results in high rates of 
technical violations and substantially reduces the cost saving potential 
of HDBS with RF. As Clear (1997:129) explained “every case that ‘fails’ 
[and results in a return to court due to technical violations] and goes to 
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prison for the original sentence not only obliterates any potential 
savings but also adds the costs of the HDBS option that failed.” 
 
 The rates of recidivism post HDBS with RF. High post HDBS with RF 
recidivism rates, usually due to a lack of rehabilitative strategies during 
the sanction, lead to increased prison crowding and hence exacerbate 
the cost of corrections. 
 
 The overall cost of delivery of HDBS with RF. Determining the cost of 
delivery of HDBS with RF for the state is complex as many interacting 
indirect factors may affect the final figure. Nevertheless, the cost is 
mainly influenced by the specific electronic monitoring agency costs 
[which vary according to the number of offenders supervised, the type 
of equipment used and the average length of time offenders are 
supervised] (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Further, the availability and 
extensiveness of rehabilitative treatment programs and services, and 
the extent to which offenders contribute to their own cost of supervision 
and monitoring are also important. 
 
In addition, no real cost savings are realised unless a prison or at least a wing 
of a prison is closed, or diversion prevents the building of a new prison (Clear 
& Dammer, 2003; Fulton et al., 1997). Alarid et al (2008:190) most clearly 
explained this in the following example: 
 
If we assume that ISP [HDBS] ‘saved’ a state corrections department 
from using 250 beds in a prison facility that holds 1,250 offenders, the 
saved costs would be meals, medical care, and other minor supplies 
that would have been provided for those 250 offenders. However, the 
prison would have to remain open for the other 1,000 offenders. 
 
In the late 1980s, studies analysing the operation of HDBS with RF reported 
that correctional departments who had implemented HDBS with RF were 
achieving significant cost savings (Wagner & Baird, 1993; Erwin, 1987; 
Pearson, 1987b). For example, Erwin (1987) and Pearson (1987) compared 
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the per diem costs of prison with the per diem costs of HDBS with RF. They 
concluded that between $6,000 and $8,000 was saved per offender who was 
diverted from prison onto HDBS with RF. A subsequent criticism of these cost 
models was that they “failed to take into account the net widening and re-
processing as a result of technical violations and new arrests” (Fulton et al., 
1997:70). A more comprehensive cost analysis was conducted in Florida by 
Baird and Wagner (1990), who considered the costs associated with net 
widening, revealing an approximate $2,700 saving per offender on the HDBS 
with RF.  
 
In the 1990s, researchers overwhelmingly concluded that HDBS with RF cost 
the state substantially more than initially thought (Fulton et al., 1997). The 
main reason was the significant rate of net widening. Numerous studies 
reported that the vast majority of offenders on HDBS with RF were not prison-
bound, that is, they were low to medium risk probationers (Fulton et al., 1997; 
Champion, 1996; Clear & Hardyman, 1990; Tonry, 1990). It was concluded 
that no real saving occurred, because even though the actual delivery of the 
HDBS with RF is cheaper than prison, HDBS with RF costs up to 10 times 
more than regular probation, which they were replacing (Clear, 1997).  
  
Furthermore, studies indicated that HDBS with RF technical violation rates 
markedly increase the costs of prisons up (Meyer, 2004). High rates of breach 
of HDBS with RF due to technical violations, combined with a penalty of one-
year incarceration in some states for those who commit such breaches, had 
inadvertently meant that many non-prison bound offenders who violated their 
conditions of HDBS with RF ended up ‘unnecessarily’ doing prison time 
(Alarid et al., 2008; Welch, 2004). If HDBS with RF did not exist it is probable 
that those offenders would simply be placed on probation or in some cases in 
prison where due to overcrowding they would serve only a portion of their 
original sentence (for more information see Clear, 2007). The prison 
consequently became a ‘backup sanction’ (Clear, 2007), or the ‘revolving 
door’ (Petersilia & Turner, 1990), when offenders were unable to abide by the 
stringent requirements of HDBS with RF. Hence, sentencing an offender to a 
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HDBS with RF could actually increase the overall cost to the state in 
comparison with incarcerating them (Meyer, 2004).  
 
At the turn of the century Johnson (2002) argued that anticipated cost savings 
associated with HDBS with RF were illusionary. The latest empirical evidence 
in contrast has indicated that HDBS with RF, which provide treatment and 
employment training, cost about two-thirds of the cost of incarceration 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Throughout the USA the median cost of leasing 
the RF equipment is $2,190 per year per offender (Brown et al., 2007). Once 
staff and overhead resources are added onto these costs they increase to 
$4,380. These figures exclude the cost associated with staff overtime, 
specialised staff training and lost/stolen equipment (Brown et al., 2007). 
 
The cost of HDBS with GPS, treatment and employment training is even 
higher, almost similar to the cost of incarceration (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; 
New Jersey State Parole Board, 2007; Shute, 2007; Renzema & Mayo-
Wilson, 2005; Caputo, 2004). Throughout the USA the median cost of leasing 
the GPS equipment is $2,920 per year per offender (Brown et al., 2007). 
Once staff and overhead resources are added onto these costs they increase 
to $5,475. [These figures exclude the cost associated with staff overtime, 
specialised staff training and lost/stolen equipment (Brown et al., 2007)]. The 
cost of operating GPS technology is more expensive as, unlike the RF 
technology, it involves much more sophisticated equipment that provides 
considerably more extensive information about the offender’s movements 
which may require analysis and action (Minnesota Department of Corrections, 
2006). Once the expenses associated with (at least some) net widening and 
technical violations are added to these costs, these sanctions are said to 
become more expensive than prison.87   
 
                                                 
87
 As mentioned earlier, it is worth noting that prisons in the USA are comparatively much 
cheaper to operate than elsewhere in the Western world. This is because the USA has a 
much higher incarceration rate per 100,000 adult population, larger prison capacities, cheaper 
construction costs and generally worse conditions in prisons (Reichel, 2008; Stephan, 2004; 
Haney, 2001). 
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According to Minnesota Department of Corrections (2006) the placement of 
serious offenders, mostly sex-offenders, on extended supervision HDBS with 
GPS to increase public safety has widened the net of social control and 
increased correctional outlays. The ‘moral panic’ surrounding sex offenders in 
particular throughout the Western world has led to stringent legislation under 
which the protection of public safety outweighs the overall concerns about the 
cost (Nellis, 2010c). Previously, these offenders would have either been set 
free into the community following imprisonment or would have received a 
parole period. The underlying assumption behind the legislative changes is 
that sex offending is fundamentally a subject of availability and opportunity. 
Imposing continual surveillance over the offender is supposed to deter them 
from re-offending both during the sentence as well as after it (Nellis, 2010c).   
 
Conversely, HDBS with GPS that operate as alternatives to prisons for 
serious offenders appear to result in cost savings for the state. This is 
because overall figures indicate that HDBS with GPS are generally cheaper 
than imprisonment. Brown et al., (2007) from the Centre for Criminal Justice 
Technology were sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (USA) to 
report on USA-wide lessons learnt about the operation of HDBS with GPS. 
They concluded that, even though the cost of incarceration varies significantly 
throughout the USA, the median figure per inmate per year is around $30,000 
(Brown et al., 2007). It should be noted that this figure typically excludes the 
costs of constructing new prisons or the expansion of current facilities. To 
these overheads, additional millions of dollars need to be added. This report 
also found that throughout the USA, on average, HDBS with GPS costs the 
state US$5,475 per offender per year. This figure is inclusive of the cost of the 
lease of equipment as well as staff and overhead resources, but excludes 
costs associated with staff overtime, specialised staff training and lost/stolen 
equipment (Brown et al., 2007). According to these average costs of 
incarceration and HDBS with GPS, about 5 offenders can be placed on HDBS 
with GPS annually rather than incarcerating one inmate for one year. 
Consequently, correctional outlays seem substantially different when making 
comparisons between prison and HDBS with GPS (Bales et al., 2010a).   
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Extensive research has however indicated that actual operational costs 
associated with HDBS with GPS are often overlooked or underestimated 
(Drake, 2009). Because GPS tracking is very resource-intensive, requiring 
extensive collaboration between different components of the criminal justice 
system (Drake, 2009; Fransson, 2005). GPS technology operates on the 
basis of mobile phone signal availability as well as the connection with 
satellite signals, which means that whenever the signal and/or connections 
are lost follow-up is necessary. This is even though the mobile phone signal 
may be in a ‘dead spot’ or the satellite signals may be lost due to the offender 
being surrounded by high-rise buildings or being inside buildings (DeMichele 
& Payne, 2009). As all of these ‘false alerts’ require analysis and perhaps a 
response, this substantially increases the costs of HDBS with GPS 
(Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2006). Due to this, monitoring centres 
need to be staffed around the clock. This is particularly for hybrid and active 
tracking since all alarms indicating possible equipment tampering or entry into 
an exclusion zones must be evaluated and responded to without delay 
(Fransson, 2005). However, the number of individuals that a staff member can 
handle simultaneously is limited. Interestingly, the response to alert warnings 
is one of the least recognised costs of HDBS with GPS (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009).  
 
Further, staff involved in installation of the device, maintenance of technical 
equipment, and staff within corrections and police departments assigned to 
monitoring the offender, also need to be costed (Fransson, 2005). In 
particular, staff salaries in proportion to the number of offenders on the HDBS 
with GPS should be included in cost calculations (Olotu et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, initial and periodically repeated training of all stakeholders is 
also a component of expenses (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Significant 
increases in personnel, overtime and training, as well as supply costs must all 
be accounted for in the operation of HDBS with GPS.  
 
Other broader costs which are rarely taken into account include establishing 
and maintaining the GPS agency infrastructure, particularly the ‘start-up costs’ 
(Olotu et al., 2009). More specifically, administration overheads, employee 
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compensation, vehicles and office space costs must be incorporated (Drake, 
2009). Further, the cost of the treatment and services provided for offenders is 
also critical when considering the total cost of a program (Shute, 2007). If 
these significant expenses are not counted, then there is a possibility that the 
calculated cost will be inaccurate and that the HDBS with GPS will be critically 
underfunded (Drake, 2009). 
 
When discussing cost effectiveness of HDBS with GPS, a number of indirect 
cost savings must be mentioned. Empirically, it has been demonstrated that 
offenders on HDBS with GPS (typically high-risk sex-offenders) have higher 
successful completion rates and lower recidivism rates. Lower costs are 
therefore associated with re-arrest and re-incarceration in comparison with 
non-electronically monitored offenders (Bales et al., 2010a; Bottos, 2007; New 
Jersey State Parole Board, 2007; Padgett et al., 2006). This is because these 
offenders consciously avoid exclusion zones in the knowledge that their 
movements are being monitored, so GPS equipment creates an ‘ever-seeing 
eye’88 within society. According to Olotu 2et al., (2009:xiv) “surveillance and 
monitoring value could [also] provide opportunities for offenders to enhance 
their independent community living” even after the HDBS with GPS. A further 
advantage of GPS technology is that it provides community corrections 
officers with valuable information about an offender’s attitude to behavioural 
change (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Cost savings may be the result of greater 
understanding of each offender’s movements. This would result in an increase 
in compliance with other conditions and subsequently lead to lower rates of 
recidivism and decreases in re-arrests and incarceration (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). 
 
Additional government savings are achievable through the possible 
continuation of an offender’s employment in the community, an offender’s 
ability to pay taxes and, in some cases, an offender’s personal contribution to 
the expenses associated with the operation of HDBS (DeMichele & Payne, 
                                                 
88
 This is also referred to as the “panopticon” (Olotu et al., 2009). This is Jeremy Bentham’s 
concept for a prison design where guards could monitor prisoner’s actions at all times without 
being seen (for more information see Clear et al., 2006). 
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2009; Bottos, 2007). In the USA, sanction costs are often partially offset 
through the offender’s contribution to equipment daily lease fees. For 
example, the Florida Department of Corrections can require offenders on 
HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS reimburse the service for some or all of 
the cost of the equipment (Bales et al., 2010a). The study conducted by Bales 
et al (2010a) found that 61% of offenders were ordered to pay for some 
portion of the daily lease of their devices. In addition, in some instances, 
damages incurred to the equipment were also charged to the offender. 
Offender payments operated on a sliding scale, proportional to the income of 
the offender89 (Bales et al., 2010a). However, it is interesting to note that all of 
the offenders’ financial contributions only offset the overall costs of sanction 
delivery by about 10% (Bales et al., 2010a). Nevertheless, as offenders adopt 
a stable lifestyle and further develop their responsibilities, such as steady 
employment and income, these cost offsets would increase according to the 
offender’s financial position in the future.  
 
3.3.2 Ethical issues and dilemmas  
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas are presented under 4 points. Initially, there is a 
philosophical discussion about whether HDBS are a part of a surveillance-
oriented Orwellian90 society. This is followed by a more specific analysis on 
whether there is discrimination in the selection process for HDBS, whether 
punishment on HDBS varies between offenders, and whether HDBS 
punishment spills over into the lives of offenders’ co-residing family members.  
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas are generally presented in relation to mostly 
HDBS with RF. This is because the number of studies that have explored the 
                                                 
89
 Using a sliding scale is necessary due to many offenders having relatively low educational 
levels and thus their ability to obtain and maintain reasonable employment may subsequently 
be limited (Bales et al., 2010a). (For more information see section 3.3.2.2). 
90
 George Orwell in his classic novel titled ‘1984’ (written in 1948 and published in 1949) 
provided a thought provoking look into the future, outlining his fear of the totalitarian state 
where among other features two-way television screens allow unprecedented governmental 
intrusion into private lives and constant monitoring of activities; it specifically included spying 
on people, revealing their secrets and imposing on their privacy (Bigo, 2006; Schmidt, 
1994b). 
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ethical issues and dilemmas of HDBS with RF is significant, but is more 
limited in relation to HDBS with GPS. In particular, gaps in research are in 
whether punishment on HDBS with GPS varies between offenders, and 
whether punishment on HDBS with GPS spills over into the lives of offenders’ 
co-residing family members. It is possible that this is because HDBS with 
GPS do not confine offenders to their homes for prolonged periods of time. As 
such, the punishment on offenders undergoing these sanctions is probably 
not as diversified and has substantially less impact on their co-residents in 
comparison with HDBS with RF (Martinovic & Schluter, 2012; Alarid et al., 
2008; Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2001). Nevertheless, future research 
assessing these issues is imperative. 
 
3.3.2.1 Are HDBS part of a surveillance-oriented Orwellian society? 
 
While from a purely operational perspective the monitoring associated with 
HDBS is not considered to be “surreptitious” (Ball et al, 1988:127), there are 
larger ethical issues and dilemmas worth considering. For example,  
 
What does it imply when homes are being converted into jails? 
What will be the effect of a policy that might lead to a significant 
portion of society living under the constant realization that their 
movement is being monitored by a computer somewhere? Is this 
just the beginning of what will become further state intrusion into the 
home? Is it part of an even larger trend toward greater state control 
over the private lives of its citizens? Such questions ... force us to 
be sensitive to the larger implications of our efforts, to the “big 
picture”.  
 
(Ball et al., 1988:127) 
 
Consequently, the first and broadest ethical consideration related to the 
operation of HDBS with RF was whether they were a part of the government’s 
move towards an extension of total control (Lilly & Ball, 1987), that is, a 
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surveillance-oriented Big Brother - Orwellian society (for more information see 
Lilly, 2006; Payne & Gainey, 1998). 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the opponents of HDBS with RF argued vigorously 
that the introduction of these sanctions has allowed governments to utilise 
‘private homes’ as ‘public prison space’. The contentious point was that ‘the 
home’, which has had historical significance among Anglo-Saxon people, was 
losing its power (Ball & Lillly, 1986). The home had acquired a sacred 
character as it became a personal sanctuary and a safe harbour for all 
regardless of their economic status. The often cited quotation from Pitt 
encapsulates this:  
 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to the crown. It 
may be frail – its roof may leak – the wind may enter – but the King 
of England cannot enter – all his force dares not cross the threshold 
of the ruined tenement.  
 
(cited in Glasser 1974:100)  
 
It was also asserted that electronic devices would inappropriately penetrate 
the offenders’ private realm (Ball et al., 1988). In particular, the electronic 
bracelet was regarded as being especially intrusive because it is strapped to 
the body itself and “the body is even more crucial to selfhood than is the 
home” (Ball et al., 1988:130). Consequently, it was argued that the excessive 
use of technology should be avoided and electronic monitoring employed 
selectively (Vaughn, 1987).  
 
The counter argument that was presented against the view that HDBS with 
RF allow the government to excessively intrude on offenders’ privacy was that 
they are much less intrusive and much more protective of personal privacy 
than institutional detention (Schmidt, 1994b; Ball et al., 1988). This view was 
eloquently expressed by Toombs (1995:343): 
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Big brother is watching criminals. The difference is that big brother’s 
current means of watching criminals gives the advantage to those 
who are being watched, the criminals, rather than to big brother, the 
watcher.  
 
However, the complexity that is associated with HDBS with RF is that they 
possess a false appearance of freedom and autonomy as well as 
maintenance of relationships with family and friends. The reality of being on a 
HDBS with RF is unpredictable and unnatural – it involves constant 
monitoring, surveillance and control that in fact blur the boundaries of liberty 
and relationships of the offender (Ball et al., 1988).    
 
Interestingly, the literature during the 1980s urged future debate, predicting 
unprecedented governmental intrusion of individual privacy through the 
application of HDBS more generally. However, the philosophical discussion 
about this ethical dilemma did not subsequently happen during the 1990s or 
2000s (Lilly, 2006; Ball et al., 1988). This is particularly astounding given the 
introduction of HDBS with GPS, where the technology is referred to as “the 
eye in the sky” (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007:26). It has 
allowed unprecedented restricting of offender’s movement as well as tracking 
and pinpointing of their specific location virtually anywhere in the world; this 
total control was at least to some extent, envisioned and cautioned by the 
author George Orwell in the late 1940s (Mair, 2006; Meyer, 2004; Black & 
Smith, 2003).  
 
The reason behind the lack of subsequent critical discussion about HDBS with 
GPS becoming part of an Orwellian society is that the use of various 
surveillance mechanisms more generally in our society has become an 
entrenched part of our lives (Lyon, 2006:3). (For more information see 
Chapter 5.4). It has also become widely accepted that the technology 
generally imposed on people as well as more specifically on offenders is “not 
the result of deliberate governmental efforts to be omnipresent” (Lilly, 
2006:94). In addition, it seems that concern for serious offenders’ privacy 
(who are typically subjected to these sanctions) has generally been 
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outweighed by the seriousness of the crimes that they have committed and 
the overall culture of fear and moral panic that generally surrounds them.   
 
3.3.2.2 Does the selection process for HDBS discriminate against 
offenders with certain characteristics?  
 
A more specific ethical issue and dilemma is whether the correctional 
selection process for HDBS discriminates against offenders with certain 
characteristics. Theoretically, offenders should be selected for HDBS 
according to a measuring instrument which provides an offender’s statistical 
risk-and-needs-analysis and considers factors such as an offender’s 
convicting offence/s, criminal history, substance abuse and interpersonal 
relations (Schulz, 1995; Reichel & Sudbrack, 1994; Fulton & Stone, 1992; Van 
Ness, 1992; Baird & Wagner, 1990). In contrast, discrimination occurs if a 
decision recommending for or against placement on a HDBS is based on 
other factors such as an offender’s gender, race or economic status.  
 
During the 1980s, there was no consideration of whether discrimination during 
the selection process for HDBS with RF occurred, but in the 1990s studies 
about it were extensive. These later studies generally confirmed an early 
concern that HDBS with RF would be more readily available for middle-and-
upper-class offenders in comparison with lower-class offenders (Reichel, 
2001). While offenders’ economic status was not directly considered during 
the selection process for HDBS with RF, three specific selection determinants 
inadvertently considered it. These included the requirement for an offender to 
reside in a suitable home, maintain a telephone and pay sanction-related 
expenses.   
   
The most basic requirement that offenders have a suitable home, that is, 
reside in a ‘private’ home or with ‘reliable friends or relatives’ and not live in 
boarding houses or hostels or have a more ‘itinerant lifestyle,’ was determined 
to be potentially discriminatory (Schulz, 1995; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994; 
Maxfield & Baumer, 1990; Friel & Vaughn, 1986). This is because some 
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offenders are excluded from HDBS with RF simply because they are indigent 
– unable to afford to reside in a ‘suitable home.’ It is a well reported fact that 
lack of appropriate housing has been an ongoing issue for offenders and 
many are precluded from participating on HDBS with RF because of it (Baldry, 
2005; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990).  
 
In addition, offenders’ co-residents over the age of 18 (if there are any) must 
consent to the offender’s placement on the HDBS with RF, and sign a 
‘contract’ agreeing to cooperate with its requirements (Gainey et al., 2000; 
Maxfield & Baumer, 1990; Ball et al., 1988). This is problematic because 
offenders are dependent on their co-residents consenting to the imposition of 
the HDBS with RF within their living space. If they do not agree, and the 
offender cannot afford to move to another suitable residence, then they are 
not placed on the HDBS with RF and are thus discriminated against.   
 
Similarly, the fact that offenders on HDBS with RF were mandated to maintain 
a telephone at their home was determined to be potentially inequitable 
(Gainey et al., 2000; Schulz, 1995; Reichel & Sudbrack, 1994; Maxfield & 
Baumer, 1990; Friel & Vaughn, 1986). The telephone is necessary for passive 
as well as active RF electronic monitoring of offenders as it either “initiates 
calls to the central computer or receives calls from it” (Baumer & Mendelsohn, 
1990:44). The need for a telephone line posed serious obstacles for offenders 
with limited financial means, as they were required to pay for the installation of 
a telephone service fee, monthly service fee and any prior outstanding 
accounts (Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990). 
 
Finally, the requirement of HDBS with RF that offenders pay sanction-related 
expenses (in the interest of cost efficiency) was also determined to be 
potentially discriminatory (Fox, 1987a). These can include paying supervisory 
fees, restitution, and drug/alcohol testing, as well as paying to travel to meet 
various sanction requirements such as community work and rehabilitative 
treatment (Blomberg et al., 1993; Fulton & Stone, 1992; United States 
General Accounting Office, 1990; Fox, 1987a).  
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Some HDBS with RF where offenders were required to pay set daily charges, 
which were estimated to be about $450 per month, discrimination was 
reported to occur (Gainey et al., 2000; Ansay, 1999; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 
1990). This is because HDBS with RF which do not base their fees on an 
offender’s income. Low-income offenders, who generally find it difficult to pay 
their and their dependents’ normal cost of living, are therefore not able to 
afford these fees (Gainey et al., 2000; Ansay, 1999; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 
1990). Hence, if HDBS with RF are utilised as diversions from imprisonment, 
offenders who are unable to meet these predetermined monetary obligations 
end up in prison and are discriminated against simply due to being indigent 
(Fox, 1987a).   
  
Alternatively, in most HDBS with RF, where supervision fees were based on a 
sliding scale approach according to an offender’s weekly income, offenders 
were not discriminated against. This is because offenders had equal access 
to being on a HDBS with RF regardless of their income. Further, some HDBS 
with RF had provisions for fees to be waived in deserving cases (Rackmill, 
1994; Renzema, 1992; Van Ness, 1992; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990; Lilly, 
Ball & Wright, 1987).   
 
Therefore, the mandatory requirements of HDBS with RF could generally be 
more easily met by persons with some level of financial security and stability 
(Reichel, 2001). Consequently, indigent offenders could be precluded from 
participating on HDBS with RF as the selection criteria potentially 
discriminated against those who did not have a suitable home, were unable to 
pay for telephone maintenance, and pay other sanction-related expenses.  
 
On the contrary, research through the 1990s reported that an offender’s family 
status, age, gender, race and education do not per se determine their 
placement onto HDBS with RF. While it was a commonly held belief that 
‘family men and women’ and older offenders would be more likely to be 
admitted onto HDBS with RF (Lilly et al., 1992), research indicated that those 
on HDBS with RF had varied marital statuses and living arrangements, and 
that their age composition was very similar to prisoners (Gainey & Payne, 
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2000; Lilly et al., 1992; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990). Other studies reported 
that even though Caucasians, females, and better-educated offenders were 
more likely to be sentenced to HDBS with RF, this did not occur due to 
potential discrimination (Lilly et al., 1992; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990). A 
close examination of the literature indicated that there was an external reason 
that accounted for this discrepancy. HDBS with RF during the 1990s 
specifically targeted offenders who committed non-violent and non-serious 
crimes and these offenders were more likely to be Caucasians, females, and 
better-educated offenders (Lilly et al., 1992; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990).  
 
Since 2000, research exploring whether discrimination occurs during the 
selection process for HDBS with GPS has been lacking. The only studies 
appear to be from Tennessee and California which found that HDBS with 
GPS targeted higher risk offenders and as such the characteristics of the 
offenders closely resembled that of the incarcerated prisoner population. It 
was thus concluded that there was no discrimination on the basis of an 
offender’s gender or race (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007; 
Turner et al., 2007; Florida Department of Corrections, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that over the last decade many jurisdictions 
that employ HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS have made specific attempts 
to reduce the inadvertent consideration of an offender’s economic status 
which can result in discrimination during the selection process.  
          
Even through having a suitable home is still the primary determinant of 
placement on HDBS with RF, alternative accommodation options are 
available in some states (Enos et al., 1999; Schulz, 1995; Petersilia & 
Deschenes, 1994). For example, offenders in California are provided with an 
option to serve their HDBS with RF in foster/surrogate homes. Here the 
offender resides outside their previous environment with a surrogate family. 
The surrogate family are paid approximately $600 a month to provide room 
and board (Enos et al., 1999). The families also contribute to the offenders’ 
rehabilitation and reintegration by providing them with transportation, 
employment assistance and overall guidance. Evaluations of this scheme 
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have shown positive results (Enos et al., 1999). The challenge is in securing 
funding to broaden such alternative accommodation options for offenders 
throughout the USA (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007).   
 
It is also important to note that having a suitable home is not a requirement for 
offenders on HDBS with GPS. While strict residency requirements are 
imposed on these offenders so that they are not near children, that is, schools 
and parks, they are able to be homeless. If an offender has no access to an 
electrical outlet to charge the device due to being homeless or indigent, as is 
the case for many offenders in the USA, finding a place to charge the GPS 
device can be a real burden. Massachusetts’ Highest Court in 2010 ruled that 
offenders should not be punished if they have no access to a power outlet 
(Myers, 2011). In such cases, responsibility falls to the Department of 
Corrections to organise alternative arrangements such as charging the GPS 
device at their premises (Myers, 2011). 
 
Similarly, while co-residents’ agreement to serve the HDBS with RF is still 
necessary, it is not a requirement for offenders on HDBS with GPS. This is 
probably because the imposition of GPS monitoring means that offenders are 
not confined to their home for a prolonged period of time and their co-
residents are not disturbed by random home visits or telephone calls which 
are usually an integral component of RF monitoring (Martinovic & Schluter, 
2012; Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2001; Church & 
Dunstan, 1997). 
 
While offenders traditionally had to maintain a telephone at their home 
(Gainey et al., 2000; Schulz, 1995; Reichel & Sudbrack, 1994; Maxfield & 
Baumer, 1990), in many HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS this is no longer 
the case. The technology of electronic monitoring equipment has continued to 
progress, allowing HDBS with RF and HDBS with active GPS to rely on 
cellular phone technology; this is increasingly cheaper for offenders in 
comparison with a landline phone and can even be supplied by the agency 
during the period of serving the sanction (Brown et al., 2007; McCarthy et al., 
2001; Reichel, 2001). In cases where landline phones are still necessary, 
169 
 
such as HDBS with passive GPS, agreements can be made in some 
jurisdictions with telephone companies to provide landlines with restricted 
service (Brown et al., 2007; Reichel, 2001; Carlson et al., 1999). Although 
phone-related expenses are becoming increasingly affordable for offenders, 
the issue remains for those who have limited financial means and their HDBS 
with RF or GPS mandates the maintenance of a landline phone at home 
(Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007). 
 
The payment of sanction-related expenses has become somewhat more 
affordable for offenders. This is because an increasing number of USA states 
- in particular 22 out of 51 - do not require offenders to contribute to a portion 
of their monitoring cost (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). Further, the set fees for 
active RF electronic monitoring are cheaper than before, estimated to be 
about $320 a month, while the fees for GPS monitoring are similar, between 
$200 and $500 a month (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Alarid et al., 2008; 
Wagner, 2008). Most importantly however, many HDBS with RF and GPS 
charge sliding scale fees and waive fees in certain cases so that low-income 
individuals can be placed onto these sanctions (Tennessee Board of 
Probation and Parole, 2007; Meyer, 2004). Nevertheless, the issue is that 
indigent offenders may still struggle to pay fees even if they are based on a 
sliding scale, and some HDBS with RF and GPS still impose fixed fees 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007).  
 
 
In conclusion, although attempts have been made over the last decade to 
make HDBS generally less discriminatory, they are still not equally accessible 
to offenders regardless of their social status. In ‘deserving cases’ jurisdictions 
should be able to absorb the cost of an offender’s accommodation (and 
relocation if necessary), telephone installation and service and sanction-
related expenses.  
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3.3.2.3 Is punishment on HDBS varied? 
 
A related ethical issue and dilemma is whether being on HDBS results in a 
vastly diverse experience of punishment and therefore discriminates against 
offenders with certain characteristics. The research, which has only been 
undertaken in relation to HDBS with RF, has overwhelmingly indicated that 
offenders potentially experience markedly different experiences of 
punishment.91 This is primarily because offenders on these sanctions are 
confined to their homes where generally the nature of their environment and 
the quality of their interpersonal relationships are of great importance. The 
punishment on HDBS with GPS is probably not as diversified since offenders 
on these sanctions are not confined to their homes for prolonged periods of 
time. More specifically, 6 personal and social characteristics of offenders, 
which are explained below, seem to most profoundly determine their HDBS 
with RF experience. It should be noted that in this section information is 
presented thematically, rather than chronologically; this is because the 
findings over the three decades of operation of HDBS are indistinguishable. 
These include: 
 
Gender - Females tend to find compliance with the requirements of HDBS 
with RF to be more onerous than males. The main reason is that females are 
much more likely to be primary care givers for dependents as well as have 
unshared domestic responsibilities (Maidment, 2002; Ansay & Benveneste, 
1999; Micucci, Maidment & Gomme, 1997; Wood & Grasmick, 1995; 
Robinson, 1992). They are also more likely to live in poverty, due to having 
limited employment skills (Micucci et al., 1997; Robinson, 1992). In addition, 
females report wearing the electronic monitoring device to be more 
burdensome than males (Payne & Gainey, 1998). They also noted being 
more worried and ashamed about being identified as an offender (Ferdinand 
& McDermott, 2002; Gainey & Payne, 2000; Payne & Gainey, 1998). This is 
                                                 
91
 It is worth noting that the experience of all penal sanctions is potentially unique, and most 
notably, imprisonment can be a vastly different individual experience dependent on offenders’ 
personal and social characteristics (Spelman, 1995; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994; Crouch, 
1993). However, the fact that it takes place in a single setting makes it somewhat less unique 
than HDBS, which occur in many different settings and environments, allowing for extreme 
disparity in sanction experience. 
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probably because industries in which females are more likely to be employed 
in, such as hospitality, usually require them to wear uniforms, so that 
concealing the device may not be possible (Micucci et al., 1997; Lilly et al., 
1992).   
 
Race - Racial minorities (such as African Americans and Hispanics) consider 
being on the HDBS with RF to be more demanding in comparison with 
Caucasians. This is because they are more likely to be unemployed or 
working in low-paid jobs having therefore lower socio-economic profiles 
(Clear, 2007; Carroll, 1982). Similarly, racial minorities are likely to reside in 
deprived, crime-prone, ghetto environments (Clear et al., 2006; Johnson, 
1976). More specifically, African American offenders were more likely to feel 
discriminated against by supervising officers, regardless of an officer’s racial 
background (Spelman, 1995). Further, the wearing of the electronic 
monitoring device is likely to result in them feeling humiliated (Baumer & 
Mendelsohn, 1990).  
 
 
Urban/rural residence - Offenders who reside in rural areas find compliance 
with HDBS with RF to be more onerous than offenders who live in urban 
areas. These offenders usually have lower incomes as a result of poorer job 
availability and skills (Ansay, 1999). They are also likely to face issues with 
access to adequate transportation (Ansay, 1999; Levine & Scotch, 1970). In 
addition, unlike their urban counterparts, rural offenders are typically not used 
to residing in more limited spaces, and are more likely to be affected by a loss 
of privacy and shaming (Gainey & Payne, 2000; Ansay, 1999; Levine & 
Scotch, 1970). Finally, offenders residing in rural areas are more likely to 
believe that they are supervised more intensely on HDBS with RF than those 
residing in metropolitan areas (Gainey & Payne, 2000; Jones, 1996).  
 
 
Employment status - Offenders who are unemployed find the HDBS with RF 
experience to be generally more difficult than those who are employed 
(Courtright, Berg & Mutchnick, 2000; Ryan, 1997; Jolin & Stipak, 1992). If the 
172 
 
HDBS with RF does not mandate offenders to obtain employment and they 
remain unemployed then they are likely to experience boredom. Alternatively, 
in HDBS with RF where offenders are required to obtain employment, 
unemployed offenders generally find this onerous because they have to notify 
their prospective employer about being on the sanction and their inability to 
follow unpredictable work schedules.92 Upon gaining employment, these 
offenders may face difficulties in quickly developing the necessary work habits 
and skills (Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994; Petersilia, 1990a).   
 
Financial situation - Offenders who are not financially stable find the overall 
punitive effect of HDBS with RF to be more onerous (Gowen, 1995; Smykla, 
1981). They are likely to reside in a smaller living space where they and their 
co-residents have less privacy, and are generally more likely to be disturbed 
by surveillance in their household (Ansay, 1999). Offenders who are not 
financially stable are similarly unlikely to be able to afford some at-home 
‘luxuries’ such as entertainment and recreational equipment that are said to 
somewhat ease the difficult time on the HDBS with RF93 (Gowen, 1995; 
Crouch, 1993; Petersilia, 1990a:). Hence, they are generally “more tempted to 
escape the deprived environment” (Ansay, 1999:217).   
 
Co-resident relationships - Offenders on HDBS with RF who are not 
supported by their co-residents94 find the experience to be more burdensome 
(Payne & Gainey, 1998; Doherty, 1995; Jolin & Stipak, 1992). This is 
particularly the case if co-residents are not willing or able to support them 
emotionally, physically or financially (Gainey et al., 2000; Ansay, 1999; Payne 
& Gainey, 1998). In order to profoundly assist the offender, co-residents may 
                                                 
92
 These are not permitted on HDBS with RF because close and random supervision at work 
would not be possible (Church & Dunstan, 1997). On the other hand, HDBS with GPS have 
overcome this problem due to their ability to constantly monitor offender movement 
anywhere, and there are no such employment-related restrictions (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). 
93
 It is therefore not surprising that “many of those at the bottom of the socio-economic scale 
enjoy better living conditions in custody” [than outside] (Gowen, 1995:12).  
94
 It should be noted that a caring and stable relationship with a family member or a friend 
who is not an offender’s co-resident could also reduce the punitive impact of the HDBS with 
RF on the offender. 
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need to drastically (and at times detrimentally) change their own lifestyles. 
(For more information see section 3.3.2.4).    
  
Therefore, females, racial minorities, those residing in rural areas, and those 
who are unemployed, not financially secure, or without supportive co-resident 
relationships seem to experience HDBS with RF to be more onerous. The 
more of these characteristics an offender possesses, the more difficult the 
HDBS with RF seems to be for them.95 The extensively varied punishment 
experience, which is potentially inequitable and even discriminatory, is an 
ethical issue and dilemma that has not yet been recognised in the policy that 
guides the operation of HDBS with RF. The policy could be amended to allow 
sentencing officials to undertake a detailed analysis of offenders’ personal 
and social characteristics, as well as their broader circumstances, indicating 
whether they fit group norms. Individually tailored conditions that are 
specifically punitive for each offender could then be imposed (Martinovic, 
2004).  
 
3.3.2.4 Do HDBS punish offenders’ co-residents? 
  
The final ethical issue and dilemma discussed is whether the punishment 
directed toward the offender on HDBS spills over into the lives of their co-
residents. Investigating this issue is important because the overwhelming 
majority of offenders reside with co-residents, who are generally family 
members, for the duration of the sanction (Mainprize, 1995; Baumer & 
Mendelsohn, 1990). The research, which is only present in relation to HDBS 
with RF, has clearly shown that offenders’ co-residing family members are 
punished, albeit indirectly and unintentionally when a HDBS with RF is 
imposed (Martinovic, 2004). HDBS with GPS probably have less punitive 
effects on offenders’ co-residents as offenders are not confined to their homes 
for prolonged periods of time, and their co-residents are not disturbed by 
random home visits or phone calls at all times which are usually an integral 
                                                 
95
 However, this overall finding must be treated with caution because not all people conform 
to group norms. 
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part of RF monitoring (Martinovic & Schluter, 2012; Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 
2004; McCarthy et al., 2001; Church & Dunstan, 1997). Sharing the punitive 
impact of HDBS with RF is ethically problematic as offenders’ co-residing 
family members have not committed any crimes and are already likely to be 
struggling financially and emotionally (Gibbs & King, 2003b).  
 
During the inception of HDBS with RF, that is in the mid-1980s, these 
sanctions were portrayed as a “piece of cake” (Blomberg et al., 1993:191), 
whose main selling-point was offenders’ ability to remain at home with their 
families continuing to maintain their roles and support them (Meyer, 2004; 
McShane & Krause, 1993). Co-residing family members’ role within HDBS 
with RF was entirely ignored and their consent for the imposition of the 
sanction within their living space was not regarded as necessary (Gainey et 
al., 2000; Ball et al., 1988). It should be noted that at the time very few 
researchers alluded to the problems that offenders’ co-residents could 
encounter during HDBS with RF – the most prominent were Ball et al (1988). 
They argued that, despite careful screening of offenders, there was a 
possibility that co-residents could be victimised by the offender, and that the 
offender could pressure them to engage in illegal activities such as procuring 
drugs (Ball et al., 1988). 
 
On the contrary, in the 1990s, jurisdictions started to make mandatory 
provisions for offenders’ co-residents to sign a contract formally consenting to 
the imposition of the HDBS with RF within their home. The contract also 
assumes that they will cooperate with the sanction requirements such as 
allowing supervising officers to conduct unannounced searches of the home 
(Roberts, 2004; Whitfield, 1997). This shift in policy was the outcome of an 
increasing recognition that HDBS with RF may have an inadvertent impact on 
offenders’ co-residents. While acknowledging this is positive, it is also 
problematic because, from the outset, co-residing family members may be 
placed in an awkward situation if they object to the offender’s placement onto 
the HDBS with RF.   
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Studies conducted throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which researched the 
effect of HDBS with RF on offenders’ co-residents, have been classified 
together (due to complementary findings) into a five-point typology of impacts 
endured by offenders’ co-residing family members (for more information see 
Martinovic, 2007).  
 
Effects caused by feeling responsible to help the offender comply with the 
HDBS with RF. Research has indicated that co-residing family members are 
most likely to feel responsible to assist offenders with three explicit conditions 
of HDBS with RF, including limited movements, monetary obligations, and 
exposure to temptations (Ansay, 1999; Altman & Murray, 1997; Blomberg et 
al., 1993). It seems that co-residing family members have chosen these three 
areas of assistance, because these are considered to be mostly demanding 
by the offenders and they are uniquely placed to offer such assistance.  
 
Limited movement is the most stringent condition of HDBS with RF which 
makes offenders particularly vulnerable. As a result, co-residing family 
members often assume additional tasks in order to help offenders comply with 
the sanction as well as reduce the potentially negative sanction effects on the 
household (Altman & Murray, 1997; Whitfield, 1997). They often elect to 
perform general duties outside the home such as shopping, paying bills and 
picking up laundry (Payne & Gainey, 1998). In addition, if offenders have 
children, co-residing family members seem to take responsibility for 
organising and orchestrating children’s schooling and recreational activities 
outside of the home (Ansay & Benveneste, 1999; Altman & Murray, 1997). 
They also often drive offenders to treatment and/or counselling centers, 
community work and/or employment in order for them to fulfill their sanction 
requirements (Ansay, 1999). This performance of additional activities usually 
results in co-residing family members curtailing their own social lives and as a 
result feeling alienated from their own social support networks (Whitfield, 
1997).  
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In order to further lessen the negative impacts that offenders experience on 
HDBS with RF, their co-residing family members have reported feeling 
responsible to financially assist them by contributing to monetary obligations 
associated with these sanctions. Consequently, co-residing family members 
have reported the necessity to jointly re-channel the household budget and/or 
sacrifice their previous spending patterns (Ansay, 1999; Blomberg et al., 
1993; Van Ness, 1992).  
 
Co-residing family members have also reported feeling responsible for 
reducing the offender’s temptations of leaving the household and returning to 
a non-pro-social lifestyle.96 They usually purposely restrict their social life 
outside of the immediate family (Ansay, 1999; Blomberg et al., 1993). A 
supervising officer encapsulated this as “when one cannot go, they all stay 
home” (Ansay & Benveneste, 1999:129-130). Moreover, co-residing family 
members typically employ various changes in the domestic setting in order to 
increase the offender’s comfort. For example, Ansay (1999:80, 153), found 
that “in one form or another, all family members produced accounts of a social 
world that had changed drastically to accommodate the restrictions placed on 
the [offender].” She specifically reported that parents were likely to purchase 
“material components of leisure pastimes (i.e. computers, VCRs)” in order to 
ensure that their son/daughter remained in the household (Ansay, 1999:217). 
 
Another temptation that co-residing family members have reported feeling 
responsible to encourage the offender to resist is drug/alcohol consumption. 
They are known to do this by themselves adopting a drug and alcohol free 
lifestyle and even undertaking rehabilitative treatment programs (Ansay, 1999; 
Blomberg et al., 1993). Hence, in various ways, co-residing family members 
may encourage the offender to endure being on the HDBS with RF and 
embrace a pro-social lifestyle, reducing the likelihood that the offender will 
return to their previous offending behaviour.  
 
                                                 
96
 Non-pro-social lifestyle may include drug use and/or alcohol consumption and not going to 
work, which all constitute breaches of HDBS with RF.  
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Effects caused by HDBS with RF’s indirectly applied facilitating control 
factors. Supervision on HDBS with RF consists of random phone calls and 
physical visits throughout a 24-hour time period to ensure that offenders are in 
fact confined to their home. This demanding discipline often means that their 
co-residing family members also feel disrupted (Ansay, 1999). In particular, 
they have reported viewing the late-night phone calls and/or unannounced 
visits at all hours of the night as the ‘most upsetting’ aspect of control 
mechanisms (Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1990). The disturbance of the home 
environment may consequently contribute to increased tension within the 
family which can result in family conflict (Whitfield, 2001; Lilly et al., 1993).    
 
Effects caused by feeling embarrassed as a result of residing with an offender 
on HDBS with RF. Co-residing family members often feel embarrassed and 
try to hide the offender’s sanction status whenever possible. Even when they 
want to disclose the offender’s sanction status to their neighbours, friends 
and/or extended family members they have reported usually feeling uncertain 
about how to explain it (Richardson, 1999). This is problematic as some co-
residing family members may avoid contact with their social support network 
and consequently feel isolated and alienated. 
 
Effects caused by perceived relocation of HDBS with RF from governmental 
control into private homes. The imposition of a HDBS with RF can be viewed 
as a relocation of surveillance and control from the government personnel to 
offenders’ co-residents (Leigh, Knaggs & McDowall, 1997). Adult siblings and 
parents of young and unmarried offenders are particularly likely to view this 
imposition to control the offender as a burden of responsibility (for more 
information see Ansay, 1999:172). This perceived family responsibility to 
informally supervise the offender contributes to co-residents feeling stress and 
anxiety (for more information see Richardson, 1999) which is “marked by 
feelings of fear, resentment, worry and guilt” (Ansay, 1999:162).  
 
Effects caused by HDBS with RF’s ‘under-duress’ social interaction in the 
household. Although most co-residing family members and offenders attempt 
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to somehow support one another during HDBS with RF, the fact that 
offenders on these sanctions are confined to their homes for prolonged 
periods of time means that ‘under-duress’ social interaction is likely 
(Maidment, 2002; Ansay, 1999; Payne & Gainey, 1998). This has been 
termed a ‘pressure cooker’ environment where a change in domestic roles 
typically occurs as co-residing family members, particularly female spouses, 
are required to instantly adjust to the offender being confined to the home and 
disrupting various family routines including child rearing, housekeeping and 
cooking (Gainey et al., 2000; Payne & Gainey, 1998; Blomberg et al., 1993). 
Moreover, co-residing family members and the offender have to at times 
adapt to each other under different circumstances and/or deal with ‘unsolved’ 
issues and problems (Payne & Gainey, 1998). Therefore, ‘under-duress’ 
social interaction inside the home, combined with the pressures of everyday 
life under circumstances where all are likely to feel frustration and stress, has 
been found to contribute to disputes and intensify strains in frequently already 
fragile relationships (Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 2004; Clear & Dammer, 2003; 
Blomberg et al., 1993).  
 
While the five-point typology provides a generic explanation of the impacts 
endured by offenders’ co-residing family members, it is worth noting that the 
impact of HDBS with RF on offenders’ co-residing family members is 
individualistic and varied (Ansay, 1999). The experience seems to be 
generally more onerous for offenders’ co-residing family members if:  
 
 they have a caring and stable relationship with the offender and feel 
obligated to assist them in complying with the HDBS with RF 
(Martinovic, 2002; Whitfield, 1997) 
 the HDBS with RF is for a relatively long period and it involves stringent 
conditions (Rackmill, 1994) 
 as a household they are not financially secure, meaning that financial 
sacrifices need to be made in order to comply with HDBS with RF 
monetary requirements (Martinovic, 2006; Ansay, 1999). 
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Interestingly, despite the abovementioned intrusions and responsibilities 
resulting from the five distinct onerous effects that are likely to place diverse 
pressures on co-residing family members, some of them seem to eventually 
regard the HDBS with RF experience as a useful opportunity for offenders to 
change their criminally-oriented lifestyles (Roberts, 2004). The principal 
positive effect is that the sanction mandates offenders to genuinely adopt a 
pro-social lifestyle which includes remaining drug and alcohol free, 
undergoing relevant rehabilitative treatment, and being employed (McCarthy 
et al., 2001). Co-residing family members, particularly female spouses, are 
likely to view this as personally beneficial as some report that for the first time 
in their marriages the offenders are employed on a continuous basis and are 
bringing home pay checks (Blomberg et al., 1993). Witnessing these 
beneficial results is likely to make co-residing family members view the HDBS 
with RF as a positive experience.  
  
Hence, HDBS with RF are said to change intra-familial social arrangements, 
as co-residing family members give up their time, leisure interests and normal 
activities in order to provide offenders with practical assistance and emotional 
support (Ansay, 1999). Even though co-residing family members may view 
these various intrusions and responsibilities that the HDBS with RF imposes 
on them as permissible (Ansay, 1999), this is ethically problematic as in reality 
punishment spills over onto those who have not committed any criminal 
offences. Therefore, HDBS with RF should consist of policies that provide co-
residing family members with sufficient information about their role and 
function within HDBS with RF, and where feasible and necessary, link them 
into external supportive services and networks as the need arises (for more 
information see Martinovic, 2007). This would adequately inform them of their 
role as well as subsequently lessen the punitive impacts that HDBS with RF 
have on them. 
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3.3.3 Legal issues and dilemmas  
 
Legal issues and dilemmas have centred on a discussion about whether 
HDBS violate the USA’s constitutional rights of offenders. The number of 
studies that have analysed the legal issues and dilemmas of HDBS with RF 
and HDBS with GPS is considerable, but the analysis within them is quite 
superficial. As a result, this section is shorter than the others.   
 
During the 1980s, some criminologists and legal professionals in the USA 
believed that the intrusion of HDBS with RF into an offender’s home and 
privacy would be regarded as unconstitutional when brought before the courts 
(for more information see Reichel, 2001; Rackmill, 1994; Ball et al., 1988). In 
fact, the imposition of these sanctions was argued to probably be in violation 
of: 
 
 Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy and protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures 
 Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination 
 Eighth Amendment’s protection from imposing cruel and unusual 
punishment 
 Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (for more 
information see DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Reichel, 2001; Carlson et 
al., 1999; Rackmill, 1994).  
 
In particular, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was seen to be most 
relevant to the prohibition of HDBS with RF. This is because it specifies: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.  
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(Enos et al., 1999:212) 
 
Consequently, throughout the 1990s a few legal challenges were based on 
the argument that HDBS with RF infringe upon various constitutional rights of 
offenders. Courts have however upheld the constitutionality of HDBS with RF 
in all instances, ruling that offenders are generally not entitled to the same 
rights that ordinary citizens enjoy as they have committed criminal offences 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Carlson et al., 1999). It has further been asserted 
that since offenders voluntarily accept being sentenced to HDBS with RF,97 
which inherently impose some intrusive conditions, they waive certain 
constitutional rights such as the right to privacy (for more information see 
DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Champion, 2008). The courts have nevertheless 
emphasised that the conditions of HDBS must be: 
 
 Related to the protection of society and/or rehabilitation of the 
offender (Port v. Templar) 
 Clear (Panko v. McCauley) 
 Reasonable (State v. Smith)  
 Constitutional (Sobell v. Reed). 
 
(Carlson et al., 1999:165-166) 
 
After 2000 the constitutionality of HDBS has not been legally questioned. 
There seems to be an overall consensus in the literature that HDBS with GPS 
do not encompass legal issues, that is, they do not violate the constitutional 
rights of offenders (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Alarid et al., 2008; Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). This is interesting given that HDBS with GPS are in fact 
mostly imposed on offenders once they have served their original sentences. 
Further, the maturing of the electronic monitoring technology from RF to GPS 
has allowed unprecedented invasion of offenders’ privacy (DeMichele & 
                                                 
97
 As mentioned previously, offenders’ consent is only sought for their placement on the 
HDBS with RF as these sanctions are usually applied as alternatives to incarceration. Hence 
the offender has a choice between undertaking the HDBS with RF or going to prison. On the 
other hand, the placement of serious offenders (mostly sex offenders), onto extended 
supervision HDBS with GPS is directly imposed by the judiciary without obtaining an 
offender’s consent (Bales et al., 2010b).   
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Payne, 2009). As mentioned earlier, it seems that there is an overall belief 
that offenders should not be entitled to the same rights as ordinary citizens - 
particularly serious sex offenders sentenced to HDBS with GPS, given the 
nature of the crimes that they have committed and the overall culture of fear 
and moral panic that surrounds them. 
 
3.3.4 Political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas  
 
Political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas discussed in this section 
comprise a discussion of stakeholders’ perceptions of HDBS and how this 
influences the political debate, policy formation and the application of these 
sanctions. The stakeholders whose views are presented below include 
criminal justice practitioners,98 offenders themselves, the community, and the 
media.99 The media has become the key stakeholder with the most dominant 
influence (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). This is because complementary or 
derogatory media coverage has the most power in creating community 
perceptions and therefore political pressure and policies. The political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas are presented on the basis of studies about 
HDBS with RF only, as no studies have been found to have analysed these 
issues and dilemmas in relation to HDBS with GPS. A lack of interest in 
critically exploring these issues and dilemmas related with HDBS with GPS 
may be attributed to the relatively non-controversial implementation of these 
sanctions for sex offenders across the USA.  
 
                                                 
98
 Stakeholders who are closely involved in the operation of HDBS are seldom asked about 
their perceptions, and even when they are, these are rarely publicised and typically do not 
have political influence (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). 
99
 The media became the major stakeholder in the 1960s when it highly politicised issues 
related to crime and justice (Clear & Dammer, 2003:470). This time period was unprecedently 
marked by anti-war and civil rights protests, various successful legal suits instigated by 
prisoners, numerous prison riots and even assassinations of high profile political figures (for 
more information see Clear & Dammer, 2003; Reichel, 2001). The media captured these 
images and widely distributed them as illustrations of out of control crime and social disorder 
as well as reporting on a daily basis cases of sensational and terrifying violent acts as the 
overall crime rate was increasing (Caputo, 2004). As the outraged public became more 
punitive towards crime and criminals, political reaction was strongly criticised and drastic 
change was demanded. This eventually resulted in politicians needing to be seen as 
responsive to community needs and promising to ‘get tough on crime’ in the 1970s (for more 
information see Caputo, 2004; Clear & Dammer, 2003; Reichel, 2001).  
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During the 1980s, stakeholders overwhelmingly viewed the development of 
HDBS with RF enthusiastically. Both sides of politics supported their 
expansion due to the belief that these sanctions would reduce prison 
overcrowding and costs, while at the same time criminals would be closely 
monitored (Lilly, 2006; Wagner & Baird, 1993; Erwin, 1987; Pearson, 1987b). 
More specifically, the growth of HDBS with RF accorded with both political 
parties’ ideologies. Liberals saw HDBS with RF as an appropriate less serious 
alternative to incarceration, while conservatives regarded HDBS with RF as 
more stringent forms of probation. The bipartisan support that these sanctions 
enjoyed when they were initiated still generally remains and has been 
instrumental in their increasing application throughout the USA (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003). 
 
Further, criminal justice officials formed partnerships and worked 
collaboratively prior to as well as during the implementation of HDBS with RF. 
In particular, legislators engaged sentencing officials in sanction development, 
and correctional authorities educated legal practitioners, the judiciary and the 
media about the operation of HDBS with RF (Clear et al., 1987; Erwin & 
Bennett, 1987). The media advocated for the further expansion of HDBS with 
RF by publishing their success stories and reassuring the community of their 
protection through the sanctions’ emphasis on offender control (Fulton & 
Stone, 1992; Byrne et al., 1989; Roeger, 1988). Stakeholders’ enthusiasm 
was so strong that, even when persuasive evidence in the late 1980s 
appeared questioning the overwhelmingly positive evaluation results of HDBS 
with RF, it was largely ignored (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Byrne et al., 1989; 
Clear et al., 1987). 
 
Despite initially supporting HDBS with RF, the media widely discredited these 
sanctions in the late 1980s. It portrayed them as an unsafe ‘slap on the wrist’ 
punishment which was unequally imposed (Lilly, 2006). Two specific cases 
rose to prominence by being given widespread media attention, illustrating the 
inadequacy of these sanctions: 
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 The William Horton case shocked the public when in 1987 the 
violent recidivist was released onto a weekend furlough100 where he 
committed a number of serious crimes, including raping a woman 
(Clear & Dammer, 2003; Payne & Gainey, 2000). Television 
advertisements displayed the image of Horton’s harsh-looking mug-
shot, followed by photographs of the innocent victims of his brutal 
crimes. These advertisements were made during George H. Bush’s 
election campaign for President of the USA in 1989. The 
conservatives used the William Horton case to show that under 
liberal leadership very dangerous offenders are and will continue to 
be let out into the community (Clear & Dammer, 2003). As a 
consequence, all community based sanctions were tarred with the 
same brush and portrayed to be unsafe because they allowed 
dangerous offenders to be in the community (Clear & Dammer, 
2003).  
 
 The John Zaccaro Jr., case outranged the community when he was 
convicted of cocaine dealing in 1988 and sentenced to a prison 
term which was converted to a HDBS with RF (Payne & Gainey, 
2000; Rackmill, 1994). The significance of this was that it was 
thought that he was given preferential treatment by the courts due 
to his affluent and influential background (Rackmill, 1994). John 
Zaccaro Jr., was the son of Geraldine Ferraro, who was a famous 
attorney and the 1984 Democratic Vice Presidential candidate 
(Rackmill, 1994:45). Further, Zaccaro was to serve his HDBS with 
RF “in a $1,500-a-month luxury New York apartment with cable 
television, maid service and privileges at the neighbouring YMCA” 
(Rackmill, 1994:45). It was therefore argued that the imposition of 
this sentence was not experienced equally or fairly among all 
                                                 
100
 Weekend furlough is an unescorted trip away from the prison prior to offenders’ official 
release. Its purpose is to slowly integrate the offender back into society by preparing them for 
release fastening networks, employment and housing. The negative media surrounding the 
William Horton case negatively affected furlough policies throughout the USA for a number of 
subsequent years (Silverman, 2001). 
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groups in society and it made a mockery of the criminal justice 
system (Payne & Gainey, 2000; Rackmill, 1994).  
 
As this was the era of conservative ideology centred on ‘the war on drugs’ and 
tough punishment, the public was easily convinced that HDBS with RF 
inadequately supervise offenders and that they should be used sparingly 
(Payne & Gainey, 2000). This also led to a general view that all punishment 
can be classified into two starkly constraining categories – prison or ‘slap on 
the wrist punishment’ (Morris, 1988). The belief that punishment in prisons is 
generally preferred and that all options outside of prison are not tough enough 
has generally impeded the necessary emphasis on rehabilitative initiatives in 
both prisons and community based corrections (Morris, 1988). 
     
Throughout the 1990s, HDBS with RF continued to attract negative publicity 
about not being tough on criminals,101 with devastating political consequences 
(Fulton et al., 1997). Whenever an offender on any type of a community 
based sanction committed a serious offence (such as rape or murder) it was 
widely publicised and extreme fear of crime and distrust in community-based 
sanctions, including HDBS with RF, was promoted (Clear & Dammer, 2003; 
Carlson et al., 1999). In addition, each time a celebrity or a wealthy person 
was sentenced to a HDBS with RF, their confinement to a luxurious home and 
maintenance of lucrative employment opportunities were portrayed as not 
sufficiently punitive (Rackmill, 1994; Cheever, 1990:31 cited in Payne & 
Gainey, 1999). Although in reality these cases were isolated, most members 
of the community saw them as ‘the image of HDBS with RF’ and compared 
them to the ‘obvious’ and widely publicised deprivations of imprisonment, 
concluding that HDBS with RF are an unequal and inappropriately lenient 
punishment.  
 
The community’s negative perceptions of HDBS with RF were affirmed in 
studies which reported that members of the general public perceive these 
sanctions as ‘soft on crime’ and therefore maintain little support for them 
                                                 
101
 Interestingly, the media did not discuss any of HDBS with RF’s problematic operational 
outcomes nor its various ethical issues and dilemmas. 
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(Payne & Gainey, 1998; Petersilia, 1998; Larivee, 1993; Von Hirsch, 1990). 
For example, a survey of 500 New Yorkers indicated that only 31% approved 
of HDBS with RF instead of incarceration and 54%, supported the imposition 
of HDBS with RF after prison (Brown & Elrod, 1995). A study by Payne & 
Gainey (1999) however indicated that, once the public was educated about 
HDBS with RF, it had much more positive view. The researchers analysed the 
views of 180 university students and 29 offenders on HDBS with RF about 
their perceptions of the severity of punishment on HDBS with RF. It was found 
that once the students were informed of the specific restrictions and 
obligations of HDBS with RF they viewed them as more punitive than the 
offenders subjected to them. Despite the fact that the community’s negative 
perceptions of HDBS with RF were based on the lack of operational 
awareness, politicians’ support for these sanctions diminished and was 
reoriented in line with the populist viewpoint of building more prisons and 
‘getting tough on crime’ (Lilly, 2006). 
 
Simultaneously however, numerous research studies were showing that 
offenders overwhelmingly perceived HDBS with RF as onerous. In fact, 
studies found that almost one quarter of incarcerated offenders who were 
surveyed (either presented with real-life choices or hypothetical questions) 
viewed HDBS with RF to be very harsh and at times preferred imprisonment 
(Champion, 2008; Wood & Grasmick, 1995; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994; 
Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Petersilia, 1990a). More specifically, studies which 
analysed the perceptions of offenders who were imprisoned and given a real-
life choice of HDBS with RF or imprisonment found that between 5 and 30% 
of inmates chose to serve the incarceration period (Jones, 1996; Petersilia, 
1990a; Pearson, 1988). Similarly, studies which report on presenting 
imprisoned offenders with hypothetical questions about the severity of various 
sanctions have found that the majority of offenders prefer a short-term of 
imprisonment rather than longer-term HDBS with RF (Spelman, 1995; 
Crouch, 1993). Despite some limitations associated with these studies, they 
collectively indicate that some offenders consider HDBS with RF to be overly 
punitive (Wood & Grasmick, 1995). 
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In particular, when certain conditions of HDBS with RF were conjoined (for 
example, 24-hour electronic monitoring, employment and payment of a 
supervision fee) they were generally perceived as more punitive than prison 
(Wood & Grasmick, 1995; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994). This was probably 
because during the 1990s HDBS with RF emphasised stringent offender 
punishment through onerous and numerous conditions including electronic 
monitoring rather than treatment and support of offenders’ needs (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2001; Petersilia, 2000; Clear, 1997; 
Deschenes et al., 1995; Fulton & Stone, 1992). It is also possible that these 
offenders had become ‘institutionalised,’ so they preferred incarceration to 
significantly changing their lifestyle in order to comply with various stringent 
conditions of HDBS with RF (Byrne, 1990). Nevertheless, due to their punitive 
stance on law and order, the public largely disregarded offenders’ views about 
punishment on HDBS with RF. 
 
The public’s growing dissatisfaction with community based punishment not 
being tough enough meant that HDBS with RF were placed on legislative 
agendas. This meant that these sanctions were strictly regulated (Payne & 
Gainey, 2000). Consequently, a number of federal restrictions were placed on 
how these sanctions operated. More specifically, federal government 
legislation titled ‘Truth in Sentencing’ resulted in HDBS with RF being 
imposed only on selected low-risk offenders and hence substantially widened 
the net of social control. (For more information see section 3.3.1). While most 
states changed the operation of HDBS with RF to comply with the federal 
restrictions, some states such as New Jersey regarded the restrictions as too 
prescriptive without an ability to reduce the prison population, and abolished 
their HDBS with RF (Payne & Gainey, 2000). The legislative changes actually 
resulted in net widening and a steady increase in the total number of 
offenders sentenced to HDBS with RF throughout the USA during the 1990s 
(Lilly, 1993; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1992).   
 
At the turn of the century most of the jurisdictions which had eliminated their 
HDBS with RF re-established them and those that kept them expanded their 
offerings by adding HDBS with GPS. The catalyst for this political reaction 
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was public pressure to extend the community based supervision of serious 
sex offenders and/or budgetary pressure to reduce unsustainable prison 
crowding and escalating prison costs (Johnson, 2002). Central to the 
expansion of re-emerged sanctions was also the continually improving 
performance of the electronic monitoring equipment itself (Payne & Gainey, 
2000).  
 
Studies assessing criminal justice practitioners’ perceptions of HDBS with RF 
during the last decade - since 2000 - have indicated mixed results. On the one 
hand, some legal personnel have generally reported positive views of HDBS 
with RF, arguing that they have improved the toolbox of judicial options by 
allowing better ‘customisation of justice’ (Meyer, 2004). Similarly, correctional 
personnel have generally reported that the close supervision which is 
imposed on these sanctions has enhanced the protection of society and this 
has somewhat revitalised the reputation of community based sanctions, 
especially probation, in the criminal justice system (Meyer, 2004; Clear & 
Dammer, 2003).  
 
Conversely, many court officials still do not consider that being on HDBS with 
RF is the same as being confined in a prison even through this may be 
legislatively purported. As a result, the judiciary has remained relatively 
modest in applying HDBS with RF (Roberts, 2004). This is despite the fact 
that in some USA states, when HDBS with RF are breached, the time spent 
on the sanction is generally not counted as time served toward the conviction 
as prison time. Hence, the offender is required to serve the full term of their 
original sentence in prison (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Alarid et al., 2008; 
Champion, 2008). 
 
Undoubtedly, a critical discourse about the overall penal system, including 
HDBS with RF, needs to regularly occur in the public domain. It could 
principally entail an outline of the criminal justice agencies’ mission and the 
specific operation of all penal dispositions such as their goals, advantages, 
disadvantages, costs and recidivism rates (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). 
Further, criminologists could more actively share their study outcomes and 
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informed opinions with the public through the media and online, and with 
practitioners and policy makers through publication in practitioner-oriented 
journals and participation in conferences (Payne & Gainey, 2000). While 
correctional personnel often regard the media as the ‘enemy,’ this perception 
must be changed as it can be central in gathering support for HDBS and 
supplying information to stakeholders (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).  
 
Correctional agencies could more specifically appoint a ‘Public Information 
Officer’ who would have a public relations strategy (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). Most importantly,  
 
public relations issues must be addressed proactively. A good 
public relations strategy should ‘sell’ the practice to the top-
decision makers and effectively elicit public support. The designers 
will need to develop press kits, conduct public information forums 
and education seminars, and hold press conferences to effectively 
communicate program benefits and limitations honestly and fairly. 
 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009:223)  
 
Scrupulous discussion about the penal system, based on empirical data, 
would generally challenge the populist assertion that tough punishment = 
incarceration = good politics. This is because it would address the current lack 
of balanced and comparative public information about all penal dispositions 
that often drive the public opposition to community based sanctions 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Roberts, 2004). In the future it is possible that it 
could consequently generate public and professional confidence in community 
based sanctions, including HDBS with RF, and lead to policies that improve 
their operation (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Roberts, 2004; Payne & Gainey, 
2000; Petersilia, 1997). 
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter critically described the currently operational late phase of HDBS 
in the USA. It commenced with the implementation of intermediate sanctions 
in the 1980s. These essentially comprised HDBS with RF. In mid-2000s 
however the expansion of sex offender post-release supervision laws resulted 
in HDBS with GPS being introduced for serious sex offenders. The number of 
offenders on all HDBS has been increasing in the USA. During the late phase 
of HDBS, the ideology of offender supervision has been characterised by 
strict and close surveillance and monitoring, although treatment-based 
components are usually available for serious offenders on HDBS with GPS.  
 
The last three decades of evaluative research of HDBS with RF indicated 
problematic operational outcomes as well as significant ethical and political 
and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. On the other hand HDBS with GPS 
have been operationally more successful. Research assessing some of their 
ethical and overall political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas has been 
lacking. Nevertheless, over the years the number of offenders sentenced to 
HDBS has continued to grow gradually.  
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Chapter 4 – Late phase of HDBS in Australia  
 
…the search for alternative means of managing offenders is 
gaining political and fiscal momentum… 
 
(Lay, 1988a:184) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As Lay (1988a) commented above, there was a comprehensive search for 
effective alternatives to imprisonment in Australia in the late 1980s that would 
reduce the fiscal impact of increasing incarceration rates. This was coupled 
with serious prison overcrowding and disillusionment with the concept of 
offender rehabilitation; hence, the result was offender surveillance and control 
becoming the primary aims of punishment on HDBS (Smith & Gibbs, 2013).  
 
The proliferation of the late phase of HDBS in the USA (discussed in Chapter 
3) was the catalyst for the development of late phase of HDBS in Australia, 
which is still operational. The Australian sanction proliferation is critically 
discussed in this chapter. The chapter consists of two themes in which 
information is generally presented chronologically. The first theme critically 
describes the operation of the late phase of HDBS in Australia. The first sub-
theme is the development of HDBS with RF, which were implemented in 
Australia in the late 1980s (Gibbs & Smith, 2013). The second sub-theme is 
the development of HDBS with GPS, which entered the correctional arena 
after 2000 in very similar circumstances to the USA. The number of all 
offenders on HDBS in Australia has however remained relatively stable. More 
specifically, the number of offenders on HDBS with RF has been decreasing, 
whilst the number of offenders on HDBS with GPS has been increasing. The 
ideology of offender supervision on these sanctions has entailed a 
combination of strict and close surveillance and treatment-based components. 
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The second theme discussed in this chapter is the assessment of outcomes 
of the late phase of HDBS in Australia. More specifically, HDBS with RF as 
well as HDBS with GPS are separately analysed in relation with 4 sub-themes 
– operational results, ethical issues and dilemmas, legal issues and dilemmas 
and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. During the last three 
decades studies of HDBS with RF generally found that these sanctions have 
achieved their anticipated operational results, but have encompassed 
significant ethical, political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. Research 
assessing the operational outcomes, ethical and political and stakeholder 
issues and dilemmas of HDBS with GPS is still lacking and it is imperative 
that it is conducted in the future. 
  
4.2 Late phase of HDBS – Operation (1982-2013) 
  
This section provides a comprehensive explanation of the historical 
development of contemporary HDBS in Australia. The mode of community 
based supervision on these HDBS has been based mostly on strict and close 
surveillance and monitoring, but has also contained rehabilitative treatment 
components as a part of case management of offenders on this sanction. 
 
4.2.1 Historical development and proliferation of intermediate 
sanctions 
 
Australia was a part of the worldwide trend to introduce intermediate 
sanctions. Although these sanctions originated in the USA, their broad 
application was prompted by United Nations’ Congresses adopting various 
resolutions for non-custodial alternatives to imprisonment to alleviate 
overcrowded prisons. In particular,  
 
in 1980, the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders adopted a resolution 
recommending that Member States expand the use of alternatives to 
imprisonment and identify various new alternatives to prison 
sentences. Five years later, the Seventh United Nations Congress 
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adopted another resolution, recommending that Member States 
intensify the search for credible non-custodial sanctions. The Eight 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders held in 1990 devoted much attention to this 
issue, which was placed on the agenda of the congress but also in 
the context of other of the congress’s items; it adopted a number of 
decisions and resolutions. 
 
(Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994:1) 
 
Reconstructed non-custodial measures such as fines, probation and parole 
orders, community service orders, home detention and suspended sentences 
were introduced into the Australian criminal justice sentencing continuum 
during the 1980s. The core feature of these sanctions was that they involved 
some limitation of the offender’s liberty. More specifically, they usually 
included any or all of the following: 
 
 requiring the offender to notify authorities of a change of address  
 receiving visits from a supervising officer 
 being required to attend community correctional centres  
 performing community work  
 undergoing drug and alcohol testing. 
 
The reworked community based penalties aimed to operate as alternatives to 
imprisonment by diverting offenders from prison without widening the net of 
social control (Biles, 1996; Broadhurst, 1991). Australian criminologist 
Braithwaite (1988:57) however warned that the practical challenge for these 
new initiatives would be their utilisation as ‘actual’ alternatives to incarceration 
and not as ‘adds on’ to those who would normally receive a conditional 
release. This is because only appropriately administered alternatives could 
produce fewer prisoners and lower correctional costs. 
 
In addition, intermediate sanctions aimed to revitalise community corrections 
on the basis of their punitive nature based on risk control and risk reduction. 
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This was significant at the time because the community was ‘fed up’ with 
escalating crime rates, distrusted the concept of ‘rehabilitation’ and believed 
that imprisonment was the only ‘real’ sanction (King, 1991). Community based 
offender supervision therefore aimed to be carefully targeted to the high risk 
and/or special need offender categories, where supervising officer 
intervention was most likely to make a ‘real difference’ (King, 1991). 
 
Over the years it has generally become apparent that intermediate sanctions 
have failed to live up to their stated promise of significantly improving the 
sentencing landscape in Australia. This is predominantly because they have 
not reduced the reliance on imprisonment. For example, over the years there 
has been a significant increase in the size of the prison population, with longer 
terms of incarceration being imposed. More specifically, the prison population 
has increased by about 100% over the last two decades whilst there has not 
been a statistically equivalent increase in the crime rate (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012; Bagaric, 2002).   
 
The problem has been that intermediate sanctions are generally considered 
by criminal justice stakeholders to be ‘soft options.’ This has led to net-
widening, because they have not typically been used for prison-bound 
offenders, but rather for offenders who would otherwise be treated less 
harshly (Bagaric, 2002). A further issue with intermediate sanctions is that, 
while operationally these sanctions are significantly cheaper than 
imprisonment, they have higher levels of breaches and violations than less 
rigorous community based sanctions, so that they are nevertheless expensive 
in absolute terms (Bagaric, 2002). 
 
4.2.2 Historical development and proliferation of HDBS  
 
The very positive USA experience with HDBS resulted in the proliferation of 
similar sanctions in the Western world during the late 1980s (Lay, 1988a). At 
the forefront of this development was Australia, with its willingness to 
implement the latest USA experiments in crime control, particularly those that 
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subsequently involved electronically monitored technology (Smith & Gibbs, 
2013). Various Australian states established working parties within their 
correctional services, and participants visited the USA to examine the 
operation and assess the applicability of HDBS for Australia (Farr, Owen & 
Hayes, 1986). The information gathered from the highest-profile USA-based 
HDBS such as Georgia and New Jersey included detailed planning, 
implementation and evaluation. This was used to launch state-specific HDBS 
in Australia during the 1980s (Lay, 1988a; Farr et al., 1986).  
 
4.2.2.1 Inaugural HDBS   
 
Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory were the three 
inaugural HDBS that were established in Australia during the late 1980s. 
Queensland was the first Australian state to trial HDBS in 1986102 (Dorey, 
1986). This HDBS was initially set up on a 6 month trial basis, and depending 
on the outcome of the trial a decision was to be made whether it was to be 
established permanently. HDBS was envisaged to operate as a ‘back-end’ 
solution to prison overcrowding.   
  
The HDBS aimed to achieve a range of specific objectives for key 
stakeholders. These were as follows:  
 
 For the offender, it aimed to allow them to be reunited with their family 
sooner and provided them with opportunities to engage in 
rehabilitative and educational activities within the community, 
therefore reducing their likelihood of further offending (Dorey, 1988; 
Dorey, 1986).  
 
 For the co-residents, it aimed to reduce the negative social and 
economic effects of prolonged incarceration of an offender by allowing 
                                                 
102
 HDBS’ operational manual however reveals that its design was not based on another 
HDBS operating at the time, but on years of offender supervision on various community 
based dispositions in multiple jurisdictions (Dorey, 1988). 
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them to more quickly re-establish family life (Dorey, 1988; Dorey, 
1986).  
 
 For the community, it aimed to provide them with an opportunity to 
have closer links to the prison system, and for government and non-
government organisations to be working collaboratively to expand 
services for prisoners and their families (Dorey, 1988; Dorey, 1986).  
 
 For the corrections department, it aimed to reduce pressure on 
existing prison space, thereby saving money (Dorey, 1988; Dorey, 
1986).  
 
The corrections department carefully selected offenders nearing prison terms 
of 12 months or more to serve up to the last 4 months of their prison sentence 
in the community on the HDBS. Those convicted of serious violent or sex 
offences were not eligible for the sanction, nor were those with 
extensive/serious criminal histories103 (Challinger, 1994b; Dorey, 1988; 
Dorey, 1986). Further, the offender had to consent to being placed on the 
sanction. They also had to reside within a district where the sanction 
operated. Initially, the HDBS was only operational within and near the 
Brisbane metropolitan area, but after the trial period the sanction was 
extended to the Rockhampton and Townsville areas in Northern Queensland 
(Dorey, 1986) and eventually statewide. The fact that Australia is a vast 
sparsely populated country with the majority of its population residing in major 
cities has meant that all of the Australian HDBS (except in the Australian 
Capital Territory which essentially comprises one city - Canberra) were 
initiated as pilot programs in only one or a few most populated cities/regions 
within a state/territory. It was anticipated that HDBS would subsequently be 
implemented state/territory wide. While this did occur in some 
states/territories, it did not in all of them. (For more information see section 
4.3.2.2). 
 
                                                 
103
 Offence restrictions on eligibility for the HDBS were subsequently removed (Sentencing 
Advisory Council, 2008). 
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In addition, offenders on HDBS had to be employed or financially supported 
by their spouse/partner, parents or relatives (as they were not eligible for 
Social Security Benefits) (Dorey, 1988; Dorey, 1986). Finally, offenders’ co-
residents were required to agree to the imposition of the HDBS within their 
living space. In particular, they had to indicate that they understood the 
sanction’s requirements and its possible implications for the home 
environment (Dorey, 1986). To reduce the potential for discrimination against 
those who lacked family/friends’ support, offenders were also allowed to 
reside in an approved hostel or a rehabilitation centre (Dorey, 1988). 
 
Similarly to offenders on HDBS in the USA, offenders on HDBS in 
Queensland were subjected to a range of random methods of supervision - 
face-to-face supervision in their homes, telephone calls to their home, and 
checking their attendance at prescribed activities (Dorey, 1986). Supervising 
officers were however atypically dressed in civilian clothes and travelled in 
unmarked cars in order to preserve offenders’ anonymity within their 
neighbourhoods and ease their transition back in the society (Dorey, 1986). 
  
The unique aspect of the Queensland’s HDBS was that its ideology of 
offender supervision apart from the surveillance and control features also 
encompassed individual case management. Unlike in the USA, it was argued 
that supervising officers in Queensland should respond to offenders’ changing 
circumstances during their time on the HDBS (Dorey, 1988). Supervising 
officers also determined, on the basis of offenders’ risk and need analysis, the 
educational, rehabilitative or other approved activities in which they should 
participate. The range of activities was extensive, including: 
  
drug and alcohol counselling, family counselling, enrolment in 
educational or technical skilling courses, attendance at Alcoholics 
Anonymous and Gamblers Anonymous, completion of self-
development and personal growth workshops and participation in 
fitness and other recreational pursuits.  
 
(Dorey, 1986:4 – 439D) 
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This type of offender management together with the positive rewards that 
encourage appropriate behavior, was thought to be likely to increase the 
chance of breaking the cycle of previous offending behaviour (Dorey, 1988). 
 
The HDBS was externally evaluated by researchers from the University of 
Queensland (Dick, Guthrie & Snyder, 1986; Dorey, 1986). The findings of the 
evaluation assessing the first 6 months of HDBS’ operation indicated very 
positive results. These were as follows: 
 
 The cost of the HDBS was 5 times cheaper than incarceration. For 
example, the cost of keeping an offender in prison was estimated to be 
around  $16,500 per prisoner per year (1983-84 data) as opposed to 
$3,242 per offender per year on HDBS (1986 data)104 (Dick et al., 
1986). In fact, the actual cost of keeping an offender on the HDBS in 
the first 6 months of sanction operation was only $304 because 
offenders spent a much shorter time on the sanction than a year (Dick 
et al., 1986).  
 
 Only 4% of offenders on the HDBS had been returned to prison for 
breaching their order. The reasons for their return were repeated 
technical violations rather than further offences (Dick et al., 1986). This 
is particularly impressive given that although most offenders on the 
HDBS were minor offenders, they were in fact chronic offenders whose 
lifestyles and behaviour had been synonymous with unlawful behavior, 
and so they were in fact at a high risk of recidivism (Dorey, 1988). 
Hence, the cost as well as breach rates of the HDBS in Queensland 
                                                 
104
 The cost of keeping an offender on the HDBS was calculated on the basis of dividing the 
known costs directly attributed to the sanction (such as salaries of three supervisors, car 
registration, petrol and cost of community activities that offenders participate in) by the 
average number of offenders on the sanction (Dick et al., 1986). Omitted from these costs 
were, however, other associated costs (such as part of the manager’s salary, telephone costs 
and costs of the premises), as well as broader cost benefits (such as reduction in capital 
works as fewer offenders are held in prisons). If these were taken into account, the cost 
advantage of the HDBS would be substantially improved. It should also be noted that as the 
caseloads on the HDBS were likely to increase, the sanction’s cost per offender would be 
further reduced (Dick et al., 1986).   
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were therefore very similar to the cost and breach rates of HDBS in the 
USA at the time (Dick et al., 1986). 
 
 Staff administering the HDBS applied the officially stated goals and 
objectives in a practical manner. Furthermore, there was evidence of 
team work as well as esprit de corps which were regarded as being 
high among the staff (Dick et al., 1986). Offenders’ assessments of the 
HDBS also indicated very positive results; in particular, they described 
officers as mostly supportive and fair (Dick et al., 1986). More 
generally, the media and the public also responded well to the HDBS 
(Dick et al., 1986). 
 
The evaluation also indicated some points of caution if the HDBS was to be 
expanded, if electronic surveillance became utilised as part of offender 
supervision and if unemployed offenders were granted HDBS. According to 
the evaluators, if the HDBS was expanded, the maintenance of staff 
commitment, teamwork and cohesion, the main components that made this 
sanction so effective, were predicted to be more difficult to retain (Dick et al., 
1986). In addition, the introduction of electronic surveillance was said to be 
likely to result in a reduction of existing rehabilitative provisions for offenders 
as well as close contact between supervising staff and offenders and their 
families (Dick et al., 1986). Finally, the placement of unemployed offenders on 
HDBS was thought to require additional resources – more intensive 
supervision and more active participation in community agencies (Dick et al., 
1986). 
 
In March 1987 following the Queensland University’s positive evaluation, the 
legislators adopted HDBS as a permanent sentencing disposition (Dorey, 
1988). From mid-1987, it was projected that a minimum of 700 offenders per 
year could be placed on the sanction, thus significantly reducing the state’s 
costs of incarceration (Dorey, 1986). By November 1987, the target of almost 
700 offenders had already been reached. Results after 5 years of operation 
continued to show successful completion rates around 95%, and 5% of 
failures mostly attributed to technical violations (Challinger, 1994b; Dorey, 
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1988). The key to the success of Queensland’s HDBS was said to be 
committed staff who provide individualistic case management to offenders 
which enhances their positive re-establishment in the community (Dorey, 
1988). 
 
Interestingly, in 2001 a trial using electronic monitoring technology was 
undertaken in Queensland. The trial was however considered to indicate 
disappointing results - on its own electronic monitoring was not able to assist 
in reintegrating offenders back into society. There was no advantage in 
completion rates for offenders who were on electronic monitoring as opposed 
to those who were not and the use of electronic monitoring was considered to 
be prohibitively expensive (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). Nevertheless, it seems that 
the expectations on the technology were too ambitious, so it is not surprising 
that it is not able to rehabilitate offenders on its own. Further, although its use 
is expensive it is undoubtedly cheaper than the cost of incarceration which it 
replaces. 
 
The second Australian state to introduce HDBS was South Australia in 1987. 
Like Queensland, South Australia initiated a back-end HDBS (Butler, 2007; 
Winton, 1999; Bloor, 1988). Broad bipartisan political support for the sanction 
was obtained on the basis of alleviating severely  overcrowded prisons, which 
created enormous pressure on the police and court systems105 (Bloor, 1988). 
Furthermore, closely structured and cost effective community based 
sanctions for currently imprisoned offenders who could be released early from 
prisons was considered to be necessary.  
 
The specific objectives of the HDBS included: 
 
 Provision of a flexible cost effective community based alternative to 
imprisonment for suitable offenders. 
                                                 
105
 The prison overcrowding situation in South Australia was further exacerbated by the 
closure of the Adelaide Gaol where deteriorated conditions were considered to be inadequate 
(Bloor, 1988). Tremendous prison crowding also had a significant impact on police holding 
cells that, despite not being designed for long-term holding of prisoners, were housing 
sentenced prisoners.   
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 Reduction in the number of incarcerated offenders and limiting adverse 
impacts of imprisonment, while at the same time maintaining a proper 
level of protection for the community. 
 
 Provision of opportunities to assist offender reintegration back into 
society, including re-establishment of family relationships and 
employment opportunities (Butler, 2007; Heath, 1996). 
 
Similar to Queensland, selected prisoners in South Australia were released 
early from prison at the discretion of the corrections department and placed 
on HDBS (Challinger, 1994b). A prisoner was said to be eligible for the HDBS 
if they were serving a sentence of imprisonment with a set parole period of 
more than 12 months. Prisoners had to specifically serve two ninths of their 
sentence in prison and be in the last 12 months of their sentence to be 
eligible to apply for the HDBS (Butler, 2007). They also had to consent to 
being on the HDBS and reside in an area where the sanction operated.106 
Finally, a supervising officer assessed offenders’ suitability at the prison as 
well as their nominated residents at their home. These residents were asked 
to sign an agreement of compliance with the HDBS terms and conditions. The 
Prisoner Assessment Committee further assessed every application and 
made the final decision on whether to release the offender on the HDBS 
(Butler, 2007). 
 
Once released onto the HDBS, offenders were confined to their homes under 
strict supervision. They could only leave for essential reasons such as 
medical treatment, employment/study/community work, food and clothing 
shopping at a centre closest to the residence, childcare responsibilities and 
legal/Centrelink/counselling appointments (Butler, 2007). On all occasions 
offenders were required to obtain pre-approved permission for their 
movements and the supervising officers checked their whereabouts either by 
telephone or face-to-face visit (Butler, 2007). 
                                                 
106
 HDBS became available statewide throughout South Australia in 2001 (Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, 2011).  
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Offenders were visited at home a minimum of 3 times per week plus 
telephoned randomly 1 to 3 times during a 24 hour period. Urinalysis and 
breath testing were also conducted randomly. A Radio Frequency based 
electronic monitoring system was subsequently introduced, partially replacing 
face-to-face supervision. This was able to check offender’s presence at their 
residence every 11 seconds and alert the officer if the offender had moved 
out of range or had tampered with the equipment (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). 
Minor breaches of compliance were dealt with by the Home Detention 
Coordinator who could direct the offender to remain at home for prolonged 
periods. More serious breaches of conditions resulted in an immediate return 
to prison (Butler, 2007).  
 
Similarly to Queensland, the ideology of offender supervision in South 
Australia, apart from the surveillance and control mechanisms, also entailed 
rehabilitative initiatives. The sanction operation manual stated that the HDBS 
was designed to function with restorative justice aims of repairing offenders’ 
relationships with their family, friends and victim/s and generally re-engaging 
them in pro-social activities. Supervising officers consequently developed 
specific re-integrative case plans for each offender while liaising with their 
families and support agencies. They also educated the community and 
departmental staff to ensure that stakeholders were informed more generally 
about the HDBS and could assist in reintegrating offenders back into society 
(Heath, 1996). 
 
The Corrections Department’s Coordinator of Research and Planning was 
responsible for assessing the efficiency of the South Australian HDBS by a 
comparison of the sanction’s stated objectives with actual outcomes during 
the first year of HDBS’ operation (Roeger, 1988). The technical violation rates 
were reported to be 15% and further offending rates were 9%. Both of these 
rates were considered to be acceptable since in comparison with other 
jurisdictions they were quite low (Heath, 1996; Roeger, 1988). Furthermore, 
the HDBS was found to be cost-effective. The cost of placement on the HDBS 
per offender per year was calculated as $17,000, which was substantially 
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cheaper than the cost of incarcerating an offender, which was calculated at 
the time to be about $44,000. It was however recognised in the evaluation 
that there was ‘no true saving’ to the correctional department since there was 
no significant reduction in expenditure on prison operation and the corrections 
budget had in fact increased (Roeger, 1988). It should be noted that there is 
quite a discrepancy in per offender per year cost of HDBS and incarceration 
in Queensland and South Australia. Both are significantly more expensive in 
South Australia, probably because it generally has a smaller incarceration 
rate and its cost analysis calculations are more comprehensive. 
 
A problem occurred as the HDBS was not diverting sufficient numbers of 
offenders from the prison system (Bloor, 1988). Advice was sought from the 
Director of Community Corrections who visited the USA and Canada and 
examined a number of HDBS in late 1987. His key recommendation was a 
reduction in restrictions on HDBS’ eligibility criteria. Furthermore, the 
decentralisation of the HDBS to District Offices was imperative to allow for 
sanction responsibility to be placed with District Probation and Parole Officers 
(Bloor, 1988). In addition, the Justice and Consumer Affairs Committee, a 
Cabinet sub-committee, explored the potential of HDBS’ expansion. It 
recommended the introduction of electronic monitoring, which was expected 
to make sanction expansion more acceptable to stakeholders, and in 
particular, the community.  
 
In November 1987, the South Australian HDBS was legislatively amended 
with several significant changes. The first major change was to the eligibility 
criteria. HDBS became available for prisoners who were serving sentences 
that were even longer than 12 months, provided that they were in the last 6 
moths of their sentence and that they had achieved a low security rating 
(Bloor, 1988; Roeger, 1988). The second amendment was the introduction of 
the use of the Telsol Electronic Monitoring System by South Australia - the 
first Australian jurisdiction to initiate electronic monitoring (Challinger, 1994b). 
The HDBS continually expanded over the next 6 years and in 1993 it was 
decentralised to Community Correctional Centres at Noarlunga, Adelaide, 
Port Adelaide and Elizabeth (Winton, 1999).  
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The Northern Territory launched the first ‘front-end’ HDBS in Australia as a 
direct alternative to imprisonment in 1988.107 Similar to the rationale for HDBS 
in Queensland and South Australia, the main reason behind the 
establishment of the HDBS in the Northern Territory was to divert offenders 
from prison. This was not specifically due to prison overcrowding, but the 
inordinately high, and growing imprisonment rate (Owston, 1991). For 
example, as Challinger (1994b) ascertained, the rate of incarceration in the 
Northern Territory had always been many times higher than the Australian 
average; for example, the imprisonment rate in the Northern Territory in 1988 
was 231 per 100,000 adult population, compared with 72 per 100,000 for 
Australia overall.  
 
More specifically, the priority was to address the overrepresentation of 
Aboriginals in the prison system. In 1984-85, Aboriginals represented only 
20% of the general territory population but comprised some 73% of the prison 
population (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991). It was considered to be 
particularly pertinent to divert Aboriginals from incarceration as they often live 
in remote communities, and a sentence of imprisonment removes them 
further from their communities into criminal activity (Challinger, 1994b). 
Furthermore, the fact that, at the time, more than 70% of prisoners were 
serving sentences of less than 12 months, for relatively minor offences, such 
as drink driving, break enter and steal, and non-sexual assault, meant that the 
possible offender pool for diversion was substantial (Owston, 1991).  
 
As the HDBS in the Northern Territory is a front-end sanction imposed directly 
by sentencing officers (magistrates and judges), strict offender criteria had to 
apply in order to reduce the possibility of net widening (Challinger, 1994b). To 
place an offender on the HDBS, the sentencing authority had to receive a 
report from the parole/probation officer stating that the offender was facing 
certain imprisonment, consented to the sanction, could reside at a suitable 
                                                 
107
 The introduction of this HDBS in the mid-1980s was part of a number of strategies that 
Northern Territory corrective service put in place to reduce the growing imprisonment rate. A 
conditional liberty program with a fine default component was another strategy that was 
implemented which had a particularly significant result – a reduction in the incarceration rate 
by 25% from 1986 to 1988 (Challinger, 1994b). 
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residence, and that the offender’s family/close neighbours were not put at risk 
by their being placed on the sanction (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991). 
 
Once on the HDBS the offender’s movements and activities were severely 
restricted beyond attending employment, treatment/counselling and 
necessary personal and family matters (Owston, 1991). Offenders’ 
compliance with remaining confined to their home or being at work was 
checked randomly on a face-to-face basis or by telephone by supervising 
officers (Owston, 1991). More specifically, computerised random selection 
determined the home visits, which averaged 3 in any 24 hour period. In cases 
where an offender’s behaviour or movements had raised suspicions, more 
frequent visits were made (Challinger, 1994b; Bakermans, 1990). In addition, 
offenders on the HDBS were usually required to abstain/reduce their level of 
alcohol consumption, which was randomly checked by an electronic breath 
analyser (Challinger, 1994b). Finally, offenders were typically mandated to 
undertake counselling or treatment for alcohol/drug abuse or mental health 
problems (Owston, 1991). 
 
In 1990, an electronic telephone surveillance system became a part of 
offender supervision on the HDBS to improve the surveillance imposed on 
offenders (Challinger, 1994b). The advantage of using the technology for the 
Correctional Service was that it could randomly and quickly verify the 
offender’s presence at home (Owston, 1991). Further, the technology 
permitted a reduction in the number of face-to-face visits, which could 
impinge on the privacy of other residents at the offender’s home (Challinger, 
1994b). As a result, most offenders who had direct access to a telephone 
were keen to accept the use of technology, which was initially voluntary 
(Bakermans, 1990). 
 
The first year of HDBS’ operation generally indicated positive results. Nearly 
130 offenders had been placed onto the sanction most of whom were 
convicted of driving-related offences such as drink driving and driving while 
disqualified (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991). More than 90% of these 
offenders had successfully completed the sanction. The average length of 
206 
 
time on the sanction was 3.5 months (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991). In 
relation to HDBS’ cost effectiveness, it was calculated that the saving in 
actual prison days was more than 5% (Challinger, 1994b). It is also worth 
noting that wider social cost savings such as the stigma accompanying 
imprisonment - which can be long lasting - and the loss of employment that 
can impact on the entire family, were avoided (Bakermans, 1990). 
 
The evaluation further revealed that offenders’ family members were 
generally not negatively affected by the imposition of the HDBS in the 
household. In fact, in most cases, offenders’ relationships with spouses and 
children had improved due to their constant employment and engagement in 
counselling or treatment for alcohol/drug abuse or mental health problems 
(Bakermans, 1990).  
 
However, the initial target of diverting 200 low-risk offenders from 
imprisonment had not been reached (Bakermans, 1990). More specifically, 
the numbers of Aboriginal offenders who were placed onto the HDBS were 
considered to be inadequate. For example, of all offenders on the sanction 
within a year only a little over 10% were Aboriginal (Owston, 1991). The 
reason for this was that the majority of Aboriginals sentenced to short-terms 
of imprisonment in the Northern Territory lived in remote traditional 
communities such as Groote Eylandt and Port Keats. The HDBS was not 
offered in these communities, but only in major centres (Darwin, Alice 
Springs, Katherine, Tennant Creek-Groote Eylandt and Nhulunbuy) and some 
remote centres (including Jabiry, Port Keats and Papunya) where a resident 
is a supervising officer (Bakermans, 1990).   
 
On the basis of statistical analysis of sentenced offenders, it was concluded 
that it should be possible to divert more than 500 offenders from prison onto 
the HDBS within the next 12 months (Owston, 1991). Furthermore, a high 
priority was placed on establishing HDBS in an increasing number of remote 
Aboriginal communities, even though it was recognised this was complex and 
only viable in some communities. Operating HDBS in all remote areas was 
said to be impossible because of logistical obstacles in establishing 
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surveillance procedures, residential problems, and lack of rehabilitative 
substance abuse programs (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991). An additional 
commitment was made to recruit more supervising officers who were of 
Aboriginal descent (Challinger, 1994). Finally, it was recommended that 
higher numbers of Aboriginal offenders living in main urban centres be placed 
onto the HDBS with alcohol treatment, since alcohol abuse was a contributing 
factor to the offending  of many of these offenders (Owston, 1991). 
 
Despite issues with small numbers on the HDBS, it was concluded that the 
overall success of the sanction had been demonstrated. This is because key 
stakeholders, including the courts, police and the community generally 
regarded it as a credible, suitably punitive, and rehabilitative alternative to 
incarceration (Challinger, 1994b; Bakermans, 1990). It was predicted that, as 
confidence in the HDBS grows, so would the use of the sanction (Challinger, 
1994b).  
 
4.2.2.2 Expansion and subsequent development of HDBS    
  
In comparison with the USA where by 1990 all states had established HDBS 
with RF, it took much longer in Australia. It was not until 2004 that all of the 
Australian mainland states and territories had introduced HDBS with RF.108 
As the main component of HDBS from the 1990s became the EM technology 
that they utilise, they are referred to as either ‘HDBS with RF’ or ‘HDBS with 
GPS’ in the remainder of this chapter. HDBS, which use the different EM 
technology, must be distinguishable as they usually have vastly different 
rationales, operations and outcomes. In instances when the generic term 
‘HDBS’ is used in the remainder of this chapter it refers to both ‘HDBS with 
RF’ as well as ‘HDBS with GPS.’   
 
Furthermore, unlike in the USA where three HDBS (Georgia, New Jersey and 
Florida) essentially became the templates that other states subsequently 
                                                 
108
 Tasmania is the only island state of Australia. It has never initiated a HDBS with RF 
(Henderson, 2006). 
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copied and adapted to their own criminal justice needs, in Australia this did 
not occur. Each mainland state and territory in Australia developed, trialed 
and operated its own HDBS. The application of these sanctions over the last 
three decades has varied significantly between the states and territories.   
 
The most substantial utilisation of HDBS with RF is in South Australia. Around 
400 offenders are on HDBS with RF at any one time (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). 
Although HDBS with RF initially started only as a back-end alternative to 
imprisonment in 1986, since 2000 their application has been extended 
statewide and another two distinct applications of HDBS with RF have been 
made available. These were a front-end alternative to imprisonment as well 
as an alternative to remand in custody, a condition of bail for unsentenced 
offenders (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011). This front-end 
HDBS with RF commenced in 2000 and operates statewide as an alternative 
to a period of up to 12 months of imprisonment. Unlike any other Australian 
state, the rules around its utilisation are very strict as it is only available in 
cases where the court has determined that the offender is unable to go to 
prison because of illness, disability or frailty. For this reason it is seldom 
applied. HDBS with RF as a condition of bail is most widely applied, and there 
is a relatively small application of it as a back-end alternative to imprisonment 
(Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; Department for Correctional 
Service, 2006).                                          
 
The second largest HDBS with RF in Australia is in New South Wales. 
Despite this, an ongoing problem has been the relatively small number of 
offenders being sentenced. That is, around 180-200 offenders at any one 
time are on the sanction compared with the total prison population which over 
the years has been consistently around 8,000-9,000 prisoners (Smith & 
Gibbs, 2013; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). As a 
result, over the last decade two government reviews have been 
commissioned to explore the reasons behind the lack of its use.  
 
The Standing Committee on Law and Justice compiled the first review in 2006 
on the basis of submissions/statements by various stakeholders. It reported 
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the following as the possible reasons behind the low offender numbers on 
HDBS with RF in New South Wales:  
 
 HDBS with RF is not available statewide and only in the Sydney 
metropolitan area, plus Newcastle and Wollongong 
 
 reluctance by some judges to sentence offenders to HDBS with RF 
due to a view that it is a soft-option 
 
 contrary perception of HDBS with RF by offenders who regard it as too 
onerous and decline placement on it (due to the belief that a 
substantial level of self-discipline is required to comply with the 
sanction’s demanding conditions) (NSW Standing Committee on Law 
and Justice, 2006). 
 
The report recommended that the government extend HDBS with RF 
statewide (Achterstraat, 2010). However, the finding that two key 
stakeholders whose discretion and preference clearly precluded the 
sanction’s wider application as they held opposing perceptions of HDBS with 
RF was more difficult to address. It would undoubtedly require stakeholder 
specific educational sessions that outline the benefits as well as the 
drawbacks that are associated with HDBS with RF. These sessions have 
been a fundamental part of most effective HDBS with RF throughout the USA 
(for more information see Clear et al., 1987; Erwin & Bennett, 1987). 
 
The Auditor-General’s Report Performance Audit constituted the second 
review in 2010, again confirming inadequate offender numbers being placed 
on HDBS with RF. In fact, the number of offenders sentenced to HDBS with 
RF was reported to be declining. In 2008-09 an average of 175 offenders 
were on HDBS with RF at any one time, compared with 2002-03 when it was 
229 offenders. The decline in offender numbers was considerable, almost one 
quarter (Achterstraat, 2010). Most of the barriers to wider application of HDBS 
with RF were repeated from the earlier report:  
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 HDBS with RF still had not been rolled out statewide and made 
available in rural and remote regions in New South Wales 
 
 some sentencing officials were still unwilling to sentence offenders 
onto HDBS with RF, as in 2008-09 only 35 out of 47 local courts with 
access to HDBS with RF made referrals to it 
 
 the Correctional Department’s screening process for HDBS with RF 
suitability had become more rigorous over time. From 2006-07 to 
2008-09 about 40% of offenders referred for assessment had been 
found unsuitable. In contrast from 1999-2000 to 2003-04 the rate of 
offender unsuitability stood at 34% (Achterstraat, 2010). 
 
Again it was recommended that HDBS with RF be expanded to all of the 
regions of New South Wales. In addition, information sessions be organised 
for sentencing officials. Further, the reasons for offenders being assessed as 
unsuitable be identified and common barriers removed (Achterstraat, 2010). 
Interestingly, the operation of HDBS with RF in New South Wales, unlike any 
other Australian state, is supported by both political parties (Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, 2011). Therefore, as it has not been highly 
politicised, its application is likely to continually improve. 
 
The smallest still operational HDBS with RF is in the Northern Territory. Only 
30-40 offenders are typically on this sanction at any one time despite its 
statewide operation (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). However, unlike New South 
Wales, no published government inquiries have been conducted in the 
Northern Territory to explore the possibilities of increasing the number of 
offenders being sentenced to HDBS with RF (Parliamentary Library Research 
Service, 2011). 
  
Over the last decade a populist political ‘tough on crime’ agenda led to a 
closure of three HDBS with RF in Australia. (For more information see section 
4.3.4). The first to discontinue its operation was Western Australia’s HDBS 
with RF in 2003, which had functioned as a post-prison sentence and a 
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condition of bail since 1996. The main reason behind its abolition was that a 
few high profile incidents resulted in a strong public drive for ‘truth in 
sentencing’ and a general hardening of community attitudes toward offenders 
(Winton, 1999).  
 
The second to cease its operation, also due to a push toward ‘truth in 
sentencing,’ was Queensland’s HDBS with RF in 2006.  This was despite its 
relative widespread use with about 80 offenders at any one time (Smith & 
Gibbs, 2013; Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008). The closure was 
specifically “designed to ensure that prisoners were either in prison or on 
parole, and that a prisoner’s release date would only be determined by a 
court or by a parole board” [not the corrections department as was the case in 
relation to HDBS with RF] (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011:11). 
Paroling offenders was considered to be less discriminatory and preferential 
as there were instances in the past where offenders could not secure suitable 
accommodation to be placed onto HDBS with RF. Further, HDBS with RF 
was reported to sometimes place significant stress on families (Sentencing 
Advisory Council, 2008).  
 
The Victorian HDBS with RF was the third to be discontinued in 2011, due to 
a perception that it was not tough on criminals. Victoria had been the final 
mainland state to initiate HDBS in 2004. The first year of its operation 
indicated successful outcomes, but low offender numbers had been an 
ongoing issue (Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008; Success Works, 2007; 
Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections 
Victoria, 2006). The previous Labour government attempted to tackle this 
issue by introducing the Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2010. This 
effectively meant that the HDBS became a sentence in its own right in 
accordance with the recommendations of three separate reports (Sentencing 
Advisory Council, 2008; Success Works, 2007; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006). This 
legislative change was also regarded to be pertinent due to the pressure to 
react to the [then opposition’s] populist ‘get tough on crime’ agenda during the 
election year. The actual effect of this legislative amendment could not be 
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seen as the HDBS with RF was abolished in the following year (Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, 2011). 
 
The abolition of the HDBS with RF in Victoria was the specific result of a 
change of state government in late 2010. Even before forming the 
government, the conservative coalition party had announced a plan to abolish 
HDBS with RF because they considered it to be a part of the previous Labour 
government’s “soft-on-crime-approach that ignores proper sentencing, 
community protection and the views of victims” (Parliamentary Library 
Research Service, 2011:4-5). Abolition of HDBS with RF was part of a wider 
coalition party’ agenda of improving sentencing policy by ‘getting tough on 
crime.’  
 
It is very important to note that in mid-2013 the Victorian coalition government 
announced the introduction of GPS technology as a possible condition of 
Parole Orders and Community Correction Orders (O’Donohue, 2013). This 
amendment of the law was portrayed as part of the ‘get tough on crime 
agenda,’ summarised as ‘giving teeth to community based sentences.’ 
However, from an operational perspective the Parole Orders and Community 
Correction Orders with GPS will be quite similar to the abolished HDBS with 
RF. The only difference between them will be the use of the updated 
technology. This is because at the time when HDBS with RF was abolished it 
in fact operated as a sentence in its own right at the highest level of the 
hierarchy of community based dispositions. The application of the electronic 
monitoring technology as a condition of various community based dispositions 
(instead of HDBS) follows the legislative trend in the USA (DeMichele & 
Payne, 2009; McCarthy et al., 2001).  
 
The Australian Capital Territory’s HDBS with RF was terminated in 2005. 
After 4 years of operation it closed because its yearly numbers were so small, 
less than 5 offenders at any one time and it struggled to be viable (Smith & 
Gibbs, 2013; Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011).   
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Whereas heinous criminal acts committed on children by recently released 
known paedophiles had resulted in the introduction of HDBS with GPS in the 
USA, in Australia the sanction commencement was sparked by the post-
prison release of high-profile violent sex offenders. In Queensland in 2003 
Dennis Ferguson’s109 release created a ‘moral panic’ in the media  (Edgely, 
2007; Queensland Corrective Services, 2007). The Queensland Government 
reacted 6 months later by passing the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (DPSOA) (Queensland Corrective Services, 2007). 
This became the first Australian legislation that allowed for post-sentence 
preventative detention as well as continued community based supervision in 
cases where a court determined that there is an unacceptable risk of the 
offender committing further serious sexual offences (Edgely, 2007). 
 
Western Australia replicated Queensland’s scheme by introducing the 
Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) (DSOA) in order to continue the 
supervision of a serial rapist Gary Narkle,110 after the expiry of his sentence 
(Edgely, 2007). Both the Queensland and Western Australian Acts are 
imposed on: 
 
serious sex offenders who have been sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment for a wide range of sexual offences against children, 
including sexual penetration, indecent assault, incest and the 
possession or production of child pornography.  
(Provan, 2007:16)  
                                                 
109
 Dennis Ferguson was a notorious paedophile who was released in 2003 in Queensland 
after he had served the entirety of his 14 year prison sentence. The main issue with his 
release was that that he had been a recidivist who was unwilling to accept treatment while in 
prison and there were no government provisions at the time to keep him detained or to 
continue supervising him in any way in the community (Edgely, 2007; Queensland Corrective 
Services, 2007).  
110
 Gary Narkle had a criminal history of sex and violent offences going back to 1972. He had 
been convicted of multiple rapes, abduction of a girl aged under 16 and carnal knowledge of 
the same minor (Cordingley, 15.10.11). Narkle was due to be released in 2006 but Western 
Australia’s former Attorney General described him as “a serial sex monster” (Cordingley, 
26.07.11), and applied to the court for him to be imprisoned indefinitely or if released for 
corrections to continue supervising him. He was released on a supervision order but 
reoffended soon after (Lampathakis, 12.07.08). The most recent string of offences involved 
him repeatedly drugging, threatening and raping a homeless man for which he was convicted 
in 2010 and is currently serving a 10-year sentence. It has been said that an application for 
his indefinite detention/continued community supervision will be made again when he is due 
to be released in 2019 (Spooner, 10.01.13).    
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If these offenders are assessed as posing an unacceptable risk of sexual re-
offending at the end of their sentence111 they can be indefinitely detained or 
released in the community subject to appropriate conditions (specified in a 
supervision order). Most importantly, these offenders are limited in where they 
can live and work and their contact with children is restricted. It is important to 
note that, unlike in the USA, in Australia offenders on extended supervision 
orders in the community are not allowed to be homeless. The conditions 
imposed on offenders on HDBS with GPS are generally said to increase their 
rehabilitative prospects as well as protect the public (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; 
Queensland Corrective Services, 2007). 
 
The Victorian Government followed suit by setting up its own legislative 
scheme so that it could continue to supervise dangerous sex offenders, such 
as Brian Keith Jones,112 who had been unresponsive to treatment, did not 
take part in rehabilitative treatments and/or did not show remorse for his 
previous crimes (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). It passed the Serious Sex Offenders 
Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic), which introduced extended supervision orders that 
offenders are ordered to serve at an acceptable residential location within the 
                                                 
111
 The application process within the DPSOA and DSOA is as follows: the Attorney-General 
applies for a Supreme Court order that the prisoner’s detention be continued indefinitely; if the 
court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for continued detention the prisoner is 
ordered to undergo examination by two court-nominated psychiatrists; both psychiatrists 
provide a detailed assessment of the level of risk that the prisoner will commit another serious 
sexual offence; the court makes a continuing detention order or orders that the prisoner be 
released at the end of their sentence under specific conditions outlined in the supervision 
order (Edgely, 2007). If a continuing detention order is imposed it applies indefinitely and is 
subject to annual reviews (Edgely, 2007). 
112
 Brian Keith Jones was initially convicted of kidnapping and molesting 6 young boys in the 
1980s for which he served 8 years incarceration. He reoffended almost immediately - post 
release - sexually assaulting two more boys. He subsequently received a sentence of 14 
years imprisonment (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). He was nicknamed ‘Mr Baldy’ by the media for 
his habit of shaving victims’ heads before molesting them. For the entirety of his sentence he 
was not responsive to treatment and was the first offender on whom the Victorian extended 
supervision order was imposed. Extensive negative media attention was given to his release. 
This started with journalists uncovering his place of residence in the community and 
subjecting him to harassment. Corrections officials had to then relocate him to the Extended 
Supervision Order Temporary Accommodation Centre (see explanation below). Ever since, 
the media has kept a close watch on his movements despite the fact that he has been 
subjected to rigorous supervision which has included electronic monitoring (Smith & Gibbs, 
2013). The media has portrayed the conditions of Jones’ release as being too lenient, despite 
the fact that these had been the toughest conditions ever imposed on a sex offender in 
Victoria.  
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community or in the Extended Supervision Order Temporary Accommodation 
Centre.113  
 
While the application process for applying for an extended supervision order 
is very similar to Queensland and Western Australia, the unique aspect of the 
Victorian legislation is that electronic monitoring is a core condition of 
extended supervision orders. It enforces offenders’ night curfew as well as 
bans them leaving home during the times when children are likely to be 
encountered (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Provan, 2007). Victoria initially utilised 
HDBS with RF but moved to HDBS with GPS in mid-2013 (O’Donohue, 2013; 
Victorian Spatial Council, 2011; Price, 2010). Extended supervision orders in 
Victoria can be for up to 15 years but are subject to review every 3 years 
(Provan, 2007). Under all of the legislative schemes if an offender fails to 
comply with any of the predetermined conditions of their supervision orders, 
without a reasonable excuse, breach action is initiated and if proven guilty 
offenders can be sentenced to a term of 5 years imprisonment (Provan, 
2007). 
 
Other Australian states soon adopted Victoria’s policy of using electronic 
monitoring in supervising dangerous sex offenders. The first to pass similar 
legislation extending supervision of dangerous sex offenders with electronic 
monitoring was New South Wales in 2006 (Edgely, 2007). Later that same 
year Queensland, then Western Australia in 2012, followed suit by passing 
amendments to their existing DPSOA and DSOA legislation which allowed 
the courts to impose electronic monitoring on offenders as one of many 
conditions issued as part of supervision orders (Orr, 30.04.12; Queensland 
Corrective Services, 2007). Hence, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland 
and Western Australia are all using HDBS with GPS to monitor sex offenders 
                                                 
113
 Extended Supervision Order Temporary Accommodation Center (dubbed ‘Village of the 
damned’) is a compound made up of one-bedroom cabins inside Ararat prison’s outer 
perimeter fence. It houses offenders for whom suitable accommodation in the community 
cannot be obtained (Wilkinson & Dowsley, 07.07.07). Difficulties are typically encountered in 
finding an acceptable residence for sex offenders as it cannot be near schools, kindergardens 
or child-care centres (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). The existence of the Temporary Accommodation 
Center has however been vigorously criticised by prominent scholars as being ‘quasi 
detention’ which lacks facilities. But, victims of crime groups generally support its operation 
(Wilkinson & Dowsley, 07.07.07).     
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(O’Donohue, 2013; O’Loan, 03.06.11; Sandy, 07.06.11). The latest 
technology was said to “complement and enhance the intensive supervision 
already in place for DPSOA [and DSOA] offenders residing in the community” 
(Queensland Corrective Services, 2007:2).  
 
In Australia, the legislative changes allowing HDBS with GPS to be used in 
supervising dangerous sex offenders after their expiry of their original 
sentences were implemented quickly, allowing little time for public debate 
(Szego, 18.04.05). The key argument for the amendment of the law was the 
enhancement of public safety (Bligh & Roberts, 2011). More specific 
advantages that sporadically appeared in the literature included that being on 
HDBS with GPS deters offenders from further offending. It results in 
controlled offender rehabilitation and its cost is lower than the cost of 
incarceration (Michael et al., 2006). Interestingly enough there was limited 
critical discourse in the public arena about this significant amendment to the 
law. An ethical issue mentioned by Michael et al. (2006) was the possibility 
that HDBS with GPS could be imposed on sex offenders who may not in fact 
be likely to offend again (Michael et al., 2006). Further, professionals who 
treat sex offenders also raised the uncertainty that these legislative changes 
would in fact reduce re-offending (Szego, 18.04.05).  
 
Following the implementation of laws allowing continued supervision of 
dangerous sex offenders in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, 
Edgley (2007) vigorously attacked the court’s process of determining 
offenders’ propensity to reoffend. The legislation specified that when 
determining whether an offender represents an unacceptable risk to the 
community the court must consider their past criminal conduct and psychiatric 
reports (Edgely, 2007). Edgely (2007:371) argued that this was highly 
problematic as “the American Psychiatric Association and the Royal 
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists have concluded that 
predictions of dangerousness are too inaccurate for use in a forensic context.” 
Edgely (2007:374) also believed that decisions about continued supervision 
were based on a “speculative practice.”  
 
217 
 
More comprehensive critical debate about using HDBS with GPS occurred 
when it was being considered for domestic violence aggressors (Immigrant 
Women’s Speakout Association of New South Wales, 2011; New South 
Wales Government, 2011). In particular, various stakeholders sent 
submissions to the ‘Inquiry into Domestic Violence trends and issues in New 
South Wales.’ The submissions that referred to the use of HDBS with GPS 
generally argued that it could be a useful tool with some shortcomings. 
Specified shortcomings included that HDBS with GPS invades domestic 
violence aggressors’ civil liberty and privacy, GPS devices can be removed, 
and GPS tracking signals can be lost for a period of time (Immigrant Women’s 
Speakout Association of New South Wales, 2011; New South Wales 
Government, 2011). The Immigrant Women’s Speakout Association of New 
South Wales (2011) also warned that the use of HDBS with GPS will only be 
successful if detailed regulations and sophisticated practice guides its 
operation. Hence, when there was a proposed expansion of the offender 
population on HDBS with GPS, stakeholders presented various critical 
arguments.114      
 
The Australian Institute of Criminology subsequently commissioned a special 
trends and issues paper demystifying common misperceptions about child 
sex offenders (Richards, 2011). It explained that, while child sex offenders are 
presented in the media as compulsive recidivists, research has indicated that 
their rates of re-offending are generally low - varying from 10% to less than 
40% - depending on the follow up period (Richards, 2011; Edgely, 2007). In 
addition, the common belief that strangers typically abuse children is 
unfounded, as the vast majority of child sex offenders are known to their 
victims (Richards, 2011). Richards (2011) concluded by stating:   
 
Although sexual offending against children is a highly emotive issue, 
it is important that the empirical literature on this topic underpins any 
public policy response to child sex offenders (eg risk assessment, 
treatment, investigative and court processes, sentencing, child 
                                                 
114
 To date no Australian state/territory has trialed the use of HDBS with GPS for domestic 
violence aggressors.  
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protection policies) in order to ensure the implementation of 
approaches that are best placed to enhance public safety and protect 
children from sexual abuse.  
 
(Richards, 2011:7) 
 
It is interesting to note that Australia has recently enacted legislation which 
enables control orders to include the application of electronic monitoring in 
preventing terrorist acts115 (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). Although these orders are 
yet to be applied, their existence has raised numerous legal and human rights 
concerns in relation to the pre-existing legal protections. Further there are 
questions about whether they are constitutional and if they comply with 
international human rights protections (Smith & Gibbs, 2013).   
 
The possibility of using electronic monitoring to track the whereabouts of 
refugees while they are in the process of applying for asylum has been 
discussed in Australia. This application would be for refugees who would 
typically be held in detention. Unsurprisingly, the Human Rights Council of 
Australia has advocated for the utilisation of electronic monitoring instead of 
detention (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). Furthermore, there has been some interest 
in using electronic monitoring to enforce restraining orders in Australia. 
Although there are no legislative provisions for the use of electronic 
monitoring in either of these settings, it is predicted that there will be in the 
future (Smith & Gibbs, 2013).  
 
In summary, unlike in the USA where there has been a continual expansion of 
HDBS that utilise both RF and GPS electronic monitoring technology, in 
Australia it has remained relatively stable as Table 4.1 shows. More 
specifically, the number of offenders on HDBS with RF has been decreasing 
because throughout Australia 4 out of 7 HDBS with RF had ceased operating 
over the last decade. Conversely, the number of offenders on HDBS with 
GPS seems to be on the increase (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Henderson, 2006). 
Actual numbers of offenders on HDBS with GPS in Australia are not publicly 
                                                 
115
 For more information please see Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Division 104. 
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available. This is because in some jurisdictions they are counted as a part of 
the imprisoned offender cohort, and in others as part of the paroled offender 
cohort. Therefore, a uniform classification of these offenders is needed. 
Despite this, it is most likely that the offender numbers on these sanctions 
have grown since the sanctions were initiated in 2006, especially given the 
fact that they are now operational in four states (O’Donohue, 2013; Orr, 
30.04.12; Edgely, 2007). 
 
Table 4.1 - Offenders on HDBS in Australia (at any one time)116 
Year Offenders on RF  
1999-2000           539              
2000-2001           576              
2001-2002           558              
2002-2003           657              
2003-2004           684              
2004-2005           792              
2005-2006           886             
2006-2007           772             
2007-2008           586             
2008-2009           665             
 
Like in the USA, in Australia the overall numbers on HDBS are relatively 
small, as they comprise only a few percent of all offenders (Henderson, 2006; 
Ross & Allard, 2001).    
 
4.2.3 Ideologies of supervision on HDBS 
 
As Australia followed the USA in setting up its own HDBS it was in a position 
to firstly assess HDBS’ ideological strengths and weaknesses and then 
implement HDBS with components that were most likely to be suitable and 
                                                 
116
 In Australia, unlike in the USA, offender numbers on HDBS are usually presented ‘at any 
one time.’ When this figure is compared to the yearly figure, the ‘at any one time’ figure is 
usually doubled or tripled as relatively short orders in duration of a few months are typically 
imposed (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006).    
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effective for the Australian sentencing landscape. The USA’s mode of 
supervising offenders on HDBS with RF being primarily based on strict 
offender punishment and surveillance was highly criticised by prominent 
scholars while the establishment of these sanctions was under consideration 
in Australia. They argued that if USA’s ideology of offender supervision on 
HDBS with RF was introduced it would simply leave offenders intensely under 
the control and surveillance without any chance of changing their behavior 
(Lay, 1988a; Fox, 1987b). Fox (1987b:83) eloquently summarised this in the 
following terms: 
 
There is reason to be anxious that the supervision of an offender in 
the community is being shifted from an individual-based program 
designed to meet and deal with the offenders’ particular needs in the 
community, to one of remote impersonal surveillance, 
superintendence and discipline in the person’s own home under 
conditions emulating a prison environment without providing 
adequate supportive services.  
 
(Fox, 1987b:83)  
 
Australian scholars were also critical of the USA’s concentration on the 
punitive and control components of HDBS with RF that seemed to simply 
reflect the popular emphasis on community protection rather than offender 
rehabilitation. Control and surveillance seemed to therefore assume a 
dominant role in order to satisfy the public’s demand for punishing offenders 
(Roeger, 1988). 
 
As a result, King (1991) argued that HDBS with RF in Australia should contain 
elements both of close surveillance and monitoring as well as treatment and 
rehabilitation. This is because controlling offender risk as well as reducing 
that risk are equally necessary in their management: 
 
 Risk control is achieved by the imposition of various correctional 
department’ surveillance enhancing mechanisms such as electronic 
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monitoring, urine analysis, breathalyser tests and intensive 
supervision. These mechanisms have a deterrent effect on the 
offender – if they breach their order conditions they know they will be 
caught (King, 1991).  
 
 Risk reduction occurs by creating provisions for offender rehabilitation. 
It more broadly involves correctional administrators contributing to 
social policy development and ensuring that offenders have access to 
community services. More specifically, it includes the establishment of 
treatment programs in accordance with particular offenders’ needs. 
These are usually substance abuse programs, adult literacy programs 
and employment training (King, 1991). 
 
So, the key issue with simply controlling offender risk on HDBS with RF, as 
some jurisdictions in the USA have done, is that the emphasis is simply on 
catching offenders should they fail to comply with order conditions and/or 
commit further offences. The counterbalance that is missing is risk reduction, 
which contains elements that provide offenders with actual strategies to 
reduce the likelihood of their non-compliance and/or further offending (King, 
1991).  
 
Taking on board the ideological criticisms of USA’s HDBS with RF, Australian 
legislators introduced HDBS with RF that are mostly based on a strict and 
close surveillance and monitoring regime (like in the USA) but also contain 
rehabilitative treatment components as a part of case management (unlike in 
the USA). Unlike the USA, Australia did not have more specific modes of 
offender supervision. (For more information see Chapter 3.2.3).  
 
Surveillance and monitoring measures in Australian HDBS with RF have 
typically encompassed electronic monitoring, a few face-to-face visits per 
week, random ‘drive-by’ contacts and phone calls, as well as urinalysis and 
breath testing (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Melbourne Centre for Criminological 
Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Studerus, 1997; 
Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991; Dorey, 1986). Treatment and rehabilitative 
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initiatives have been plentiful and offenders’ participation has been dependent 
on their problems, their criminogenic needs and other goals. Initiatives have 
been determined on the basis of individualised case management, which is 
able to respond to offenders’ changing circumstances and is said to increase 
the chance of breaking the cycle of criminal offending (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Owston, 1991; Dorey, 1988).  
 
It should also be noted that offender supervision supporting offender 
treatment and rehabilitation has been particularly employed in back-end 
HDBS with RF in Australia (Queensland, South Australia and Victoria). This is 
through the application of case management principles that specifically 
encourage both offenders and their co-residents to engage in pro-social 
activities and lifestyle (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Heath, 1996). Furthermore, while 
supervising officers are typically liaising with offenders’ families, they are also 
in dialogue with offender support agencies with the objective of successfully 
reintegrating them back into the wider community (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Heath, 
1996). 
 
A comprehensive Benchmarking Study of HDBS with RF in Australia and 
New Zealand by Henderson (2006) confirmed that, decades after the 
introduction of HDBS with RF, supervising officers still regarded a mix of 
surveillance monitoring mechanisms and rehabilitative provisions imposed 
through case management practices as critical components of effective 
HDBS with RF. In particular, they outlined:  
 
 an intensive case management approach combining (monitoring/supervision 
with guidance/counseling) 
 an effective case management approach based on one to one personal 
contact and  
 ensuring ‘a constructive day’ through work or other activities.  
(Henderson, 2006:53) 
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Henderson’s (2006) findings contradict South Australia’s findings where 
correctional officers supervising those on HDBS with RF were usually not 
clear about what constitutes case management and even if they were clear 
they generally do not apply its principles consistently (Department for 
Correctional Service, 2006; Winton, 1999). South Australia’s findings are not 
surprising as the main clientele on HDBS with RF in South Australia are 
bailees, who arguably should not be case managed as they are awaiting trial 
and have not yet been convicted of any criminal offences (Department for 
Correctional Service, 2006). 
 
The ideology of punishment for offenders on HDBS with GPS seems to be 
very similarly based on HDBS with RF, that is, it typically contains aspects of 
both strict surveillance and monitoring as well as rehabilitative initiatives 
(Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Edgely, 2007). 
 
It is not surprising that international best practice has continually documented 
the importance of integrating rehabilitative provisions based on individual 
case planning which match assessed risks/needs to services, and case 
management of offenders which provides appropriate levels and types of 
support to address those risks/needs (Henderson, 2006). 
 
4.3 Late phase of HDBS - Assessment of outcomes (1982-2013) 
 
This section discusses the outcomes of the currently operational late phase of 
HDBS in Australia. These outcomes are chronologically described over last 
three decades almost exclusively in relation to HDBS with RF. No Australian 
studies have yet comprehensively assessed the outcomes of HDBS with 
GPS. This is possibly because there was very limited critical discourse about 
the introduction of HDBS with GPS in the public arena and for that reason 
there were probably no immediate plans to evaluate their application. 
Australian legislators probably relied on the USA literature, which had over a 
decade of experimentation with HDBS with GPS, yielding very positive 
operational results. This is nevertheless troublesome, as the use of HDBS 
with GPS must be assessed within the unique Australian context. 
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The outcomes are presented under 4 sub-themes - operational results, ethical 
issues and dilemmas, legal issues and dilemmas and political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas. Whilst the arguments presented under 
operational results are mostly based on actual figures, the analysis presented 
under ethical, legal and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas is 
somewhat broader and less tangible.   
 
4.3.1 Operational results  
 
The Operational results are presented under 4 points. The first broadly 
examines whether HDBS have widened the net or reduced prison crowding. 
The second analyses the effect of HDBS’ technical violation rates on prison 
crowding. The third investigates the effect of HDBS’ recidivism rates on prison 
crowding. The fourth discusses whether HDBS have generally reduced the 
cost of corrections. These points were determined to be pivotal in discussing 
the operational results of HDBS because they either formed the rationale for 
their establishment or were generally considered to be important by 
corrections departments.  
 
4.3.1.1 Have HDBS widened the net or reduced prison 
overcrowding?   
 
The driving force behind the establishment of HDBS with RF in Australia was 
the belief that these sanctions would alleviate overcrowding in prisons (Smith 
& Gibbs, 2013:82). All HDBS with RF shared this aim117 (NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Owston, 1991; Bloor, 1988; Dorey, 
1988). This aim was to be achieved by diverting lower-risk prison-bound 
                                                 
117
 It is worth noting that, although Victoria operated HDBS with RF as an alternative to 
imprisonment from 2004 to 2010, State Parliament amended the law in 2010 for it to operate 
as a sanction in its own right. This radical step was considered pertinent in an election year 
due to the popularity of the opposition’s ‘get tough on crime agenda’ that encompassed the 
abolition of HDBS with RF (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011:4-5). HDBS with 
RF was nevertheless abolished in late 2010 by the incoming conservative coalition 
government (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; Sentencing Advisory Council, 
2008). 
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offenders at either front-end or the back-end from incarceration 
(Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; NSW Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006; Challinger, 1994b). It was anticipated that the 
offender pool for diversion from prison would be substantial (Owston, 1991). 
  
As mentioned earlier, it is considered to be quite problematic if the net of 
social control widens when alternatives to imprisonment are misapplied as a 
replacement for more lenient sanctions. This is because if net widening 
occurs, then HDBS with RF increase both the prison population and the 
corrections budget (Meyer, 2004; Wagner & Baird, 1993). Fox (1987b) was 
one of the first Australian scholars to warn about the possibility of net 
widening on the basis of past experience with community based alternatives 
to imprisonment:   
  
when a non-or semi-custodial sanction is supposed to be available 
only on the basis that it is a humane and mitigated version of 
imprisonment, there is an inexorable tendency to make use of it 
when, in truth, there is not a real likelihood of immediate 
imprisonment at all. This can be easily tested by seeing what 
happens when the order is breached, or when the offender refuses to 
consent to it for some personal reason. They should be sent straight 
to prison. They are not in a significant number of cases.  
 
(Fox, 1987b:80) 
 
Australian evaluations conducted in the 1980s which explored whether HDBS 
with RF had reduced prison overcrowding all indicated that actual diversion 
from prison was occurring (Owston, 1991; Dorey, 1988). Furthermore, these 
evaluations indicated that while offender numbers on inaugural HDBS with RF 
were adequate, the longer-term prospects entailed substantial growth in 
offender numbers on these sanctions (Owston, 1991; Bloor, 1988). To 
facilitate this, many states relaxed the eligibility criteria of HDBS with RF, 
hoping that increased offender numbers on these sanctions would thereby 
substantially reduce prison overcrowding (Bloor, 1988).  
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During the 1990s one study, which analysed whether net widening was 
occurring when HDBS with RF was imposed, was undertaken in New South 
Wales. Specifically, a statistical exercise was conducted using the Judicial 
Information Research System (JIRS). It reported that the “large majority of the 
sentences handed down were within acceptable sentencing parameters for 
each particular offence type” (Heggie, 1999:117). This finding that no net 
widening was related to front-end HDBS with RF, which is typically much 
more susceptible to net widening than back-end HDBS with RF, is considered 
to be significant (for more information see Clear, 1997; Clear & Hardyman, 
1990; Tonry, 1990; Erwin, 1987). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, unlike in 
the USA, Australian criminologists did not critique the validity of the officially 
reported findings that HDBS with RF did not result in net widening but in fact 
reduced prison crowding. The lack of interest may have been due to no 
anticipation that untrue prison diversion was occurring. Furthermore, unlike in 
the USA, in Australia there were no government sponsored large-scale critical 
evaluations of already established HDBS with RF. 
 
Since 2000 there have not been any specific studies assessing whether 
HDBS with RF has widened the net or reduced prison overcrowding. 
Nevertheless, government issued reports and sponsored studies generally 
stated that HDBS with RF lower the prison population as they operate as 
alternatives to incarceration (Provan, 2007; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). Offender numbers on HDBS 
with RF have however typically been “too small to exert a significant 
downward influence on prison numbers” (Ross & Allard, 2001:6). This is 
despite the early expectation that offender numbers on HDBS with RF 
throughout Australia would grow considerably thereby substantially reducing 
prison crowding (Smith & Gibbs, 2013:85). George (2006:88) has however 
argued that “whether HDBS with RF reduce prison numbers is unclear and 
extremely difficult to assess.” This uncertainty was based on the continued 
rise of the prison population across Australia (George, 2006; Black & Smith, 
2003). Hence, no concrete evidence has been presented to counteract the 
claim that HDBS with RF reduce prison crowding to date.  
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The recently implemented HDBS with GPS however do not aim to reduce 
prison overcrowding. Instead serious sex and violent offenders are placed 
onto extend supervision via HDBS with GPS to increase public safety with 
little concern about the net widening effect. Prior to the establishment of 
extended supervision HDBS with GPS these offenders would have been 
released into the community following their prison sentence or they would 
have been on basic parole (for more information see Smith & Gibbs, 2013; 
Edgely, 2007). The lack of concern about the net widening was the result of 
legislative amendments to address the culture of fear and moral panic in the 
community that surrounds sex offenders’ release from prison (Szego, 
18.04.05).  
 
4.3.1.2 What has been the effect of HDBS technical violation rates on 
prison crowding?  
 
Over the last three decades the rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF 
throughout Australia have varied between 2 and 25% (Achterstraat, 2010; 
Community Based Services Directorate, 1999; Heggie, 1999; Heath, 1996; 
Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991; Roeger, 1988; Dick et al., 1986). As these 
rates have been considered to be low, they have not been regarded as 
contributing to prison crowding (Achterstraat, 2010). The technical violations 
of HDBS with RF have been low due to appropriate funding provisions, which 
have permitted small offender caseloads and individual case management, as 
well as various rehabilitative initiatives (Heath, 1996; Dorey, 1988).  
 
In the 1980s, the rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF throughout 
Australia varied between 4 and 15% (Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991; 
Roeger, 1988; Dick et al., 1986). These rates were particularly low because 
the states that implemented initial HDBS with RF such as Queensland and 
South Australia had fairly overcrowded prisons. As a result, it was relatively 
easy for them to ‘hand pick’ small numbers of ‘likely to be compliant’ 
offenders for placement on pilot HDBS with RF (Bloor, 1988; Dorey, 1988). 
After the ‘Hawthorne effect’ during the 1990s it was expected that the rates of 
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technical violations on HDBS with RF would increase (for more information 
see Lilly et al., 1993). 
 
As anticipated, technical violation rates of HDBS with RF during the 1990s 
increased to a range of between 15 and 20% (Community Based Services 
Directorate, 1999; Heggie, 1999; Heath, 1996). This increase in technical 
violations probably occurred because numbers on HDBS with RF increased 
and offenders were no longer ‘hand picked’ for participation. Nevertheless, 
the increase in technical violations was not significant (unlike in the USA) 
probably because HDBS with RF in Australia continued to encompass 
individual case management and rehabilitative provisions (Henderson, 2006; 
Heath, 1996).   
 
Since 2000, technical violations of HDBS with RF technology throughout 
Australia ranged between 2 and 25%, but have mostly been around the 20% 
(Achterstraat, 2010; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). 
Technical violations of HDBS with RF over the last three decades have 
generally continued to increase throughout the country. Interestingly, actual 
technical violation rates have been directly associated with the number of 
offenders on the HDBS with RF – the smaller the number of offenders on the 
HDBS with RF – the smaller the breach rate. For example, in Victoria in 2008-
09 the average number of offenders was 32 and the breach rate was 2%. The 
larger the number of offenders on the HDBS with RF, the larger the breach 
rate. For example, in South Australia in 2008-09 the average number of 
offenders was 423 and the breach rate was 25%) (Achterstraat, 2010). This is 
probably because HDBS with RF that have more substantial offender 
numbers are unlikely to ‘hand pick’ offenders for participation on these 
sanctions, and their offender eligibility criteria is more relaxed. The overall 
technical violation rates of HDBS with RF however have not increased 
substantially, because these sanctions still entail individual case management 
and rehabilitative provisions, and are therefore resource intensive.   
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4.3.1.3 What has been the effect of HDBS recidivism rates on prison 
crowding? 
 
Since HDBS with RF were initiated in Australia, follow-up re-offending rates 
have varied between 0 and 12% (NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation 
for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Heath, 1996; Roeger, 1988; Dick et al., 1986). 
As these have been considered to be low, they have not been regarded as 
contributing to prison crowding (Achterstraat, 2010). These rates have 
probably been low because, unlike in the USA, HDBS with RF in Australia 
encompass adequate rehabilitative services, which have seemed to positively 
impact on recidivism rates.  
 
During the 1980s, follow up recidivism rates of offenders on HDBS with RF 
were reported to range between 0 and 9% (Heath, 1996; Roeger, 1988; Dick 
et al., 1986). This was regarded to be very positive because it was 
substantially lower than post-release recidivism rates for other community 
based dispositions (for more information see Dick et al., 1986). The re-
offending rates were particularly low as offenders were carefully selected for 
participation on inaugural HDBS with RF. This meant that they were very 
likely to be low-risk and compliant (Dorey, 1988; Bloor, 1988). Again these 
offenders were also individually case managed and had access to various 
rehabilitative initiatives (Heath, 1996; Dorey, 1988).  
 
No evaluations in Australia during the 1990s analysed re-offending rates on 
HDBS with RF. However, it was expected that post the ‘Hawthorne effect’ the 
rates of technical violations on HDBS with RF would have increased during 
this time with a resultant increase in offenders returning to prison (for more 
information see Lilly et al., 1993). The increase would probably not have been 
substantial, as HDBS with RF as discussed above continued to entail 
individual case management and rehabilitative provisions.   
 
Since 2000, recidivism rates on HDBS with RF throughout Australia have 
ranged between 2 and 12% (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
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2006; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2006). Therefore, recidivism rates for HDBS with RF 
have continued to slightly increase throughout Australia over the last three 
decades. This is probably because offenders are no longer ‘hand picked’ for 
participation on these sanctions, and the offender eligibility criteria is more 
relaxed. Again the recidivism rates of HDBS with RF have not grown 
substantially because these sanctions still encompass individual case 
management and rehabilitative provisions.   
 
HDBS with RF’s recidivism rate of between 2 and 12% is generally compared 
to the recidivism rate of 50% for offenders released from prison, and 26% for 
offenders on other community based dispositions (Sentencing Advisory 
Council, 2008). HDBS with RF are said to have a lower recidivism rate than 
prisons because they more effectively support reintegration and rehabilitation 
of offenders, thereby preparing them more adequately to adopt a pro-social 
lifestyle (Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008; NSW Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006). Furthermore, offenders on HDBS with RF are said to 
have a distinct offender profile as opposed to offenders on other community 
based penalties – these offenders are more likely to be low-risk, non-violent, 
better educated, employed and generally adopting a stable lifestyle, and 
hence less likely to reoffend (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011). 
Nevertheless, Achterstraar (2010) argued that it should be possible to further 
lower the reoffending rates of offenders on HDBS with RF by more intensively 
targeting rehabilitation programs to offenders as part of their individual case 
management and supervision.    
 
4.3.1.4 Have HDBS reduced the cost of corrections?   
 
Directly associated with the aim of relieving overcrowded prisons is the goal 
of saving government resources (NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006; Heath, 1996; Dorey, 1988; Dorey, 1986). Unlike in the USA, 
HDBS with RF have been considered to be cost effective in Australia over the 
last three decades. This is because rates of technical violations and net 
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widening have been relatively low, and the cost of their alternative, that is 
incarceration, has been quite expensive. 
 
In the late 1980s, evaluations of HDBS with RF reported significant cost 
savings for correctional departments who had implemented these sanctions. 
The actual per offender per year cost of HDBS with RF substantially varied 
from state to state ranging from $3,200 per offender per year in Queensland 
to $17,000 per offender per year in South Australia. Further, a cost advantage 
for HDBS with RF over prison was generally reported to be between the ratio 
of 1:2.5 and 1:5 (Challinger, 1994b; Roeger, 1988; Dick et al., 1986). The 
discrepancy in the cost of HDBS with RF between the Australian states and 
territories is not surprising, as it is very similar to the variation in the cost of 
incarceration between the states and territories (Challinger, 1994b). 
 
Interestingly, however, Roeger (1988) warned that these are not ‘true savings’ 
but rather are ‘figurative savings’ – meaning that there had not been a 
significant reduction in prison expenditure – correctional budgets had in fact 
continually increased. It should be noted that it is highly likely that if HDBS 
with RF were not introduced correctional budgets would have increased even 
further. This is because all of these offenders (due to no net widening) would 
have been in prison instead of HDBS with RF. The evaluations however 
pointed out the broader, not easily quantifiable, positives of HDBS with RF. 
These included the fact that the social and psychologically debilitating effects 
of imprisonment are avoided/reduced when an offender is on HDBS with RF. 
Further, many offenders gain employment while on HDBS with RF which 
means that their family is no longer dependent on welfare benefits (Roeger, 
1988). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these evaluations omitted to add 
into their cost estimates the cost, although minor, of processing HDBS with 
RF’s technical violators and recidivists.  
 
During the 1990s, studies revealed comparable findings. More specifically, 
HDBS with RF were reported to cost between $10,000 (in South Australia) 
and $17,520 (in New South Wales) per offender per year (Heggie, 1999; 
Winton, 1999; Heath, 1996). When these costs were compared to the cost of 
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incarceration in both states, HDBS with RF were said to yield a general 
saving of 1:3 ratio in comparison with incarceration. The cost in New South 
Wales was produced as a part of an evaluation of pilot HDBS with RF. As 
such, it was projected that in the future the cost of HDBS with RF when 
operating at or near capacity would decrease to $12,775 per offender per 
year (Heggie, 1999). It should be noted that instead the cost of HDBS with RF 
in New South Wales to date has continued to slightly increase (Achterstraat, 
2010; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). This is probably 
because the optimal offender number on HDBS with RF has still not been 
reached, but has in fact continued to decrease over the last decade 
(Achterstraat, 2010). (For more information see section 4.2.2.2). 
 
Winton (1999) however, similarly to Roeger (1988), cautioned that diversion 
from prison to HDBS with RF does not result in a lump sum saving to 
corrections. As he explained:  
 
the transfer of a single prisoner from a custodial environment to 
[HDBS with RF] does not produce a saving of the difference between 
the annual  cost of imprisonment and the annual cost of home  
detention. Up to 90% of the costs of maintaining a prisoner in custody 
are essentially fixed for small changes in prisoner numbers. These 
costs include the shared staff supervision costs for a prison unit, 
administrative costs, energy and other building related costs. All of 
these costs are still incurred if there are a small number of empty 
beds in a unit. In the long run, a sustained reduction in prisoner 
numbers can create opportunities for the closure of units and 
additional savings. 
 
(Winton, 1999:17) 
 
The evaluations once again reiterated that “the exact costs of [HDBS with RF] 
remain unknown” (Heath, 1996:35). This is because cost is typically 
calculated on a direct basis excluding the costs and savings of other related 
agencies such as welfare, police and courts, and more broadly the family, 
victims and community at many different levels (Heath, 1996). If all of these 
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costs and savings were included it is highly likely that they would indicate 
substantial cost benefits of HDBS with RF. These savings would however be 
somewhat offset if the costs of processing HDBS with RF’s technical violators 
and recidivists were also included in the overall cost analysis. 
 
Studies conducted since 2000 assessing the cost of HDBS with RF have 
once again indicated similar findings. HDBS with RF in New South Wales was 
estimated to cost around $20,000 per offender per year, whereas HDBS with 
RF in Victoria was calculated to cost $48,000 per offender per year 
(Achterstraat, 2010; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on Law 
and Justice, 2006). This cost of HDBS with RF in New South Wales and 
Victoria is not inclusive of the costs associated with the processing of HDBS 
with RF’s technical violators and recidivists (although these are probably 
minor). The Victorian figure however is more expensive than any other 
previously provided. This is because it was based on a relatively recent 
evaluation of a pilot HDBS with RF, which is usually higher than the 
operational cost of an established HDBS with RF. Further, this HDBS with RF 
only attracted less than one third of the expected caseload during the pilot 
period, and as such its per offender per year cost was substantially higher 
than anticipated. It was predicted that the cost per offender per year would 
substantially reduce once HDBS with RF was established as a permanent 
sentence and the number of offenders on the order grew. This HDBS with RF 
also uniquely specified a strong emphasis on case management, which could 
have somewhat contributed to its high cost (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria 2006). 
 
Although these figures are substantially higher than the figures reported in 
earlier decades, they are still much lower than the cost of incarceration, which 
has also continued to increase and is calculated at $68,255 per prisoner per 
year (in New South Wales) and $83,200 per prisoner per year (in Victoria) 
(Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2006). When the cost of HDBS with RF is compared to 
incarceration the HDBS with RF’s cost advantage is said to be between the 
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ratio of 1:1.8 and 1:3 (Achterstraat, 2010; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006). 
George (2006), an outspoken opponent of HDBS with RF, has however 
contentiously maintained that the cost of HDBS with RF should be compared 
to other community-based dispositions, rather than imprisonment. This is 
because she has argued that “if a person is ‘safe enough’ to be in their home 
they are ‘safe enough’ to be in the community” (cited in Parliamentary Library 
Research Service, 2011:7-8). 
 
The evaluations since the turn of the century have also specified a number of 
HDBS with RF’s outcomes to which a monetary value cannot be assigned. 
These include: reduced parole breach rates, reduced cost of crime (due to 
reduced recidivism), improved employment outcomes (offenders on HDBS 
with RF were more likely to find employment than those released from prison) 
and improved family outcomes (Achterstraat, 2010; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). Achterstraat (2010) has 
argued that governments around Australia could achieve various savings if 
they expand HDBS with RF. He also ascertained that the costs associated 
with HDBS with RF would further reduce with the expansion of these 
sanctions, but these should not be at the cost of their integrity.  
 
The placement of serious sex-offenders on extended supervision HDBS with 
GPS to increase public safety has widened the net of social control and as a 
result increased correctional outlays. The ‘moral panic’ that has surrounded 
sex offenders has meant that the concern for public safety has outweighed 
any concerns about increased spending (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Edgely, 2007). 
As mentioned earlier, these offenders would previously have either been 
released into the community following imprisonment or have received a 
parole period.  
 
 
235 
 
4.3.2 Ethical issues and dilemmas  
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas are presented under 4 points. Initially, there is a 
broad philosophical discussion about whether HDBS are a part of a 
surveillance-oriented Orwellian society. This is followed by a more specific 
analysis on whether there is discrimination in the selection process for HDBS, 
whether punishment on HDBS varies between offenders, and whether HDBS 
punishment spills over into the lives of offenders’ co-residing family members.  
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas are generally presented in relation to mostly 
HDBS with RF. This is due to the considerable volume of studies which have 
explored the ethical issues and dilemmas of HDBS with RF and the lack of 
studies that have assessed these issues and dilemmas in relation to HDBS 
with GPS. In particular, there are gaps in research exploring whether there is 
discrimination in the selection process for HDBS with GPS, whether 
punishment on HDBS with GPS varies between offenders, and whether 
punishment on HDBS with GPS spills over into the lives of offenders’ co-
residing family members. It is possible that this is because HDBS with GPS 
are structurally less discriminatory during the selection process, they do not 
confine offenders to their homes for prolonged periods of time, and the 
punishment of offenders on these sanctions is therefore probably not as 
diversified and has substantially less impact on their co-residents in 
comparison with HDBS with RF (Martinovic & Schluter, 2012; Alarid et al., 
2008; Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the lack of research 
is troublesome and future research is imperative.  
 
4.3.2.1 Are HDBS part of a surveillance-oriented Orwellian society? 
 
While no Australian researchers have specifically engaged in the debate 
about whether HDBS are a part of governments’ movement towards a 
surveillance-oriented Orwellian society, they have continually discussed the 
broader ethical implications of HDBS. It was only Fox (2001) who explored 
the applicability of Orwell’s surveillance-oriented society to the general way in 
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which society in the present day functions, not the imposition of HDBS with 
RF as such. He concluded that state centered surveillance, as argued by 
Orwell, is only operational in former eastern block countries (Fox, 2001). In 
capitalist societies, on the other hand, surveillance is conducted by both the 
public and private sectors for their own separate purposes. Even though the 
information collected is subject to the risks of error and abuse, the community 
has not regarded this to be oppressive ‘Big Brother’ watching. Fox (2001) 
explained that this was because surveillance is less visible, as well as being 
generally consensual, diffuse and benign, and therefore not considered to 
systematically undermine personal freedom and individual privacy. 
 
In the 1980s, Fox (1987a, 1987b) initiated a theoretical discussion about the 
ethical issues related to HDBS with RF. He argued that the imposition of 
these sanctions means that homes in practice were being converted into 
prisons with the discipline of imprisonment being dispersed into people’s 
homes (Fox, 1987b). At home, he ascertained that electronic monitoring is 
both physically and psychologically invasive to the wearer – physically as the 
device is attached to the person and – psychologically as self discipline is 
required to endure the strict monitoring. He further contended that being on 
HDBS with RF is more onerous than incarceration (Fox, 1987a).   
 
Ellard (1988) added to the debate by accurately predicting that future 
electronic devices would be able to determine an offender’s location at any 
given time and correlate that information with other offenders’ movements as 
well as crimes. While he argued that this would be plausible for crime 
detection, he maintained that it was quite problematic that the offender pool 
for monitoring could be potentially extremely wide. Furthermore, he 
provocatively asked “why stop there?” – perhaps all crime could be prevented 
if all people at birth were equipped with an electronically monitored device 
(Ellard, 1988:24). The basic argument was therefore that the government, 
with the ‘right’ arguments, could turn the entire society into a controlled 
institution (Ellard, 1988).  
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The actual utilisation of ‘home’ as a place of confinement on HDBS with RF 
has been vigorously criticised by Australian authors such as George, (2006), 
Fisher (1995) and Aungles (1994). It was argued that that HDBS with RF 
impose a real threat to the sanctity of home, which had “over time … become 
a place of sanctuary, symbolising the dignity and freedom of the individual 
despite their social status” (Fisher, 1994:15). When HDBS with RF are 
imposed the ‘private domestic family sphere’ becomes the location for penal 
reform, blurring the boundaries of social control and social relations (George, 
2006; Aungles, 1994; Fisher, 1994). 
 
In Australia academic interest in critically exploring broader ethical issues of 
HDBS with RF has not abated like in the USA, but has continued since the 
turn of the century. Black and Smith (2003), in a special publication of Trends 
and Issues titled ‘Electronic monitoring in the criminal justice system’ 
published by the Australian Institute of Criminology, argued that there are 
many ethical issues with electronic monitoring that have not yet been 
resolved despite the fact that the technology had been in use for several 
decades (Black & Smith, 2003). They illustrated this through posing a number 
of pertinent ethical questions for which protections under the law were non-
existent. These included: 
 
Is the use of force acceptable when attaching a device? Should 
surgically implanted devices ever be appropriate? If the offender is 
subject to a curfew, should authorities have any right to track his or 
her movements outside curfew hours? To what uses should 
information about the offender’s movements be put? ... Should the 
general legal power to impose conditions be interpreted as authority 
to order electronic monitoring? This is currently the position in some 
Australian jurisdictions where electronic monitoring is used under the 
court’s general power to impose conditions on an individual. If that 
power is sufficient to require a person to wear a monitoring device, 
does it also authorise a court to compel an individual to submit to a 
surgically implanted device?   
 
(Black & Smith, 2003:5) 
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As HDBS with GPS had just permanently entered the correctional arena in 
the USA, and were under consideration in Australia, Black and Smith (2003) 
more specifically argued that the application of this surveillance had the 
unprecedented potential to create over-regulation and infringement of human 
rights. They therefore considered it to be imperative for policies to be enacted 
to ensure that the information gathered is used in the most productive and 
ethical way, and that clear procedures are established for unethical or illegal 
uses of that information (Black & Smith, 2003). 
 
Black and Smith (2003) concluded by presenting a case that there should be 
specific legislation governing the application of electronic monitoring. They 
even suggested that this be done at the national level under Commonwealth 
Government’s constitutional powers over “telegraphic, telephonic, and other 
like services” (s. 51(v) of the Australian Constitution) (Black & Smith, 2003:5). 
This was considered to be essential, despite the existing guidelines for the 
implementation of home detention and electronic monitoring, which state that 
offenders “should be subject to the minimum level of supervision necessary 
and that the use of monitoring devices should be unobtrusive and clearly 
explained to offenders” (Black & Smith, 2003:5). The issue with these is that 
they are not enforceable, although they were endorsed and published by the 
Corrective Services Ministers’ Conference (1996). 
 
Specific exploration of wider ethical implications of tracking offenders’ 
movements through HDBS with GPS was conducted by Michael et al. (2006). 
They agreed with earlier reports that there are many problematic ethical 
implications of these sanctions, as well as an absence of stringent ethical 
safeguards for those who are tracked. They also suggested that policy 
makers establish comprehensive procedures to ensure the ethical treatment 
of offenders on these sanctions (Michael et al., 2006). More specifically, 
tracking of serious offenders on extended supervision HDBS with GPS 
resulted in ethical as well as unethical aspects. Ethical aspects included that it 
may prevent crimes from occurring, and it controls and rehabilitates. 
However, it is considered unethical that monitoring could be imposed on 
offenders who were unlikely to re-offend (Michael et al., 2006).   
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Most recently, Smith and Gibbs (2013) repeated the ethical concerns that 
were presented earlier by Black and Smith (2003). The application of 
electronic monitoring has arguably continued to raise serious civil liberty 
concerns and a range of other ethical issues. This is because the abundance 
of information that can be collected and the resultant potential for misuse that 
could infringe human rights. Policies, which are still unavailable despite earlier 
recommendations, are considered to be essential to ensure the ethical use of 
the application of electronic monitoring and data collected (Smith & Gibbs, 
2013). Interestingly, the concerns expressed by Australian researchers about 
these potential misuses have not appeared in the USA literature. 
 
4.3.2.2 Does the selection process for HDBS discriminate against 
offenders with certain characteristics?  
 
A more specific ethical issue and dilemma is whether the correctional 
selection process for HDBS discriminates against offenders with certain 
characteristics. Offenders should be selected for HDBS according to their 
statistical risk-and-needs-analysis, which considers factors such as their 
criminal history, substance abuse and interpersonal relations (Henderson, 
2006; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice 
2006; Heggie, 1999). In contrast, discrimination occurs if a decision 
(recommending for or against placement on a HDBS) is based on other 
factors such as an offender’s gender, race or economic status.  
 
It is important to note that offenders on HDBS with RF throughout Australia, 
unlike in the USA, have never been required to financially contribute to any 
direct sanction-related expenses such as supervisory fees and drug/alcohol 
testing (George, 2006; Fox, 1987b). Offenders on HDBS with RF in Australia, 
like in the USA, have however been required to maintain their ‘suitable 
residence’ with electricity and a telephone, provide for their own basic human 
needs, and pay to travel to various sanction-requirements such as community 
work and rehabilitative treatment. George (2006:81) nevertheless considers 
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this to be “bearing the cost of running the home prison,” which, she argues, is 
usually done by the entire family. (For more information see section 4.3.2.4).   
 
Like in the USA during the 1980s there was no investigation in Australia about 
whether discrimination occurred during the selection process for HDBS with 
RF. During the 1990s and 2000s a number of studies discussed this issue. 
These studies generally confirmed an earlier concern that HDBS with RF 
would be more readily available for middle-and-upper-class offenders than 
lower-class offenders (Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008; Success Works, 
2007; George, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1995). While offenders’ 
economic status was not directly considered during the selection process for 
HDBS with RF, three specific selection determinants inadvertently considered 
it. These included offenders’ requirement to reside in an area within the 
state/territory where the HDBS with RF is operational, residing in a suitable 
home, and maintaining a telephone.  
 
The most basic requirement that offenders reside in an area within the 
state/territory where the HDBS with RF is operational was determined to be 
potentially discriminatory (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006; Heggie, 1999; Heath, 1996). This is because some offenders are 
excluded from HDBS with RF simply because they are able to reside only in 
rural or remote areas, usually due to living in Aboriginal communities and/or 
not being able to move for financial reasons to metropolitan areas where the 
HDBS with RF is operational. The fact that Aboriginal people are much more 
likely than non-Aboriginal people to reside in communities that are situated in 
rural and remote areas of Australia, where there has traditionally been a lack 
of availability of HDBS with RF, has meant that Aboriginal people have been 
more likely to be discriminated against (NSW Standing Committee on Law 
and Justice, 2006). 
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Another requirement that offenders have a ‘suitable home’ was determined to 
be potentially discriminatory118 (George, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006; Moyle, 1993/94). This is because some offenders are 
excluded from HDBS with RF because they are indigent, that is, unable to 
afford to reside in a ‘suitable home.’ Similarly to the USA, in Australia the lack 
of appropriate housing has been an ongoing issue for offenders, particularly 
women, and many are precluded from participating on HDBS with RF 
because of this (George, 2006; Baldry, 2005). It is also worth noting that 
Aboriginal offenders are particularly disadvantaged by the strict definition of 
‘home’ as “it may not fit the concept of home within the Aboriginal 
communities” (Heggie, 1999:98). This is the case if they reside in wider 
settlements called outstations119 (for more information see NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Moyle, 1993/94).  
 
Offenders’ co-residents over the age of 18 (if there are any) also must 
consent with their placement on the HDBS with RF, that is, sign a ‘contract’ 
agreeing to cooperate with its requirements (Heggie, 1999; NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Moyle, 1993/94). This is a potential 
issue because offenders are dependent on their co-residents being prepared 
to accept the imposition of onerous conditions of HDBS with RF within their 
living space. If they do not agree, and the offender cannot afford to move to 
another suitable residence, then they are not placed on the HDBS with RF 
and thus are discriminated against. This requirement is also particularly 
problematic for Aboriginal spouses as well as wider family members as there 
is substantial pressure on them to accept the responsibility due to a strong 
cultural expectation of hospitality. Hence, they may do so without necessarily 
understanding the implications that HDBS with RF will have on them (Moyle, 
1993/94).  
 
                                                 
118
 It should however be noted that Queensland’s HDBS with RF from commencement had 
provision that allowed offenders who lacked family/friends’ support to reside in an approved 
hostel or rehabilitation centre (Dorey, 1988). 
119
 An outstation is “a small number of houses on an area of land occupied by a family group 
remotely situated as a satellite to a larger community” (NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006:192). 
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Finally, the requirement that offenders maintain a telephone at their home 
was determined to be potentially inequitable (NSW Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006; Health, 1996; Bakermans, 1990; Vernon, 1987). The 
need for a telephone can pose serious obstacles for indigent offenders, as 
they may be required to pay the telephone installation fee, monthly service 
fee and prior outstanding accounts if there were any. 
 
The mandatory requirements of HDBS with RF are in reality more easily met 
by persons with some level of financial security and stability. Consequently, 
indigent offenders, particularly Aboriginals were possibly precluded from 
HDBS with RF as the selection criteria potentially discriminated against those 
who did not reside in an area within the state/territory where the HDBS with 
RF is operational, have a suitable home, and were unable to pay for 
telephone maintenance.  
 
Over the years many Australian jurisdictions have made specific attempts to 
reduce the inadvertent consideration of offender’s economic status that can 
result in discrimination during the selection process for HDBS with RF.  
          
HDBS with RF had become operational state/territory wide in most Australian 
states/territories. Western Australia (discontinued), Queensland  
(discontinued), Australian Capital Territory (discontinued), South Australia 
(ongoing), and the Northern Territory (ongoing) all operate/d HDBS with RF 
on a state/territory wide basis (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006; Heath, 1996). This was considered to be pertinent as the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Report recommended that all 
community based initiatives be made available in Aboriginal areas, 
particularly the ones that are situated in rural and remote areas (Heath, 
1996). 
 
Offenders on HDBS with RF in the remote areas of Australia usually have 
been supervised face-to-face without electronic monitoring, which was 
logistically impossible to operate in some terrain. Supervisors have been 
employed on a casual basis to impose surveillance on offenders within their 
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local community. In cases when an offender wants/needs to leave their 
community they phone the Regional Community Corrections Office which 
then recruits another suitable casual supervisor who monitors the offender 
traveling away from their community and ensures that surveillance is not 
compromised. Partnership arrangements are also arranged with local police 
agencies (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). This 
supervision model however presented challenges as in some communities it 
is easier and in others more difficult to recruit suitable supervisors (NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heath, 1996). 
 
On the other hand, HDBS with RF did not become operational statewide in 
Victoria, even though there was a plan for this to occur in 2011; this is 
because the incoming conservative coalition government instead 
discontinued HDBS with RF (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; 
Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008). In addition, statewide operation also has 
not to date occurred in New South Wales despite the recommendations on 
expanding it to all of the regions of the state. It seems that ongoing issues 
have been a lack of resources, that is staff required to monitor offenders and 
lack of availability of adequate electronic monitoring technology that is able to 
service rural and remote areas (Achterstraat, 2010; NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006).  
 
By flexibly defining Aboriginals’ homes during HDBS with RF, Aboriginals’ 
cultural difficulties have been partially recognised in two jurisdictions that 
have significant Aboriginal populations - Northern Territory and Queensland 
(NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Moyle, 1993/94). In the 
Northern Territory, as discussed above Aboriginal offenders residing in 
remote areas are confined to small community areas called ‘outstations’ 
instead of a dwelling (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). 
In Queensland, where the HDBS is now discontinued Aboriginal offenders 
were given the option to serve the HDBS with RF in a rehabilitation centre 
due to recognition that they frequently have problems with alcohol 
consumption and within their communities there is usually heavy alcohol 
consumption (for more information see Moyle, 1993/94).  
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In addition, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, before 
discontinuing their HDBS with RF, both recognised the need and explored the 
possibility of providing ‘supported accommodation’ for offenders who did not 
have a suitable residence (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006).  
 
While offenders on HDBS with RF have traditionally had to maintain a 
telephone at their home, suggestions have been made for the government to 
absorb this cost in justifiable circumstances. Furthermore, it has been 
recommended that strategies be implemented to prevent offenders from 
abusing access to the telephone. These included: 
  
 Easycall abbreviated dialing which only allows calls to numbers that are 
programmed into the telephone exchange at the Department’s request 
 Easycall call control which limits the amount of numbers that the offender is 
allowed to access to as few as three 
 In some exchanges an “In Contact” service allows incoming calls but restricts 
the customer to calling 000 or Telstra.  
 
(Heath, 1996:31) 
 
It was argued that specific cost implications should be further investigated in 
an effort to make eligibility for HDBS with RF more equitable (Heath, 1996). 
This however did not eventuate in any of the Australian states/territories.  
 
Although attempts have been made to make HDBS with RF less 
discriminatory, these sanctions are still not equally accessible to offenders 
regardless of their social status. HDBS with RF should be operational 
state/territory wide and in ‘deserving cases’ jurisdictions should have 
provisions to absorb the cost of offender’s accommodation (and relocation if 
necessary) and telephone installation and service. 
 
In addition, research assessing the claim that “home detention is a sentence 
with inherent class, gender and racial bias” (George, 2006:81) has reported 
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that an offender’s family status, age, gender, race and education do not in 
themselves determine their placement onto HDBS with RF. More specifically, 
studies have found that even though females, the racial majority and the 
better-educated offenders are more likely to be sentenced to HDBS with RF, 
this does not occur due to potential discrimination (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Heath, 1996). 
In fact HDBS with RF specifically target offenders who commit non-violent 
and non-serious crimes; these offenders are in fact more likely to be females, 
the racial majority and better-educated offenders (Heggie, 1999; Moyle, 
1993/94).  
 
4.3.2.3 Is punishment on HDBS varied?  
 
A related ethical issue and dilemma is whether being on HDBS results in a 
vastly diverse experience of punishment and therefore discriminates against 
offenders with certain characteristics. The research, which has only been 
undertaken in relation to HDBS with RF, has overwhelmingly indicated that 
offenders potentially experience drastically different experiences of 
punishment. This is primarily because offenders on these sanctions are 
confined to their homes where generally the nature of their environment and 
the quality of their interpersonal relationships are of great importance.120 Like 
the research in the USA, Australian research has also reported that offenders’ 
6 personal and social characteristics, which are explained below, seem to 
most profoundly determine their sanction experience. It should be noted that 
in this section information is presented thematically, rather than 
chronologically. This is because the findings over the last three decades of 
operation of HDBS are consistent.  
 
Gender – Australian research concurred with USA’ research by 
overwhelmingly arguing that women are particularly disadvantaged by the 
                                                 
120
 As already mentioned punishment on HDBS with GPS is probably not as diversified as 
offenders on these sanctions are not confined to their homes for prolonged periods of time.  
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imposition of HDBS with RF. This is mainly because they are much more 
likely than men to have sole parental responsibility/ties, without adequate 
support from other family members. The overall compliance with the 
requirements of HDBS with RF is hence particularly difficult for them (NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). Women also face particular 
challenges when no other adult is available to take their children out, as they 
have to deal with having them confined to the home (Sentencing Advisory 
Council, 2008; Heggie, 1999; Heggie, 1998). If they want assistance to take 
their children out, they usually have to reluctantly explain to their family/friends 
about being on the HDBS with RF (George, 2006).  
 
Race - Australian research has vigorously argued that the requirements of 
HDBS with RF generally ignore the special needs of Aboriginal (or other 
racial/ethnic minority) groups, and it is more difficult for them to comply with 
such sanctions (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Moyle, 
1993/94). More specifically, the fact that HDBS with RF confine offenders to 
their homes for prolonged periods of time is considered to be culturally 
inappropriate for Aboriginal offenders, as their strong kinship and familial ties 
with their community inevitably suffer (NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006). This is especially problematic as they are more culturally 
vulnerable to feel isolated in comparison with non-Aboriginal people (NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). Even in cases where 
Aboriginal offenders are confined to outstations, the environment in some of 
these communities is not conducive to being on HDBS with RF, as there may 
be overcrowding and heavy consumption of alcohol (Moyle, 1993/94). In 
addition, the strict planning ahead of all activities and adherence to time 
restraints, which are an intrinsic part of HSBS with RF, typically disadvantage 
Aboriginal people who usually lack organisational skills (Moyle, 1993/94). 
Despite the cultural issues, it has been recognised that HDBS with RF are 
better for Aboriginal offenders than incarceration (NSW Standing Committee 
on Law and Justice, 2006). 
 
Urban/rural residence - Offenders who reside in rural areas experience 
compliance with HDBS with RF to be more onerous compared to offenders 
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who live in urban areas. This is because these offenders are more likely to 
perceive being confined to their home as difficult due to feeling socially 
isolated from their very close contact with the wider community (NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Moyle, 1993/94). Offenders 
living in rural areas are also more likely to be generally disadvantaged and 
have less employment prospects in comparison with those residing in urban 
regions (Moyle, 1993/94).  
 
Employment status - Offenders who are unemployed generally find the HDBS 
with RF experience to be more difficult in comparison with those who are 
employed (George, 2006; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; Moyle, 1993/94). If they remain 
unemployed, providing that the conditions of the HDBS with RF permit it, 
boredom is an often reported issue (George, 2006; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005). 
Conversely, if they are unemployed and required to obtain employment or 
choose to obtain employment, the research has shown that it is particularly 
difficult and/or awkward for them to inform potential employers about being on 
the HDBS with RF. Often this resulted in potential employers being reluctant 
to employ them. In addition, it was difficult to find ‘suitable employment’ as 
many workplaces have variable worksites and are deemed to be inappropriate 
by supervising officers121 (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005).  
 
Financial situation - Offenders who are not financially stable experience the 
overall punitive effect of HDBS with RF to be more onerous. This is because 
they are likely to reside in a smaller living space such as a small flat in a 
public housing estate, where overcrowded conditions are rife. They are also 
likely to be receiving minimal income such as social security benefits and as 
such struggle to afford basic home-based entertainment to somewhat ease 
                                                 
121
 Variable work sites are not permitted on HDBS with RF because close and random 
supervision at work would not be possible (Church & Dunstan, 1997). On the other hand, 
HDBS with GPS have overcome this problem due to their ability to constantly monitor 
offender movement anywhere, and therefore there are no such employment-related 
restrictions (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). 
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the onerous HDBS with RF experience (George, 2006; Bagaric, 2002). 
Australian academics have been particularly scathing of HDBS with RF being 
served in individual homes, what George (2006:83) called “class-determined 
prisons,” as this infringes the principle of equality in the impact of sanctions. 
Consequently, they have argued that these sanctions structurally perpetuate 
the grossly unequal impacts on offenders with differing resources and 
sensitivities (Bagaric, 2002). The example which is often used to illustrate this 
point is that a financially stable offender may be confined to a mansion with 
access to a tennis court, swimming pool, garden, the latest computer 
technology and television networks, as well as be able to continue working in 
a highly paid job (George, 2006; Bagaric, 2002). 
 
Co-resident relationships - Offenders on HDBS with RF who are not 
supported by their co-residents122 find the experience to be more physically, 
emotionally and financially burdensome (George, 2006; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; 
Heggie, 1999). They are also more likely to feel bored and even isolated due 
to spending a prolonged period of time confined to their home (George, 2006).   
 
Therefore, females, racial minorities, those residing in rural areas, 
unemployed, not financially secure, and those without supportive co-resident 
relationships find HDBS with RF to be more onerous. The more of these 
characteristics an offender possesses, the more difficult the HDBS with RF 
seems to be for them.123 The extensively varied punishment experience, 
which is potentially inequitable and even discriminatory, is an ethical issue 
and dilemma that has not yet been recognised by the policy that guides the 
operation of HDBS with RF.  
 
Specific suggestions to address the inequality have been made, including 
allocating time provisions for females with childcare responsibility/ties, for 
                                                 
122
 As mentioned earlier, a caring and stable relationship with a family member or a friend 
who is not an offender’s co-resident could also reduce the punitive impact of the HDBS with 
RF on the offender. 
123
 However, this overall finding must be treated with caution because not all people conform 
to the group norms. 
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Aboriginal offenders to be supervised by local Aboriginal communities who 
are best placed to understand the sensitivity of their social and cultural 
aspects, and permitting offenders to work at variable worksites where their 
employers accept a supervising role during their work hours (Smith & Gibbs, 
2013; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2005; Heath, 1996; Moyle, 1993/94). A more general 
suggestion is amending the HDBS with RF policy to allow sentencing officials 
to undertake a detailed analysis of offenders’ personal and social 
characteristics, as well as their broader circumstances indicating whether they 
fit group norms; individually tailored conditions that are specifically punitive for 
each offender could then be imposed (Martinovic, 2004).  
 
4.3.2.4 Do HDBS punish offenders’ co-residents? 
 
The final ethical issue and dilemma discussed in this section is whether the 
punishment directed toward the offender on HDBS spills over into the lives of 
their co-residents. Investigating this is important as the overwhelming majority 
of offenders live with co-residing family members (George, 2006; Aungles, 
1995), and “the family domain essentially becomes the site of containment” 
(Aungles, 1994:66). The research, which is only existent in relation to HDBS 
with RF, has overwhelmingly shown that HDBS with RF have inadvertent 
punitive effects on offenders’ co-residing family members (Martinovic, 2004). 
HDBS with GPS probably have less punitive effects on offenders’ co-
residents as offenders are not confined to their homes for prolonged periods 
of time, and their co-residents are not disturbed by random home visits or 
phone calls any time which are usually an integral part of RF monitoring 
(Martinovic & Schluter, 2012; Alarid et al., 2008; Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et 
al., 2001; Church & Dunstan, 1997). This is ethically problematic as offenders’ 
co-residing family members have not committed any crimes.  
  
Similarly to the USA, when HDBS with RF were introduced in Australia in the 
mid-1980s they were depicted as ‘family friendly,’ with one of their most 
important advantages being the offender’s ability to avoid/reduce prison time 
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and be at home with their families (Butler, 2007; Heath, 1996; Dorey, 1988; 
Dorey, 1986). It is important to note that the offender’s ability to remain at 
home with their family has continued to be regarded as a major advantage of 
HDBS with RF (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Henderson, 2006). More specifically, “it 
was argued that HDBS with RF reduce the disruption to family life; minimise 
the deterioration of relationships between parents and children (particularly 
very young children); and provide an opportunity for offenders to strengthen 
relationships by spending quality time with family” (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005:4). 
 
Interestingly, however unlike in the USA where the co-residing family 
members’ role within the sanction’s experience was entirely ignored until the 
1990s, in Australia even the inaugural HDBS with RF during the 1980s 
required co-residents’ consent for the imposition of these sanctions (Butler, 
2007; Challinger, 1994b; Owston, 1991; Dorey, 1986). For example,  
 
The South Australian scheme initially asked the home ‘resident’ to 
sign a contract agreeing to accommodate the prisoner, to assist and 
encourage the prisoner to be of good behaviour, to abide by the 
conditions of the HDBS and to contact the supervisor without delay 
on any matters of concern involving the prisoner’s HDBS conditions.  
 
(Aungles, 1995:36) 
 
George (2006) has argued, however, that although co-residents who are 
usually women (as offenders on HDBS with RF are predominantly men) are 
asked for their ‘consent’ before a HDBS with RF is imposed, this does not 
constitute a ‘real choice’ for women. This is because women tend to put the 
needs of others ahead of their own, and they generally prefer their family 
member to be out of prison. Hence they may feel a sense of obligation to 
consent to the HDBS with RF within their living space. In her analysis, George 
(2006:84) further notes that:  
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The burden women are expected to consent to is agreeing to their 
home becoming prison, having a male partner trapped in the home 
for months, and being essential to both supporting compliance with 
and vigilance of [sanction’s] conditions.  
 
Residing with an offender on a HDBS with RF is therefore a much more 
onerous obligation than living with an offender on parole where they are not 
confined to the home and their supervision is undertaken by others (George, 
2006; Aungles, 1994). Another potentially problematic issue for co-residing 
family members is that they may experience subsequent vengeful behaviour if 
they object to the offender’s placement onto the HDBS with RF (Feiner, 
1987). 
 
Although no studies assessed the impacts of HDBS with RF on offenders’ co-
residing family members during the 1980s, a number of studies were 
conducted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. As in the previous chapter these 
have been classified together (due to complementary findings) into a five-
point typology of impacts endured by offenders’ co-residing family members. 
(For more information see Martinovic, 2007).  
 
Effects caused by feeling responsible to help the offender comply with the 
HDBS with RF. Research has indicated that co-residing family members are 
most likely to feel responsible to assist offenders with three explicit conditions 
of HDBS with RF; these include limited movements, monetary obligations, 
and exposure to temptations (George, 2006; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; 
Bagaric, 2002; Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994; Moyle, 1993/94). As mentioned 
earlier, these three areas of assistance have been chosen because they are 
considered to be mostly demanding by the offenders, and their co-residents 
are uniquely placed to offer their assistance with them. 
 
Limited movement is the most stringent condition of HDBS with RF for which 
co-residing family members feel most compelled to offer their assistance 
(Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
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Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; Heggie, 1999). Co-residing family 
members typically perform numerous duties outside the home on behalf of 
the offender (George, 2006). A co-residing family member illustrated this:   
  
I was pushed to the limit during my husband’s sentence. I had to hold 
down a job, do all the shopping, take the kids to school then take 
them to sport on Saturday… 
 
(Heggie, 1999:66)  
 
Even more problematic is that co-residing family members, usually women, 
also continue to conduct the majority of the unpaid domestic labour inside the 
home, including cooking, housekeeping and child rearing (George, 2006). 
Additional activities such as these typically result in co-residing family 
members reducing their social activities (Bagaric, 2002).   
 
Co-residing family members have reported feeling responsible to assist 
offenders with the monetary obligations of HDBS with RF by jointly making 
changes to their previous spending patterns (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heggie, 1999). For example, Heggie 
(1999) found that most families thought that there was decreased expenditure 
on relatively expensive goods and services (such as social activities outside 
the home, take-away foods, personal items, drugs and/or alcohol), and 
increased expenditure on relatively cheaper goods and services, including 
groceries, home entertainment and phone bills. 
 
Co-residing family members also revealed feeling accountable for reducing 
the offender’s temptations of leaving the household and returning to a non-
pro-social lifestyle while they are on the HDBS with RF.124 The Melbourne 
Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria 
(2005:6), reported that “co-residents acknowledged that they were not 
expected to alter their routines for the offender, but they still made efforts to 
                                                 
124
 As mentioned earlier, non-pro-social lifestyle may include drug use and/or alcohol 
consumption and not going to work, which all constitute breaches of HDBS with RF.  
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organise their lives around the HDBS with RF to ensue that the offender didn't 
feel lonely, left out or distressed in any way.” This burden of ensuring the 
offender remained at home ‘at ease’ is likely to result in co-residing family 
members restricting their social life (Melbourne Centre for Criminological 
Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; Bagaric, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, co-residing family members indicated feeling responsible to 
encourage the offender to resist the temptation of drug and alcohol use by 
themselves adopting a drug and alcohol free lifestyle. Interviews with 
offenders and their co-residents revealed that the “pressure placed on family 
to refrain from using drugs/alcohol [led] to an overall decrease in 
consumption” (Heggie, 1999:74-75).  
 
Effects caused by HDBS with RF’s indirectly applied facilitating control 
factors. As the confinement of offenders to their homes on these sanctions is 
ensured by random phone calls and physical visits throughout a 24-hour time 
period, offender’s co-residing family members are undoubtedly disrupted 
(Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994). In particular, the frequent late-night calls, 
which disturb their regular sleeping patterns, are reported to be the most 
annoying part of HDBS with RF (Heggie, 1999). Further, the disturbance of 
the home environment is likely to exacerbate stress and lead to conflict 
(Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994).    
 
Effects caused by feeling embarrassed as a result of residing with an offender 
on HDBS with RF. Co-residing family members have on occasions reported 
wanting to hide the offender’s sanction status because they felt embarrassed 
(Heggie, 1999; Fisher, 1994). Some have also revealed feeling social stigma 
due to home visits by supervising officers and worry about the longer-term 
impact these might have on their children’s perceptions of crime and 
punishment (Fisher, 1994).  
 
Effects caused by perceived relocation of HDBS with RF from governmental 
control into private homes. The imposition of a HDBS with RF can be viewed 
as a relocation of surveillance, control and labour from government 
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personnel, that is prison officers and social workers, to offenders’ co-residing 
family members (George, 2006). Co-residing family members have in 
particular reported having a sense of obligation to adopt a ‘supervisory role’ in 
making sure that the offender complies with the rules and attends all of the 
appointments associated with the HDBS with RF (Smith & Gibbs, 2013). This 
feeling of personal responsibility and blaming of oneself if the offender 
breaches the condition/s and/or reoffends is likely to result in co-residing 
family members feeling stress and anxiety (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; George, 
2006; Aungles, 1994).  
 
A contradictory finding was reported by the Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria (2005:7), 
which found that co-residing family members generally did not feel the need 
to act as “quasi-parole officers.” This can be explained by the fact that the 
participants in this study displayed an unusually strong level of support for the 
offender and the HDBS with RF, stating that they would get through it “no 
matter what” as it is “infinitely better than having a partner or relative in 
prison” (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2005:7). Co-residing family members probably held this 
view because offenders on this HDBS with RF were actually released early 
from prison, and they were ‘more likely to be compliant’ because this was a 
pilot HDBS with RF. Post the ‘Hawthorne effect’, that is, once offenders were 
no longer ‘hand-picked’ for placement on the HDBS with RF, the views of co-
residents would probably be similar to the other studies.   
 
Effects caused by HDBS with RF’s ‘under-duress’ social interaction in the 
household. Even though most co-residing family members and offenders aim 
to support each other during HDBS with RF, the fact that offenders are 
confined to their homes for prolonged periods of time means that ‘under-
duress’ social interaction between them is likely (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; 
George, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994). The home environment has 
even been termed a ‘pressure cooker,’ as the sanction “shifts the usual roles 
within the family dynamic” (Heggie, 1999:70). The change in domestic 
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responsibilities may mean that the co-residing family members, particularly 
female spouses, must adjust to having the offender detained in their home 
and challenging the established family routines related to child rearing, house 
keeping and cooking (Heggie, 1999). In addition, co-residing family members 
and the offender may have to instantly deal with previously unsolved issues 
(Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994). Therefore, ‘under-duress’ social interaction 
inside the home, where everyone is under pressure and stress, may lead to 
conflict (George, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Aungles, 1994).  
 
The five-point typology provides a generic explanation of the HDBS with RF’s 
impacts endured by offenders’ co-residing family members, but the specific 
impact is of course individualistic and varied (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005). The 
experience seems to be generally more onerous for offenders’ co-residing 
family members if:  
 
 they have a caring and stable relationship with the offender and so feel 
responsible to support them during the HDBS with RF (Martinovic, 
2002) 
 the HDBS with RF is relatively long and imposes stringent conditions 
(Rackmill, 1994) 
 as a household they are not financially stable, and so changes to 
previous spending patterns must be made in order to comply with 
HDBS with RF monetary requirements (Martinovic, 2006:5). 
  
Despite the abovementioned intrusions and responsibilities resulting from the 
five distinct onerous effects that are likely to place diverse pressures on co-
residing family members, they can regard the HDBS with RF experience as a 
beneficial opportunity for offenders to start living a pro-social lifestyle 
(Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2005; Heggie, 1999; Bakermans, 1990). In addition, 
many co-residing family members have reported that the sanction experience 
had ultimately led to an improved relationship between them and the offender, 
as well as an increased bond between the offender and their children 
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(Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2005; Heggie, 1999). Furthermore, some co-residing 
family members have indicated a reduction in their financial hardship as 
offenders on HDBS with RF were working regularly (NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Bakermans, 1990). It 
seems then that, as the offender establishes a pro-social lifestyle on HDBS 
with RF, their co-residents persist with the various intrusions and 
responsibilities that the sanction experience indirectly imposes on them 
(Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and Evaluation for 
Corrections Victoria, 2005). This may eventually lead to an improvement in 
their relationship.  
  
Therefore, co-residing family members usually make substantial changes in 
their own lives in order to practically and emotionally support the offender on 
HDBS with RF (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2005; George, 2006; Heggie, 1999; 
Aungles, 1995; Aungles, 1994). Even though co-residing family members 
may view the various intrusions and responsibilities that the HDBS with RF 
imposes on them as permissible, this is ethically problematic since in reality 
punishment spills over onto those unconvicted of criminal offences. 
Therefore, HDBS with RF should consist of policies that provide co-residing 
family members with sufficient information about their role and function within 
HDBS with RF, and where feasible and necessary, link them into external 
supportive services and networks as the need arises (for more information 
see Martinovic, 2007). This would adequately inform them of their role as well 
as subsequently lessen the punitive impacts that HDBS with RF have on 
them. 
 
4.3.3 Legal issues and dilemmas  
 
Legal issues and dilemmas in Australia have centered on questioning the 
overall legality of HDBS. This is a somewhat broader discussion than in the 
USA, as Australia’s constitution contains no guarantees of individual rights 
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unlike the USA’s constitution which entails a Bill of Rights. The number of 
studies that discussed these issues is somewhat limited and the analysis 
within them is superficial. As a result, this section is much more succinct 
when compared with other sections.   
  
Fox (1987b) ignited the Australian legal debate in relation to HDBS with RF 
by questioning the legality of electronic monitoring technology reporting a 
breach in court. More specifically, he argued that it would be difficult to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the offender had in fact breached a condition of 
HDBS with RF and needed to be resentenced. This is because ‘dead space’ 
was a real issue at this time in that the electronic monitoring technology could 
inaccurately indicate that an offender was not at home when in actual fact 
they were125 (Fox, 1987b). However, to this day, there have been no legal 
challenges of any aspect of HDBS with RF or HDBS with GPS before the 
Australian courts. 
 
Nevertheless, Black and Smith (2003) have argued that even though the 
application of HDBS with RF has become entrenched in our legal system, 
specific legislative provisions guiding their operation should be enacted. 
These should deal with broader issues such as whether force can be used 
when placing the device, can the device be surgically implanted, and whether 
offenders can be monitored outside of their curfew hours (Black & Smith, 
2003).  
 
Black and Smith (2003) Smith and Gibbs (2013) and have further maintained 
that the application of HDBS with GPS, which has the unprecedented 
potential to create over-regulation and infringement of human rights, in 
particular must be regulated by specific legislation that should be enacted 
ideally at the Commonwealth level (Black & Smith, 2003). To date, however 
no such legislation has been enabled in Australia.  
 
                                                 
125
 Most of these early problems with RF electronic monitoring technology have subsequently 
been fixed, however the technology still is not foolproof. (For more information see Chapter 
1.4.2). 
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4.3.4 Political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas  
  
Political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas discussed in this section 
comprise a discussion on stakeholders’ perceptions of HDBS and how this 
influences the political debate, policy formulation and the application of these 
sanctions. The stakeholders whose views are presented below include 
criminal justice practitioners, offenders themselves, the community, and the 
media. The political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas are presented in 
relation to a number of studies about HDBS with RF only, as no studies have 
been found to have assessed these issues and dilemmas in relation to HDBS 
with GPS. Nevertheless, brief anecdotal information about HDBS with GPS is 
presented on the basis of media reports. A lack of interest in critically 
exploring political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas related with HDBS 
with GPS may be attributed to the limited critical discourse about the 
implementation of these sanctions for serious sex offenders.  
 
During the 1980s, stakeholders generally supported HDBS with RF. There 
was broad bipartisan political support for HDBS with RF due to the rampant 
problem of prison overcrowding and the perception that these sanctions could 
alleviate this situation. Also, the criminal justice officials who were involved in 
the delivery of HDBS with RF were enthusiastic about their development and 
application (Bloor, 1988; Dorey, 1988; Dick et al., 1986). However, there were 
no established partnerships that engaged the immediately involved 
stakeholders in the development, critical discussion and ongoing 
improvement of HDBS with RF. Nor was there a media strategy that supplied 
information to educate the wider stakeholders. This is surprising as during this 
time criminologists throughout Australia discussed the importance of 
proactive public relations, community education programs and the necessity 
of an overall community understanding of the law and order debate (Hancock, 
1988; Gerkens, 1987; Vernon, 1987). For example, Vernon (1987:2) argued 
that “community education is necessary to provide an understanding of the 
costs, disadvantages of imprisonment and the benefits of the alternatives.” 
Further, Patmore (1991:1) added that otherwise, whenever a government 
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introduces a community based alternative to imprisonment, the opposing 
political party and the media will accuse it of “going soft on criminals.”     
 
In addition, advice that Australian correctional authorities received from the 
USA on the highest-profile USA-based HDBS with RF such as Georgia and 
New Jersey most likely included the significance of thoroughly planned 
extensive education and lobbying of key government officials and the media 
(Clear et al., 1987; Erwin & Bennett, 1987). It seems that policy makers and 
correctional authorities ignored the well-known fact that community backed 
correctional programs are politically supported, and hence well resourced and 
more likely to operate effectively. Anecdotally during this time there was no 
evidence of public opposition to HDBS with RF. It was however argued that 
there was a potential for severe criticism due to an ill-informed public. There 
was even a recommendation to develop “a careful and low-key information 
campaign to inform the media (and through them, the public) of the nature of 
the majority of people presently confined in our prisons” (Dick et al., 1986:12). 
As far as can be determined, it does not seem that this ever took place. 
 
Failure to continuously engage and properly inform stakeholders as well as 
obtain their enduring support for HDBS with RF has meant that relatively low 
numbers of offenders have been sentenced to these sanctions since they 
were implemented (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Parliamentary Library Research 
Service, 2011; Bakermans, 1990). This was particularly evident in front-end 
HDBS with RF in the Northern Territory, New South Wales and Victoria, 
which are entirely dependent on sentencing officials placing offenders on 
them (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Achterstraat, 2010; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). 
  
Consequently, a number of evaluative studies interviewed judges and/or 
magistrates in order to explore the reasons behind the low offender numbers 
on front-end HDBS with RF. Heggie (1999), who conducted 21 interviews with 
randomly selected judges in New South Wales, found that despite the 
legislative provision that equates a term of imprisonment and HDBS with RF 
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(for non-violent offences) up to a period of 18 months, 40% of those 
interviewed felt that there was no real equivalence between the two 
sanctions. Sentencing officials’ lack of belief in the comparability between the 
two sanctions explains their reluctance to sentence prison-bound offenders to 
HDBS with RF. This is quite problematic because it defeats the legislative 
rationale for the introduction of these sanctions (Heggie, 1999). 
 
The contentious view that HDBS with RF and imprisonment are not 
equivalent was subsequently supported in a key judgment of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in 1998 (Keay, 2000). This was in Jurisic, when the 
Court of Appeal sat to reconsider the place of HDBS with RF given the 
difference of opinion in some previous Court of Criminal Appeal decisions. 
Contradicting judgments included the ruling in Smith that HDBS with RF was 
a “collateral sentence” to imprisonment, and the ruling in Pine that the two 
sentences were quite dissimilar126 (Keay, 2000:101). The bench of five judges 
unanimously ruled in Jurisic that HDBS with RF is a lenient option, as there is 
“a significant watering down of a sentence of imprisonment” (Keay, 
2000:101). They also upheld the sentencing officials’ discretion to impose 
HDBS with RF even if the offender is assessed as suitable for it. The rationale 
behind this decision was summarised by Justice Sully, who provided leading 
judgment:  
 
I accept that the standard conditions of a home detention order are 
burdensome, but it seems to me that they are burdensome in the 
sense of being, by and large, inconvenient in their disruption of what 
would be the normal pattern and rhythm of the offender’s life in his 
normal domestic and vocational environment. Any suggestions that 
such inconvenient limitations upon unfettered liberty equate in any 
way at all to being locked up full-time in the sort of prison cell and 
within the sort of gaol that are normal in New South Wales could not 
be accepted…by anybody who has had the opportunity of going 
                                                 
126
 Both of these cases were Crown appeals about the leniency of original sentences handed 
down. Despite the differences of opinion about HDBS with RF in relation to imprisonment, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the original sentences in both cases (for more information see Keay, 
2000). 
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behind the walls (of a prison) and of seeing, even from the view of a 
casual visitor, what is really entailed by a full time custodial 
sentence.127  
 
(cited in Keay, 2000:101) 
 
The findings of the actual review of HDBS with RF in New South Wales have 
however ascertained that the vast majority of offenders were not residing in 
comfortable settings, but were living in below standard housing and on social 
security benefits (Heggie, 1999). Furthermore, the effect of being on the 
HDBS with RF was “certainly more than an inconvenience,” as offenders 
were subjected to 24 hour surveillance, had all social activities outside the 
house curtailed, and even the activities within the house were restricted 
(Keay, 2000:102).  
 
Nevertheless, many sentencing officials perceptions that HDBS with RF are 
not ‘really’ equivalent to prison has persisted in New South Wales (despite the 
legislative provisions stating otherwise). This was evident in two government 
reviews that were commissioned over the last decade to explore the reasons 
behind the inadequate and decreasing trend in the application of HDBS with 
RF (Achterstraat, 2010; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006). Both reviews reported that some judges did not want to sentence 
offenders to HDBS with RF because they regarded it as a ‘softer’ option than 
incarceration.  
 
Similar sentencing officials’ views were reported in Victoria in 2006. 
Interviews with magistrates exploring the reasons behind the inadequate 
numbers of offenders being placed on front-end HDBS with RF showed that 
the fact that the legislation equated a term of imprisonment with a term of 
HDBS with RF was regarded as inequitable, since the two sentences impose 
                                                 
127
 Justice Sully indicated very similar reasoning in Pine, “I cannot see how home detention 
with, inter alia, comfortable accommodation, furniture and fittings, home cooking, the company 
of spouse and/or family and a generally unregulated timetable, could be regarded as not more 
lenient than full time incarceration in an institution under the administration of the Department 
of Corrective Services” (cited in Keay, 2000:101). 
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very different restrictions and obligations. Magistrates also reported being 
unsure of the most appropriate cases for HDBS with RF (Melbourne Centre 
for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006). 
This uncertainty is not surprising given that there has been a lack of 
involvement of sentencing officials in the development and evolving operation 
of HDBS with RF in Victoria. 
 
When the Victorian Government commissioned a private company - Success 
Works - to explore the possibilities of increasing offender numbers on HDBS 
with RF, comparable wider stakeholders’ views were also reported. In 2007, 
interviews were conducted with 25 people representing victim support groups, 
Victoria Police, the judiciary and the legal profession (Success Works, 2007). 
Stakeholders agreed that HDBS with RF was not equivalent to a term of 
imprisonment, and that alternatively it should be a sentence in its own right on 
the sentencing hierarchy (Success Works, 2007). In line with this 
recommendation, as well as recommendations by the Sentencing Advisory 
Council (2008) and Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria (2006), in 2010 Victoria legislatively 
modified HDBS with RF and it became a sentence in its own right. This 
change in the law amended the original purpose of Victoria’s HDBS with RF 
as it ceased operating as an alternative to imprisonment. No other Australian 
state had succumbed to this type of stakeholders’ pressure. Victorian 
Government probably caved into the pressure because it was election year 
and the pre-election polls were showing the popularity of the opposition’s ‘get 
tough on crime agenda’ that encompassed the abolition of HDBS with RF 
(Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011). So, the [then] government 
attempted to retain power by also appearing ‘tough on crime,’ but was 
unsuccessful.     
 
In late 2010 the incoming conservative coalition government abolished HDBS 
with RF (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; Sentencing Advisory 
Council, 2008). Yet, in mid-2013 the same government introduced GPS 
technology as a possible condition of Parole Orders and Community 
Correction Orders (O’Donohue, 2013). As mentioned earlier, this amendment 
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of the law was portrayed as part of the ‘get tough on crime agenda.’ However, 
from an operational perspective the Parole Orders and Community Correction 
Orders with GPS will be quite similar to the abolished HDBS with RF. (For 
more information see 4.2.2.2). 
 
Offenders who are exposed to HDBS with RF mostly view them as onerous, 
and some even regard them as very punitive. In fact, almost one quarter of 
offenders who were presented with a choice of HDBS with RF or going to 
prison, preferred imprisonment (Melbourne Centre for Criminological 
Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Chan 
& Zdenkowski, 1986). It appears that these offenders would rather go to 
prison than engage in the high level of self-control required to change their 
lifestyle in order to comply with the stringent conditions of HDBS with RF 
(NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). Offenders who chose 
HDBS with RF over prison unsurprisingly indicated that there were difficulties 
with serving the HDBS with RF, but stated that it was overall less challenging 
than the stress associated with being in prison (Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006).  
 
A very powerful stakeholder - the media - has predominantly reported 
negative stories about HDBS with RF128 and the community has perceived 
them to be lenient and dangerous. In particular, during the last decade the 
profile of these sanctions has been substantially raised as they were 
portrayed as ‘elitist,’ that is, mostly used by white collar criminals and upper 
class offenders (Moran, 11.07.11). For example, the media extensively 
reported the sentencing of Glenn Wheatley129 and Derryn Hinch,130 high 
                                                 
128
 Interestingly, the media has not discussed any of HDBS with RF’s effective operational 
outcomes nor its various ethical issues and dilemmas. 
129
 Glenn Wheatley is a high-profile Australian music promoter who was convicted of tax fraud 
in 2007. Wheatley failed to declare more than $300,000 in income to the Australian Tax Office 
in 2003. Once he was found out, as a part of the Australian Tax Office’s Operation Wickenby 
(largest-ever white collar criminal investigation), he co-operated fully and paid the appropriate 
tax (Cowan, 19.05.08). Wheatley pleaded guilty to the criminal charges and received a 
sentence of 30 months incarceration with a minimum of 15 months to be served. The last 5 
months of his term of incarceration was served on HDBS with RF. Wheatley was confined to 
his mansion, in the upper class Melbourne suburb of South Yarra, where he continued to 
work, managing rock music bands (Adams, 06.09.08). 
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profile businessmen, to HDBS with RF (Critchley, 18.02.12; Moran 11.07.11). 
The media showed them being confined to their luxurious homes while being 
able to maintain family ties and lucrative employment as “the image of HDBS 
with RF.” As a result, the community saw these sanctions as being “soft on 
crime” in comparison with the obvious and widely publicised deprivations of 
imprisonment. In addition, the media has actively reported instances when 
offenders on HDBS with RF engage in serious re-offending (Winton, 1999). 
This is despite the fact that in reality the placement of affluent offenders and 
serious re-offending on HDBS is isolated131 (Martinovic, 2010).   
 
The damaging media portrayal of HDBS with RF has led to community 
opposition to these sanctions and inevitably a push for ‘truth in sentencing.’ 
This populist political ‘tough on crime’ agenda has resulted in the closure of 
three HDBS with RF in Australia – Western Australia, Queensland and 
Victoria (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; Sentencing Advisory 
Council, 2008; Winton, 1999). The HDBS with RF that have continued 
operating, New South Wales and the Northern Territory, have generally 
experienced relatively small and decreasing offender numbers (NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). The only exception to this is 
the HDBS with RF in South Australia, which is operating with optimal 
numbers. This is because its main clientele are bailees and not sentenced 
offenders that need to be supervised and case managed (Department for 
Correctional Service, 2006). The application of HDBS with RF as a part of bail 
has typically been less controversial in the public domain when compared 
with its application as an alternative to imprisonment.  
                                                                                                                                           
130
 Derryn Hinch is a controversial Australian broadcaster who was found guilty of contempt 
for breaching suppression orders by publicly naming two sex offenders on his website and at 
a public rally in 2008. In 2011, he was sentenced to 5 months on HDBS with RF (Critchley, 
18.02.12). There were two extenuating circumstances that should be mentioned in relation to 
this case. First, even though it is against the law, Hinch has a long history of publicly naming 
sex offenders in order to ‘protect victims,’ and has been generally considered by the 
community to be a ‘victim’s advocate.’ Second, at the time of sentencing, Hinch had recently 
undergone a lifesaving liver transplant operation (Critchley, 18.02.12). Therefore, the 
community was generally more receptive to him being sentenced to HDBS with RF in 
comparison with Glenn Wheatley. During HDBS with RF, Hinch was confined to a spacious 
inner city St Kilda (Melbourne) apartment with fabulous views where he wrote a book about 
the experience (Akerman, 22.06.11; Ross, 21.07.11). 
131
 This was explained by Hancock (1988:34) who stated, “there will always be an element of 
calculated risk. If there is not an element of risk it would seem that we are only placing ‘safe’ 
candidates on specific programs and not providing ‘developmental opportunities.’”  
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Ever since HDBS with GPS entered the criminal justice arena, the media has 
portrayed them negatively. It has sensationally highlighted instances where 
offenders escape detention, that is remove their GPS device, despite the fact 
that authorities are automatically alerted when this occurs and offenders are 
usually re-captured within days (Bucci & Oakes, 20.06.13; Chamberlin, 
24.04.13; Viellaris, 30.04.13). In addition, instances when very serious 
offenders are sentenced to these sanctions widely appear in the media. The 
media is usually critical of them being sentenced to HDBS with GPS arguing 
that they should instead be incarcerated despite the fact that they have 
served the entirety of their original sentences and there are no legislative 
provisions for this to occur (Keim, 01.05.13; Smith & Gibbs, 2013).     
  
Undoubtedly, relatively small offender numbers in Australia on HDBS with RF 
and even the closure of some HDBS with RF have been the result of 
inadequate stakeholders’ support. More specifically, the negative media 
portrayal has immensely contributed to their demise. It is likely that there will 
be similar troublesome outcomes for HDBS with GPS as there has been no 
proper engagement of stakeholders in their implementation and operation. If 
this problematic trend is to change, it is imperative that a critical discourse 
about the overall penal system occurs in the public arena. More specifically, 
this needs to realistically inform stakeholders about the benefits, as well as 
the drawbacks, that are associated with HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS. 
It is likely that this could result in community support of HDBS more generally 
including policies that adequately support their application.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter critically analysed the currently operational late phase of HDBS 
in Australia. HDBS with RF were introduced in the late 1980s and HDBS with 
GPS entered the correctional arena after 2000 in very similar circumstances 
as in the USA. The number of offenders on HDBS in Australia remained 
relatively stable. The overwhelming ideology of offender supervision on HDBS 
has generally been based on a combination of strict and close surveillance 
and treatment-based components.  
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Research has indicated that HDBS with RF have generally achieved their 
stated operational objectives, but have encompassed significant ethical and 
particularly political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. Research 
assessing the operational outcomes, ethical and political and stakeholder 
issues and dilemmas of HDBS with GPS is still lacking and it is imperative 
that it is conducted in the future.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and future implications for 
HDBS in the USA and Australia 
 
  
Imprisonment has remained the most commonly accepted form 
of punishment for crime for 200 years and society’s confidence 
in it as a punishment and as an instrument to protect the 
community from further anti-social acts by offenders remains 
largely intact. 
 
(Dawes, 1988:68)  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Decades later the above statement still largely holds true even though 
community based sanctions, including HDBS, have produced more favourable 
outcomes than prisons. For example, they have traditionally had substantially 
lower reoffending rates, as well as, lower direct and indirect costs (Clear et al., 
2006; Graycar, 2000; Keay, 2000; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994:5; Van Ness, 
1992). These sanctions have had more positive outcomes because they do 
not separate offenders from their family support and conventional ties (unlike 
prisons), and they usually encourage pro-social reintegration through 
rehabilitative and supportive initiatives. The main reason behind the 
community’s punitive view is a lack of awareness about the actual operation 
and outcomes of the various penal dispositions. Hence, education of 
stakeholders is crucial to provide an understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of imprisonment as well as the benefits and drawbacks of 
community based sanctions (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Roberts, 2004; 
Vernon, 1987). 
  
This chapter provides the overall conclusion to the research and future 
implications for HDBS in the USA and Australia. It starts with outlining the key 
outcomes and conclusions of this research. The late phase of the evolution of 
HDBS, which started in the 1980s and is still operational, was particularly 
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significant as both the USA and Australia launched a wide-spread introduction 
of HDBS. Evaluations have indicated that HDBS with RF did not achieve their 
anticipated operational results in the USA, but they did in Australia. 
Nevertheless, these sanctions have had significant ethical and political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas in both nation states. Conversely, HDBS 
with GPS have indicated effective operational results in the USA, but have not 
yet been evaluated in Australia. Similarly, these sanctions’ ethical and political 
and stakeholder issues and dilemmas remain largely unexplored in both 
nation states. 
 
Subsequently, the future trajectory of HDBS in the USA and Australia, as well 
as the lessons learnt to improve the operation of these sanctions in both 
nation states are discussed. Although the application of HDBS has varied in 
the USA and Australia, it is predicted to increase in the future. The future 
viability and outcomes of HDBS in both nation states are however dependent 
on whether policy makers and/or correctional administrators, with the support 
of governments, improve the operation of HDBS by implementing the lessons 
learnt based on the evidence of best practice. This section concludes by 
describing HDBS in the ‘age of surveillance.’ 
 
5.2 Key outcomes and conclusions  
 
This research answered the research question and sub-questions by 
specifically outlining the evolution of the HDBS frameworks in the USA and 
Australia, as well as the key outcomes from the currently operational late 
phase of HDBS in both nation states. The following section amalgamates the 
findings for both the USA and Australia and demonstrates how the research 
questions were answered.  
  
5.2.1 Evolution of the HDBS frameworks in the USA and Australia 
 
In this research the evolution of HDBS frameworks has been divided into 
three ideologically distinguishable phases.  
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Early phase of HDBS in the USA and Australia operated from the 1840s until 
1960s. This phase was characterised by the introduction of probation and 
parole, which were the predecessors to the late phase of HDBS when 
contemporary application of these sanctions started (Clear et al., 2006; 
O’Toole, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2001; Cromwell & Killinger, 1994). During this 
period the ideological and legislative groundwork for community based 
sentences was laid. These sanctions rose to prominence on the basis of 
offender supervision based on humanistic and rehabilitative principles (Clear 
et al., 2006; O’Toole, 2006; Daley, 2005). 
 
The middle phase of HDBS was the interregnum between the two phases, 
which operated during the 1960s and 1970s in both the USA and Australia. It 
comprised five converging factors (McCarthy et al., 2001; Joutsen & Zvekic, 
1994; Patmore, 1991; Petersilia, 1987). The most problematic was the fact 
that ‘tough on crime’ policies led to enormous prison crowding and budgetary 
restraint, while the currently available community based dispositions were 
regarded as ineffective. This culminated in a ‘correctional disillusion’ that led to 
government’s decision to introduce the late phase of HDBS (Petersilia, 2000; 
Petersilia, 1998; Biles, 1996; King, 1991). 
 
The late phase of HDBS in the USA and Australia has been operating from 
1982 to today (2013). During the 1980s HDBS with RF were introduced 
initially in the USA to reduce overwhelming institutional crowding and 
therefore the unsustainable cost of corrections. The ideology of offender 
supervision was based on strict and close surveillance and offender 
monitoring (Champion, 2008; Cromwell et al., 2005). The initially reported 
very positive USA experience with these sanctions appealed to policy makers 
in Australia. This is because the evaluations in the beginning indicated 
reductions in prison crowding, correctional cost, and the negative social and 
economic effects of incarceration on the offender and their family. 
Furthermore, the punitive ideology of offender supervision seemed attractive. 
Nevertheless, when HDBS with RF were implemented in the Australian 
sentencing landscape, they encompassed both close offender monitoring as 
well as rehabilitative treatment initiatives (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Henderson, 
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2006; King, 1991). This was different to the USA where rehabilitative 
treatment initiatives were generally ignored.  
 
In the mid-2000s, the expansion of sex offender post-release supervision laws 
throughout the USA resulted in a vast introduction of HDBS with GPS for 
serious sex offenders (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 2006). Again due to 
positive evaluation results from the USA, Australian policy makers also 
introduced HDBS with GPS for serious sex offenders in mid-2000s (Edgely, 
2007). In both nation states the culture of fear and moral panic has 
surrounded these offenders leading to an emphasis on development of HDBS 
with GPS to reduce offender risk and enhance community protection instead 
of reducing the cost of corrections by diverting offenders from incarceration. 
As a result, the ideology of offender supervision on HDBS with GPS in both 
the USA and Australia has encompassed both strict and close surveillance 
and monitoring as well as treatment-based components (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009; Szego, 18.04.05). 
 
5.2.2 Key outcomes from the late phase of HDBS in the USA and 
Australia  
 
In this research the outcomes of the late phase of HDBS in the USA and 
Australia have been presented under 4 sub-themes - operational results, 
ethical issues and dilemmas, legal issues and dilemmas, and political and 
stakeholder issues and dilemmas. These are written first in relation to HDBS 
with RF and then HDBS with GPS. 
 
Operational results – In relation to HDBS with RF, evaluative research has 
indicated that anticipated results have not been achieved in the USA, but they 
have in Australia. In the USA, HDBS with RF have widened the net of social 
control, that is, they have been predominantly imposed on non-prison bound 
offenders and have had very little, if any, overall impact on reducing the size 
of the prison population and the correctional budget (Alarid et al., 2008; 
Meyer, 2004; Petersilia & Turner, 1993). Similarly, because treatment and 
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other service-oriented components generally have received a low priority, 
HDBS with RF’s high technical violation rates and post sanction recidivism 
exacerbated the imprisonment rate as well as correctional spending (Alarid et 
al., 2008; Fulton et al., 1997; Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Tonry, 1990).  
 
In contrast, in Australia HDBS with RF have been predominantly imposed on 
prison-bound offenders and as such have reduced the prison population and 
the correctional spending (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Owston, 1991). 
Furthermore, they have had relatively low rates of technical violations and 
recidivism, which have not been regarded to contribute to prison crowding. 
This is probably because HDBS with RF have had appropriate funding 
provisions that have allowed individual case management of offenders and 
appropriate rehabilitative provisions (Achterstraat, 2010; Melbourne Centre for 
Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; 
Heggie, 1999; Challinger, 1994b; Roeger, 1988).  
 
In relation to HDBS with GPS, operationally studies have found them to be 
successful in the USA. This is due to relatively low technical violation and 
reoffending rates; these are the result of mandatory treatment provisions 
(Bales et al., 2010a; DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Padget et al., 2006). 
However, no studies have assessed the operational outcomes of HDBS with 
GPS in Australia. It is imperative that this research is conducted. 
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas – In relation to HDBS with RF, studies in both 
the USA and Australia have reported very similar ethical issues and 
dilemmas. These were discussed under four specific points. First, the broad 
philosophical discussion on whether HDBS are a part of a surveillance-
oriented Orwellian society in the USA indicated that these sanctions are 
generally not the result of deliberate governmental efforts to be omnipresent 
(Champion, 2008; Lilly, 2006; Lyon, 2006). Even though no such debate 
occurred in Australia, there has been a broader concern about the lack of 
legislation governing the ethical application of these sanctions (Smith & 
Gibbs, 2013; Michael et al., 2006; Black & Smith 2003). Second, research in 
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both the USA and Australia has indicated that the correctional selection 
process for HDBS with RF may discriminate against indigent offenders, who 
can be precluded from participating in these sanctions (NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Reichel, 2001; Gainey et al., 2000; 
Heggie, 1999; Moyle, 1993/94). Third, studies in both the USA and Australia 
have found that being on HDBS with RF may result in a significantly different 
experience of punishment, dependent on offenders’ personal and social 
characteristics, and therefore may discriminate against offenders with certain 
characteristics (George, 2006; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006; Ansay, 1999; Heggie, 1999; Payne & Gainey, 1998; Moyle, 1993/94). 
Fourth, research in both the USA and Australia has indicated that the 
punishment directed toward the offender on HDBS with RF may spill over into 
the lives of their co-residing family members thereby often complicating 
already fractious relationships (George, 2006; Ansay, 1999; Heggie, 1999; 
Aungles, 1994; Van Ness, 1992). 
 
Over the last decade, various jurisdictions within both the USA and Australia 
have amended their operations in an attempt to make the selection process 
for HDBS with RF less discriminatory (Brown et al., 2007; NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Enos et al., 1999). However the 
potentially varied experience of punishment on HDBS with RF and the 
multiple punitive effects that HDBS with RF may have on offenders’ co-
residents have not to date been recognised by HDBS policy.  
 
In relation to HDBS with GPS, the number of studies that explored their 
ethical issues and dilemmas is almost non-existent in both the USA and 
Australia. In particular, gaps in include assessing whether there is 
discrimination in the selection process, whether punishment varies between 
offenders, and whether punishment spills over into the lives of offenders’ co-
residing family members. It is possible that this is because HDBS with GPS 
are structurally less discriminatory during the selection process and they do 
not confine offenders to their homes for prolonged periods of time (Martinovic 
& Schluter, 2012; Bales et al., 2010b). As such, the punishment on offenders 
on these sanctions is probably not as diversified, and it has lesser impact on 
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their co-residents in comparison with HDBS with RF. Nevertheless, the lack of 
research is troublesome and future research is imperative.  
 
Legal issues and dilemmas – In relation to both HDBS with RF and HDBS 
with GPS there have been no successful legal challenges of any aspect of 
their operation in the USA or Australia. In the USA, unlike in Australia, there 
have however been challenges that have been quashed by courts repeatedly 
ruling that offenders are not entitled to the same rights as ordinary citizens 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Champion, 2008; Black & Smith, 2003). In 
Australia, unlike in the USA, there have been calls to establish specific 
legislative provisions that guide the operation of these sanctions to protect the 
potential infringement of offenders’ human rights (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Black 
& Smith, 2003). 
 
Political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas – In relation to HDBS with RF, 
research in both the USA and Australia has shown that the media, which 
inaccurately portrays these sanctions, seems to be the key stakeholder with 
the most dominant influence (Martinovic, 2010; Fulton et al., 1997; Lilly, 2006; 
Rackmill, 1994). The ongoing discrediting media coverage of HDBS with RF 
has created negative community perceptions and political pressure. In the 
USA this led to an instigation of HDBS with RF policies which enhanced their 
punitive orientation and seldom contained rehabilitative initiatives (Payne & 
Gainey, 2000; Lilly, 1993; Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1992). The lack of 
stakeholder support in Australia however led to more drastic ‘get tough on 
crime’ policies, which have encompassed abolishment or sparing application 
of HDBS with RF (Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2011; Sentencing 
Advisory Council, 2008). 
 
In relation to HDBS with GPS, no studies have been found to have analysed 
their political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. A lack of interest in 
critically exploring these issues and dilemmas related with HDBS with GPS 
may be attributed to the relatively non-controversial implementation of these 
sanctions for sex offenders across the USA and Australia (Bligh & Roberts, 
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2011; Myers, 2011; Jannetta, 2006; Michael et al., 2006; Szego, 19.04.05; 
Nellis, 2004). 
 
Despite the problematic outcomes, HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS have 
both become integral components of the correctional continuum across the 
USA. Further, the number of offenders sentenced to them has continued to 
increase over the last three decades (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Lilly, 1993; 
Baumer & Mendelsohn, 1992). In contrast, the overall application of HDBS in 
Australia has been stagnating even though these sanctions have had better 
outcomes overall than in the USA. More specifically, the number of offenders 
sentenced to HDBS with RF has been decreasing as these sanctions have 
either been abolished or have continued operating with struggling offender 
numbers. Yet, the number of offenders on HDBS with GPS seems to be on 
the increase in Australia (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; Henderson, 2006). 
 
5.3 Future trajectory of the HDBS frameworks and lessons learnt  
 
The following outlines the predicted future trajectory of the HDBS frameworks 
in the USA and Australia, as well as the basis of it which is underpinned by six 
relevant facts. It then discusses the lessons learnt that apply to the USA and 
Australia.  
 
5.3.1 Future trajectory of the HDBS frameworks in the USA and 
Australia  
 
Despite differing outcomes and varied trends of HDBS, the broad predicted 
future trajectory of these sanctions in both the USA and Australia is increased 
sanction application. This trajectory is based on six relevant facts:  
 
In numerous nation states around the world, HDBS have become a 
permanent part of the sentencing landscape. Similarly to the USA and 
Australia, many other nation states have experienced increasing numbers of 
offenders being incarcerated each year and ‘moral panics’ created by the 
release and/or reoffending of known serious sex offenders. These have been 
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the catalyst for the widespread experimentation and implementation of HDBS 
(Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005; John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000; 
Whitfield, 1997).  
 
HDBS with RF are currently applied in more than 30 nation states throughout 
the world and are typically used for low to medium risk offenders (Nellis, 
Beyens & Kaminski, 2013). Alternatively, HDBS with GPS are utilised only in 
the USA, Australia, Brazil, Sweden and Spain for the highest risk sex 
offenders and/or perpetrators of domestic violence. HDBS with GPS have 
also been trialled and are in the process of being established in Canada, 
England and Wales, New Zealand, and The Netherlands (Paterson, 2013; 
Paterson, 2007; Lilly & Nellis, 2001; Whitfield, 1997; Mainprize, 1995). Nation 
states usually initially implement HDBS with RF and then subsequently 
introduce HDBS with GPS (Nellis et al., 2013). Further, each nation state 
designs its own HDBS as a specific response to the unique issues identified 
within its own criminal justice system. 
  
Evidence based research throughout the Western world has shown that 
HDBS mostly operate effectively. In particular, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, England and Wales as well as the Nordic nations all indicate that 
HDBS with RF generally reduce prison crowding, have relatively low technical 
violations and recidivism rates, and are cost effective (Smith & Gibbs, 2013; 
Nellis, 2011; Henderson, 2006; Black & Smith, 2003). Hence, the only nation 
state where these sanctions do not seem to operate effectively is the USA; 
the main reason is that, unlike other nation states, HDBS with RF typically do 
not encompass rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives and are instead 
mostly punishment and surveillance oriented. It is therefore likely that if the 
USA implements these initiatives (in accordance with the lessons learnt), then 
its operation of HDBS with RF would improve.  
 
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that HDBS with RF operate with 
minimalist ethical and political issues and dilemmas in New Zealand and 
Canada, as well as the Nordic nations (Hucklesby, 2009; Olotu et al., 2009). 
This is very much unlike the findings in the USA and Australia. While the 
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ethical and political issues and dilemmas in the USA and Australia would 
definitely reduce on the basis of the already identified lessons learnt (see 
below), future research which comparatively assesses the overall outcomes of 
HDBS in additional nation states would clearly be beneficial. The lessons 
learnt from the additional nation states may however not be clearly applicable 
to the USA and Australia, since the other countries and their criminal justice 
systems may not be homogenous to the USA and Australia. Hence, the 
lessons learnt from the most effective other nation states’ HDBS would firstly 
need to be piloted in the USA and Australia and, if they are empirically 
validated, they could then be widely implemented.    
 
Alternatively, the operational results in relation to HDBS with GPS have when 
comparated with other nation states around the world been most effective in 
the USA (for more information see Nellis, 2011; Bales et al., 2010a; 
DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Olotu et al., 2009). This is particularly in relation to 
these sanctions’ technological operation. The numerous technological issues 
raised have over the years been resolved in the USA as it has been at the 
forefront of implementing these sanctions since 1997 (Lilly, 2006). 
Furthermore, in the USA, HDBS with GPS have typically contained mandatory 
treatment provisions and as a result have experienced relatively low technical 
violation and reoffending rates (Bales et al., 2010a; DeMichele & Payne, 
2009). Studies assessing the ethical and political and stakeholder issues and 
dilemmas are however quite limited in the USA and further research to assess 
these issues is imperative. The very positive results of the operation of HDBS 
with GPS in the USA have meant that other nation states have followed the 
USA’s lead by experimenting and implementing their own HDBS with GPS. 
 
Australian jurisdictions (New South Wales and Victoria) that have had 
stagnating application of HDBS have been examining ways of increasing the 
use of these sanctions. First, New South Wales commissioned two 
government reviews over the last decade to explore the reasons behind the 
decreasing sanction trend (Achterstraat, 2010; NSW Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice, 2006). Similar recommendations were made in both reports, 
but as their implementation would be complex and expensive, these are yet to 
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be implemented. Second, in Victoria, in 2011, the number of offenders on 
HDBS was quite small and plans were made to abolish the sanction for 
political reasons, yet the government initiated a trial to test the various EM 
technologies and commissioned a comprehensive review of the literature to 
elicit best practice in HDBS. Subsequently, the introduction of GPS 
technology as a possible condition of Parole Orders and Community 
Correction Orders was recently announced (O’Donohue, 2013:1).   
  
EM technology is constantly advancing in precision and reliability, becoming 
less intrusive and cheaper overall. Over the last three decades a large 
number of private sector manufacturers and vendors have invested significant 
amounts of money in continuously improving EM technology in order to satisfy 
corrections’ search for ways to more securely contain offenders in the 
community (Mair, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2001). As a result, abundant 
possibilities for controlling offenders in the community have become available 
– the most important have been the developments within the GPS technology 
– these have enabled increasingly precise offender tracking (Bales et al., 
2010a; Clear & Cole, 2003; John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000).  
 
In addition to deterring offenders from engaging in crime, the EM technology 
also ensures that offenders attend rehabilitative initiatives, thus being more 
likely to result in them adopting a pro-social lifestyle (Nellis, 2010b; New 
Jersey State Parole Board, 2007; Payne & Gainey, 2004). Consequently, it 
has become possible for HDBS to be imposed on not only low and medium 
risk offenders, but also high risk offenders. The advancements in EM 
technology have also meant that it has become less invasive for the offender 
as well as their co-residing family members. Hence, the application of HDBS 
has become more widespread, which has resulted in the cost of the 
technology reducing (Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007).  
 
Nation states around the world have engaged in the development of 
additional satellite navigation systems, and the establishment of GNSS. This 
will mean that within the next decade the tracking information from more than 
100 satellites from various nation states, including USA’s GPS, Russian’s 
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GLOSNASS, Europe’s GALILEO and China’s COSMOS, will be combined. 
The accuracy of offender tracking data will be substantially improved and the 
rate of ‘false alerts’ will be reduced (Victorian Spatial Council, 2011).   
 
Incarceration does not seem to rehabilitate offenders and has significant 
direct and indirect costs, which cannot be sustained due to the multifaceted 
budgetary pressures on governments. Prisons seldom have pro-social 
transformation effects as more than half of ex-prisoners reoffend within three 
years of their release and are re-imprisoned in both the USA and Australia 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Ross, 2005). The prison experience seems to 
actually produce more serious and violent criminals who become 
institutionalised in artificial environments that support criminal socialisation 
and the sharing of criminal tactics, as well as encourage violence and sexual 
assault (Clear, 2007; Meyer, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2001; Enos et al., 1999; 
Dean-Myrda & Cullen, 1998; Doherty, 1995). When prisons are overcrowded, 
which is typically the case in both the USA and Australia, the effects of the 
negative environment are exacerbated (Alarid et al., 2008; Clear et al., 2006; 
Bartlett, 2005; Caputo, 2004; Clear, 1997; Fulton et al., 1997).  
 
In addition, incarceration is extremely expensive (Alarid et al., 2008). For 
example, while the cost of incarceration in the USA is equivalent to about 
$50,000 per offender per year,132 it must also be taken into account that: 
 
the cost of building a prison runs upward of $100,000 per cell, 
excluding financing. Each personnel position represents expenditures 
equal to twice his/her annual salary when fringe benefits, retirement 
costs and office supplies are taken into consideration. The processing 
of an offender through the corrections system can run as high as 
$20,000 in direct costs and nearly half that much again in indirect 
                                                 
132
 This cost seems comparatively low when compared with the cost of incarceration in 
Australia which is more than $100,000 per offender per year (Fowlie, 12.02.13). This 
disreprency may be explained by the fact that the USA has a much higher incarceration rate 
per 100,000 adult population, larger prison capacities, cheaper construction costs and 
generally worse conditions in prisons (Reichel, 2008; Stephan, 2004; Haney, 2001). 
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costs (such as defaulted debts, welfare to families, and lost wages 
and taxes). 
 
 (Clear et al., 2006:550) 
 
Appropriate allocation of scarce public resources is therefore required, 
especially in light of the continuing global financial crisis. More extensive use 
of EM technology will probably continue in the future as governments attempt 
to contain correctional costs.  
 
In the USA, the inability to finance growing prison populations due to the 
country’s economic downturn as well as global instability has resulted in a 
shift toward more reasonable crime and justice policies over the last few 
years. These have included the justice reinvestment movement, resulting in 
actual flattening out of the incarceration rate and even its reduction in state 
prisons (Cole, 2011; Guerino, Harrison & Sabol, 2011). In Australia, some of 
these policies have been trialed, but have not yet been widely implemented. 
Given the historical events in corrections, where Australian governments 
generally follow the USA’s lead, it is likely that Australia will implement these 
in the future. 
 
5.3.2 Lessons learnt that apply to the USA and Australia 
 
Given that increased application of HDBS is the predicted future trajectory in 
both the USA and Australia, it is imperative that the operation of these 
sanctions is improved. This can be achieved by the specific jurisdictions within 
these nation states implementing the relevant lessons learnt to improve their 
own problematic areas of HDBS operation. The utilisation of comparative 
historical analysis has been instrumental in amalgamating the existing 
research (over the last three decades from both the USA and Australia) into 
the following seven lessons learnt that should be enacted as 
recommendations. These should be a vital part of the operation of HDBS in 
both nation states. More specifically, the first three lessons generally apply to 
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all HDBS, the following three are applicable to only HDBS with RF, and the 
last one applies only to HDBS with GPS.  
  
1. Collaborative working and sharing of information with stakeholders (applies 
to HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS) 
 
Research has unanimously indicated that the establishment of a stakeholders’ 
working group is vital (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Ross & Allard, 2001).  It 
should comprise stakeholders from various criminal justice related agencies, 
which support as well as oppose the implementation of HDBS.133 The group 
would contribute to the decision-making and implementation of HDBS, and 
should be formed as early as possible and operate on an ongoing basis. Early 
formation is imperative for the following three reasons. First, although various 
stakeholders are likely to have diversified viewpoints, once these are 
cooperatively amalgamated they would be in the best interest of offenders 
and the community. Second, time and cost would be saved from the outset, 
as different stakeholders would be able to identify problems and barriers that 
may arise when developing and implementing HDBS. Third, the involvement 
of stakeholders in the early stages of development and implementation of 
HDBS is likely to lead to longer-term support and promotion of HDBS 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Ross & Allard, 2001; King, 1991).  
  
More specifically, a stakeholders’ working group should comprise internal as 
well as external stakeholders134 who possess the knowledge and skills 
needed to contribute to the development and implantation of HDBS. 
According to DeMichele and Payne (2009), the group could include the 
judiciary, policy makers, police, prison administrators, probation and parole 
officers, private vendors of EM equipment, public prosecutors, defence 
lawyers, victims and victim’s advocates, offenders and their families, media 
                                                 
133 This is because the mixed views can result in strategies that in fact enhance the HDBS.   
134 Internal stakeholders are those within corrections who manage the HDBS, supervise 
offenders, and maintain a working relationship with private vendors, service providers and the 
community (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). External stakeholders involve those outside of 
corrections who are impacted by the offender being on the HDBS. They include victims of 
crime, families, treatment providers, employers, judges, law enforcement, media and the 
community (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).  
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representatives and the public. This group of stakeholders would have the 
specialist knowledge about the relevant legal information, technical 
information, planning and program development skills, budget and financing 
skills, experience with working with offenders, community values and needs, 
and public relations experience.  
 
If the stakeholders’ working group is relatively large, then it could be divided 
into two manageable smaller groups - a project steering committee (engaged 
in high level planning) and an implementation team (dealing with operational 
issues) (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). The tasks that could be shared between 
the two groups include assessing resources and needs, developing program 
policies and procedures, identifying and securing funding and support, 
providing services for offender needs, and education, promotion and media 
awareness (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). The collaborative sharing of ideas 
and early identification of potential problems would reduce the possibility of 
HDBS being misunderstood or oversold, which has in the past resulted in 
disappointment when unrealistic expectations have not been met (DeMichele 
& Payne, 2009).  Furthermore, it would most likely lead to greater confidence 
and support for HDBS, and eventually address the traditional problem of 
inadequate offender numbers on HDBS in both the USA and Australia 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Henderson, 2006; Ross & Allard, 2001). It should 
however be noted that the initial offender uptake is likely to be slow and it may 
take a minimum of 6 months or longer for the optimal number of offenders to 
be sentenced to HDBS (Ross & Allard, 2001). 
  
Corrections needs to change its typical strategy of under-utilising the media, 
and engage with it to gather support for HDBS135 (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; 
Brown-Greaves, 1987). Research has repeatedly shown that the media is a 
very powerful external stakeholder which can negatively influence the 
opinions of many other stakeholders (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Ross & 
Allard, 2001). Consequently, having regular contact with the media and 
regularly informing the public through correctional websites, social media, 
                                                 
135 Unlike corrections, the media unit within the police has been extremely effective in 
presenting a police point of view (Brown-Greaves, 1987). 
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press releases/newsletters, holding community meetings and running 
seminars, conferences and workshops has proven to be critical (Brown et al., 
2007). 
 
When dealing with the media, best practice has particularly indicated that 
there should be:  
 
 single point of contact to engage with the media and a tight 
communication plan 
 quick response to a crisis 
 regular provision of informative, educative and ‘good news’ stories 
about HDBS  
 endorsements about HDBS from wider community-based groups in 
society. 
 
The ongoing provision of information in the public domain would be an 
example of the utilisation of a proactive versus reactive approach that has 
often elicited negative public reaction (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Hucklesby, 
2009; Weatherburn, 1991). It would ensure that the public receives credible 
and accurate information about the actual capabilities and operation of HDBS 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009).  
  
A wider issue that must be tackled is that the public has generally not been 
persuaded that HDBS can adequately punish offenders in the community 
(Alarid et al., 2008; Payne & Gainey, 1999). This view has been based on the 
retributive public perception that the prison is the only appropriate punishment 
for the vast majority of offenders who should suffer its harsh deprivations 
(DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Roberts, 2004; Morris, 1988; Vernon, 1987). 
Therefore, the community needs to be provided with a frank explanation of the 
operation of the entire criminal justice system (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; 
Braithwaite, 1988; Hancock, 1988). Realistic expectations, advantages and 
disadvantages, and typical short-term as well as long-term outcomes of all 
penal dispositions need to be effectively communicated (DeMichele & Payne, 
2009; Meyer, 2004; Weatherburn, 1991).  
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Once the public is provided with proper information and detail, it is likely to be 
less punitive, have greater confidence in community based dispositions, and 
even progressively generate political support and additional resources for 
HDBS (Payne & Gainey, 1999; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994; Patmore, 1991). 
Furthermore, the awareness would discontinue the current trend in both the 
USA and Australia where the development, implementation and abolition of 
HDBS have on occasions been purely politically driven – HDBS have 
appeared and disappeared – just as quickly as political agendas have 
changed. It would importantly ensure that correctional policies are based on 
good practice instead of populist political agendas (Scott, 2007). 
 
2. Inclusion of rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives (applies to HDBS with 
RF and HDBS with GPS) 
 
Studies have consistently shown that HDBS must contain rehabilitative and 
reintegrative initiatives in order to reduce the offender’s risk of reoffending 
(Bales et al., 2010a; DeMichele & Payne, 2009; Brown et al., 2007; 
Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008; NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006; Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005; Renzema, 2003; Ross & 
Allard, 2001; Petersilia, 1997). It seems that the stability in the lives of 
offenders is enhanced when they are placed on HDBS, which in turn provides 
them with the ability to complete rehabilitation program/s, and ultimately 
reduce the rate of recidivism.  
 
Offenders on HDBS with RF often need access to various services and/or 
forms of rehabilitative assistance. This is because they are typically “buffeted 
by serious personal problems – unemployment, emotional and family crises, 
substance abuse – that cannot be addressed effectively without some form of 
service or treatment” (Clear & Dammer, 2003:219). Consequently, HDBS with 
RF need to address offenders’ complex personal issues and criminogenic 
284 
 
needs through wide-ranging rehabilitative treatment and services136 (Clear & 
Dammer, 2003; Fulton et al., 1997).   
 
The most complex and prominent offender cohort on HDBS with GPS is 
serious, often high-profile sex offenders who require offender-specific 
supervision carefully combined with quality treatment. This is because the 
motivations underlying sexual offender behaviours may include 
psychopathology, biological contributions, brain damage, and ineffective 
problem-solving skills (Bales et al., 2010a; Janicki, 2007). More specifically, 
the ‘containment approach’ of offender supervision is said to produce the 
most effective USA-wide results for lowering recidivism among sex offenders. 
Under this model the emphasis is on ‘offence-specific treatment service,’ and 
a close partnership between supervision officers, treatment providers, 
polygraph examiners and victim advocates (Sex Offender Supervision and 
GPS Monitoring Task Force, 2010; Jannetta, 2006). This collaboration allows 
for a rapid response to early warning signs of reoffending that may be noticed 
by the supervising officer or the treatment provider (New Jersey State Parole 
Board, 2007). Proactive intervention is encouraged, and reoffending is 
significantly reduced (Losel & Schmucker, 2005).  
 
If the quality treatment is non-existent, the immediate cost of the provision of 
rehabilitative services is likely to be substantial but it would be definitely offset 
by the long-term benefits (DeMichele & Payne, 2009). HDBS that encompass 
individual case management and rehabilitative provisions that address 
offenders’ criminogenic needs are likely to effectively support their 
reintegration, thus resulting in longer-term pro-social behavioural changes 
(Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008; NSW Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice, 2006). HDBS would then be likely to have relatively small recidivism 
rates, hence not contributing to prison crowding (Achterstraat, 2010).  
 
                                                 
136 It must be understood that “change in anyone must come from within if it is to have any 
meaning. Without motivation and desire on the part of offenders to change their lifestyles, all 
the correctional resources in the world are not going to change their behaviour… The 
challenge we face is to find ways to stimulate and motivate offenders to help themselves” 
(Carlson, 1988:45).  
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3. Ongoing independent evaluation process that informs continual 
improvement (applies to HDBS with RF and HDBS with GPS) 
 
It has been well documented that an ongoing independent evaluation process 
should be in place so that the operation of HDBS can be continually improved 
(Bales et al., 2010a; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). 
Evaluations should be periodically conducted, lasting for adequate amounts of 
time, ideally two years, and these should follow up offenders once they have 
completed HDBS for at least another two years. This would mean that the 
prolonged impact of the HDBS could be determined. In addition to measuring 
the ‘traditional outcomes’ such as technical violation rates, reoffending rates 
and cost, ‘broader outcomes’ associated with HDBS also need to be followed 
up. These could include whether there are any improvements in offenders’ 
employment, levels of substance abuse and other behavioural or attitudinal 
changes (for more information see Boone & Fulton, 1995). Any limitations 
associated with HDBS that are identified as a part of the evaluation process 
could then be continually addressed. An evidence-based continual 
improvement process for HDBS would undoubtedly improve the operation of 
these sanctions (DeMichele & Payne, 2009).  
 
4. Application of equitable selection criteria and conditions (applies to HDBS 
with RF only) 
 
Review of research has shown that the selection criteria and conditions 
imposed on offenders on HDBS with RF should be equitable. At the outset 
these sanctions should be operational state/territory wide, so that offenders 
living in rural/remote areas of the state/territory are not automatically 
precluded from being placed on these sanctions (Achterstraat, 2010; NSW 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). More specifically, during the 
selection process for HDBS with RF, offenders who do not have a ‘suitable 
residence’ should be provided with state-sponsored accommodation such as 
foster/surrogate homes (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Enos et al., 1999). Similarly, if 
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offenders are unable to cover the cost of telephone installation and service, 
then the state should pay for these services (Tennessee Board of Probation 
and Parole, 2007; Heath, 1996).  
 
Further, for Aboriginal offenders in Australia, ‘home’ should be more broadly 
defined to include an increased use of wider settlements called ‘outstations’ 
where Aboriginals typically reside. This would avoid Aboriginal offenders 
being disadvantaged by the strict defining of ‘home’ (NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006; Heggie, 1999; Moyle, 1993/94). Finally, 
if supervision fees are imposed on the HDBS with RF, these should be based 
on a sliding scale and waived in certain cases (DeMichele & Payne, 2009; 
Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, 2007). These policies would 
ensure that HDBS with RF operate equitably as they would be more 
accessible to offenders regardless of their social status.  
 
5. Offender tailored order conditions and length of orders (applies to HDBS 
with RF only) 
 
For a variety of reasons, studies have demonstrated that HDBS with RF 
should be imposed with offender tailored conditions and order length. This is 
firstly to avoid the inequitable and even discriminatory extensively varied 
punishment experience on these sanctions, which seems to be most 
profoundly dependent on offenders’ personal and social characteristics 
(discussed above). Secondly, it prevents too many conditions being placed on 
the offender, which in most USA jurisdictions has led to very frequent 
technical violations, formal revocation processes, and usually subsequent 
incarceration (Martinovic, 2010). Thirdly, it avoids the imposition of 
unnecessarily long orders that often have high technical violation rates and 
possible adverse effects on offenders and their co-residents (Nellis, 2013; 
Ross & Allard, 2001; Rackmill, 1994). Similarly, it prevents the imposition of 
orders that are not sufficiently long for the offender’s lifestyle to stabilise for 
the imposed treatment to have the most effective results.  
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Offender tailored conditions and order length should be imposed during the 
sentencing stage once the sentencing official has obtained a detailed analysis 
of offenders’ personal and social characteristics, as well as their broader 
circumstances indicating whether they fit group norms (Martinovic, 2004). This 
then forms the basis for the sentencing officials to also specifically target the 
particular offending-characteristic behaviours of each individual offender, 
while more broadly minimising the levels of risk associated with re-offending 
and increasing public safety (for more information see Martinovic, 2010). 
 
The following provides a comprehensive list of possible order conditions for 
offenders on HDBS with RF. From this list relevant and specific conditions 
could be selected: 
  
 not committing a further offence/s  
 not tampering with the EM equipment  
 residing in a suitable residence  
 having co-residents’ agreement to serve the sanction 
 remaining confined to their residence for at least 12 hours a day  
 being subjected to electronic monitoring technology  
 receiving home visits  
 engaging in employment 
 performing community work 
 maintaining a log book of daily activities 
 attending treatment/counseling sessions  
 remaining drug and alcohol free 
 prohibition of contact with previous criminal associates  
 paying part of supervision cost, drug testing and victim restitution 
(Champion, 2008; Henderson, 2006; Mair, 2006; Cromwell et al., 2005; 
O’Toole, 2002; Gainey et al., 2000; Ansay & Benveneste, 1999; 
Heggie, 1999; Church & Dunstan, 1997; Whitfield, 1997; Schulz, 1995; 
Rackmill, 1994; Blomberg et al., 1993; Fulton & Stone, 1992; Baumer & 
Mendelsohn, 1990; Maxfield & Baumer, 1990).  
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Similarly, while in the USA and Australia offenders can be sentenced to HDBS 
with RF for periods of up to two years, the most suitable order length should 
be identified during sentencing and imposed on each offender (Bales et al., 
2010a; Martinovic, 2010; Henderson, 2006). Consequently, an extensively 
varied punishment experience on HDBS with RF would be avoided and these 
sanctions would probably have relatively low rates of technical violations 
which would not be regarded as contributing to prison crowding.  
 
6. Provision of support for offenders’ co-residing family members (applies to 
HDBS with RF only) 
 
Research has shown that a myriad of support needs to be provided to co-
residing family members who often perform the untrained and unpaid roles of 
prison officers and social workers as they reside with an offender on HDBS 
with RF (Martinovic, 2007; George, 2006; Aungles, 1995). The following 
recommendations aim to ease the burden and stress that HDBS with RF 
indirectly places upon co-residing family members:  
 
 Before signing the contract agreement for the HDBS with RF to be 
imposed in their living space, co-residing family members should be 
provided with a comprehensive resource kit which provides them with 
clear and realistic explanations about the potential impact of the 
sanction on them and their household relationships (Melbourne Centre 
for Criminological Research and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 
2006; Whitfield, 2001).  
 
 Corrections should provide co-residing family members with a support 
network, set up by professionals and/or volunteers, who could help 
them in dealing with domestic issues and childcare (Doherty, 1995).  
 
 Offenders should be provided with an ongoing option to serve their 
HDBS with RF in state-sponsored accommodation such as 
foster/surrogate homes (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research 
and Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Enos et al., 1999). 
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 The conditions of HDBS with RF should be set up in a way that 
reduces the sanction’s burden on co-residing family members. This 
means that offenders should be allocated more time to perform errands 
outside of home (Melbourne Centre for Criminological Research and 
Evaluation for Corrections Victoria, 2006; Ross & Allard, 2001). 
 
These initiatives would reduce varied and indirect pressures that are placed 
on co-residing family members, providing them with more quality time for re-
building their relationship with the offender as well as for themselves. It would 
also result in co-residing family members being better informed about how to 
deal with complex issues that are associated with residing with an offender on 
HDBS with RF (for more information see Martinovic, 2007).  
 
7. Clear policies and procedures to guide their operation (applies to HDBS 
with GPS only) 
 
Studies have demonstrated that written policy and procedures defining the 
responsibilities and obligations of all staff engaged in HDBS with GPS delivery 
are essential in order for these sanctions to operate successfully. Hence, a 
robust audit system where GPS information is prioritised to specific staff must 
be implemented to ensure that all alerts are handled in accordance with 
predetermined protocols (Drake, 2009). This ensures precise response 
procedures and accountability. 
 
In addition, HDBS with GPS need an effective centralised monitoring centre, 
which can be run either by a private company on behalf of the government or 
by the government itself (Sex Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring 
Taskforce, 2010; Hucklesby, 2009). Florida, the USA’s most experienced user 
of GPS, improved its service delivery substantially by establishing a privately 
run state-wide monitoring centre in 2007 (Bales et al., 2010a). Empirical 
research has indicated that this model has substantially reduced the number 
of ‘false alerts’ and allowed supervising officers to more effectively spend their 
time directly supervising offenders. As a result similar centres are being 
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implemented across the USA (Sex Offender Supervision & GPS Monitoring 
Taskforce, 2010). 
 
Hence, despite the predicted increased trajectory in the application of HDBS, 
the future viability and outcomes of these sanctions in both the USA and 
Australia are dependent on whether policy makers and/or correctional 
administrators, with the support of governments, improve the operation of 
these sanctions by implementing the relevant lessons learnt based on the 
evidence of best practice.  
 
5.4 HDBS in the ‘age of surveillance’ 
 
The application of surveillance technology has rapidly expanded over the last 
decade, defining the 21st century as the ‘age of surveillance’ (Welsh & 
Farrington, 2009; Bigo, 2006; Lyon, 2006). In particular, the surveillance and 
monitoring of the movement of each individual has grown to become a routine 
feature of everyday life. The technology that has permitted this has most 
significantly been closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras and more recently 
drones137 [also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely 
Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs)] (Cavoukian, 2013; Bigo, 2006).  
 
CCTV cameras came to prominence when, through the media, they displayed 
the unfolding of horrific and highly emotional criminal acts. In the UK, in 1993, 
they publicised fuzzy images of the two ten-year old offenders in the 
kidnapping and subsequent murder of toddler James Bulger (Norris, McCahill 
& Wood, 2004). Then they clearly showed the images of suicide bombers in 
the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, the London 
underground in 2005, and Boston marathon in 2013138 (Pilkington, Gabbatt & 
                                                 
137
 Drones can range in size from an aircraft to an insect, which can fly in a pattern searching 
for suspicious activities/persons or hover in a location waiting for an instruction to be sent to it 
remotely (Finn & Wright, 2012; Calo, 2011). They “can be equipped with sophisticated zoom 
cameras, infrared thermal imagers, radar, location-based tracking tools, communication 
interception and listening devices” (Cavoukian, 2013:41). Drones can also be combined with 
facial recognition software and used to continuously track individuals in public as well as 
private places without their knowledge (Cavoukian, 2013; Schlag, 2013; Takahashi, 2012).  
138
 In the UK there has been a high level of public support for the use of CCTV to prevent 
crime in public settings ever since the 1990s. However, in the USA “the public was less 
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Williams, 18.04.13; Welsh & Farrington, 2009; Hier, Walby & Greenberg, 
2006). These events have led to increased application of CCTV cameras in 
the UK and the USA with the purpose of preventing crime more generally, and 
terrorist activities more specifically.139 However, a meta-analysis of 
evaluations of CCTV cameras in the UK found that they “produced a non-
significant and rather small 7% reduction in crime” (Welsh & Farrington, 
2009:20). In the USA, despite the paucity of rigorous evaluations, very similar 
rates of crime reduction to the UK were reported (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi & 
Taylor, 2009). Nevertheless, the use of digital CCTV cameras in public 
spaces has rapidly expanded around the Western world. (For more 
information see Lilly & Nellis, 2013; Norris et al., 2004). 
 
Currently, drones are frequently used in the USA by the military and sparingly 
by a few government departments for law enforcement purposes and border 
protection. However, the issue is that ‘rampant’ domestic use of drones 
seems inevitable. While many more government departments plan to use 
them to ease the complexity of the daily tasks that they undertake, privately 
owned companies and individuals also want to use them for various 
commercial incentives (Thompson, 2013:3; Calo, 2011:30). For example, the 
internet company Google has already acquired a drone with a permit to take 
photographs of public streets in order to maximise the precision of its maps 
(Finn & Wright, 2012). It has been predicted that the domestic application of 
drones will reach 30,000 in the USA by 2020 (Cavoukian, 2013; Schlag, 
2013). In Australia, the use of drones is also emerging as a possible law 
enforcement tactic, but it is still in infancy compared to the USA.  
 
The advancements in technology, particularly drones, can on the one hand be 
useful for policing in monitoring large/suspect crowds, preventing and 
                                                                                                                                           
accepting and more apprehensive of Big Brother implications of the use of video surveillance 
in public places” until the terrorist attacks of 2001 (Welsh & Farrington, 2009:118). 
139
 For example, it has been estimated that there are about 4.2 million CCTV cameras 
throughout the UK, which is equivalent to one for every 14 citizens (Ricci, 08.10.12; Welsh & 
Farrington, 2009; Norris et al., 2004). In practice, this means that an average Briton is caught 
on camera about 300 times per day (Welsh & Farrington, 2009). Unfortunately, there is little 
data on the actual number of CCTV cameras in operation in public spaces in the USA, but it 
is known that annual sales throughout the country have reached 2 million cameras (Norris et 
al., 2004). 
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detecting crime and assisting in incident responses as well as border 
protection matters (Finn & Wright, 2012). However, many academics and civil 
liberties associations around the Western world have warned that the large-
scale civil application of drones which potentially allows indiscriminate 
persistent and continuous monitoring raises a number of pressing social 
concerns (Schlag, 2013; Finn & Wright, 2012; Calo, 2011). These include 
threatening privacy and other civil liberties, and reinforcing the notion of the 
‘fortress society’ and the social exclusion of marginalised populations such as 
vagrants, the homeless, minorities and unemployed young people 
(Cavoukian, 2013; Welsh & Farrington, 2009). In fact, “the surveillance 
devices often target ‘usual subjects,’ including the poor, people of colour and 
anti-government protesters” (Finn & Wright, 2012:188). 
 
In relation specifically to the USA, it has even been argued that the 
surveillance imposed by CCTVs and drones in particular could violate the 
USA’s constitutional protection established in the 4th amendment’s prohibition 
against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ (Welsh & Farrington, 2009). 
This however has not yet been tested in the US Supreme Court.140 In order to 
ensure that the use of the surveillance is appropriate and accountable, 
personal safety and personal privacy in public spaces must be balanced. 
Some USA states have already taken steps to regulate the domestic 
application of drones. For example, police are required to obtain a warrant 
before using drones, explain where and how the data obtained will be filed, 
and/or ascertain how the collection of information obtained will be minimised. 
(For more information see Cavoukian, 2013; Thompson, 2013; Finn & Wright, 
2012).  
   
In addition, in 2013 in the USA, several legislative bills were introduced 
federally, to restrict the domestic use of drones. These include the Preserving 
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, Preserving American 
                                                 
140
 In 2012, in United States v Jones, the entire US Supreme Court held that the 
government’s warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on an individual’s vehicle violated the 
4
th
 amendment against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ (Cavoukian, 2013). It hence 
seems likely that in future similar cases involving surveillance captured by drones will be 
challenged in court. 
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Privacy Act of 2013 and Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013 
(Thompson, 2013). Whether these USA-based legislative initiatives 
adequately protect the rights set out in the 4th amendment of the constitution 
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, other Western countries, which will follow 
the USA’s example and allow drones to become domestically available, need 
to introduce their own strategies so that surveillance in public spaces is 
subject to strict controls, that is, a multifaceted regulatory framework. (For 
more information see Cavoukian 2013; Schlag, 2013; Finn & Wright, 2012).  
  
While there may be legitimate reasons to be concerned about potential large-
scale indiscriminate and persistent surveillance as a result of CCTV cameras, 
and particularly drones, these concerns are not relevant in relation to HDBS. 
This is primarily because HDBS impose surveillance generally on convicted 
offenders. In addition, in contrast with prisons, these sanctions have many 
benefits.141 Primarily, HDBS have fewer ‘social costs’ than prisons as 
offenders are better able to retain valuable conventional and family ties by 
remaining at home.142 They are also kept out of ‘crime schools,’ which is 
particularly significant for first-time and young offenders (Meyer, 2004; Clear & 
Dammer, 2003; Joutsen & Zvekic, 1994). Further, when HDBS offer extensive 
treatment intervention strategies and other services such as employment 
programs they have the potential to lower recidivism. This is because the 
forced discipline, structure, and schedule advances long-term behavioural 
change (Nellis et al., 2013; Alarid et al., 2008; Fulton et al., 1997). It is also 
worth noting that HDBS have broader economic advantages as, if the 
offender is employed, they can continue to pay taxes, there is a reduced 
possibility of government assistance funds being needed for them or their 
family, and they take their own responsibility for medical care (DeMichele & 
Payne, 2009).  
                                                 
141
 It is also worth noting that, providing that retributive principles are satisfied, it is neither 
humanely nor economically beneficial to incarcerate offenders who are not a great risk to 
public safety (Vaughn, 1987). 
142
 This is based on the fact that community based supervision, while subjecting the offender 
to onerous order conditions, often enhances family cohesion. This is because it allows 
families to remain together, whereas “prisons are full of young men who were raised by one 
guardian or by a guardian who was too busy with work or other children to attend to their 
supervision” (Clear & Dammer, 2003:223). 
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
This research has filled the gap in existing research by comparatively and 
historically analysing the development, implementation, operation, and 
outcomes of HDBS in the USA and Australia over the last three decades 
(1982-2013). Furthermore, the methodology employed led to the predicted 
future trajectory of HDBS in both nation states, and the lessons learnt that 
could be implemented to improve the operation of these sanctions. 
 
The evolution of the HDBS frameworks in the USA and Australia was 
described through three ideologically distinguishable phases – early, middle 
and late. The late phase of HDBS was particularly substantial as 
contemporary HDBS with RF as well as HDBS with GPS originated in this 
period. The very positive USA experience with these sanctions appealed to 
policy makers in Australia, and they followed the USA’s lead by initiating their 
own HDBS.   
 
In the USA, HDBS with RF developed mainly on the basis of strict and close 
surveillance and offender monitoring. Unsurprisingly, evaluative research over 
the last three decades has indicated that in operational terms, these sanctions 
have not achieved their anticipated results. Furthermore, they have had 
significant ethical and political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. HDBS 
with GPS on the other hand have been operationally effective as they have 
usually encompassed both strict and close surveillance and monitoring as well 
as treatment-based components. However, studies assessing some of their 
ethical and overall political and stakeholder issues and dilemmas have been 
lacking. 
 
In Australia, unlike in the USA, HDBS with RF as well as HDBS with GPS 
have both entailed strict and close offender monitoring as well as individual 
case management of offenders and appropriate rehabilitative provisions. 
Evaluations have indicated that HDBS with RF have generally achieved their 
anticipated operational results, but have had substantial ethical and political 
and stakeholder issues and dilemmas. HDBS with GPS are still to be 
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examined by researchers in relation to their operational outcomes as well as 
ethical and political and stakeholder issues.  
 
Over the last three decades the number of offenders sentenced to HDBS has 
generally continued to grow across the USA, however it has been stagnating 
in Australia. Despite the varying trends of these sanctions in the two nation 
states examined in this research, the predicted future trajectory in both is 
increased sanction application. This is based on six relevant facts - numerous 
nation states have adopted HDBS as permanent parts of their sentencing 
landscape; throughout the Western world, HDBS mostly operate effectively; a 
few Australian jurisdictions have been examining ways of increasing the use 
of these sanctions; the EM technology is constantly advancing, becoming less 
intrusive and overall cheaper; nation states are developing additional satellite 
navigation systems and establishing the GNSS; and mass incarceration is not 
sustainable. Given this clear trajectory, it is imperative that policy makers 
and/or correctional administrators, with the support of governments, improve 
the operation of these sanctions.  
  
The key practical outcome of this research is that the operation of HDBS can 
become more effective if the specific jurisdictions within the USA and 
Australia implement the lessons leant relevant to their own problematic areas 
of HDBS’ operation. The lessons learnt that have been identified on the basis 
of best practice research over the last three decades in both the USA and 
Australia include: 
 
 Collaborative working and sharing of information with stakeholders 
 Inclusion of rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives 
 Ongoing independent evaluation process that informs continual 
improvement  
 Application of equitable selection criteria and conditions 
 Offender tailored order conditions and length of orders 
 Provision of support for offenders’ co-residing family members  
 Clear policies and procedures to guide their operation.  
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Thus, it remains to be seen whether governments, practitioners and the 
community can move beyond the present infatuation with punitive policies, 
and re-channel resources into improving the operation of HDBS in 
accordance with the findings of best practice research. 
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